Expectations and Preferences for Sequences of Health and Money

Three experiments demonstrated that preferences for sequences of money differed from preferences for sequences of health. Undergraduates gave preference ratings for graphs that illustrated how monetary income or health quality might change over time, with total amount of money or health held constant. In Experiment 1, subjects expected to experience health that decreased over a lifetime; they also preferred such a sequence. In contrast, they expected to experience increasing monetary income over their lifetimes and preferred such monetary sequences. Experiment 2 showed that these different preferences for sequences of health and money did not hold true for short, 1-year sequences, where subjects had similar expectations about health and money. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 2 and showed that expectations mediate the effect on preference of decision domain (health or money) and sequence length. These results point to the importance of expectations in forming preferences for sequences.     

Satan,Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg

We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (a paradigm of rationality) apparently gives rise to a situation closely analogous to having intransitive preferences (a paradigm of irrationality). Indeed, the agents in these examples are vulnerable to a money pump set-up despite having preferences that exhibit no obvious defect of rationality. We explore several putative solutions to such problems, particularly those that appeal to binding and to deliberative dynamics. We consider the prospects for these solutions, concluding that if they fail, the examples show that money pump arguments are invalid.     

Does Children's Colour Use Reflect the Emotional Content of their Drawings?

When children draw in clinical contexts, clinicians sometimes rely on children's colour use to make inferences about their emotional reaction to the subject of the drawing. Here, we examined whether children use colour to portray emotion in their drawings. In Experiment 1, children indicated their colour preferences and then coloured in outlines of figures characterized as nasty or nice. Children also drew complex, multi‐coloured pictures about their own happy or sad experiences. In Experiment 2, hospitalized children drew about being worried or scared in hospital and about their positive experiences. In both experiments, we examined the relation between children's colour use and their colour preferences. Three‐ to 10‐year‐old children used more preferred colours to colour in the nice outline. Although they were more likely to use non‐preferred colours to colour in the nasty outline, they tended to used a mix of preferred and non‐preferred colours. When both normal and hospitalized children produced drawings about positive and negative events, there was no relation between children's colour choices and their colour preferences; children primarily used preferred colours. These data suggest that clinicians should exercise extreme caution when interpreting the meaning of colour in children's drawings. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Utility maximization and melioration: Internalities in individual choice

How do people go about choosing between alternatives in relatively simple settings? This study explores some of the variables that past work suggests may be relevant. Volunteer subjects worked for money in six procedures in which the probability of a payment from either of two alternatives was 1.0, but the rate of pay (i.e. the speed with which a payment was delivered or the size of the payment) interacted with the subjects recent allocation of choices, which we define as the ‘internalities’. Because of the internalities, choosing the currently more profitable alternative did not maximize total earnings. Subjects were more likely to fail to maximize when the interaction between present pay and past choices was spread over longer sequences of choices, or when the reward variable was the speed, rather than the value, of each payment. Subjects often disregarded the internalities and were instead guided by the current yields of the two alternatives, which is a frequently observed tendency, called ‘melioration’, in experiments on choices by animals. The tendency toward melioration was only partially counteracted by explicit instructions on how to maximize earnings. We discuss a theoretical framework for melioration that postulates both motivational and cognitive sources.     

A Reason‐Based Theory of Rational Choice *

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason‐based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.     

Between Determinism and Indeterminism: The Freedom of Choice in Fichte's Das System Der Sittenlehre

This paper examines Fichte's conception of the freedom of choice in Das System der Sittenlehre of 1798 as a solution to the dilemma posed by determinism and indeterminism. It show that Fichte does not simply affirm an indifferent power of voluntary choice, but demonstrates how such a power might co‐exist with the measure of regularity and lawfulness we normally admit of human choices. Particular choices do not occur at random, but are based on general reasons. These reasons are in turn based on the extent to which we have freely reflected on our original drive. Thus our choices can be comprehended and predicted from the point of reflection from which we choose. This does not lead to the denial of the freedom of choice, but only to rethinking it in terms of the freedom of reflection: Though we cannot choose other than what we choose from the point of reflection we occupy, we can choose other than what we choose by raising or lowering ourselves through reflection to a higher or lower point of reflection.     

Who should be on the $10 and $20 bills? Preferences based on gender,sexism, race,racism, political affiliation,and political ideology

In June 2015, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced that a woman would replace Hamilton on the $10 bill. In April 2016, it announced that Harriet Tubman would replace Andrew Jackson on the $20 bill, instead. After each announcement, we surveyed nationally representative samples of American adults and asked them what they thought of these proposed changes for the $10 bill (Study 1, N = 209) and the $20 bill (Study 2, N = 208). Predictors of currency preferences were gender, race, political affiliation and their respective prejudices and biases—sexism, racism, and political ideology. On the basis of social identity, system justification, and social dominance theories we predicted that privileged groups (i.e., males, Whites) and groups who desire to maintain the status quo (i.e., Republicans, conservatives, sexist and racist individuals) would prefer to leave Hamilton on the $10 bill and Jackson on the $20 bill. Results were consistent with these predictions: Overall, we found that under‐represented groups and more liberal individuals support the proposals from the U.S. Department of the Treasury. These findings suggest a bill of money is not just a piece of paper. The person depicted on U.S. currency can be perceived as an in‐group or out‐group member and this can affect judgements in line with relevant social psychological theories.     

TOUCH,SOUND, AND THINGS WITHOUT THE MIND

Abstract: Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind‐independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so‐called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind‐independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds—and argue that only on the normative construal of them are they resolvable as intended by the a priori methods of the philosophers who pose them.     

Well‐being in cross‐cultural transitions: discrepancies between acculturation preferences and actual intergroup and intragroup contact

Two studies examined the effect of acculturation–contact discrepancies on well‐being. Specifically, we tested the prediction that well‐being will be compromised when cultural minorities' acculturation preferences are not met by the intergroup and intragroup contact in a new society. Study 1 found that for Polish immigrants (n = 55) acculturation–contact discrepancies were associated with compromised well‐being. Study 2 followed a cohort of international students (n = 106) for a period of two academic years. Results suggested that discrepancies in students' acculturation–contact in their first year had harmful consequences for their well‐being 1 year later. Overall, the two studies show that discrepancies between acculturation preferences and actual contact have negative implications for the psychological adaptation of acculturating individuals.     

FREEDOM AND WEAKNESS OF WILL

Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not diminish our freedom. I challenge the coherence of this position. My strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will – Descartes, Aquinas and Reid – to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak‐willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them.     

Transformative Choice,Practical Reasons and Trust

Abstract

In this article I reflect on the question of whether we can have reason to make transformative choices. In attempting to answer it, I do three things. First, I bring forward an internalist account of practical reasons which entails the idea that agents should deliberate to the best of their ability. Second, I discuss L.A. Paul’s views on transformative choice, arguing that, although they present a real problem, the problem is not as profound as she believes it is. Third, I argue that, given the situation in which we face transformative choices (a situation of principled uncertainty though not cluelessness), trust is an appropriate response to transformative choices, and that when one’s trust that one’s current desires will be fulfilled in making a transformative choice is reasonable, one has a reason to make it. Thus, trust turns out to be a crucial response to a profound problem each of us will face during our lives.     

WHAT ARE DESIRES GOOD FOR? TOWARDS A COHERENT ENDORSEMENT THEORY

Desire‐based theories of well‐being are often said to accept (G), x is good for a person just in case he wants it, and (B), x is better for a person than y just in case he prefers x to y. I shall argue that (G) and (B) are inconsistent, and this inconsistency resists any plausible refinement of these principles. The inconsistency is brought out by cases in which our wants and preferences for certain life‐options are contingent on which life‐option we realize. My argument can be generalized to endorsement theories that define a person’s good as the right combination of some kind of objective desirability and subjective endorsement, and allow preferences to be tie‐breakers when the compared objects are equally desirable (or incommensurable). My conclusions will not just be negative. I shall argue that if the choice is between (G) and (B), the most attractive option is to keep (G), slightly refined, and drop (B). 1     

Why ‘Swampman’ Would Not Even Get as Far as Thinking it Was Davidson: On the Spatio‐temporal Basis of Davidson's Conjuring Trick

In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought‐experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson's Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson's Swampman as well as analysing the spatio‐temporal conditions of the thought‐experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn't take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman's creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson's. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought‐experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought‐experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self‐deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources.     

Variations in Level of Moral Judgment as a Function of Type of Dilemma and Moral Choice

This study compares the predictive power of two models of moral judgment: (a) Kohlberg's model, which predicts stage consistency across varying content, and (b) a model that predicts variations in stage as a function of complex interactions between people and social contexts. Forty university students were asked to make and justify choices on three moral dilemmas—a dilemma involving the sale of defective merchandise (selling dilemma) and two dilemmas from Kohlberg's test of moral judgment. Half the participants made hypothetical choices on the selling dilemma; the other half were offered a selfish incentive—money—for concealing the defects in the merchandise. In support of the interactional model, (a) participants scored lower on the selling dilemma than on Kohlberg's test, (b) the monetary incentive affected moral choices, (c) participants justified the choice to conceal defects in the merchandise with significantly lower stage moral judgments than they invoked in support of the decision to disclose its defects, and (d) participants who upheld the choice to disclose supported it with higher stage justifications than those who rejected it. Surprisingly, however, participants who stood to make money disclosed more about the defects in the article and charged less than participants who did not.     

Responsibility and Judgment

I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View (JRV). According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability‐relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought.     

Inaccurate self-knowledge formation as a result of automatic behavior

Four studies tested a post-priming misattribution process whereby a primed goal automatically influences people's behavior, but because people are unaware of that influence, they misattribute their behavior to some other internal state. People who were primed with a goal were more likely to choose an activity that was relevant to that goal, but did not recognize that the prime had influenced their choices. Instead, people used more accessible and plausible reasons to explain their behavior. The goals were seeking romantic interaction (Studies 1 and 2), helping (Study 3) and earning money (Study 4). People made choices related to these goals but misattributed the choices to temporary preferences (Studies 1 and 3) and more permanent dispositions (Studies 2 and 4). The misattribution had downstream effects, leading to choice behavior consistent with the erroneous self-knowledge. We suggest that automatic behavior can lead to a confabulated self-knowledge with behavioral consequences.     

得失框架效应的分离—— 来自收益与损失型跨期选择的研究

本研究通过创设收益和损失跨期选择情境, 采用不同表征方式(得框架、失框架)的跨期选择任务, 分别探讨了收益和损失情境下的跨期选择是否存在得失框架效应, 及其是否会受任务难度的影响。结果发现：(1)收益型跨期选择只在任务容易时存在得失框架效应, 与失框架相比, 被试在得框架下选择即时获益的概率更高; 任务困难时得失框架效应消失(实验a); (2)损失型跨期选择中不存在得失框架效应(实验b)。结果表明, 得失框架效应在损、益型跨期选择中出现了分离, 收益型跨期选择中的得失框架效应的内在认知机制很可能与风险决策中的框架效应类似并且是一种较为初级的认知加工过程。     

In Defence of Proportionalism

In his book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean theory of reasons. Humeanism is the view that you have a reason to X only if X‐ing promotes at least one of your desires. But Schroeder rejects a natural companion theory of the weight of reasons, which he calls proportionalism. According to it, the weight of a reason is proportionate to the strength of the desire that grounds it and the extent to which the act promotes the object of that desire. In this paper, I aim to do three things: (1) to show why Schroeder's arguments against proportionalism do not refute it; (2) to identify the real trouble with proportionalism; and (3) to suggest a better way of understanding it (preferentialism). According to this theory, the overall strength of reasons is determined by the agent's preferences.     

Creativity versus conscientiousness: which is a better predictor of student performance?

This paper examines the extent to which the incremental validity of creative thinking (over and above personality) in the prediction of academic performance may be a function of assessment methods. British university students (N = 307) completed the Alternate Uses Test and Big Five personality inventory at the beginning of the first academic year. Students' academic performance was assessed throughout a 4‐year period via written exams, continuous assessment (tutored seminars) and a supervised dissertation in the final year. Creative thinking was more related to final dissertation marks than to exam and continuous assessment performance (which were associated with Conscientiousness, rather than creative thinking). A follow‐up questionnaire on preferences for different assessment methods revealed that creative thinking was positively related to preference for viva voce (oral) exams, group projects and final dissertation, but negatively associated with preferences for multiple‐choice and essay‐type exams, as well as continuous assessment. Implications are discussed with regard to educational settings, in particular assessment methods. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.