Action,movement, and neurophysiology

Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent‐causation and event‐causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co‐existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa.     

Nature,corruption, and freedom: Stoic ethics in Kant's Religion

Kant's account of “the radical evil in human nature” in the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone is typically interpreted as a reworking of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. But Kant does not talk about Augustine explicitly there, and if he is rehabilitating the doctrine of original sin, the result is not obviously Augustinian. Instead, Kant talks about Stoic ethics in a pair of passages on either end of his account of radical evil and leaves other clues that his argument is a reworking of an old Stoic problem. “Radical evil” refers to the idea that our moral condition is—by default and yet by our own deed—bad or corrupt; and that this corruption is the root (radix) of human badness in all its variety, ubiquity, and sheer ordinariness. Kant takes as his premise a version of the Stoic idea that nature gives us “uncorrupted starting points” (Diogenes Laertius 7.89). What sense can be made of the origin of human badness, given such a premise? Kant's account of radical evil is an answer to this old Stoic problem, which requires a conception of freedom that is not available in his Stoic sources.     

An Eastern Heritage in a Western Rite: A Study of Source and Method for Archbishop Cranmer's Inclusion of ‘A Prayer of Chrysostome‘ in the English Litany of 1544

Abstract

Representing the first officially authorized printing of an English-language text, Thomas Cranmer's Litany (1544)—a direct precursor of the 1549 Book of Common Prayer—is an important historical document. It also has linguistic significance, since ‘in setting forth certain godly prayers and suffrages in our native English tongue', Cranmer went beyond simple translation of the Latin. Among his innovations was the insertion of ‘A Prayer of Chrysostome', taken directly from an Eastern Orthodox source. The English rendering of the prayer has long been considered a masterly translation. However, while beautifully executed, Cranmer's version (compared with earlier Greek and Latin texts) is peculiar at points and raises theological questions. This study reviews and critiques scholarship on the matter while offering new insights into Cranmer's connections to Christian Orthodox thought and practice.     

Absolute Positing,the Frege Anticipation Thesis,and Kant's Definitions of Judgment

Abstract: Kant follows a substantial tradition by defining judgment so that it must involve a relation of concepts, which raises the question of why he thinks that single‐term existential judgments should still qualify as judgments. There is a ready explanation if Kant is somehow anticipating a Fregean second‐order account of existence, an interpretation that is already widely held for separate reasons. This paper examines Kant's early (1763) critique of Wolffian accounts of existence, finding that it provides the key idea in his mature model of existential judgment, which is in fact sharply opposed to the Fregean strategy. By relating this to Kant's theory of judgment in general—in particular, to his claim for an isomorphism between the assertoric function of judgment and the category of existence—a preliminary case is made that absolute positing, far from being a marginal special case, accomplishes the primary function of judgment. This argument shows the importance of distinguishing between contexts in which Kant is treating judgment as a vehicle for inference (e.g. pure general logic) and contexts in which he is treating it, more robustly, as the cognition of an object.     

Reply to Review Essay

I thank John Kerr for his long and detailed review of my Freud biography and note our major points of agreement and disagreement. Kerr and I both see the wisdom of placing Freud in the context of the major relationships of his life as opposed to viewing him as a self-created hero. We also note the value of using contemporary ideas and research, much of them based on the foundation that Freud erected, to loop back and understand him in new ways. I believe, more strongly than Kerr, that Freud's early traumatic losses, and the way he came to terms with them—or did not—in his self-analysis, had long-lasting effects on his character, relationships, and psychoanalytic theory and therapy. Several minor points of agreement and disagreement are also discussed.     

Médicaments princeps vs. marché concurrentiel. De la motivation obligatoire,au contrôle des motifs médicaux ?

Physicians are free to prescribe the drugs they consider the best for their patients, and simultaneously required to seek healthcare’ cost-effectiveness — especially after patents expiry. While the physician choice of a given molecule is indisputable, French pharmacists gradually gained a large power to choose the brands on chemicals’ and biologics’ competitive markets. In May 2018, the highest judicial Court decided the physician must expressly motivate his exclusive choice of a given brand, and can not simply refuse the brand’ substitution by pharmacists. This unprecedented requirement is extrapolable to all substitutable drugs in France (registered generics and biosimilars). It raises the possible examination of medical choice motives — but in our opinion, it finishes, rather than it opens the arms race between prescribers and mandatory health insurers in France.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

Stand-Up Comedy,Authenticity, and Assertion

Stand-up comedy is often viewed in two contrary ways. In one view, comedians are hailed as providing genuine social insight and telling truths. In the other, comedians are seen as merely trying to entertain and not to be taken seriously. This tension raises a foundational question for the aesthetics of stand-up: Do stand-up comedians perform genuine assertions in their performances? This article considers this question in the light of several theories of assertion. We conclude that comedians on stage do not count as making genuine assertions—rather, much like actors on a stage, they merely pretend to perform speech acts. However, due to norms of authenticity that govern stand-up comedy, performers can nonetheless succeed in conveying genuine insights. Thus, our account accommodates both the seemingly incompatible aspects of our ordinary appreciation of stand-up comedy and points toward deeper philosophical understanding of stand-up comedy as a unique art form.     

Similarity and attribution in concept combination: Reply to Wisniewski

Wisniewski raises several important points in his comment on our study of the (non)role of similarity in concept combination. He notes that feature diagnosticity is an important factor in property attribution. He also points out that relational interpretations of combined concepts depend on thematic role plausibility, not constituent similarity. We agree with both of these points. Wisniewski further identifies a possible item artifact that might account for our results. However, reexamination of those items fails to support this hypothesis. Wisniewski also claims that an alignment process is necessary to specify how an attributed property should be instantiated in the combined concept. We argue instead that postcomprehension elaboration processes can account for specific property instantiations. Finally, we suggest that the perceived similarity between the constituents of a combined concept is an outcome of the comprehension process, not a prior condition for, or an integral part of, that process.     

A Plea for a Measure of Cautious Optimism: Reply to Book Reviews

The author responds to four reviews of his book Impossible Training. He describes how the book came into being, discusses his attitude to the Freud—Ferenczi and Klein—Winnicott debates, and raises the dangers of rigid views as to what is truly psychoanalytic and what is truly relational. The global scene of psychoanalytic training today is discussed. It is suggested that critiques do have an impact on psychoanalytic education and that in spite of its flaws and inner contradictions, this education raised generations of sophisticated thinkers and sensitive clinicians.     

Critique of modernity in the philosophy of Nishitani Keiji

This article analyses Nishitani Keiji’s persistent critique of modernity and how it intertwines with other issues—such as nihilism, science and religion—in his philosophy. While Nishitani gained some notoriety for his views on overcoming modernity during WWII, this article will look at his relationship with the issue more in the scope of his whole philosophical career. Pulling together various strands that weave through Nishitani’s treatment of modernity, its relation to nihilism and his views for overcoming both, we find that it motivates his themes of Heideggerian critique of technology and Nietzschean redemption of tradition that combine with a reverse-Hegelian search for an originary ground that is grasped via existential realisation revealed through religious praxis. However, Nishitani’s approach raises some problematic questions on the social level due to the way it conceptualises modernity through a Nietzschean lens that leaves little room for modernity as a social and political phenomenon.     

On Post-Heideggerean Difference: Derrida and Deleuze

This paper takes up the Heideggerean question of difference. I argue that while Heidegger raises this question, his response to the question remains ambiguous and that this ambiguity pivots around the question of time. The bulk of the paper then looks at how Derrida and Deleuze respectively attempt to advance beyond Heidegger's ambiguity regarding the questions of difference and time. Derrida is able to demonstrate the manner in which time—as delay—is constitutive of any attempt to think difference. I argue, however, that his innovative articulation of “différance” maintains an extrinsic rather than intrinsic relation to difference in-itself. To achieve an intrinsic relation, it is necessary to turn to the work of Deleuze, particularly to his discussion of “nonsense” and “singularity.”     

The Prodigal and his Brother: Impartiality and the Equal Consideration of Interests

At the heart of Peter Singer’s utilitarianism is the impartial weighing of the interests of those affected by our actions. Singer calls this the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. This paper argues that Singer’s Principle does not accord with our moral intuitions and the logic of our moral thinking. It discusses the Principle in the context of the parable of the Prodigal Son and his Brother – a parable that raises the issue of impartiality in a particularly challenging way. What the parable shows is, first, that our moral thinking often turns on judgements of fairness that are prior to any impartial weighing of interests; and, second, that impartial fairness itself is sometimes transcended by compassionate love. Both of these points have important implications for bioethics.     

Avoid violence,rioting, and outrage; approach celebration,delight, and strength: Using large text corpora to compute valence,arousal, and the basic emotions

Ever since Aristotle discussed the issue in Book II of his Rhetoric, humans have attempted to identify a set of “basic emotion labels”. In this paper we propose an algorithmic method for evaluating sets of basic emotion labels that relies upon computed co-occurrence distances between words in a 12.7-billion-word corpus of unselected text from USENET discussion groups. Our method uses the relationship between human arousal and valence ratings collected for a large list of words, and the co-occurrence similarity between each word and emotion labels. We assess how well the words in each of 12 emotion label sets—proposed by various researchers over the past 118 years—predict the arousal and valence ratings on a test and validation dataset, each consisting of over 5970 items. We also assess how well these emotion labels predict lexical decision residuals (LDRTs), after co-varying out the effects attributable to basic lexical predictors. We then demonstrate a generalization of our method to determine the most predictive “basic” emotion labels from among all of the putative models of basic emotion that we considered. As well as contributing empirical data towards the development of a more rigorous definition of basic emotions, our method makes it possible to derive principled computational estimates of emotionality—specifically, of arousal and valence—for all words in the language.     

Stereotypes,Prejudice, and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind1

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit (roughly, nonconscious or involuntary). This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative (anti‐Humean) framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect‐laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co‐activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic‐affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination.     

ACTIONS AS THE TIES THAT BIND Love, Praxis, and Community in the Thought of Gustavo Gutiérrez

Gustavo Gutiérrez develops an account of human action or praxis that I—borrowing the language of Charles Taylor—label expressivist. Human action must be understood as expressing an underlying potential or impulse that only becomes real through expression in action. Gutiérrez's expressivism is fundamental to his view of the relationship between faith and love, his notion of three dimensions of liberation/salvation, and his understanding of the fundamental option as a yes or no in response to grace. Moreover, it supports a valuable approach to community as defined more by shared actions than a shared tradition or narrative. The final section briefly indicates two limitations to Gutiérrez's vision—especially with regard to the conception of community—and suggests the direction that a constructive appropriation of his thought might take.     

Medicine as Enlightenment cure: Benedetto Frizzi, physician to eighteenth-century Italian Jewish society

This article examines modern Jewish doctors and the Enlightenment in action through its analysis of Dr. Benedetto Frizzi (1756–1844) as an Enlightenment Jewish physician and public intellectual in Habsburg northern Italy. Frizzi sought to spread the new Enlightenment gospel of polizia medica—public health policy or social medicine—that he learned from its pioneering exponent, Dr. Johann Peter Frank, his teacher at the University of Pavia. Frizzi dispensed Enlightenment medicine for the benefit of the state and society in general, as well as Jewish society and culture in particular, for he saw himself as both public health crusader and doctor-priest ministering to his own people. His commitments to Enlightenment science and rationalism led him to criticize Jewish social practices harshly even as he creatively reinterpreted classic Jewish texts; accordingly, Frizzi was regarded in some quarters as subversive, while in others as an apologetic defender of Jews and Judaism. Situating Frizzi within the traditions of Jewish as well as European Enlightenment physicians, this article raises broader questions about religion and secularism in the modern discourse of medicalized Judaism.