Are You Minority Enough? Language Ability Affects Targets' and Perceivers' Assessments of a Candidate's Appropriateness for Affirmative Action

In the present study, we focus on Spanish language ability as a predictor of the extent to which Latinos are viewed by both others and themselves as full-fledged minorities. Study 1 shows that perceivers viewed Latinos described as Spanish speakers as more appropriate for race-based affirmative action than Latinos who were unable to speak Spanish (controlling for intellectual competence evaluations). Moreover, the affirmative action advantage that the Spanish-speaking Latinos had over the non-Spanish-speaking Latinos was explained by perceivers viewing the Spanish speakers as having greater minority status. The results of Study 2 suggest that Spanish-speaking ability is related to self-perceptions of minority status among Latinos. Like their perceivers in Study 1, Latinos who have less Spanish-speaking ability feel less Latino and report reluctance to apply for race-based assistance in the form of academic minority scholarships.     

Afro-communitarianism and affirmative action in South Africa: A response to David Benatar

In a 2008 article “Justice, Diversity and Racial Preference: a Critique of Affirmative Action”, published in the South African Law Journal, David Benatar argues that affirmative action in South African higher education institutions cannot be justified. In response to this argument and the views expressed in his article, I show that his conclusions depend on an individualistic, decontextualised, and dehistoricised conception of the person. I argue that if we take an Afro-communitarian understanding of the person as our starting point, Benatar's arguments fail. An upshot of my argument is that affirmative action emerges as a useful and critical measure of restorative justice in the South African context.     

Computers, criminals, an eccentric billionaire, and APA: a brief autobiography

In this invited autobiographical account, I sum up what life has been like for me personally and professionally. For most of the first 50 years of my life, I lived in Alabama. During my years at the University of Alabama, my professional activities included developing a computer-based system to interpret the MMPI (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943), managing a national and international continuing education program for psychologists, involvement in a class action suit that resulted in the deinstitutionalization of Alabama's mental hospitals, organizing a team of professionals to reclassify all of the inmates of Alabama's prison system, and conducting a psychological autopsy on Howard Hughes. I was the American Psychological Association (APA) president in 1988 and served from 1989 to 2003 as APA Chief Executive Officer. Since my time at APA, I have been engaged in work with international psychological organizations.     

Support for Race‐Based Affirmative Action: Self‐interest and Procedural Justice1

The current study examines attitudes toward affirmative action. Hypotheses related to self‐interest concerning perceptions of the benefits of affirmative action and hypotheses derived from procedural justice research regarding the structure of policy statements both received support. A survey completed by 387 undergraduate and graduate student participants found greater perception of benefits resulting from affirmative action policies, defined in terms of increased opportunity (concrete benefit) and increased satisfaction (abstract benefit), related to greater support for affirmative action. Policies presented with justification received more support than did policies presented without justification. Ethnicity did not directly affect support for affirmative action; however, ethnicity did affect perceptions of the benefits of affirmative action. Perceptions of the benefits of affirmative action mediated ethnicity effects. Suggestions for increasing support for affirmative action are provided.     

How believing in affirmative action quotas affects White women’s self-image

Believing that affirmative action entails quotas may both help and hurt White women’s self-image - contingent on whether they perceive themselves as beneficiaries of affirmative action. Consistent with research on the affirmative action “stigma of incompetence” (Heilman, Block, & Lucas, 1992), White women who think of themselves as affirmative action beneficiaries may report a more negative self-image the more they believe that affirmative action entails quota procedures. Conversely, White women who do not think of themselves as beneficiaries of affirmative action may report a more positive self-image as a function of quota beliefs, consistent with research suggesting that non-beneficiaries can derive self-image benefits from maintaining the belief that affirmative action entails quotas (Unzueta, Lowery, & Knowles, 2008). Two studies provide evidence for the benefits of quota beliefs on White women’s self-image, but no support for the stigma of incompetence perspective. The lack of support for the stigma of incompetence perspective suggests that self-stigmatization may occur only under operationalizations of affirmative action that explicitly inform beneficiaries that they were selected on the basis of demographics and not merit. Absent such an operationalization, the affirmative action self-stigma may not emerge.     

Procedural Justice and Affirmative Action

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed.     

Implicit bias,confabulation, and epistemic innocence

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.     

Sterba on Affirmative Action,or, it Never was the bus,it was Us!

Professor Sterba argues for two interesting and provocative positions regarding affirmative action. First, affirmative action programs are still needed to ensure diversity in educational institutions of higher learning. Secondly, the proponents and opponents of affirmative action are not as far apart as they seem to think. To this end, he proposes a position that would give weight to race as a category for affirmative action that can withstand the challenges of affirmative action opponents while giving the needed support for affirmative action proponents. It is his contention that both sides can support arguments for diversity affirmative action. This paper raises concerns about the ability of arguments for racial diversity to resolve or bring together opponents and proponents of affirmative action. It is argued that the negative social climate, regarding the social and intellectual merits of black Americans, works against the acceptance of affirmative action programs. In sum, it is argued that Professor Sterba’s position continues to put the social onus of changing racial attitudes on blacks with little or no effort on the part of whites other than allowing blacks admittance to formerly segregated educational institutions to interact with white students.     

Reasons,impossibility and efficient steps: reply to Heuer

Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim.     

Affirmative action. Psychological data and the policy debates

The authors bring psychological research to bear on an examination of the policy of affirmative action. They argue that data from many studies reveal that affirmative action as a policy has more benefits than costs. Although the majority of pro-affirmative action arguments in the social sciences stress diversity, the authors' argument focuses on issues of merit. The merit-based argument, grounded in empirical studies, concludes that the policy of affirmative action conforms to the American ideal of fairness and is a necessary policy.     

Shared Being,Old Promises,and the Just Necessity of Affirmative Action

Although the residues of official segregation are widespread, affirmative action continues to meet resistance in both official and everyday life, even in such recent Supreme Court decisions as Grutter v Bollinger (539 U.S. 306). This is due in part to a governing ontology that draws the line between individual and collective. But there are other possibilities for conceiving the social, and I offer one here in a theory of affirmative action that is developed through close examination of sharing and promising as elemental qualities of equitable communal life. The nature and value of these actions are demonstrated in narrative formulations of fairness as exemplified in triage and the situation at the end of slavery; of the difference between equality and equity and how justice depends on their conjunction; and finally of theorizing how these may come together in the permutable, opaque, yet resilient interdependence of person and community that represents most deeply the Greek idea of two in one, that is, of one two, not two ones. In these respects the paper is successful insofar as it discloses the kinds of reasoning that underlie both resistance and commitment to affirmative action.     

How believing in affirmative action quotas protects White men’s self-esteem

We propose that White men derive a psychological benefit from believing that affirmative action is a quota-based policy. Three studies provide evidence that quota beliefs protect White men’s self-esteem by boosting their sense of self-competence. Study 1 found a positive relationship between quota beliefs and self-esteem that was mediated by self-perceived competence. In Studies 2 and 3, the belief in affirmative action quotas—whether measured or experimentally manipulated—protected White men’s self-esteem from self-image threatening feedback. Only participants who did not believe in quotas reported a lower self-esteem after being told they had performed poorly on an intelligence test. As in Study 1, this effect was mediated by self-perceived competence. In all, these studies suggest that the belief that affirmative action is a quota policy may persist, in part, because it benefits White mens’ self-esteem.     

Was I Entitled or Should I Apologize? Affirmative Action Going Forward

As a U.S. civil rights policy, affirmative action commonly denotes race-conscious and result-oriented efforts by private and public officials to correct the unequal distribution of economic opportunity and education attributed to slavery, segregation, poverty and racism. Opponents argue that affirmative action (1) violates ideals of color-blind public policies, offending moral principles of fairness and constitutional principles of equality and due process; (2) has proven to be socially and politically divisive; (3) has not made things better; (4) mainly benefits middle-class, wealthy and foreign-born blacks; (4) stigmatizes its beneficiaries; and (5) compromises the self-esteem and self-respect of beneficiaries who know that they have been awarded preferential treatment. By way of a thought experiment, imagine that after decades of public policy and experimentation, the United States public finally came to agree: affirmative action is morally and legally wrong. Employing such a thought experiment, this essay by a beneficiary of affirmative action—written in response to James Sterba’s Affirmative Action for the Future (2009)—examines duties of moral repair and the possibility that the past beneficiaries of affirmative action owe apologies, compensation or some other highly personal form of corrective accountability. Beneficiaries of affirmative action have experienced woundedness and moral insecurity. Indeed, the practice of affirmative action comes with a psychology, a set of psychological benefits and burdens whose moral logic those of us who believe in our own fallibility—as much as we believe in the justice of what we have received and conferred on others—should address.     

The dynamics and impact of affirmative action processes on higher education,the curriculum,and black women

Affirmative action is perceived as a tool that can bring about significant social change. In higher education, it has yet to produce the desired results for which its policies were designed. In whatever stage of the affirmative action process colleges and universities find themselves, it can be observed that there are complex dynamics of formulating, implementing, and enforcing affirmative action goals that affect all participants in the process. The complex dynamics of achieving affirmative action goals within higher education deserve attention because they forecast the interactions between black women and higher education that we may expect to see in the future.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

Quotas and affirmative action: Understanding group‐based outcomes and attitudes

More and more countries are adopting quotas to increase group‐based equality in the boardroom and the political sphere. Nevertheless, affirmative action in general and quotas in particular remain a highly controversial subject—eliciting negative reactions from privileged groups, while support among minority and lower‐status groups is generally higher. Focusing on gender, we take a broad approach to the topic and discuss (a) the effects of quotas and affirmative action on the under‐representation of minority groups and on perceptions of their competence, (b) the effects of quotas and affirmative action on organisational performance, and (c) predictors of attitudes towards affirmative action and quotas. We conclude that the benefits of quotas outweigh their costs and that they are an effective way of tackling group‐based inequality. We also discuss strategies that can be used to elicit more support among those groups that are particularly critical of quotas.     

Understanding Affirmative Action

The purpose of this article is to lay a conceptual groundwork that is needed if social scientists and policy makers are to design and implement fair and effective affirmative action programs. Because affirmative action is not well understood, in or out of the academy, the article starts with definitions, both general and technical, contrasts affirmative action with equal opportunity, and touches on the distinction between policy and practice. I then argue that affirmative action is a necessary policy, that it can be effective, and that it is fair. But the policy is for three other reasons: (a) it focuses on deficiencies, (b) it disturbs expectations, and (c) it poses a threat to individualism, interfering with self-congratulations.     

To Accept or to Reject: The Effect of Framing on Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action1

Two experiments examined the effect of framing on attitudes toward an affirmative‐action program of preferential treatment. Participants' attitudes were consistently more favorable toward the affirmative‐action program presented in a positive frame—preferring a target group's applicant over a majority group's applicant—than when the very same program was presented in a negative frame—rejecting the majority group's applicant in favor of the target group's applicant. Similar effects were evident for 3 target groups in the context of higher education selection and personnel selection. Two theoretical explanations for the effect of framing on attitudes toward affirmative‐action programs are suggested. The implications of this effect are discussed, and the challenges facing future research of this phenomenon are outlined.     

White guilt and racial compensation: the benefits and limits of self-focus

In two studies, the authors investigated guilt as a response to group-based advantage. Consistent with its conceptualization as a self-focused emotion, White guilt was based in self-focused beliefs in racial inequality. Thus, guilt was associated with belief in White privilege (Study 1) and resulted from seeing European Americans as perpetrators of racial discrimination (Study 2). Just as personal guilt is associated with efforts at restitution, White guilt was predictive of support for affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. White guilt was not, however, predictive of support for noncompensatory efforts at promoting equality, such as affirmative action programs that increase opportunities (Study 2). In contrast, the other-focused emotion of group-based sympathy was a more general predictor of support for different affirmative action policies. Our findings demonstrate the benefits and limits of group-based guilt as a basis of support for social equality and highlight the value of understanding the specific emotions elicited in intergroup contexts.     

HAVING KNOW‐HOW: INTELLECT,ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE‐HOW AND KNOWLEDGE‐THAT

Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing‐how/knowing‐that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge‐how is non‐propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program.