‘The Process Concept of God and Pacifism’

In this article I argue for the superiority of the neoclassical (or process) concept of God to the classical concept of God as static, especially as the former relates to the moral superiority of pacifism to just war theory. However, the two main proponents of neoclassical or process theism—Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne—failed to see the full ramifications of their improved concept of God in that they tended to stop short of pacifism by maintaining an uneasy alliance with the violence often associated with classical theism.     

‘We don't do God’: A critical retrospective of New Labour's approaches to ‘religion or belief’ and ‘faith’

Given that Tony Blair was once infamously told by an aide that in Britain ‘we don't do God’, the New Labour Government that he led was responsible for developing and implementing a series of policies that brought religion firmly into British political spaces. Adopting two policy approaches, these approaches focused on ‘religion or belief’ and ‘faith’. Alongside the incorporation of ‘religion and belief’ into the broadening equalities framework, New Labour encouraged greater engagement with faith communities initially through urban regeneration before implementing a more faith-specific programme, namely the interfaith framework. Drawing on three research projects, this article retrospectively considers the extent to which these approaches were joined up and whether – and indeed how – they contributed to New Labour's overarching measurements of success: creating a more equal society.     

Pascal’s Wager and the Nature of God

This paper argues that Pascal’s formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one’s rational self-interest. Specifically, it is argued that if we accept Pascal’s premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.     

Kierkegaard and the problem of special relationships: Ferreira, Krishek and the ‘God filter’

Kierkegaard??s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ??special relationships??. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard??s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira??s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek??s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard??s position centred round the image of God as a ??filter?? through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira??s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard??s idea that neighbour love is only a ??sketch?? until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard??s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek??s critique.     

The ‘God beyond God’ in Fiction for Young People

In this article, the author focusses upon two major works of children's fiction which illustrate a post‐Christian concept of spirituality permeating common life. He shows how the narrative, imagery and ideas constitute a challenge to orthodox thought, not only about the way life is, but also about what children should know and think. The central thesis is that literature is the most effective medium for quickening those imaginative powers fundamental to dynamic engagement with ultimate questions, a thesis exemplified in the examination of these works.     

‘God’s got your back’: teenage boys talk about God

This paper reports on ongoing research that has gathered data from 1100 boys, between 15‐ and 18‐years‐old, on the ways in which they experience and express spirituality. The paper is set against the background of a previous paper in this journal (Engebretson, 2004 Engebretson, K. 2004. Teenage boys, spirituality and religion. International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 9(3): 263–278.  [Google Scholar]), that introduced the research and gave its theoretical framework. The focus of this paper is on the boys’ articulated experiences of the transcendent. The paper reports on these, claiming that transcendent experiences occurred for the boys in times that involved risk, fear, challenge, need and loss. Their sense of God was personal, one who was always there, who understood, who listened, who cared and protected. The paper then critically analyses why a much smaller percentage of boys who were given the opportunity to answer these questions did so, in comparison with the much higher percentage who answered the other questions on the questionnaire. Finally, questions are posed that will guide the research as it continues.     

A Comparison of Christians’ Concepts of Jesus Christ and God

In the god concept literature, little research has been conducted on how people think about and relate specifically to Jesus Christ. This study addresses the extent to which Christians distinguish between Jesus and God in terms of their concepts of Jesus and God, the pathways they use to connect with Jesus and God, and the benefits they seek and receive from Jesus and God. The study also tests whether participants’ concepts of Jesus have unique predictive power for psychological, social, and spiritual criterion variables after controlling for their concepts of God. The sample includes 165 college students and 107 church attendees who self-identified as Christians. Results indicate that although most participants view Jesus and God as being similar to each other, they perceive Jesus to be warmer but less transcendent and stern than God. Including participants’ concepts of Jesus in hierarchical multiple regressions accounted for significant additional variance after controlling for their concepts of God in predicting participants’ negative affect, social justice attitudes, spiritual emotions, and Christian orthodoxy. Participants generally used various pathways more to connect with God than with Jesus, and they reported seeking and receiving many benefits more from God than from Jesus. These results suggest that future research on god concepts among Christians ought to include separate measures of Jesus concepts and God concepts.     

Defining ‘Dead’ in Terms of ‘Lives’ and ‘Dies’

What is it for a thing to be dead? Fred Feldman holds, correctly in my view, that a definition of ‘dead’ should leave open both (1) the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being alive, and (2) the possibility of things that go directly from being alive to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. But if this is right, then surely such a definition should also leave open the possibility of things that go directly from being dead to being neither alive nor dead, but merely in suspended animation. I show that Feldman’s own definition of ‘dead’ (in terms of ‘lives’ and ‘dies’) does not leave this possibility open. I propose a new definition that does.     

Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism and the Mystery of God

Anselm said that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but he believed that it followed that God is greater than can be conceived. The second formula—essential to sound theology—points to the mystery of God. The usual way of preserving divine mystery is the via negativa, as one finds in Aquinas. I formalize Hartshorne’s central argument against negative theology in the simplest modal system T. I end with a defense of Hartshorne’s way of preserving the mystery of God, which he locates in the actuality of God rather than in the divine existence or essence. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

The Ways of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Human

We argue that developing integrative models of psychological phenomenon require dealing simultaneously with information-theoretic and meaning making processes at the individual and group levels. Attempts to fuse these across levels based on intentionality become difficult because phenomena at the lower level organisms are conceptualized employing concrete systems language, while in case of human and social systems both concrete and abstracted systems concepts are used. Intentionality also needs to be looked at as arising out of the processes of both being and becoming. Fusing of psycho-and socio-logics necessarily requires taking into consideration psychological processes and notions of intentionality and future within cultural contexts in a more holistic manner. It is also argued that both at personal and collective levels, human intentionality operate as bounded intentionality alternating between states of being and becoming.     

On the Alleged Ambiguity of ‘Now’ and ‘Here’

It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond to the time and/or location of the utterance, `now' and `here' work in an anaphoric way, inheriting their reference from another noun phrase. The latter may be explicit or implicit in the discourse. It is also shown that `now' and `here' can inherit their reference from a presupposed or tacit reference. In that case, they are coreferential with what will be labeled a `tacit initiator'. This anaphoric interpretation has the merit of fitting within the Kaplanian distinction between pure indexicals (`now', `here', `today', etc.) and demonstratives (`this', `that', `she', etc.).     

‘Preparedness’ and ‘arousability’ as determinants of electrodermal conditioning

‘Arousability’, as defined through spontaneous electrodermal responses, has been empirically linked to anxiety, phobic symptoms and outcome of systematic desensitization. Previous data from our laboratory indicate that ‘preparedness’, as defined through potentially phobic vs. fear-irrelevant or ‘neutral’ conditioned stimuh, is an important determinant of electrodermal conditioning. The present experiment compared groups selected to be high or low in spontaneous responding during differential conditioning to potentially phobic or neutral stimuh. It was found that the effects of these two factors were essentially additive, i.e. conditioning and resistance to extinction were better for phobic stimuli and for high-arousal groups. The high-aroused group with phobic stimuh showed diffuse responding during acquisition, not differentiating between reinforced and unreinforced cues. However, it was the only group that failed to extinguish during 20 trials, which indicates that high arousal gives superior resistance to extinction particularly for phobic stimuli.     

The logic of obligation, ‘better’ and ‘worse’

Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, FT-33794. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for remarks on an earlier version of this paper.     

Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands

According to Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy, adherents of skeptical theism will find their sense of moral obligation undermined in a potentially ‘appalling’ way. Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea disagree, claiming that God’s commands provide skeptical theists with a source of moral obligation that withstands the skepticism in skeptical theism. I argue that Bergmann and Rea are mistaken: skeptical theists cannot consistently rely on what they take to be God’s commands.

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.