On luck and chance: Need for control as a mediator of the attribution of events to luck

Chance and luck are regarded as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. Whereas chance is deemed utterly uncontrollable, luck elicits, at the very least, an illusion of control. Hence, need for control might be a decisive factor in determining whether an event is attributed to chance or to luck. More specifically, the greater is a person's need for control, the stronger would be that person's tendency to attribute events to luck. This proposition, along with its implications concerning effects of luck attributions on decision making, were tested in three experiments. The results showed that situational circumstances and personality dispositions that heighten individuals' need for control strengthen their tendency to attribute events and outcomes to luck. The results showed, further, that such attributions can affect the process of decision making.     

Inferring task performance and confidence from displays of eye movements

Eye movements reveal what is at the center of people's attention, which is assumed to coincide with what they are thinking about. Eye-movement displays (visualizations of a person's fixations superimposed onto the stimulus, for example, as dots or circles) might provide useful information for diagnosing that person's performance. However, making inferences about a person's task performance based on eye-movement displays requires substantial interpretation. Using graph-comprehension tasks, we investigated to what extent observers (N = 46) could make accurate inferences about a performer's multiple-choice task performance (i.e., chosen answer), confidence, and competence from displays of that person's eye movements. Observers' accuracy when judging which answer the performer chose was above chance level and was higher for displays reflecting confident performance. Observers were also able to infer performers' confidence from the eye-movement displays; moreover, their own task performance and perceived similarity with the performer affected their judgments of the other's competence.     

Thought and the social community

The anti‐Cartesian idea that a person's thoughts are not entirely fixed by what goes on inside that person's head is suggested by Hegel, and echoed in Wittgenstein and Frege. An argument for the view has recently been given by Tyler Burge. This paper claims that Burge's data can be explained better by an individualistic theory. The basic idea is that an individual's thoughts are specified analogically, in ordinary discourse, through the model of a language. Though the modelling‐sentences are public, the thoughts of the individual are inner states whose identity does not depend upon those sentences. They have content naturally, whether or not content happens to be ascribed to them.     

Empathic forecasting: How do we predict other people's feelings?

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.     

DECEPTIVE LOVE: Kierkegaard on Mystification and Deceiving into the Truth

This article explains and assesses a particular method of loving others that is espoused by Søren Kierkegaard. In his later works, Kierkegaard advocates a kind of deceptive love whereby one mystifies or deceives another person for that other person's own good. The theological underpinning of this mode of love is found in the imitation of Christ. In other words, just as Jesus adopted an incognito, so also Christians should, at times, appear different or lowlier in order to help others by meeting them where they are. After explaining this form of love, I argue that there are considerable reasons not to follow Kierkegaard in his support of outright deception within personal relationships. I conclude with some brief reflections on whether the deceptive structure of Kierkegaard's own authorship is thereby condemned or whether it can be exonerated.     

Do You Have the Heart to Come to Faith? A Look at Anti‐Climacus' Reading of Matthew 11.6

In Practice in Christianity, Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Anti‐Climacus enters into an extended engagement with Matthew 11.6, ‘Blessed is he who takes no offense at me’. In so doing, he comes to an understanding that ‘the possibility of offense’ characterises the ‘crossroad’ at which one either comes to faith in Christ's revelation or rejects it. Such a choice, as he is well aware, cannot be made from a neutral standpoint, and so he is led to propose that it is ‘the thoughts of the heart’ (i.e. a person's disposition) that constitute the pivotal factor in determining whether or not God will reconcile a person into the Christian faith. In this paper, I discuss Anti‐Climacus' interpretation of Mt. 11.6 and consider his reasons for interpreting a person's predisposition as being so decisive for faith.     

Reasonology and False Beliefs

Abstract

Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false belief, an agent performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that ‘intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason’ and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation.     

Developing a Validity Argument Through Abductive Reasoning with an Empirical Demonstration of the Latent Class Analysis

This article proposes and demonstrates a methodology for test score validation through abductive reasoning. It describes how abductive reasoning can be utilized in support of the claims made about test score validity. This methodology is demonstrated with a real data example of the Canadian English Language Proficiency Index Program (CELPIP)-General test—a program assessing functional English language ability in the community and workplace. Abductive reasoning seeks the enabling conditions through which a claim about a person's ability makes sense. For example, it makes sense that a person has strong functional language proficiency if he or she has been regularly using English to write emails and meet with colleagues at work. A valid test score should be affected by the extent of a person's engagement with such enabling conditions. Empirical evidence that warrants such an abductively reasoned claim is illustrated through a latent class analysis within a structural equation model. Evidence is examined to investigate whether certain classes of test takers who have been differentially engaging in the enabling conditions do, in fact, predict a person's CELPIP-General performance. The steps of the methodology are summarized in the closing section.     

Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment

Subject‐sensitive invariantism posits surprising connections between a person's knowledge and features of her environment that are not paradigmatically epistemic features. But which features of a person's environment have this distinctive connection to knowledge? Traditional defenses of subject‐sensitive invariantism emphasize features that matter to the subject of the knowledge‐attribution. Call this pragmatic encroachment. A more radical thesis usually goes ignored: knowledge is sensitive to moral facts, whether or not those moral facts matter to the subject. Call this moral encroachment. This article argues that, insofar as there are good arguments for pragmatic encroachment, there are also good arguments for moral encroachment.     

Reexamining Personal and Situational Factors in Drunk Driving Interventions1

Informal peer intervention may be an effective means of combating drunk driving. Prior research finds that: (a) An experimental model of decision making in bystander intervention situations can successfully be applied to drunk driving intervention (DUI intervention); and (b) various personal and situational factors influence a person's decision to intervene. Our research examines questionnaire data and finds support, with some modification, for application of the experimental model to DUI intervention. We also find that a person's self-evaluation as a competent helper is often the most important factor in determining whether or not they intervene. This suggests that empowering persons as interveners may be an effective means of decreasing drunk driving.     

Reactions to Others' Selfish Actions in the Absence of Tangible Consequences

This research assessed the role of perceived selfishness in people's reactions to events without tangible consequences. In Experiment 1, participants were assigned to complete a boring task by another person who gave a selfish, legitimizing, or exculpatory explanation for the decision. However, half of the participants knew that the other's decision was irrelevant and that they would complete the task regardless of the person's decision. In a second experiment, participants were told that the decision was irrelevant either before or after learning that the other person assigned them to do the boring task. Both studies showed that participants who received a selfish explanation responded strongly to the other person whether or not the person's decision had tangible consequences for them.     

Why Toleration Is Not the Appropriate Response to Dissenting Minorities' Claims

For many liberal democrats toleration has become a sort of pet‐concept, to which appeal is made in the face of a myriad issues related to the treatment of minorities. Against the inflationary use of toleration, whether understood positively as recognition or negatively as forbearance, I argue that toleration may not provide the conceptual and normative tools to understand and address the claims for accommodation raised by at least one kind of significant minority: democratic dissenting minorities. These are individuals, or aggregates of them, who oppose, on principled grounds, the outcomes of the majoritarian decision‐making process. I argue that democratic dissenting minorities' claims are better understood as calls for respect for a person's capacity for self‐legislation. I view respect as the cornerstone of justice in a liberal democracy: all norms resulting in a constraint on a person's conduct should be appropriately justified to her. I argue that the reconciliation of democratic dissenting minorities' claims requires an enhancement of the justificatory strategies of democratic decisions by enhancing in turn citizens' rights to political participation. This should be done both during decision making and after a provision is enacted by also securing space for contestation through such forms of illegal protest as civil disobedience and conscientious objection.     

Majoring in Selection,and Minoring in Socialization: The Role of the College Experience in Goal Change Post–High School

Though it is frequently assumed that the college experience can influence our life goals, this claim has been relatively understudied. The current study examined the role of goals in college major selection, as well as whether major selection influences later goal change. In addition, we examined whether a person's perceptions of his or her peers' goals influence goal setting. Using a sample of German students (M_age = 19 years; n = 3,023 at Wave 1), we assessed life goal levels and changes from high school into college across three assessment occasions. Participants reported their current aspirations, along with the perceived goals of their peers during the college assessments. Using latent growth curve models, findings suggest that life goals upon entering college significantly predict the majors students select. However, this major selection had limited influence on later changes in life goals. Stronger effects were found with respect to perceptions of peers' goals, with students tending to change their goals to better align with their peers. The current study provides evidence that life goals are relatively stable and yet can change during the emerging adult years, in ways that demonstrate the potential influence of the college experience.     

The Chancellor's memory: Rhetoric and truth in discursive remembering

This paper explores the notion of truthfulness in research on conversational remembering. It argues that people's accounts of past events, before they can be taken as data on the cognitive workings of memory, need to be examined as contextualized and variable productions that perform pragmatic and rhetorical work; no one version can be taken as a person's real memory. The consequences of this discourse-analytical perspective are examined first through a critical discussion of Ulric Neisser's study of John Dean's testimony to the senate ‘Watergate’ committee. The issues are then explored more deeply in an analysis of reportings of a different event, in which similar (Watergate-like) issues of memory, truth and accuracy are also at issue. It is argued that: (a) all of Neisser's three kinds of memory–verbatim, gist and ‘repisodic’–involve problematical assumptions concerning their relation to some true, original event; and (b) that Dean's accounts of his memory and his displays of memory should be approached as occasioned productions oriented pragmatically to the assignment of guilt and avoidance of scapegoating. Through an analysis of newspaper reports (based on memory) of a controversial briefing given by the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, we then examine: (a) how discourse about what could be used as an arbiter of truth was rhetorically organized; (b) how participants' versions of events were constructed rhetorically, as parts of arguments; (c) that both sides in the dispute maintained the coherence of their positions by a form of error accounting similar to that used by Neisser with respect to Dean. It is suggested that cognitive psychologists, whether working in the laboratory or attempting to do real-world studies of everyday remembering, need to avoid simplistic notions of true original events, and can do so by addressing the rhetorical organization of participants' memory accounts.     

Distinguishing the subjective and the objective aspects of self‐concept clarity

Since its introduction, self‐concept clarity has been viewed as a construct related to the structure and organization of a person's self‐concept. We argue, however, that self‐concept clarity may best be understood as a combination of subjective, metacognitive beliefs about the self‐concept and objective structure and organization. We consider the unique influences of both objective and subjective clarity and offer some suggestions and novel hypotheses for investigating this proposed distinction.     

Estimating the probability of negative events

How well we are attuned to the statistics of our environment is a fundamental question in understanding human behaviour. It seems particularly important to be able to provide accurate assessments of the probability with which negative events occur so as to guide rational choice of preventative actions. One question that arises here is whether or not our probability estimates for negative events are systematically biased by their severity. In a minimal experimental context involving an unambiguous, objective representation of probability, we found that participants judged a controllable event as more likely to occur when its utility was extremely negative than when it was more neutral. A decision-theoretic explanation based on loss function asymmetries is advanced which supports the claim that probability estimates are not intrinsically biased by utilities.     

Children tell white lies to make others feel better

We investigated whether children tell white lies simply out of politeness or as a means to improve another person's mood. A first experimental phase probed children's individual insight to use white lies when prosocial behaviour was called for. We compared a situation in which a person had expressed sadness about her artwork and the goal was to make her feel better (Sad condition) with a situation in which a person was indifferent about her work (Neutral condition). Children at 7 years and older were more likely to tell a white lie than the blunt truth in the Sad over the Neutral condition. Five‐year‐olds showed only a trend. A second phase tested whether children selectively use white lie telling after it was modelled by an adult. Results showed that after modelling, children from all age groups were significantly more likely to use white lies in the Sad condition than in the Neutral condition. Taken together, these results show that children are attentive to another person's affective states when choosing whether to tell a white lie or tell the truth. We discuss the emergence of this behaviour in relation to children's developing social cognition and the increasing sophistication of children's prosocial behaviour.     

Personal Standards in Professional Relationships: Limiting Interpersonal Harassment

An attempt is made to define abusive actions by offering criteria against which the behaviour of individuals can be considered. These criteria are based on whether the behaviour is avoidable, the appraisal of an objective observer and the impact of the behaviour on the ‘psychological contract’ between employer and employee. Particular abusive actions, identified by these criteria, are described and are contrasted with what are termed ‘reasonable expectations’ of one person's behaviour towards another. It is argued that only by translating these expectations into personal commitments, against which one's own behaviour can be compared, will interpersonal harassment be limited. It is also proposed that the size of consensus about what constitutes abusive actions measures the integrity of an organization's culture. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who can spot a potential problem gambler? Testing “it takes one to know one” and acquaintanceship effects in a university student population

How easy is it for individuals to detect low to moderate levels of problem gambling tendencies in others? Are individuals who have problem gambling tendencies themselves, or are close relationship partners, more accurate judges? We examine these questions in two studies involving a total of 336 interacting dyads drawn largely from a university student population. In Study 1 all pairs were strangers, whereas in Study 2 approximately half of the pairs were close. After the “judge” observed the “target” complete a gambling task, the dyad had a face-to-face discussion, with topics including favorite pastimes and personal weaknesses. Judges estimated the target's problem gambling tendencies, and both judges and targets self-reported their own gambling tendencies. There was evidence of modest, albeit somewhat inconsistent, accuracy in individuals’ judgments of the other person's problem gambling tendencies, but no “it takes one to know one” or acquaintanceship effects were apparent. Results also indicated that judges evidenced a projection bias, whereby they saw the target as similar to themselves, especially within close pairs. These results reveal that even after minimal interaction with a stranger individuals can be able to judge the person's gambling tendencies with some accuracy. At the same time, our findings indicating that close others and those with problem gambling tendencies themselves are not more or less tuned in to the early signs of a problem than anyone else suggest that it would be inappropriate to be especially convinced by—or skeptical of—these individuals’ judgments.     

Prediction of environmental change: Wish-fulfillment revisited

Two experiments are reported which examine the relationship between a person's estimate of the likelihood of a future change in his environment and his assessment of its desirability. The first experiment showed a general tendency for probability and desirability ratings to be positively correlated. This correlation was higher when the desirability of a predicted change was seen, on average, as matching its probability of occurrence, e.g., if the change was seen as both desirable and probable rather than probable but undesirable. In the second experiment subjects wrote an essay arguing either that a predicted change was probable, improbable, desirable or undesirable. Arguing for desirability of the predicted change had as much effect on subjects' probability estimates as arguing for its probability; similarly, arguing for its probability had as much effect on desirability ratings as arguing for its desirability. These results are taken to imply that individuals may seek to achieve greater cognitive simplicity by treating probability and desirability as a single dimension.