Elicited versus emitted behavior: Time to abandon the distinction

The concept of emitted behavior was formulated as a part of the original argument for the validity of a new kind of learning called operant conditioning. The rationale for operant conditioning contrasted it with Pavlovian or classical conditioning, which was (and remains) fundamentally based on responses to conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. Classical conditioned responses were said to be elicited. In contrast, operant behavior was viewed as emitted and controlled primarily by response consequences rather than antecedents. I argue that the distinction between emitted and elicited behavior is no longer warranted for three major reasons. First, the distinction was based on a view of Pavlovian conditioning that is no longer viable. Second, the distinction is incompatible with both empirical data and contemporary conceptualizations of operant behavior. Third, the only way to overcome these problems is to define emitted and elicited in terms of the type of conditioning (operant and classical) that produces these behaviors, but that approach makes the definitions circular and does not avoid implications of the terms that are misleading and counterproductive in light of contemporary research and thinking.     

Mass nouns,vagueness and semantic variation

The mass/count distinction attracts a lot of attention among cognitive scientists, possibly because it involves in fundamental ways the relation between language (i.e. grammar), thought (i.e. extralinguistic conceptual systems) and reality (i.e. the physical world). In the present paper, I explore the view that the mass/count distinction is a matter of vagueness. While every noun/concept may in a sense be vague, mass nouns/concepts are vague in a way that systematically impairs their use in counting. This idea has never been systematically pursued, to the best of my knowledge. I make it precise relying on supervaluations (more specifically, ‘data semantics’) to model it. I identify a number of universals pertaining to how the mass/count contrast is encoded in the languages of the world, along with some of the major dimensions along which languages may vary on this score. I argue that the vagueness based model developed here provides a useful perspective on both. The outcome (besides shedding light on semantic variation) seems to suggest that vagueness is not just an interface phenomenon that arises in the interaction of Universal Grammar (UG) with the Conceptual/Intentional System (to adopt Chomsky’s terminology), but it is actually part of the architecture of UG.     

Making sense of sensitivity in the human operant literature

Human operant behavior is often said to be controlled by different variables or governed by different processes than nonhuman operant behavior. Support for this claim within the operant literature comes from data suggesting that human behavior is often insensitive to schedules of reinforcement to which nonhuman behavior has been sensitive. The data that evoke the use of the terms sensitivity and insensitivity, however, result from both between-species and within-subject comparisons. We argue that because sensitivity is synonymous with experimental control, conclusions about sensitivity are best demonstrated through within-subject comparisons. Further, we argue that even when sensitivity is assessed using within-subject comparisons of performance on different schedules of reinforcement, procedural differences between studies of different species may affect schedule performance in important ways. We extend this argument to age differences as well. We conclude that differences across populations are an occasion for more precise experimental analyses and that it is premature to conclude that human behavior is controlled by different processes than nonhuman behavior.     

Property instantiation in conceptual combination

In four experiments, I examined how a property in one concept is transferred to a second concept during conceptual combination. The results suggest that people instantiate properties: that is, they use a specific representation of a property in the modifier concept to construct a new version of that property that is specific to the combination. If people are instantiating properties, then the modifier property should match its counterpart in the combination to the extent that the modifier and head noun are similar. This observation leads to a variety of predictions (supported by the experiments) about interpretations of similar and dissimilar combinations and about plausibility, preference, and similarity judgments associated with such interpretations. The results argue against an alternative view of transfer that posits that, in general, abstract representations of properties are copied from one concept to another. In this paper, I describe various processing accounts of instantiation and discuss the implications of the instantiation view for theories of metaphor, conceptual combination, and induction.     

Operant Variability: A Conceptual Analysis

Some researchers claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. The present paper reviews the concept of operant behavior and emphasizes that differentiation is the behavioral process that demonstrates an operant relation. Differentiation is conceived as change in the overlap between two probability distributions: the distribution of reinforcement probability as a function of some response property (S distribution) and the probability distribution of the response property itself (R distribution). This concept implies that the differentiation process can be measured only if S distribution and R distribution are both established on the same response property. To determine whether the differentially reinforced behavioral variability fits the proposed concept of operant behavior, I examine the main procedures (lag n and threshold procedures) and the main dependent variable (U value) employed in the studies of operant variability. Because lag n and threshold procedures establish their S distributions on properties distinct from U value, differentiation cannot be measured over the change in U value. I conclude that studies of operant variability have failed to provide a direct demonstration that variability is an operant dimension of behavior. Hence, studies in which measures of variability provide a basis to measure differentiation can better support the claim that variability is an operant dimension of behavior.     

Concerning the Madrid Lecture: the equivocal character of Pavlov's reflexological objectivism and its influence on the distorted concept of the physiology-psychology relationship

The aim of this study is to bring to light and make clear the characteristic equivoque Pavlov made when he conceived the neurophysiological circuit involved in conditioned behavior as if this circuit contained or reduced, in its own terms, such behavior. I also wish to point out how this interpretation implies a distorted concept of the relationships between neurophysiology and behavior. As an alternative, it is proposed that behavior, which is always operant behavior, is not at all reducible to its neurophysiological ingredients, but instead acts like an arrow-head for adaptation that, in turn, confers a subordinate function to the neurophysiological ingredients involved. To make this evident, behavior is considered an operant organic activity that takes place in an environment of "remote co-present" texture, and different from its neurophysiological ingredients, which take place within the context of spatial contiguity relationships.     

Conceptual combination with prototype concepts

This paper deals with how people combine simple, prototype concepts into complex ones; e.g., how people combine the prototypes for brown and apple so they can determine the typicality of objects in the conjunction brown apple. We first consider a proposal from fuzzy-set theory (Zadeh, 1965), namely, that the typicality of an object in a conjunction is equal to the minimum of that object's typicality in the constituents (e.g., an object's typicality as a brown apple cannot exceed its typicality as a brown or as an apple). We evaluated this “min rule” against the typicality ratings of naive subjects in two experiments. For each of numerous pictured objects, one group of subjects rated its typicality with respect to an adjective concept, a second group rated its typicality vis-à-vis a noun concept, and a third group rated its typicality with respect to the adjective-noun conjunction. In both studies, most objects were rated as more typical of the conjunction than of the noun. These findings violate not only the min rule but also other simple rules for relating typicality in a conjunction to typicalities in the constituents. As an alternative to seeking such rules, we argue for an approach to conceptual combination that starts with the prototype representations themselves. We illustrate one version of this approach in some detail, and show how it accounts for the major findings of the present experiments.     

The place of the human subject in the operant laboratory

Although laboratory study of human behavior seems an obvious vehicle for strengthening the scientific base of behavior analysis, the place of the human subject within the operant laboratory remains problematic. The prevailing research strategy has been to link principles developed with animals to human affairs, either through interpretation of naturally occurring human behaviors or through application of the principles to the solution of human problems. The paucity of laboratory research on human operant behavior derives from several misconceptions: the possibility that experimental demand characteristics and pre-experimental behavioral dispositions of human subjects contaminate the results; that ethical considerations place undue constraint on research topics and experimental designs; and that uncontrollable variation in subjects' histories and other relevant personal characteristics prevents observation of reliable functional relations. We argue that these problems do not pose insurmountable obstacles to the experimental analysis of human behavior; that adequate methods of control and analysis are available; and that operant techniques, by emphasizing experimentally imposed contingencies, are well suited for the laboratory study of human behavior.     

Comments on the 1950s applications and extensions of Skinner's operant psychology

These comments address Laties', Dewsbury's, and Rutherford's papers on the extension and application of Skinner's operant psychology during the 1950s. I begin by reflecting on the papers' overall theme-that the success of behavior analysis lies in its practical applications-and add some comments on Planck's principle. I then turn to the three papers and address such topics as (a) other applications and extensions (e.g., the U.S. space program), (b) relations between the research and researchers at the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology (e.g., a Yerkes' researcher in Skinner's laboratory), and (c) human schedule performance (e.g., continuity and discontinuity with nonhuman behavior). I end with a discussion of the fundamental reason for the success of the extensions and applications of behavior analysis-the experimental analysis of behavior.     

Response-initiated imaging of operant behavior using a digital camera

A miniature digital camera, QuickCam Pro 3000, intended for use with video e-mail, was modified so that snapshots were triggered by operant behavior emitted in a standard experimental chamber. With only minor modification, the manual shutter button on the camera was replaced with a simple switch closure via an I/O interface controlled by a PC computer. When the operant behavior activated the I/O switch, the camera took a snapshot of the subject's behavior at that moment. To illustrate the use of the camera, a simple experiment was designed to examine stereotypy and variability in topography of operant behavior under continuous reinforcement and extinction in 6 rats using food pellets as reinforcement. When a rat operated an omnidirectional pole suspended from the ceiling, it also took a picture of the topography of its own behavior at that moment. In a single session after shaping of pole movement (if necessary), blocks of continuous reinforcement, in which each response was reinforced, alternated with blocks of extinction (no reinforcement), with each block ending when 20 responses had occurred. The software supplied with the camera automatically stored each image and named image files successively within a session. The software that controlled the experiment also stored quantitative data regarding the operant behavior such as consecutive order, temporal location within the session, and response duration. This paper describes how the two data types--image information and numerical performance characteristics-can be combined for visual analysis. The experiment illustrates in images how response topography changes during shaping of pole movement, how response topography quickly becomes highly stereotyped during continuous reinforcement, and how response variability increases during extinction. The method of storing digital response-initiated snapshots should be useful for a variety of experimental situations that are intended to examine behavior change and topography.     

Self-Sacrificial Behavior and its Explanation in Terms of Max Scheler’s Concept of Spirit

One of the key concepts of the German philosopher Max Scheler (1874–1928) is his concept of spirit. He understands spirit as one of several naturally functioning human mental agencies, such as consciousness, will, memory, etc. That is, he treats the mental agency of spirit in a scientific way and avoids any esoteric or religious connotations that this peculiar term may involve. The nature of human spirit, according to Scheler, is the ability to withstand and deliberately redirect biological imperatives and instinctive drives, up to the point of purposefully throwing away one’s own life. The presence of spirit constitutes the essence of the human being that differentiates him qualitatively from all animals. In this article, I argue that it is human spirit that plays the determinative role in causing heroic and self-sacrificial behavior. I also argue that the individual human spirit experiences its inherent development, thus having several rather dissimilar stages and manifestations. I discuss the meaning that the term ‘spirit’ has in the English and the American philosophical and psychological traditions and the meaning of the corresponding term ‘der Geist’ in the German traditions. The specific English-language understanding of the term ‘spirit’, compared to its German counterpart ‘der Geist’, namely, less scientific and more religious and esoteric and metaphorical for the former, makes it alien and almost unusable in the English and American traditions. The linguistic difference leads to the misunderstanding of some very important ideas brought by the concept of spirit as introduced by Scheler. My purpose is to overcome this discrepancy and omission and to introduce the notion and the concept of spirit, in their scientific understanding, into the arsenal of modern English-language cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy in order to provide for the full explanatory force of the hitherto neglected concept of spirit.     

Melioration and self-experimentation

Operant researchers rarely use the arena of applied psychology to motivate or to judge their research. Absence of tests by application weakens the field of basic operant research. Early in their development, the physical and biological sciences emphasized meliorative aspects of research. Improvement of human life was a major goal of these young sciences. This paper argues that if basic operant researchers analogously invoked a melioration criterion, the operant field might avoid its tendency toward ingrowth and instead generate a broadly influential science. Operant researchers could incorporate melioration by (a) creating animal models to study applied problems; (b) confronting questions raised by applied analysts and testing hypotheses in applied settings; or (c) performing self-experiments—that is, using experimental methods and behavioral techniques to study and change the experimenter's behavior.     

Countercontrol in behavior analysis

Countercontrol is a functional class of behavior that is part of Skinner's analysis of social behavior. Countercontrol refers to behavioral episodes comprised of socially mediated aversive controlling conditions and escape or avoidance responses that do not reinforce, and perhaps even punish, controllers' responses. This paper suggests that neglect of countercontrol in modern behavior analysis is unfortunate because the concept applies to interpersonal and social relations the fundamental operant principle that human behavior is both controlled and controlling-humans are not passive and inflexible. Countercontrol is addressed here in terms of conceptual status, contemporary developments in behavior analysis, its importance in a behavior-analytic approach to freedom and cultural design, applications, and research. The main conclusion is that Skinner's formulation of counter-control is scientifically supported and worthy of increased prominence in behavior analysis.     

Analyzing the reinforcement process at the human level: Can application and behavioristic interpretation replace laboratory research?

Critics have questioned the value of human operant conditioning experiments in the study of fundamental processes of reinforcement. Contradictory results from human and animal experiments have been attributed to the complex social and verbal history of the human subject. On these grounds, it has been contended that procedures that mimic those conventionally used with animal subjects represent a "poor analytic preparation" for the explication of reinforcement principles. In defending the use of conventional operant methods for human research, we make three points: (a) Historical variables play a critical role in research on processes of reinforcement, regardless of whether the subjects are humans or animals. (b) Techniques are available for detecting, analyzing, and counteracting such historical and extra-experimental influences; these include long-term observations, steady state designs, and, when variables are not amenable to direct control (e.g., age, gender, species), selection of subjects with common characteristics. (c) Other forms of evidence that might be used to validate conditioning principles-applied behavior analysis and behavioristic interpretation-have inherent limitations and cannot substitute for experimental analysis. We conclude that human operant conditioning experiments are essential for the analysis of the reinforcement process at the human level, but caution that their value depends on the extent to which the traditional methods of the experimental analysis of behavior are properly applied.     

An Analysis of Feedback from a Behavior Analytic Perspective

The present paper presents a systematic analysis from a behavior analytic perspective of procedures termed feedback. Although feedback procedures are widely reported in the discipline of psychology, including in the field of behavior analysis, feedback is neither consistently defined nor analyzed. Feedback is frequently treated as a principle of behavior; however, its effects are rarely analyzed in terms of well-established principles of learning and behavior analysis. On the assumption that effectiveness of feedback procedures would be enhanced when their use is informed by these principles, we sought to provide a conceptually systematic account of feedback effects in terms of operant conditioning principles. In the first comprehensive review of this type, we compare feedback procedures with those of well-defined operant procedures. We also compare the functional relations that have been observed between parameters of consequence delivery and behavior under both feedback and operant procedures. The similarities observed in the preceding analyses suggest that processes revealed in operant conditioning procedures are sufficient to explain the phenomena observed in studies on feedback.     

Disabled – therefore,Unhealthy?

This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because (a) one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and (b) one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I argue that it is often wrong to use the term ‘healthy’ in a way that makes health inconsistent with any degree whatsoever of health-relevant bodily dysfunction. Whether someone is ‘healthy’ properly-so-called depends on standards of health presupposed in conversational context. Sometimes, I argue, these standards are or ought to be lax enough to allow some people with some health deficits still to count as ‘healthy’ per se. Taking inspiration from David Lewis and Mary Kate Mcgowan, I go on to argue that denying that someone is ‘healthy’ in a context typically succeeds in shifting going presuppositions to require standards strict enough to make that denial acceptable. And this, I conclude by arguing, often constitutes an abuse of conversational power.     

Establishing operations, cognition, and emotion

In this paper we argue that behavior analysts have tended to neglect the study of important aspects of complex human behavior, including cognition and emotion. This relative neglect has been costly in terms of mainstream psychology's perception of the field of behavior analysis and in terms of our ability to provide a more thorough account of human behavior. Observations and findings from the clinical context are offered as examples of behavior that are not readily explained by the three-term contingency, and we argue that an adequate account of these behaviors must include principles derived from recent behavior-analytic work, in particular a better understanding of the short- and long-term effects of establishing operations. The concept of the establishing operation and its implications for understanding complex human behavior are discussed.