Developmental differences in working memory: Where do they come from?

Several models assume that working memory development depends on age-related increases in efficiency and speed of processing. However, age-related increases in the efficiency of the mechanisms that counteract forgetting and restore memory traces may also be important. This hypothesis was tested in three experiments by manipulating both the processing duration within a working memory task and the time available to restore memory traces. Third- and sixth-grade children performed a complex span task in which they maintained series of letters while adding numbers to series of digits. When we equated processing and restoration times between ages, the developmental difference in working memory span was reduced but remained significant. However, this residual difference was eliminated when the time available to reactivate memory traces was tailored to the processing speed of each age group. This indicates that children employ active mechanisms for maintenance and restoration of memory traces that develop with age.     

Where do hypotheses come from?

Why are human inferences sometimes remarkably close to the Bayesian ideal and other times systematically biased? In particular, why do humans make near-rational inferences in some natural domains where the candidate hypotheses are explicitly available, whereas tasks in similar domains requiring the self-generation of hypotheses produce systematic deviations from rational inference. We propose that these deviations arise from algorithmic processes approximating Bayes’ rule. Specifically in our account, hypotheses are generated stochastically from a sampling process, such that the sampled hypotheses form a Monte Carlo approximation of the posterior. While this approximation will converge to the true posterior in the limit of infinite samples, we take a small number of samples as we expect that the number of samples humans take is limited. We show that this model recreates several well-documented experimental findings such as anchoring and adjustment, subadditivity, superadditivity, the crowd within as well as the self-generation effect, the weak evidence, and the dud alternative effects. We confirm the model’s prediction that superadditivity and subadditivity can be induced within the same paradigm by manipulating the unpacking and typicality of hypotheses. We also partially confirm our model’s prediction about the effect of time pressure and cognitive load on these effects.     

Three approaches to the psychology of culture: Where do they come from? Where can they go?

Cultural psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and indigenous psychology are three approaches to the psychology of culture. The author begins by comparing the three approaches – conceptually, methodologically; and historically. She concludes that each approach has contributed knowledge of the "deep structure" of culture to the field of psychology. This "deep structure" consists of the framework of individualism and collectivism; particular cultures are therefore surface forms of one or the other of these basic cultural frameworks. Rather than being universal, classical social and developmental psychology are seen as reflecting a particular indigenous psychology. For the future, a truly universal psychology must offer a theoretical framework that encompasses alternative indigenous psychologies.     

Where do Bayesian priors come from?

Bayesian prior probabilities have an important place in probabilistic and statistical methods. In spite of this fact, the analysis of where these priors come from and how they are formed has received little attention. It is reasonable to excuse the lack, in the foundational literature, of detailed psychological theory of what are the mechanisms by which prior probabilities are formed. But it is less excusable that there is an almost total absence of a detailed discussion of the highly differentiating nature of past experience in forming a prior. The focus here is on what kind of account, even if necessarily schematic, can be given about the psychological mechanisms back of the formation of Bayesian priors. The last section examines a detailed experiment relevant to how priors are learned.     

Behavior-analytic repertoires: Where will they come from and how can they be maintained?

The field of behavior analysis faces a number of issues concerning its existence as a discipline and as a profession, including (a) identification of the knowledge and skills comprising the repertoire of competent behavior analysts, (b) the nature of the curricula that will produce the scientists and practitioners needed by the discipline, (c) identification of the generic professional and social skills required for any successful professional career, (d) academic employment opportunities for behavior analysts, and (e) the maintenance of behavior-analytic repertoires. Recommendations are offered as possible solutions to problems raised with respect to each of these issues.     

Where do dialectal effects on speech processing come from? Evidence from a cross-dialect investigation

Accented speech has been seen as an additional impediment for speech processing; it usually adds linguistic and cognitive load to the listener's task. In the current study we analyse where the processing costs of regional dialects come from, a question that has not been answered yet. We quantify the proficiency of Basque–Spanish bilinguals who have different native dialects of Basque on many dimensions and test for costs at each of three levels of processing–phonemic discrimination, word recognition, and semantic processing. The ability to discriminate a dialect-specific contrast is affected by a bilingual's linguistic background less than lexical access is, and an individual's difficulty in lexical access is correlated with basic discrimination problems. Once lexical access is achieved, dialectal variation has little impact on semantic processing. The results are discussed in terms of the presence or absence of correlations between different processing levels. The implications of the results are considered for how models of spoken word recognition handle dialectal variation.     

Twin-singleton differences in verbal ability: Where do they stem from?

In a follow-up investigation at age 9, the cognitive and social characteristics of 35 pairs of twins, studied previously at age 2, were compared with those of matched singletons at school. At age 2, twins' lower verbal ability compared with singletons' was attributed to lesser amount of speech by parents—seen as an outcome of the “twoness” of the “twin situation”—rather than to biological handicap or mother's education. At age 9, twins were equal to singletons in physical development and nonverbal ability, but the monozygotic (MZ)—not the dizygotic (DZ)—twins showed lower verbal ability. However, far more variance in verbal ability was accounted for by mother's education and birthweight than by twinship. In the long run, therefore, mothers' educational differences are more influential than the “twoness” of the “twin situation.”     

Where do "constraints" come from? A comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning

In this paper, as a commentary on the papers in this special issue, the nature of constraints is discussed in terms of the comparison between inferences in biology and in word learning. Young children's inferences in biology could be constrained by three sources of information: factual knowledge, expectations based on a theory, and ontological knowledge. For example, young children's inference about the length of noses could be constrained by the facts the children know about the animals, the similarity between the animals and humans, and the ontological distinction between living things and nonliving things. In the same way, young children might figure out word meanings by linguistic and pragmatic knowledge, expectations of word meanings (e.g., the whole-object assumption), and ontological knowledge. Interactions among these sources of knowledge are documented by the papers in this special issue and related studies. It is argued that learning biases such as the whole-object assumption could not be induced only by linguistic and pragmatic cues in a social context, but should be regarded as a product of the interaction between a social context and children's theories.     

Where do desires come from? Positivity offset and negativity bias predict implicit attitude toward temptations

Temptations elicit both appetitive and aversive responses because they offer hedonic gratification on the one hand and impede long-term goal pursuit on the other hand (Fujita, Personality and Social Psychology Review 15(4):352–366, 2011). In this paper, we investigate how people’s affective responses toward temptations are regulated by the appetitive and aversive motivational systems. We employ the mini Motivated Action Measure (miniMAM; Lang et al., Communication Methods and Measures 5(2):146–162, 2011) to measure the signature patterns with which the two systems regulate affective activation: positivity offset and negativity bias. We found that positivity offset and negativity bias predict unique variance (5.5%) of dieters’ (N?=?312) implicit attitude toward tempting foods, over and above predictors related to behavioral regulation (BIS/BAS: Carver, White, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67:319–333, 1994; BSC: Tangney et al., Journal of Personality 72(2):271–324, 2004). By contrast, positivity offset and negativity bias did not predict dieters’ behavioral intentions for tempting foods. Investigating how the appetitive and aversive systems regulate affective activation apart from behavioral responses offers unique insights into people’s desires towards temptations.     

How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003)

Recently, [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] used a masked priming paradigm to argue that neither the 'elaborate processing' or the 'evolving automaticity' view can account for the processing of unconscious numerical stimuli. In our Experiment 1 we replicated [Kunde, W., Kiesel, A., & Hoffmann, J. (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition, 88, 223-242] Experiment 4 and show that with a less demanding mask than that used by Kunde et al., 'elaborate processing' can explain priming results given that there are side conditions to trigger elaborate processing of unconscious stimuli. The second experiment further explores this influence of the masks by increasing the relevance of the symbols by which the mask is composed. The results show that an increase in relevance of the mask is accompanied by a decrease in the priming effect, though there was no significant change in conscious awareness of the prime.     

Inhibitory phonetic priming: Where does the effect come from?

Both phonological and phonetic priming studies reveal inhibitory effects that have been interpreted as resulting from lexical competition between the prime and the target. We present a series of phonetic priming experiments that contrasted this lexical locus explanation with that of a prelexical locus by manipulating the lexical status of the prime and the target and the task used. In the related condition of all experiments, spoken targets were preceded by spoken primes that were phonetically similar but shared no phonemes with the target (/bak/–/dεt/). In Experiments 1 and 2, word and nonword primes produced an inhibitory effect of equal size in shadowing and same–different tasks respectively. Experiments 3 and 4 showed robust inhibitory phonetic priming on both word and nonword targets in the shadowing task, but no effect at all in a lexical decision task. Together, these findings show that the inhibitory phonetic priming effect occurs independently of the lexical status of both the prime and the target, and only in tasks that do not necessarily require the activation of lexical representations. Our study thus argues in favour of a prelexical locus for this effect.     

Worry and rumination: do they prolong physiological and affective recovery from stress?

Background: Anxiety and depression have been linked to repetitive negative self-regulation styles in the form of worry and rumination respectively. Following predictions of the metacognitive model [Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective. Hove: Erlbaum], the current study compared the effect on recovery from stress of three strategies: worry, rumination, and distraction using a stress exposure paradigm. It was predicted that worry and/or rumination would be associated with delayed recovery on physiological and/or self-report indices when compared to distraction.

Method: Fifty-four participants were randomly assigned to one of the self-regulation conditions and then completed a modified version of the Trier Social Stress Test [TSST; Kirschbaum, C., Pirke, K. M., & Hellhammer, D. H. (1993). The “TSST” – A tool for investigating psychobiological stress responses in a laboratory setting. Neuropsychobiology, 28, 76–81. doi:10.1159/000119004]. Skin conductance and negative affect (NA) measurements were obtained at six different time points.

Results: Skin conductance indicated a prolonged recovery in the rumination condition when compared with the distraction condition. Individuals in the worry condition reported an immediate-delayed recovery from stress marked by higher NA scores in comparison to the distraction condition.

Conclusions: These findings may provide important insights into the effects of different forms of repetitive negative thinking on physiological and psychological recovery from stress. The different response patterns observed are discussed within the context of the metacognitive model.     

When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application

The authors describe a theoretical framework for understanding when people interacting with a member of a stereotyped group activate that group's stereotype and apply it to that person. It is proposed that both stereotype activation and stereotype application during interaction depend on the strength of comprehension and self-enhancement goals that can be satisfied by stereotyping one's interaction partner and on the strength of one's motivation to avoid prejudice. The authors explain how these goals can promote and inhibit stereotype activation and application, and describe diverse chronic and situational factors that can influence the intensity of these goals during interaction and, thereby, influence stereotype activation and application. This approach permits integration of a broad range of findings on stereotype activation and application.     

Explaining personality or explaining variance? A comment on Creed and Funder (1998)

Based on factor analyses of the private self‐consciousness scale, Creed and Funder (1998) posit ‘two faces of private self‐consciousness’: self‐reflectiveness, which relates to negative outcomes, and internal state awareness, which relates to positive outcomes. The significance of this distinction is questioned. I contend (i) that the existence of two subfactors is a fatal deficiency in the private self‐consciousness scale, not a benefit; (ii) that factor analysis can never discover aspects of personality; (iii) that only an underlying theoretical network, not unique variance, makes a scale useful; and (iv) that the SR and ISA distinction exemplifies the undesirable Aristotelian approach (Lewin, 1931) to personality. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.