西方四种心理学流派近19年在中国的发展

本文通过对 1 980～ 1 998年间 6种“核心”心理学期刊所发表论文题目的关键词、参考文献引用杂志的分析 ,对认知心理学、行为主义、精神分析和神经科学四种心理学流派在中国的发展做了研究 ,得出以下结果 :(1 )认知心理学研究论文的数量快速增长 ,神经科学领域的研究略有增加 ;(2 )四学派在中国受重视的程度依次为认知心理学、神经科学研究、行为主义、精神分析 ;(3 )精神分析和行为主义的研究极少。     

The Rediscovery of the Human Mind: The Discursive Approach

The demise of behaviorism was followed by a period of cognitive model building, on Cartesian lines, invoking unobservable cognitive processes, then "mind behind the mind". This has been followed by a second cognitive revolution which emphasizes the idea that mind is a flow of private and public symbolic patterns, created according to local norms. Basing psychology on this insight requires the preservation of the psychological concepts of ordinary languages as part of the basis for scientific psychology. The concept of 'skill' can be used to link individuals with the matrix of interpersonal symbolic and practical interactions. The second revolution can be illustrated by recent work on emotion displays as discursive acts, and by studies on the role of pronouns in the expression of a sense of personal identity.     

Teleological behaviorism.

A psychological science of efficient causes, using internal mechanisms to explain overt behavior, is distinguished from another psychological science, based on Aristotelian final causes, using external objects and goals to explain overt behavior. Efficient-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of how a particular act is emitted; final-cause psychology is designed to answer the question of why a particular act is emitted. Physiological psychology, modern cognitive psychology, and some parts of behaviorism including Skinnerian behaviorism are efficient-cause psychologies; final-cause psychology, a development of Skinnerian behaviorism, is here called teleological behaviorism. Each of these two conceptions of causality in psychology implies a different view of the mind, hence a different meaning of mental terms.     

Misconception and miseducation: Presentations of radical behaviorism in psychology textbooks

Behavior analysts have recently expressed concern about what appear to be misrepresentations of behaviorism in psychology textbooks. This paper presents an analysis of currently used textbooks in the areas of introductory, social, cognitive, personality, and developmental psychology that confirms this. Topics on which behavior analysis is most often misrepresented relate to the role of animal learning research, environmentalism, the "empty organism," language, and the overall utility of the approach. Because textbooks are often a major medium of interaction between the public and behaviorism, behavior analysts must work to correct these errors and to prevent possible negative consequences of widespread misunderstanding. Several potential solutions to these problems are presented that take into account current publishing practices and the monetary contingencies which support them.     

Wilhelm Wundt and the cognitive shift

This paper compares Wundtian and cognitive psychology with respect to immediate and mediate experience, non-functionalism, and the status of the experiment. It is pointed out that the perspective of immediate experience, which can also be found in early American functionalism, has disappeared in the wake of behaviorism. Next cognitive psychology, which to some extent represents a correction of behaviorism, is compared with Wundt's system. It is concluded that in spite of certain similarities the Wundtian and the cognitive perspective are irreconcilably opposed.     

Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process.     

Epistemological barriers to radical behaviorism

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.     

Conceptual approaches and issues

The experimental analysis of behavior has lagged far behind mainstream psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, in the study of complex behavior—remembering, thinking, imaging, problem solving, and the like. Yet it is the study of these kinds of behavior that will provide the greatest justification of our continued existence in the community of behavioral scientists. Focusing primarily on remembering as a complex performance, aspects of (1) radical behaviorism, (2) the methodology of the experimental analysis of behavior, and (3) the special contributions of B. F. Skinner are assessed as explicitly or implicitly discouraging the experimental treatment of such complex behavior. Although there are encouraging signs of advancement into the present domains of cognitive psychology, future success of the experimental analysis of behavior in this endeavor will require aggressive pursuit by investigators and more effective training of their students.     

Origins of the cognitive (r)evolution

The well documented cognitive "revolution" was, to a large extent, an evolving return to attitudes and trends that were present prior to the advent of behaviorism and that were alive and well outside of the United States, where behaviorism had not developed any coherent support. The behaviorism of the 1920 to 1950 period was replaced because it was unable to address central issues in human psychology, a failure that was inherent in part in J. B. Watson's founding manifesto with its insistence on the seamless continuity of human and nonhuman animal behavior. The "revolution" was often slow and piecemeal, as illustrated by four conferences held between 1955 and 1966 in the field of memory. With the realization that different approaches and concepts were needed to address a psychology of the human, developments in German, British, and Francophone psychology provided some of the fuel of the "revolution."     

Pavlov's methodological behaviorism as a pre-Socratic contribution of the melding of the differential and experimental psychology

The differential/experimental distinction that Cronbach specified is important because any adequate account of psychological phenomena requires the recognition of the validity of both approaches, and a meaningful melding of the two. This paper suggests that Pavlov's work in psychology, based on earlier traditions of inquiry that can be traced back to the pre-Socratics, provides a potential way of achieving this melding, although such features as systematic rather than anecdotal methods of observation need to be added. Pavlov's methodological behaviorist approach is contrasted with metaphysical behaviorism (as exemplified explicitly in Watson and Skinner, and implicitly in the computer-metaphorical, information-processing explanations employed by current "cognitive" psychology). A common feature of the metaphysical approach is that individual-differences variables like sex are essentially ignored, or relegated to ideological categories such as the treatment of sex as merely a "social construction." Examples of research both before and after the "cognitive revolution" are presented where experimental and differential methods are melded, and individual differences are treated as phenomena worthy of investigation rather than as nuisance factors that merely add to experimental error.     

Utopianism in psychology: the case of Wilhelm Reich

This article examines utopian elements in Wilhelm Reich's writings in his American phase (1939-1957) in order to illustrate utopian sources of dynamic psychology. Although there are scholars who have used the term "psychological utopia" and applied it to individual thinkers (Reich, Marcuse, Fromm) and to specific psychological disciplines (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology), the term itself has remained elusive and vague. Furthermore, there have been few attempts to systematically examine utopian elements in twentieth-century psychology in general and the basic assumptions of psychological utopianism in particular. While pointing out that Reich's orgonomic theories have no scientific merit, this article argues for the relevancy of his ideas for understanding the nature of utopianism in dynamic psychology.     

An empirical analysis of trends in psychology

The present research examined trends in the prominence of 4 widely recognized schools in scientific psychology: psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. The results, which replicated across 3 measures of prominence, showed the following trends: (a) psychoanalytic research has been virtually ignored by mainstream scientific psychology over the past several decades; (b) behavioral psychology has declined in prominence and gave way to the ascension of cognitive psychology during the 1970s; (c) cognitive psychology has sustained a steady upward trajectory and continues to be the most prominent school; and (d) neuroscience has seen only a modest increase in prominence in mainstream psychology, despite evidence for its conspicuous growth in general. The authors use these findings as a springboard for discussing different views of scientific prominence and conclude that psychologists should evaluate trends in the field empirically, not intuitively.     

Entre neurosciences et neurophilosophie : la psychologie cognitive et les sciences cognitives

The cognitive sciences are all at once a scientific field with far-reaching epistemological implications and the locus of institutional confrontation between several academic disciplines. In this context, cognitive psychology occupies a key historical and theoretical position. It is therefore essential to clearly situate its contribution to the origin and the development of the cognitive sciences. For some, cognitive psychology may end up being dissolved by cognitive neuroscience, with its brain imaging techniques, which in the long run, should solve the age-old problem of brain-mind dualism. For others, this epistemic wager can only be won by reducing cognition to its most elementary states and processes. Here, the problem of mental representation (of meaning and consciousness) is brought to bear to rule out a view that strictly reduces the mind to the brain. Will the cognitive sciences, then, be nothing more than a mere stage in the integration of cognitive psychology into the cognitive neurosciences? Or on the contrary, will the other disciplines in the cognitive sciences be led to recognize the specificity of cognitive psychology and put it at the centre of their research program? The debate is underway, but the scientific and institutional outcome is uncertain.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Delusions and theories of belief

Cognitive neuropsychiatry is a branch of cognitive psychology that seeks to explain neuropsychiatric symptoms in terms of disruptions or damage to normal cognitive processes. A key objective of this approach is to use insights derived from the study of pathological symptoms to inform accounts of premorbid cognitive systems. Delusions, in particular, can be considered to represent dysfunction of the cognitive processes underlying belief formation, so studying delusions may provide unique insights into nonpathological belief. While this approach has provided compelling accounts for a range of delusions in terms of putative cognitive dysfunctions, it is less clear that it has achieved progress in its reciprocal goal of informing understanding of belief more generally. In this review, we trace the origins of the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach and consider the reasons for the lack of progress. We propose a tentative framework to overcome these challenges and suggest directions for future research.     

文化视域下文化神经科学学科主张与检讨

文化神经科学是在宏大的文化背景下来全面深入考察个体的"心理、行为与脑认知机制"之间规律的一门学科。文化神经科学所倡导的神经-文化交互作用模型表明该学科以融合视野引领心理学研究范式的变革成为可能。同时,从文化学视野来审视,亦折射出其在文化学层面的短板,即人文精神与文化意蕴在"文化"名义下日渐式微。     

Progress in Executive-Function Research: From Tasks to Functions to Regions to Networks

ABSTRACT— It has long been observed that damage to the frontal cortex affects a person's ability to control thought, behavior, and emotion while sometimes leaving fundamental processes such as vision, hearing, and long-term memory intact. Such observations have led theoreticians to suppose that a set of executive control functions exists, at the top of the hierarchy of mental processes. To study these executive functions and their relation to the frontal cortex and its subregions, researchers have long employed several now-classic cognitive tests in patients with brain damage. Yet until recently it has proved difficult to reliably localize the putative executive functions to discrete regions. This article illustrates how recent progress in executive-functions research has been driven by the coupling of sophisticated neuroscience techniques with advances in experimental psychology. Taking examples from recent studies, it shows how experimental tasks may be decomposed into cognitive components that can be localized to discrete—but structurally connected—brain regions. What emerges is a new ontology for executive function in terms of which cognitive components exist and of how, and when, they are recruited during task performance.     

Synaptogenesis and heritable aspects of executive attention

In humans, changes in brain structure and function can be measured non-invasively during postnatal development. In animals, advanced optical imaging measures can track the formation of synapses during learning and behavior. With the recent progress in these technologies, it is appropriate to begin to assess how the physiological processes of synapse, circuit, and neural network formation relate to the process of cognitive development. Of particular interest is the development of executive function, which develops more gradually in humans. One approach that has shown promise is molecular genetics. The completion of the human genome project and the human genome diversity project make it straightforward to ask whether variation in a particular gene correlates with variation in behavior, brain structure, brain activity, or all of the above. Strategies that unify the wealth of biochemical knowledge pertaining to synapse formation with the functional measures of brain structure and activity may lead to new insights in developmental cognitive psychology.