Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined events in sub‐clinical obsessive‐compulsive checkers

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories and imagined experiences were examined in checking‐ and non‐checking‐prone individuals. Participants were asked to retrieve a positive, a negative and a neutral memory, and to imagine a positive, a negative and a neutral experience. They were then requested to evaluate each event according to characteristics such as sensory and contextual details. The main results revealed that non‐checking‐prone participants reported more general vividness than checking‐prone individuals for real events. In addition, non‐checking‐prone individuals reported more visual details and vividness for real than imagined experiences, while no difference between real and imagined events was found for checking‐prone participants. These results suggest that checking‐prone participants report poor memories of real events, which could in turn explain their difficulties distinguishing between real and imagined events. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is the truth in the details? Extended narratives help distinguishing false “memories” from false “reports”

The present study examined the effects of fantasy proneness on false "reports" and false "memories", of existent and non-existent footage of a public event. We predicted that highly fantasy prone individuals would be more likely to stand by their initial claim of having seen a film of the event than low fantasy prone participants when prompted for more details about their experiences. Eighty creative arts students and 80 other students were asked whether they had seen CCTV footage preceding the attack on Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh up to, and including, non-existent footage of the actual moment of the attack. If affirmative, they were probed for extended narratives of what they claimed to have seen. Overall, 64% of participants provided a false "report" by answering yes to the initial question. Of these, 30% provided no explicit details of the attack, and a further 15% retracted their initial answer in their narratives. This left 19% of the sample who appeared to have false "memories" because they provided explicit details of the actual moment of the attack. Women scored higher than men and art students scored higher than other students on fantasy proneness, but there was no effect on levels of false reporting or false "memory". Memories were rated more vivid and clear for existent compared to non-existent aspects of the event. In sum, these data suggest a more complex relationship between memory distortions and fantasy proneness than previously observed.     

Neural processing associated with true and false memory retrieval

We investigated the neural bases for false memory with fMRI by examining neural activity during retrieval processes that yielded true or false memories. We used a reality monitoring paradigm in which participants saw or imagined pictures of concrete objects. (A subsequent misinformation task was also used to increase false memory rates.) At test, fMRI data were collected as the participants determined whether they had seen or had only imagined the object at study. True memories were of seen pictures accurately endorsed as seen, and for false memories were of imagined pictures falsely endorsed as seen. Three distinct patterns of activity were observed: Left frontal and parietal activity was not different for true and for false memories, whereas activity was greater for true than for false memories in occipital visual regions and posterior portions of the parahippocampal gyrus, and activity was greater for false than for true memories in right anterior cingulate gyrus. Possible interpretations are discussed.     

Do you remember the day of your graduation ceremony from junior high school?: A factor structure of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire1

Abstract: Autobiographical memory refers to the recollection of experiences from an individual's life. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988) developed a Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) to examine several qualitative characteristics of autobiographical memories such as sensory, affective, and contextual details. In the present study, we attempted to determine the factor structure of the MCQ. We asked 1183 participants to rate actual autobiographical memories using the MCQ. On the basis of the factor analyses of the MCQ, we obtained eight factors: (a) clarity, (b) retrospective recollection, (c) time information, (d) overall impression, (e) sensory experiences, (f) spatial information, (g) bizarreness, and (h) events before and after. This factor structure is generally consistent with previous studies that have investigated the factor structure of the MCQ.     

The development of metamemory monitoring during retrieval: the case of memory strength and memory absence

This research examined the development of the ability to monitor memory strength and memory absence at retrieval. In two experiments, 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults enacted and imagined enacting a series of bizarre and common actions. Two weeks later, they completed a memory test in which they were asked to determine whether each action had been enacted, had been imagined, or was novel and to provide a confidence judgment for each response. Results showed that participants across age groups successfully monitored differences in strength between memories for enacted actions and memories for imagined actions. However, compared with 10-year-olds and adults, 7-year-olds exhibited deficits in monitoring of differences in memory strength among imagined actions as well as deficits in monitoring memory absence. Results underscore metamemory developments that have important implications for memory accuracy.     

Me Too!: Social modelling influences on early autobiographical memories

To investigate the malleability of early memories, 200 participants were asked to describe their earliest memories. Before doing so, approximately half were exposed to confederates who described very early memories such as their first steps or a second birthday party, while others were asked only to think about their earliest memories for two minutes before beginning writing. Participants who were exposed to confederate very early memories produced memories that were nearly a year younger on average than the memories reported by controls (2.99 years vs. 3.96 years). Additionally, when participants in the memory discussion condition were asked about an early event that a confederate had recounted they were more confident than controls that they could recall the event in their own lives. These results indicate that autobiographical memories for early events are quite susceptible to social influence and that simply hearing the very early memories of others can alter autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

Priming voluntary autobiographical memories: Implications for the organisation of autobiographical memory and voluntary recall processes

The goal of this study was to show that voluntary autobiographical memories could be primed by the prior activation of autobiographical memories. Three experiments demonstrated voluntary memory priming with three different approaches. In Experiment 1 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their elementary school years. In a subsequent memory task primed participants were asked to recall memories from any time period, and they produced significantly more memories from their elementary school years than unprimed participants. In Experiment 2 primed participants were asked to recall what they were doing when they had heard various news events occurring between 1998 and 2005. Subsequently these participants produced significantly more memories from this time period than unprimed participants. In Experiment 3 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their teenage years. Subsequently these participants were able to recall more memories from ages 13–15 than unprimed participants, where both had only 1 second to produce a memory. We argue that the results support the notion that episodic memories can activate one another and that some of them are organised according to lifetime periods. We further argue that the results have implications for the reminiscence bump and voluntary recall of the past.     

Distinguishing true from false memories in forensic contexts: Can phenomenology tell us what is real?

We studied the extent to which subjective ratings of memory phenomenology discriminate true‐ and false‐memory responses, and whether degree of gist‐based processing influences false memory and phenomenology, in a classic forensic task, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS). Participants heard a narrative of a robbery followed by suggestive questions about the content of the narrative. They were asked to rate the items they recognized as studied using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Consistent with studies of word lists, there were phenomenological differences between true and false memory responses: memory phenomenology was richer for true than for false memories, which supports opponent‐process accounts of false memory such as fuzzy‐trace theory. Thus, phenomenology is a useful means for differentiating experienced from non‐experienced events in forensic contexts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory characteristics of recently imagined events and real events experienced previously

In two experiments, we evaluated the memory characteristics of real and imagined events as they changed over time. Memories of real events were richer than memories of imagined events, and memories of recent events were richer than of events from a week earlier. These differences interacted such that memories of real events performed in week 1 were very similar to memories of events that were imagined in week 2. Source monitoring was tested and implications for the repressed or recovered memory debate are considered.     

Imagination equally influences false memories of high and low plausibility events

To examine the effects of event plausibility on people's false beliefs and memories for imagined childhood events, subjects took part in a three‐stage procedure. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events. They also rated their memories of the events. Second, 1 week later, subjects imagined one high, one moderate and one low plausibility event. Third, 1 week later (and 2 weeks after their initial ratings), subjects rated their confidence and memory a second time. Imagining the events made subjects more confident that they were genuine experiences and gave subjects clearer and more complete memories. Plausibility did not affect subjects' confidence but it did affect their memories. Subjects developed clearer and more complete memories for high, followed by moderate, followed by low plausibility events regardless of whether those events were imagined. We use a nested model of plausibility, belief and memory to discuss our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Phenomenal characteristics of autobiographical memories for positive,negative, and neutral events

We investigated memory qualities for positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical events. Participants recalled two personal experiences of each type and then rated their memories on several characteristics (e.g. sensorial and contextual details). They also reported whether they ‘see’ the events in their memories from their own perspective (‘field’ memories) or whether they ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would (‘observer’ memories). Positive memories contained more sensorial (visual, smell, taste) and contextual (location, time) details than both negative and neutral events, whereas negative and neutral memories did not differ on most dimensions. Positive and negative events were more often recollected with a field perspective than neutral events. Finally, participants were classified in four groups according to the repressive coping style framework. Emotional memories of repressors were not less detailed than those of the other groups. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.     

Proust revisited: odours as triggers of aversive memories

According to the Proust phenomenon, olfactory memory triggers are more evocative than other-modality triggers resulting in more emotional and detailed memories. An experimental paradigm was used to investigate this in aversive memories, similar to those experienced by patients with posttraumatic stress disorder. Seventy healthy participants watched an aversive film, while simultaneously being exposed to olfactory, auditory and visual triggers, which were matched on intensity, valence, arousal and salience. During a second session one week later, participants were randomly exposed to one of the three triggers, and asked to think back about the film and to rate the resulting memory. Results revealed that odour-evoked memories of aversive events were more detailed, unpleasant and arousing than memories evoked by auditory, but not visual, triggers.     

How pleasant was your childhood? Beliefs about memory shape inferences from experienced difficulty of recall

People's beliefs about how memory works can affect their inferences from experienced difficulty of recall. Participants were asked to recall either 4 childhood events (experienced as an easy task) or 12 childhood events (experienced as a difficult task). Subsequently, they were led to believe that either pleasant or unpleasant periods of one's life fade from memory. When the recall task was difficult (12 events), participants who believed that memories from unpleasant periods fade away rated their childhood as less happy than participants who believed that memories from pleasant periods fade away. The opposite pattern was observed when the recall task was easy (4 events). This interplay of recall experiences and memory beliefs suggests that the judgmental impact of subjective experiences is shaped by beliefs about their meaning. It also suggests that the recall difficulty in clinical memory work may lead a person to make negative inferences about his or her childhood, provided the person shares the popular belief that memory represses negative information.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

Importing perceived features into false memories

False memories sometimes contain specific details, such as location or colour, about events that never occurred. Based on the source-monitoring framework, we investigated one process by which false memories acquire details: the reactivation and misattribution of feature information from memories of similar perceived events. In Experiments 1A and 1B, when imagined objects were falsely remembered as seen, participants often reported that the objects had appeared in locations where visually or conceptually similar objects, respectively, had actually appeared. Experiment 2 indicated that colour and shape features of seen objects were misattributed to false memories of imagined objects. Experiment 3 showed that perceived details were misattributed to false memories of objects that had not been explicitly imagined. False memories that imported perceived features, compared to those that presumably did not, were subjectively more like memories for perceived events. Thus, perception may be even more pernicious than imagination in contributing to false memories.     

‘Comparisons of traumatic and positive memories in people with and without PTSD profile’

According to most post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) theories, memory mechanisms are involved in its development and maintenance. However, the specific memory characteristics responsible for this disorder are still not well known. In the present study, 210 participants having reported at least one traumatic experience were assigned to a PTSD or to a non‐PTSD symptom profile group. Both groups rated their memories for their most traumatic and intense positive life events. We observed that the traumatic memories of PTSD profile participants were more clear, detailed and judged as significant compared with those of the non‐PTSD profile group. However, participants in the first group acknowledged having more difficulties putting their traumatic memories into words and controlling these remembrances. These differences were absent in their positive memories. Additionally, clear relationships emerged between memory ratings and PTSD symptoms measures. Results are discussed according to fragmentation and superiority views of traumatic memories in PTSD. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interviewing Witnesses: Forced Confabulation and Confirmatory Feedback Increase False Memories

In two experiments, adults who witnessed a videotaped event subsequently engaged in face-to-face interviews during which they were forced to confabulate information about the events they had seen. The interviewer selectively reinforced some of the participants' confabulated responses by providing confirmatory feedback (e.g., "Yes, _is the correct answer") and provided neutral (uninformative) feedback for the remaining confabulated responses (e.g., "O.K. _"). One week later, participants developed false memories for the events they had earlier confabulated knowingly. However, confirmatory feedback increased false memory for forcibly confabulated events, increased confidence in those false memories, and increased the likelihood that participants would freely report the confabulated events 1 to 2 months later. The results illustrate the powerful role of social-motivational factors in promoting the development of false memories.     

Childhood amnesia: on answering questions about very early life events

Twenty five young adults were asked about the events surrounding the birth of a younger sibling which took place when they were under the age of 2 years. Approximately 40% of the participants claimed to have significant memories of the events. The mothers of our participants verified that a majority of their answers were accurate. Comparing the pattern of data with those previously collected (Eacott & Crawley, 1998) suggests that the memories of those who were aged below 2:0 are qualitatively similar to the memories of those who were older at the time of events and dissimilar in type to those who are basing their reports on reconstructions from family knowledge. This finding may be evidence that memories of events that occurred before the age of 2 years are genuine but rare. This conclusion may be useful in assessing theories of childhood amnesia.