Systematic and heuristic processing of majority and minority-endorsed messages: the effects of varying outcome relevance and levels of orientation on attitude and message processing

Two experiments investigated the conditions under which majority and minority sources instigate systematic processing of their messages. Both experiments crossed source status (majority vs. minority) with message quality (strong vs. weak arguments). In each experiment, message elaboration was manipulated by varying either motivational (outcome relevance, Experiment 1) or cognitive (orientating tasks, Experiment 2) factors. The results showed that when either motivational or cognitive factors encouraged low message elaboration, there was heuristic acceptance of the majority position without detailed message processing. When the level of message elaboration was intermediate, there was message processing only for the minority source. Finally, when message elaboration was high, there was message processing for both source conditions. These results show that majority and minority influence is sensitive to motivational and cognitive factors that constrain or enhance message elaboration and that both sources can lead to systematic processing under specific circumstances.     

Mood and multiple source characteristics: mood congruency of source consensus status and source trustworthiness as determinants of message scrutiny

This research deals with the interplay of mood and multiple source characteristics in regard to persuasion processes and attitudes. In a four-factorial experiment, mood (positive vs. negative), source consensus status (majority vs. minority), source trustworthiness (high vs. low), and message strength (strong vs. weak) were manipulated. Results were in line with predictions of a mood-congruent expectancies perspective rather than competing predictions of a mood-as-information perspective. Specifically, individuals in both moods evinced higher message scrutiny given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) source characteristics. That is, across source trustworthiness, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given a minority (majority) versus a majority (minority) source. Furthermore, across source consensus, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given an untrustworthy (trustworthy) versus a trustworthy (untrustworthy) source. Additional analyses revealed that processing effort increased from doubly mood-congruent source combinations (low effort) over mixed-source combinations (intermediate effort) to doubly mood-incongruent combinations (high effort). Implications are discussed.     

Majority versus minority influence: when,not whether,source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro‐ versus counter‐attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self‐interest. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants’ attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion.     

Social influence: The role of originality

Two experiments investigated the role of message originality vs. conventionality in social influence. It was hypothesized that subjects would generate more original proposals when confronted with a minority advocating an original viewpoint than when confronted with a conventional minority proposal or with an original majority proposal. In the first experiment, subjects exposed to an original minority paired with a conventional majority produced a wider range and more original proposals than those exposed either to a conventional minority paired with a conventional majority or to a majority source only. The second experiment further demonstrated that the original message induced creative processing only when attributed to a minority source but not when attributed to a majority source. It also showed that the original minority elicited creative processing mainly when paired with a conventional majority, but not when paired with a majority advocating an equally original position. Findings are interpreted in the frame of Nemeth's (1986) minority influence theory.     

The Effects of Caffeine Consumption on Direct and Indirect Majority and Minority Influence

A study is reported that examines the effect of caffeine consumption on majority and minority influence. In a double blind procedure, 72 participants consumed an orange drink, which either contained caffeine (3.5mg per kilogram of body weight) or did not (placebo). After a 40-minute delay, participants read a counter-attitudinal message (antivoluntary euthanasia) endorsed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both direct (message issue, i.e., voluntary euthanasia) and indirect (message issue-related, i.e., abortion) change was assessed by attitude scales completed before and after exposure to the message. In the placebo condition, the findings replicated the predictions of Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory; namely, majorities leading to compliance (direct influence) and minorities leading to conversion (indirect influence). When participants had consumed caffeine, majorities not only led to more direct influence than in the placebo condition but also to indirect influence. Minorities, by contrast, had no impact on either level of influence. The results suggest that moderate levels of caffeine increase systematic processing of the message but the consequences of this vary for each source. When the source is a majority there was increased indirect influence while for a minority there was decreased indirect influence. The results show the need to understand how contextual factors can affect social influence processes.     

Minority influence and musical preference: Innovation by conversion not coercion

Studied the effect of social categorization, strength of influence and predisposition to influence on social influence concerning musical preferences. One-hundred and sixty-eight French adolescents (age 15 years) were assigned to the eight conditions of a 2 (social categorization: majority/minority) × 2 (strength of influence: strong/weak) × 2 (predisposition to influence: pervious/impervious) design. Influence source was an opinion poll based on pupils from two types of secondary school. Direct influence was exerted from ‘hard-rock’ to ‘new wave’ music; indirect influence was measured by subjects' preferences for hard-rock versus ‘contemporary’ music. Ratings of the source were also elicited. Analyses of variance revealed indirect influence to be significantly greater with the minority than the majority source (p < 0.02). Indirect influence was especially high for subjects with a clear predisposition to influence and when the influence was weak (p < 0.0005). Further analyses confirmed the effect to be due to the actual numbers of subjects influenced. The study thus demonstrated the generalizability of the ‘conversion’ notion (minority influence on an indirect level) from numerical to social minorities.     

Source consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus: the three dimensions of the Kelley ANOVA model in persuasion

Based on a conceptual analysis and existing research, the authors propose that the three source dimensions specified in the ANOVA model play similar roles in persuasion as other source characteristics (e.g., expertise). Two studies test assumptions derived from this approach regarding the effects of different combinations of consistency and consensus (Study 1) and distinctiveness and consensus (Study 2). Combinations resulting in contradictory (vs. similar) inferences regarding message validity should affect judgmental confidence and, consequently, affect message scrutiny. Study 1 shows that, as predicted, high consistency/low consensus and low consistency/high consensus (incongruent combinations) lead to higher desired confidence and more extensive message elaboration than high consistency/high consensus and low consistency/low consensus (congruent combinations). Similarly, Study 2 reveals heightened message scrutiny given incongruent (vs. congruent) combinations of distinctiveness and consensus. Results are discussed with respect to majority/minority influence processes and multiple source characteristics.     

Heuristic processing of distinctiveness information in minority and majority influence

The role of distinctiveness information in majority and minority influence was studied. Students read a message containing strong or weak arguments advocated by a minority or majority source. The communicator's minority (majority) status was said to be either distinctive to the target topic or nondistinctive across topics. Major dependent variables were attitude judgments and cognitive responses. Across conditions, messages were processed systematically, and a majority communicator tended to be more persuasive than a minority communicator. Most importantly, high distinctiveness led to greater influence than low distinctiveness, and this effect was independent of argument strength and minority versus majority status. Theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Studies in social influence VI: Is Lenin orange or red? Imagery and social influence

Two experiments dealing with the effects of a majority or a minority source influence, solely on the recognition of a portrait, let us study the generalization of the influence to a portrait symbolically linked to a colour. According to the theory of conversion, the bringing into play of the validation process of the stimulus when the source is a minority should allow such a generalization cognitive association. When the source is a majority, a social comparison process should lead to compliance about the portrait, without any cognitive investigation of the whole stimulus. In the first experiment, four slides were shown successively using material similar to Luchins' (1945) and progressively drawing the portrait of Lenin, with a red-orange background for each phase. The dependant variables are: (1) the drawing, (2) the colour of the background, (3) the after-image. On the two last slides for which the answer ‘Lenin’ is given by the source, changes towards red (and the complementary colour green), in the absence of the source under the minority influence, and changes towards orange under majority influence in the absence of the source are registered. Moreoever, the most significant changes of the colour judgment are due to the subjects who refuse to answer ‘Lenin’ during the interaction. In the second experiment, only the fourth slide, on which Lenin's portrait completely appears is shown. The subjects submitted to majority influence answer ‘Lenin’ more than the control group does, only in the presence of the source and change their judgment on the colour of the after-image towards the complementary of orange in the absence of the source. When the source is a minority a sinificant effect towards the red and its complementary colour is shown.     

Minority versus majority influence and uncertainty orientation: processing persuasive messages on the basis of situational expectancies

The authors examined the effects of uncertainty orientation on processing persuasive messages from minority sources versus majority sources. The authors gave participants a proattitudinal or counterattitudinal message that either a numerical majority or a numerical minority endorsed and that contained strong or weak arguments. In support of the hypothesis that was related to message scrutiny, uncertainty-oriented individuals engaged in greater message scrutiny when the Source-Position (i.e., minority/majority-pro/con) pairing was imbalanced (in majority-con, minority-pro conditions) than when it was balanced (in majority-pro, minority-con conditions). Certainty-oriented participants showed the opposite pattern, scrutinizing the message more when the situation was balanced than when the situation was imbalanced. Support for the hypothesis that was related to nonsystematic processing was less clear because the majority appeared to have played a greater role in accounting for the aforementioned interaction than did the minority. Additional analyses supported this interpretation. However, in all cases, individual differences in uncertainty orientation moderated strength and direction of information processing.     

The effects of labelling,expert testimony,and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trials

Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ‘psychopath’) or unfamiliar (e.g. ‘paraphilia’) to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well‐being are discussed.     

Perceptions of source efficacy and persuasion: Multiple mechanisms for source effects on attitudes

When communicators are perceived as likely to bring proposed outcomes to fruition, they have source efficacy. Although perceptions of source efficacy are common in persuasion settings, this construct has received little direct research attention. The present research explored how source efficacy may impact persuasion in different ways at different levels of motivation to process messages. Across three experiments, participants encountered message arguments of varying quality from a source manipulated to be relatively efficacious or inefficacious. When motivation to process the message was low, source efficacy served as a peripheral cue (Experiment 1). When motivation was high, efficacy information learned before the message biased processing of ambiguous messages (Experiment 2), but source efficacy learned after the message affected the amount of confidence people had in their message‐related thoughts (Experiment 3). These effects of source efficacy were distinct from effects of perceived source expertise/credibility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Numerical support,information processing and attitude change

In two experiments we studied the prediction that majority support induces stronger convergent processing than minority support for a persuasive message, the more so when recipients are explicitly forced to pay attention to the source's point of view; this in turn affects the amount of attitude change on related issues. Convergent processing is the systematic elaboration on the sources position, but with a stronger focus on verification and justification rather than falsification. In Experiment 1 it was found that numerical support is related to information processing as predicted: The greater the support, the more convergent the processing. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and furthermore confirmed our expectations regarding attitude change: The more convergent processing occurs, the less subjects change their attitude on related issues.     

Advertising effectiveness as a function of numerical support: From majority compliance to minority conversion

In an experiment, we manipulated numerical support (majority versus minority versus absence of support) for advertising commercials and examined its effects at both manifest and latent levels. Results indicated that commercials induce greater manifest influence when receiving majority support and greater latent influence under minority support. In a second study, minority support for commercials was held constant while the modality of comparison between source and target was manipulated (independence versus negative interdependence). Results revealed that latent influence occurs only when the social comparison is independent. These results and their implications for the conception of advertising campaigns are discussed with regard to the conversion theory and the dissociation process.     

Chimpanzees prioritise social information over pre-existing behaviours in a group context but not in dyads

How animal communities arrive at homogeneous behavioural preferences is a central question for studies of cultural evolution. Here, we investigated whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) would relinquish a pre-existing behaviour to adopt an alternative demonstrated by an overwhelming majority of group mates; in other words, whether chimpanzees behave in a conformist manner. In each of five groups of chimpanzees (N?=?37), one individual was trained on one method of opening a two-action puzzle box to obtain food, while the remaining individuals learned the alternative method. Over 5 h of open access to the apparatus in a group context, it was found that 4/5 ‘minority’ individuals explored the majority method and three of these used this new method in the majority of trials. Those that switched did so after observing only a small subset of their group, thereby not matching conventional definitions of conformity. In a further ‘Dyad’ condition, six pairs of chimpanzees were trained on alternative methods and then given access to the task together. Only one of these individuals ever switched method. The number of observations that individuals in the minority and Dyad individuals made of their untrained method was not found to influence whether or not they themselves switched to use it. In a final ‘Asocial’ condition, individuals (N?=?10) did not receive social information and did not deviate from their first-learned method. We argue that these results demonstrate an important influence of social context upon prioritisation of social information over pre-existing methods, which can result in group homogeneity of behaviour.