What Do Happiness Studies Study?

What do, or should, happiness studies study? Everything to which we refer with the word ‘‘happiness’’ is worth some study. But the study of subjective states covers only part of the ground covered by the word ‘‘happiness’’ and by no means all the ground central to understanding happiness. On the central use of ‘‘happiness,’’ to be happy is to be glad or satisfied or content, which suggests subjectivity, with having a good measure of what is important in life, which suggests objectivity. We find the same suggestion of both subjectivity and objectivity in the list of what enhances the quality of life. There are strong arguments in favour both of the subjectivity of what enhances life and of its objectivity. I argue that neither is right, that the story is more complicated. The conclusion of the story is that there is a list of several non-reducible features that contribute to the quality of a characteristic human life, and that anything that contributes to the quality of any human life will be one or other of these features. But there is a problem. When we speak of the quality of a human life, there may be no one thing we have in mind. Perhaps some of us are not disagreeing with one another over the nature of a ‘‘happy’’ life but speaking of different things.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Winnicott's invitation to ‘further games of Jung‐analysis’

Winnicott signs off his celebrated review of Jung's (1963) autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections with the warning that translation of ‘erreichten’ as ‘attained’ (implying assimilation) rather than as ‘reached to’, could ‘queer the pitch for further games of Jung‐analysis’. This subtly underscores his view that Jung—who he described earlier as ‘mentally split’ and lacking ‘a self with which to know’—remained essentially dissociated. However, Winnicott, whilst immersed in this work on Jung, wrote a letter to Michael Fordham describing himself as suffering ‘a lifelong malady’ of ‘dissociation’. But this he now reported repaired through a ‘splitting headache’ dream of destruction, dreamt ‘for Jung, and for some of my patients, as well as for myself’ (Winnicott 1989, p. 228). Winnicott's recurrent concern during his last decade was with ‘reaching to’—that quintessential Winnicottian term—some reparative experience that could address such difficulties in constellating a ‘unit self’. This is correlated with his engagement with Jung and tracked through his contemporaneous clinical work, particularly ‘Fear of Breakdown’ (1963). Themes first introduced by Sedgwick (2008) and developed by the author's earlier ‘Winnicott on Jung; destruction, creativity and the unrepressed unconscious’ (2011) are given further consideration.     

Why are good theories good? reflections on epistemic values, confirmation, and formal epistemology

Franz Huber’s (2008a) attempt to unify inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist intuitions on confirmation by means of a single measure are examined and compared with previous work on the theory of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. The idea of connecting ‘the logic of confirmation’ with ‘the logic of acceptability’ is also critically discussed, and it is argued that ‘acceptability’ takes necessarily into account some pragmatic criteria, and that at least two normative senses of ‘acceptability’ must be distinguished: ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being allowed to accept’, and ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being obliged to accept’. Lastly, some connections of confirmation theory with naturalism, intertheoretic reduction, and explanation vs. understanding are explored.     

Individual differences in the tendency to see the expected

Prior knowledge has been shown to facilitate the incorporation of visual stimuli into awareness. We adopted an individual differences approach to explore whether a tendency to ‘see the expected’ is general or method-specific. We administered a binocular rivalry task and manipulated selective attention, as well as induced expectations via predictive context, self-generated imagery, expectancy cues, and perceptual priming. Most prior manipulations led to a facilitated awareness of the biased percept in binocular rivalry, whereas strong signal primes led to a suppressed awareness, i.e., adaptation. Correlations and factor analysis revealed that the facilitatory effect of priors on visual awareness is closely related to attentional control. We also investigated whether expectation-based biases predict perceptual abilities. Adaptation to strong primes predicted improved naturalistic change detection and the facilitatory effect of weak primes predicted the experience of perceptual anomalies. Taken together, our results indicate that the facilitatory effect of priors may be underpinned by an attentional mechanism but the tendency to ‘see the expected’ is method-specific.     

Depth of intention

The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear‐cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as thinking and perception, involve discrimination at higher or lower levels. There is neither a ceiling of crystal‐clear propositions nor a floor of ‘given’ sensations or ‘objective’ stimuli independent of categorizations and discriminations, which might serve as a bridge for translation or interpretation between the conceptual‐perceptual schemes of individuals. The notions of ‘concept’, ‘conceptual framework’, ‘situation’, ‘situation type’ and ‘proposition’ are defined, with some reliance on Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. Two notions of accessibility of situation types are defined; one as constructibility of the type at a given level of discrimination, i.e. in terms of objects discerned and concepts discriminated; the other as intelligibility of the type. Intelligibility entails constructibility, but not conversely. A type of situation may be constructible at some person's level of discrimination, but not coherently intelligible to him. On this basis, a logic of senses or truth‐conditions for uses of expressions is developed, and a logic of interpretations of uses. The central notions of Naessian semantics are defined: ambiguity and direction of interpretation, level of discrimination and depth of intention.     

Settling space and covering the nation: Some conceptual considerations in analysing affect and discourse

This article explores how affect and discourse intertwine. We analyse a corpus of newspaper editorials and comment pieces from 2013 to 2014 concerning Aotearoa New Zealand's national day investigating how affective-discursive practices are mobilised to ‘cover the nation’ and ‘settle space’. We identify pervasive formulations of ‘bitter Māori’ and ‘indifferent Kiwis’ and the canon of affective-discursive repertoires and subject positions routinely set up as part of continuing white settler (Pākehā) cultural projects. A second objective is to contribute to the development of theory and method in studies of affect. We argue against non-representational perspectives and for a practice viewpoint that can work with entanglements of semiosis and embodied affect. Concepts from social psychological studies of discourse are applied in preference to ‘structures of feeling’, ‘affect economies’, ‘emoscapes’ and ‘emotion styles’.     

The Medieval Octagon of Opposition for Sentences with Quantified Predicates

The traditional Square of Opposition consists of four sentence types. Two are universal and two particular; two are affirmative and two negative. Examples, where ‘S’ and ‘P’ designate the subject and the predicate, are: ‘every S is P’, ‘no S is P’, ‘some S is P’ and ‘some S is not P’. Taking the usual sentences of the square of opposition, quantifying over their predicates exhibits non-standard sentence forms. These sentences may be combined into non-standard Squares of Opposition (an Octagon in this case), and they reveal a new relationship not found in the usual Square. Medieval logicians termed ‘disparatae’ pairs of sentences like ‘every S is some P’ and ‘some S is every P’, which are neither subaltern nor contrary, neither contradictory nor subcontrary. Walter Redmond has designed a special language L to express the logical form of these sentences in a precise way. I will use this language to show how Squares of Opposition, standard and non-standard, form a complex network of relations which bring to light the subtleties contained in this traditional doctrine.     

Differences in multiple‐target visual search performance between non‐professional and professional searchers due to decision‐making criteria

Professional visual searches, such as those conducted by airport security personnel, often demand highly accurate performance. As many factors can hinder accuracy, it is critical to understand the potential influences. Here, we examined how explicit decision‐making criteria might affect multiple‐target search performance. Non‐professional searchers (college undergraduates) and professional searchers (airport security officers) classified trials as ‘safe’ or ‘dangerous’, in one of two conditions. Those in the ‘one = dangerous’ condition classified trials as dangerous if they found one or two targets, and those in the ‘one = safe’ condition only classified trials as dangerous if they found two targets. The data suggest an important role of context that may be mediated by experience; non‐professional searchers were more likely to miss a second target in the one = dangerous condition (i.e., when finding a second found target did not change the classification), whereas professional searchers were more likely to miss a second in the one = safe condition.     

Historical Judgement, Transcendent Perspective and 'Resurrection Appearances'

Suppose one judges as a historian that after Jesus' death there was an occurrence during the careers of various individuals in which: they took it that Jesus was appearing, raised by God to Life; and a concept worked in their minds, ‘Already, Jesus has been raised to Life’. Assume also that before one are fuller statements proposed now as to what happened. Some themselves cite just inner-worldly, non-transcendent factors – delusion and so on. The ‘Encountered’ statement however runs: ‘A transcendent reality, Jesus raised by God to Life, was encountered by the individuals.’ At first glance it might seem that in principle one could say: ‘Whereas I have not been convinced by the statements citing inner-worldly factors alone, I do by contrast find the Encountered statement convincing and elucidatory.’ But on closer scrutiny, would it indeed be possible for one maturely to say that? Some commentators voice a quick ‘Yes’– an apologetic argument thus. On the other hand some press challenges that a priori one may never fittingly say that. We should be content neither with a swift ‘Yes’ nor with swift dismissiveness. How you think directly about ‘resurrection appearances’ depends much on your analysis apropos of a wide range of epistemological and other matters. Some challenges are that the Encountered statement is as such flawed. But these claims rest on premises which arguably we should judge misguided. Some challenges (Humean and Barthian) concern how one is placed when the Encountered statement lies adjacent to ‘inner-worldly’ statements. Now we should maintain a standpoint on which a person can reach, apart from regard to Jesus, a theistic outlook: yet not by ‘natural theology’. Where that person is oneself, no a priori obstacles prevent one's maturely saying, ‘The Encountered statement for me elucidates, in contrast to the others’. These points can be put without talk of ‘probability estimates’ or ‘explanation’.     

The Community Story,Relationality and Process: Bridging Tools for Researching Local Knowledge in a Peri‐urban Township

In intervening in social challenges impacting local communities, Western forms of dispute/conflict resolution have been critiqued for imparting norms, values and practices that marginalise worldviews of indigenous people. From a decolonizing stance, indigenous scholars have emphasised the need for recovery of ‘lost’ values, beliefs and practices to advance indigenous knowledge. We highlight some of the conceptual challenges associated with applying ‘indigenous knowledge’ and culture‐specific ‘indigenous methodologies’ to a marginalised peri‐urban, ethnically plural township community situated on the outskirts of Johannesburg, South Africa. In embracing the mutuality of indigenous and Western knowledge forms, we explore three elements: the community story, relationality and process in relation to initial engagements with our study community. We attempt to transcend the dualism between ‘Western’ epistemologies and ‘indigenous knowledge’ through these ‘bridging concepts’. What is offered is not a formula or model but an orientation that aims to foster mutual learning through collaborative partnerships within and between communities and researchers with a view to inspiring possibilities for creative and meaningful solutions for violence prevention and dispute/conflict resolution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptions of the Nature of Happiness: Cultural,but Related to the Dynamics of the Human Mind and the Gratification of General Needs

In her book ‘Happiness’ Laura Hyman identifies some discourses, as defined by Foucault, about happiness among 19 middle-class respondents in the UK. A discourse is a way of thinking and communicating about some issue, and comparable to a ‘perception’ or a’ view’. The dominant ‘Therapeutic Discourse’, is based on the view that happiness is an individual and normative challenge; it is to be worked on by selfcare and self-knowledge. A somewhat contradictory discourse puts more priority on social relations, as a condition for happiness. Hyman explains the co-existence of these discourses as a consequence of individualization. Individualization puts more priority on individual responsibility, but can easily lead to a neglect of social relations. It is difficult to assess the universality of these discourses, because the sample of respondents is very homogeneous. If individualization is an important factor we might expect different discourses in more collectivistic cultures. There are, however, theoretical reasons to believe that these discourses are rather universal. We may expect that the gratification of general needs is important. If certain needs are not gratified they will get more attention, and more priority, in a discourse about happiness. The ‘Therapeutic Discourse’, more in particular, is apparently a logical consequence of the dynamics of the human mind. The characteristics of the human consciousness clearly support this discourse. We need more empirical research, about discourses in different cultures, to find out for sure!     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority

It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on what makes standards like etiquette ‘not really normative’. I defend a fictionalist theory on which etiquette is ‘not really normative’ in roughly the same way that Sherlock is ‘not really a detective’, and show that fictionalism about some normative standards helps us explain the possibility of normative authority.     

Pasifika in the news: the portrayal of Pacific peoples in the New Zealand press

Pacific Islanders have faced discrimination in New Zealand particularly since the 1960s when communities began to be transplanted from their home nations to Aotearoa as cheap immigrant labour. Subsequently, the New Zealand vernacular has contained references to Pacific Islanders as ‘overstayers’, ‘coconuts’, ‘bungas’ and ‘fresh off the boat’ [FOB]. However, the legacy of a domineering relationship between the Palagi 1 majority group and Pacific minorities 2 that is captured by such derogatory terms is still evident in public forums such as the media. Using a quantitative content and qualitative narrative analysis, this paper documents portrayals of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand print media reports (n = 65) published over a 3 month period. Findings reveal that Pacific people are predominantly portrayed as unmotivated, unhealthy and criminal others who are overly dependent on Palagi support. We consider this offered pacific identity formation with that implied for Palagi, which is active, independent, competent and caring. Issues in coverage are discussed in relation to how Pacific Islanders are encouraged to see themselves, and the health and social consequences of dominant practices in press coverage. We offer some suggestions as to how more equitable representations of Pacific people could be fostered in news media. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Gender-Specific Trajectories of Conduct Problems from Ages 3 to 11

Gender-specific pathways of conduct problems (CP) from toddlerhood have received little attention. Using a nationally representative sample of UK children born in 2000–2001 (6458 boys and 6340 girls), the current study (a) identified subgroups of CP pathways separately for boys and girls from ages 3 to 11 and (b) examined early precursors (pregnancy to 9 months) of these trajectories. Group-based trajectory models identified four distinct trajectories for both boys and girls: each characterized as ‘low’; ‘early-onset, desisting’; ‘early-onset, persistent’ and ‘school-onset’. This suggests that the taxonomic framework developed to conceptualise childhood-onset CP among males is also applicable to females, though needing some revision to capture heterogeneity identified during early and middle childhood. We also found significant precursors of the different trajectory groups with some variation by gender. Early socioeconomic deprivation was a significant risk factor of the early-onset pathways among both genders, but played no significant role for ‘school-onset’. Childhood-onset trajectories of boys, but not girls, were predicted by parenting attitudes and behaviour.     

Indicating a Translation for ‘Bedeutung’

The translation of both ‘bedeuten’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in Frege's works remains sufficiently problematic that some contemporary authors prefer to leave these words untranslated. Here a case is made for returning to Russell's initial choice of ‘to indicate’ and ‘indication’ as better alternatives than the more usual ‘meaning’, ‘reference’, or ‘denotation’. It is argued that this choice has the philosophical payoff that Frege's controversial doctrines concerning the semantic values of sentences and predicative expressions are rendered far more comprehensible by it, and that this translational strategy fulfills the desiderata of offering a translation which is acceptable both before and after Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference or, as this paper would have it, between the sense of an expression and what it indicates.     

The Possibility of Inductive Moral Argumets

Abstract

Is it possible to have moral knowledge? ‘Moral justification skeptics’ hold it is not, because moral beliefs cannot have the sort of epistemic justification necessary for knowledge. This skeptical stance can be summed up in a single, eat argument, which includes the premise that ‘Inductive arguments from non-moral premises to moral conclusions are not possible.’ Other premises in the argument may rejected, but only at some cost. It would be noteworthy, therefore, if ‘inductive inferentialism’ about morals were show to be at least possible. Some philosophers may suppose that inductive moral argumets from non-moral premises cannot get off the ground, but I show that a perfectly legitimate inductive moral argument exists. This argument has on-moral premises and a moral conclusion, its premises are related to its conclusion in the right way, and it avoids some of the problems of other, better-know argumets from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’.