Nonword repetition in lexical decision: Support for two opposing processes

We tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the prior presentation of nonwords in lexical decision is the net result of two opposing processes: (1) a relatively fast inhibitory process based on global familiarity; and (2) a relatively slow facilitatory process based on the retrieval of specific episodic information. In three studies, we manipulated speed-stress to influence the balance between the two processes. Experiment 1 showed item-specific improvement for repeated nonwords in a standard “respond-when-ready” lexical decision task. Experiment 2 used a 400-ms deadline procedure and showed performance for nonwords to be unaffected by up to four prior presentations. In Experiment 3 we used a signal-to-respond procedure with variable time intervals and found negative repetition priming for repeated nonwords. These results can be accounted for by dual-process models of lexical decision (e.g., Balota & Chumbley, 1984; Balota & Spieler, 1999).     

Rapid naming is affected by association but not by syntax

Three experiments are reported that focused on the grammatical and associative relationship between a single-word context and a to-be-named target in the Serbo-Croatian language. Unlike in studies using the English language, word class need not be violated in order to obtain grammatical incongruency: all word pairs, therefore, can be semantically plausible. Experiment 1 contrasted naming with lexical decision using associative and grammatical priming, a replication of Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, and Langer’s (1984) study. With associative priming, both lexical decision and naming were facilitated significantly, but with grammatical priming, only lexical decision was affected significantly. Heeding observations of West and Stanovich (1986), in Experiment 2 we used stimuli known to produce a robust grammatical congruency effect on lexical decision (130 msec) and a procedure designed to slow naming latencies. Again, no grammatical congruency effect for naming was obtained. Finally, because Experiment 1, which used a row of Xs as the neutral context, showed an associative priming effect on naming pseudowords, Experiment 3 used a neutral context that was linguistic. An associative priming effect was found for words but not for pseudowords. Results were discussed in terms of pre- and postlexical loci of contextual effects.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The transience of constructed preferences

A large body of research suggests that preferences are constructed rather than merely accessed in the course of making decisions. The current research examines the stability of constructed preferences over time. Preferences for various factors relevant to a job choice were measured prior to presentation of the job‐choice task, at the point of decision, and again following a delay. It was found that relative to baseline pre‐decision levels, preferences shifted to provide stronger support for the emerging decision. Preference changes proved to be transient, receding to baseline after 1 week (Experiment 1), and even within 15 minutes (Experiment 2). These findings, which can be interpreted in terms of decision‐making by constraint satisfaction, suggest that preferences are constructed to serve the decision at hand, without constraining the decision maker in future decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Latent semantic analysis cosines as a cognitive similarity measure: Evidence from priming studies

In distributional semantics models (DSMs) such as latent semantic analysis (LSA), words are represented as vectors in a high-dimensional vector space. This allows for computing word similarities as the cosine of the angle between two such vectors. In two experiments, we investigated whether LSA cosine similarities predict priming effects, in that higher cosine similarities are associated with shorter reaction times (RTs). Critically, we applied a pseudo-random procedure in generating the item material to ensure that we directly manipulated LSA cosines as an independent variable. We employed two lexical priming experiments with lexical decision tasks (LDTs). In Experiment 1 we presented participants with 200 different prime words, each paired with one unique target. We found a significant effect of cosine similarities on RTs. The same was true for Experiment 2, where we reversed the prime-target order (primes of Experiment 1 were targets in Experiment 2, and vice versa). The results of these experiments confirm that LSA cosine similarities can predict priming effects, supporting the view that they are psychologically relevant. The present study thereby provides evidence for qualifying LSA cosine similarities not only as a linguistic measure, but also as a cognitive similarity measure. However, it is also shown that other DSMs can outperform LSA as a predictor of priming effects.     

情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响

两个实验考察了情绪和任务框架对自我和预期他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果表明:(1)获益框架下,悲伤情绪比愉悦情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,自我决策比预期他人决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(2)损失框架下,愉悦情绪比悲伤情绪诱发更强的风险偏好,预期他人决策比自我决策表现出更强的风险偏好;(3)在自我决策时,愉悦情绪在损失框架下比在获益框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好,悲伤情绪在获益框架下比在损失框架下诱发了更强的风险偏好;在预期他人决策时,无论是愉悦情绪还是悲伤情绪,损失框架均比获益框架诱发了更强的风险偏好。     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptual and response components in repetition priming of spoken words and pseudowords

Two experiments explored repetition priming effects for spoken words and pseudowords in order to investigate abstractionist and episodic accounts of spoken word recognition and repetition priming. In Experiment 1, lexical decisions were made on spoken words and pseudowords with half of the items presented twice (～12 intervening items). Half of all repetitions were spoken in a “different voice” from the first presentations. Experiment 2 used the same procedure but with stimuli embedded in noise to slow responses. Results showed greater priming for words than for pseudowords and no effect of voice change in both normal and effortful processing conditions. Additional analyses showed that for slower participants, priming is more equivalent for words and pseudowords, suggesting episodic stimulus–response associations that suppress familiarity-based mechanisms that ordinarily enhance word priming. By relating behavioural priming to the time-course of pseudoword identification we showed that under normal listening conditions (Experiment 1) priming reflects facilitation of both perceptual and decision components, whereas in effortful listening conditions (Experiment 2) priming effects primarily reflect enhanced decision/response generation processes. Both stimulus–response associations and enhanced processing of sensory input seem to be voice independent, providing novel evidence concerning the degree of perceptual abstraction in the recognition of spoken words and pseudowords.     

Automatic effects of deviancy cues on creative cognition

Three experiments test the existence of an automatic deviancy‐creativity link. Using a lexical decision task, in Experiment 1 we found a semantic link between deviancy and creativity words in that decision times for creativity‐related words were enhanced after subliminal deviancy priming. In Experiment 2, participants were led to think about either a punk or an engineer and afterwards were administered creative insight and analytical reasoning problems. According to a pretest, punks and engineers were judged as differing in uniqueness but not in creativity. Participants given ‘punk’ priming solved more creative insight problems and fewer analytical reasoning problems than those given ‘engineer’ priming. In Experiment 3, participants were incidentally exposed to abstract artworks symbolically expressing either the concept of conformity or deviancy and were subsequently asked to solve a creative generation task. Exposure to the artwork representing deviancy led to generation of more creative solutions than exposure to that representing conformity. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

语言理解转换中非目标语言影响目标语言的时间进程

运用跨语言即时启动和延时启动范式,要求被试完成生物属性的语义判断任务,研究语言理解转换中非目标语言影响目标语言语义理解的时间进程。实验1非目标语言为英文,目标语言为中文,结果表明,无论是即时启动(t = -0.423, p = 0.676),还是延时启动(t = -0.82, p = 0.419),语义相关组与语义无关组都无显著差异。实验2非目标语言为中文,目标语言为英文,结果表明,在即时启动条件下,语义相关组显著快于语义无关组(t = -3.05, p = 0.006),但延时条件下语义相关组与语义无关组无显著差异(t = -0.63, p = 0.536)。综合两个实验结果表明,晚期熟练双语者在双语语言理解转换过程中语义的即时启动影响存在不对称性,语义相关的非目标语言中文对目标语言英文语义理解起促进作用;但是语义启动效应没有得到延时体现。     

Automatic affective processing

Abstract

Semantic and emotional priming below objective detection threshold was investigated using a binocular pattern masking procedure. In the first experiment lexical decision time to emotionally aversive target stimuli was significantly faciliated by the presentation of emotionally aversive primes and primes semantically related to the target, thus replicating the emotional and semantic priming effects found supraliminally in Hill and Kemp-Wheeler (1989). In Experiment 2, a significant semantic priming effect was again found but the subliminal emotional priming effect of Experiment 1 did not replicate.     

Priming for new associations in animacy decision: Evidence for context dependency

In four experiments we investigated the context-dependent nature of semantic memory by looking at priming effects in animacy decision for newly formed associations. The first experiment investigated whether the priming effect depended on the nature of the prior relation between the word pairs. The results showed no such effect, replicating earlier findings. Experiments 2, 3, and 4 investigated the role of context overlap between study and test. In Experiment 2 priming for new associations was found only for word pairs that had been presented in the animacy decision task during study. Experiment 3 showed that in order to obtain priming effects for new associations these associations have to be studied in a study task that is aimed at unitized processing of the word pair at a semantic level. Experiment 4 showed that processing the pairs as separate words at an orthographic level cancelled the priming effect. The results are explained by assuming that priming results from the overlap of features that are activated during both study and test.     

Who Takes the Lead in Risky Decision Making? Effects of Group Members' Risk Preferences and Prototypicality

In two experiments, we studied the effects of (a) the extent to which group members are risk seeking in comparison with others in the group and (b) group member prototypicality (the extent to which individuals hold group-typical risk preferences) on the likelihood that group members will take the lead in risky decision making. Participants were led to believe that they engaged in a four-person group discussion and received bogus feedback about their own risk preferences, the risk preferences of the other group members, and the risk preferences of their group as a whole. In Experiment 2, we also manipulated the framing of the decision problem (gain vs. loss frame). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) more risk seeking members are more likely to take the lead and (b) prototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is ambiguous (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are incongruent), whereas nonprototypical members are more likely to take the lead when the problem facing the group is relatively clear-cut (i.e., when group risk preferences and decision framing are congruent).     

Semantic priming and identification of near threshold primes in a lexical decision task

Three experiments examined both the impact of semantic analysis of 50-msec, masked visual primes on a target response and the impact of semantic analysis of the target on a prime response. The first two experiments used a prime-target interval of 1000 msec. In Experiment 1, subjects reported the identity of each prime: (a) after a lexical decision about the target, (b) both before and after a lexical decision, or (c) after a target detection response. Prime report after both types of target response showed retroactive priming in which report was facilitated by related targets and inhibited by unrelated targets. Analyses of lexical decision latency and accuracy conditionalized on prime report showed that semantic priming was restricted to reported related primes. In Experiment 2, subjects made no overt response to the primes. Priming was conditionalized on recognition of the primes on a subsequent test. The pattern was the same as Experiment 1: There was priming only for recognized primes; recognition memory showed a pattern consistent with retroactive priming. Experiment 3 also conditionalized priming on recognition performance but used a prime-target interval of only 250 msec. Again, semantic priming was found only for recognized primes, and recognition memory revealed retroactive priming. Retroactive priming indicates an interdependency between prime and target processing that needs to be incorporated into models of semantic priming.     

Being responsible versus acting responsibly: Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments

In three experimental studies, with managers and students as participants, we explore in this paper the relation between two kinds of responsibility judgments, called Responsibility 1 (R1) and Responsibility 2 (R2). Decision makers can be viewed as being more or less responsible for their choice and its consequences (R1). Their actions can also be evaluated, from a normative point of view, as instances of more or less responsible behavior (R2). Experiment 1 showed that managers who depart from the default or “normal” course of action, by choosing a new (versus familiar) alternative, changing (versus sticking to) an initial decision, or going against (versus following) the advice of a management team, are rated as more responsible (R1) for the outcomes of their decision. At the same time, they are perceived to act in a less responsible way (R2). Experiment 2 compared decision makers choosing between more or less risky options. High risk takers were held more responsible (R1) for their choice and for its consequences, but were again viewed as behaving in a less responsible way (R2) than low risk takers. In Experiment 3, participants judged decision makers who followed or opposed others' advice by choosing either a high or a low risk option. Opposing others' advice led to higher R1 and lower R2 scores, especially when choosing the high risk option, moderated by outcome (successful decisions appearing more responsible than those that went wrong). Thus R1 and R2 judgments should be distinguished as having different and sometimes even opposite determinants.     

Self‐framing of risky choice

Previous research on framing effects has largely focused on how choice information framed by external sources influences the response of a decision maker. This research examined how decision makers framed choice options and how the hedonic tone of self‐framing influenced their risk preference. By using pie charts and a complementary sentence‐completion task in Experiment 1, participants were able to interpret and frame the expected choice outcomes themselves before making a choice between a sure option and a gamble in either a life–death or a monetary problem. Each of these self‐frames (phrases) was then rated by a group of independent judges in terms of its hedonic tone. The hedonic tone of self‐frames was mostly positive and was more positive in the life–death than the monetary context, suggesting a motivational function of self‐framing. However, positive outcomes were still more likely to be framed positively than negative outcomes. In Experiment 2, choice outcomes were depicted with a whole‐pie chart instead of a pie slice in order to emphasize positive and negative outcomes equally. The results showed that the hedonic tone of self‐framing was still largely positive and more positive in the life domain than the monetary domain. However, compared to Experiment 1, the risk preference in the life–death domain was reversed, showing an outcome salience effect: when the pie‐slice chart emphasized only survival outcomes, participants were more risk taking under positive hedonic frames whereas when the whole‐pie chart depicted both survival and mortality outcomes, they became risk averse under positive frames. In sum, self‐framing reflected a positive bias in encoding risk information and affected the risk preference of the decision maker. Like the tone of voice used in communication, the hedonic tone of self‐framing, either positive or negative, can affect risk perception of a choice problem. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Repetition priming and face processing: Priming occurs within the system that responds to the identity of a face

A familiar stimulus that has recently been recognized will be recognized a second time more quickly and more accurately than if it had not been primed by the earlier encounter. This is the phenomenon of “repetition priming”. Four experiments on repetition priming of face recognition suggest that repetition priming is a consequence of changes within the system that responds to the familiarity of a stimulus. In Experiment 1, classifying familiar faces by occupation facilitated subsequent responses to the same faces in a familiarity decision task (Is this face familiar or unfamiliar?) but not in an expression decision task (Is this face smiling or unsmiling?) or a sex decision task (Is this face male or female?). In Experiment 2, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or an expression judgment had been required when the faces were first encountered. Expression decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 3, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or a sex judgment had been asked for when the faces were first encountered. Sex decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 4, familiarity decisions continued to show repetition priming when a brief presentation time with encouragement to respond while the face was displayed reduced response latencies to speeds comparable to those for sex and expression judgments in Experiments 1 to 3. The results are problematic for theories that propose that repetition priming is mediated by episodic records of previous acts of stimulus encoding.     

Is Milkman a superhero like Batman? Constituent morphological priming in compound words

In the present study, we examined morphological decomposition of Basque compound words in a series of masked priming lexical decision experiments. In Experiment 1, Basque compound words could be briefly preceded by other compounds that shared either the first or second constituent, or by unrelated noncompound words. Results showed a significant priming effect for words that shared a constituent, independently of its position. In Experiment 2, compound words were preceded by other compound words that shared one of their constituents, but in a different lexeme position (e.g., the first constituent of the compound that acted as a prime was the second constituent of the compound that acted as a target). Results again showed a constituent priming effect (i.e., location in the string is not necessary for priming to occur). In Experiment 3, we demonstrated that these priming effects were not due to mere form overlap: pairs of noncompound words that shared either the beginning or the ending chunk did not produce a priming effect. Taken together, the present results converge with previous data on orthographic/morphological priming and provide evidence favouring early morphological decomposition.     

Extreme malleability of preferences: Absolute preference sign changes under uncertainty

Malleability of preferences is a central tenet of behavioral decision theory. How malleable preferences really are, however, is a topic of debate. Do preference reversals imply preference construction? We argue that to claim preferences are construed, a demonstration of more extreme preference malleability than simple preference reversals is required: absolute preference sign changes within participants. If respondents value a prospect positively in 1 condition but negatively in a different condition, preferences cannot be considered stable. Such absolute preference sign changes are possible under uncertainty. In 2 incentive‐compatible experiments, we found participants were willing to pay to take part in a gamble and also demanded to be compensated to take part in a subsequent gamble with identical outcomes and probabilities. Such absolute preference sign changes within participants led to simultaneous risk aversion and risk seeking for the same risky prospect, suggesting that, at least in the domain of risky decisions, consumers' preferences are indeed malleable and construed.