Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.     

Divorce Adjustment Groups are Not for All Divorcees

This article provides information about individuals who dropped out of postdivorce-adjustment groups and proposes guidelines to assist counselors in the screening process for divorce groups.     

Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes

The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ' S V s that p '. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, etc., about non-existing things is also rejected. Last, some sentences ascribing abilities and dispositions have the same grammatical form as some senses that ascribe mental states, so that the attempt to paraphrase the latter would obscure the conceptual relations between the two sorts. It follows that mental states are not relations to propositions.     

We are All Bayesian,Everyone is Not a Bayesian

Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims. In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian reasoning. We suggest that acknowledging the potentiality of Bayesian statistics might contribute to clarify and improve comprehension of medical research. Nevertheless, despite Bayesianism may provide a better account for scientific inference with respect to the standard frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason lies in the supposed subjective elements characterizing this perspective. Hence, we discuss this objection presenting the so-called Reference analysis, a formal method which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statistics in order to define priors which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities. Furthermore, according to this method only available data are relevant sources of information, so that it resists the most common criticisms against Bayesianism.

     

The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes

In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expectedconsequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality ofdoing so. Special attention is given to various ways in whichone might attempt to exert some measure of control over whatone believes and the normative status of the beliefs thatresult from the successful execution of such projects. I arguethat the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should thinkabout the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issueshas given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes.     

Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the Philosophy of Action

Propositionalism in the philosophy of action is the popular view that intentional actions are bodily movements caused and rationalized by certain ‘internal’ propositional attitude states that constitute the agent's perspective. I attack propositionalism's background claim that the genuinely mental/cognitive dimension of human action resides solely in some range of ‘internal’ agency‐conferring representational states that causally trigger, and thus are always conceptually disentangle‐able from, bodily activity itself. My opposing claim, following Ryle, Wittgenstein, and others, is that mentality and intentionality can be constitutively implicated in bodily actions themselves, as exercises of a distinctive form of embodied practical understanding. I attempt to show this by attending to the fine‐grained contours of various skillful actions.     

Not All Worlds Are Stages

The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivatedby the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in thecases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claimsthat there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory,it argues that these spacetime worms are not familiar particulars liketables and chairs. Rather, familiar particulars are the instantaneoustemporal slices of worms. In order to explain our intuitions that particulars persist for more than an instant, the stage theory drawson the counterpart theory of modal possibilism, which it is supposedto parallel. In this paper I show how the stage theory presupposes thattime can be divided into instants, which I call the atomistic view oftime. I do this by laying out an alternative theory of the nature oftime, the gunky view, and show that if time is gunky the stage theorycollapses into the worm theory. The deeper problem is that the merepossibility of gunky time would cause the stage theory's parallels topossibilism to break down. I therefore conclude that the stage theoryis committed to the view that time is necessarily atomistic. Finally,in the last section I argue that the fact that the stage theory rulesout a priori the possibility of time being gunky gives us reason toreject it as an account of persistence.     

Knowledge Change as a Function of Mathematics Experience: All Contexts are Not Created Equal

This study investigated how understanding of the equal sign changes as a function of experience in mathematics and variations in context. Students with different levels of mathematics experience (elementary school, seventh grade, undergraduate, and graduate) were randomly assigned to view the equal sign in one of three contexts: (a) equal sign alone, =; (b) typical addition problem, 4 + 8 + 5 + 4 = __; or (c) equivalence problem, 4 + 8 + 5 = 4 + __. Students were asked to define the equal sign and to rate six fictitious students' definitions of the equal sign. Elementary school students interpreted the equal sign as an operational symbol meaning the answer or the total in all contexts, whereas undergraduate and graduate students viewed it as a relational symbol of equivalence in all contexts. Seventh-grade students interpreted the equal sign as an operational symbol in the alone and addition contexts but as a relational symbol of equivalence in the equivalence context. Results highlight that the shape of knowledge change depends on the context in which the knowledge is elicited. Furthermore, the context may influence whether newly emerging ideas are activated.     

凡事都可行

常有信徒来到牧师面前问:这件事我可以去做吗?那件事呢?是的,对生活中一些具体的事例是否可行,有的在圣经中根本查不到针对性的教导。但是,圣经却清楚告诉了我们一些行事为人的重要的原则,就在这些原则指导之下,基督徒"凡事都可行"!     

The Feeling of Not Knowing It All

How do consumers assess their mastery of knowledge they have learned? We explore this question by investigating a common knowledge consumption situation: encountering opportunities for further learning. We argue and show that such opportunities can trigger a feeling‐of‐not‐knowing‐it‐all (FONKIA), which lowers consumers’ confidence in their mastery of the knowledge they already possess. Specifically, listing optional follow‐up readings at the conclusion of a course lowered students’ confidence in their mastery of the course material they had already learned (Study 1). Encountering an optional learning opportunity increased the FONKIA, which mediated the decreased confidence (Studies 2 and 3). We also document two moderators consistent with our conceptualization. First, participants primed with mastery (vs. instrumental) motivation were more negatively impacted when they encountered optional learning opportunities. Second, the more related the optional opportunities were to the target topic, the lower participants’ confidence in their mastery of what they had already learned. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings, such as encouraging further learning or harming teaching evaluations.     

All Roads Do Not Lead to Rome

In commenting on Philip A. Ringstrom's paper I add a few caveats of my own regarding the comparison of intersubjective theories under consideration, then go on to take up some of the topics Ringstrom highlights including projective identification, mutual recognition, reified language, and analytic authority. The strength of Ringstrom's paper is to return us to the type of critical inquiry regarding comparative psychoanalysis that Mitchell made the hallmark of his own intellectual project.     

E-sports are Not Sports

The conclusion of this paper will be that e-sports are not sports. I begin by offering a stipulation and a definition. I stipulate that what I have in mind, when thinking about the concept of sport, is ‘Olympic’ sport. And I define an Olympic Sport as an institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill. The justification for the stipulation lies partly in that it is uncontroversial. Whatever else people might think of as sport, no-one denies that Olympic Sport is sport. This seeks to ensure that those who might wish to dispute my conclusion might stay with the argument at least for as long as possible. Secondly, the justification for the stipulation lies partly in its normativity—I have chosen an Olympic conception of sport just because it seems to me to offer some kind of desirable version of what sport is and might become. Thirdly, I give examples which show how prominent promoters of e-sports agree with my stipulation, as evidenced by their strenuous attempts to comply with it in order to join the Olympic club. The justification for the definition lies in the conceptual analysis offered—an ‘exhibition-analysis’ which clarifies the concept of sport by offering ‘construals’ of the six first-level terms. The conclusion is that e-sports are not sports because they are inadequately ‘human’; they lack direct physicality; they fail to employ decisive whole-body control and whole-body skills, and cannot contribute to the development of the whole human; and because their patterns of creation, production, ownership and promotion place serious constraints on the emergence of the kind of stable and persisting institutions characteristic of sports governance. Competitive computer games do not qualify as sports, no matter what ‘resemblances’ may be claimed. Computer games are just that—games.     

高通量分析技术:流行背后的思考

1　高通量分析技术产生的背景人类基因组计划以前的遗传学偏重于单个基因的研究 ,而人类基因组计划则是把目光投向整个基因组的所有基因 ,从整体水平去考虑基因的存在、基因的结构与功能、基因之间的相互关系等 ,其意义与价值是以前的研究方法所不可比拟的。正是由于这个背景 ,伴随着相关技术的成熟 (光蚀刻、机器手、大规模测序、生物信息学技术 ) ,生物芯片这个集多学科之大成的技术产物应运而生[1] 。芯片技术一经推出 ,立即在世界范围内引起轰动。最初产生的芯片主要是ＤＮＡ芯片、ｃＤＮＡ微阵列 ,随后 ,蛋白质阵列浮出水面 ,并逐渐开…     

Not All Hazards are Created Equal: The Significance of Hazards in Inattentional Blindness for Static Driving Scenes

Explaining how we attend to some objects and not others in real world environments remains a challenge for theories of attention. Driving is an ideal example of this, as it requires a complex synthesis of attentional processing, while still allowing attention to be captured by hazards. In the current study we employed a static inattentional blindness (IB) driving task in which participants were required to make decisions about the content of driving‐related scenarios. In a critical trial, an additional stimulus was added to the driving scenario. All unexpected stimuli were thematically consistent with a normal driving environment but varied in their level of hazard threat. Rates of IB were consistent with the level of hazard threat of the stimuli. The results are discussed in terms of semantic‐based attentional capture in driving, and models of IB.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.