Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations

Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.     

Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.     

Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: when putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements

Previous negotiation research predominantly focused on psychological factors that lead to suboptimal compromises as opposed to integrative agreements. Few studies systematically analyzed factors that impact the emergence of hurtful partial impasses (i.e., nonagreements on part of the issues). The present research investigates negotiators' egoistic motivation as a determinant for the emergence of partial impasses. In addition, the authors seek to demonstrate that perspective taking serves as a powerful tool to avoid impasses and to overcome egoistic impediments. Specifically, it was predicted that within an integrative context perspective-takers succeed to exchange concessions on low- versus high-preference issues (i.e., logroll), thereby increasing their individual profits without inflicting hurtful losses upon their counterparts. Three studies were conducted to test these predictions. Study 1 reveals that whereas negotiators' egoistic motivation increases the risk of partial impasses, perspective taking alleviates this risk. Study 2 demonstrates that this beneficial effect of a perspective-taking mindset is limited to integrative negotiations and does not emerge in a distributive context, in which negotiators are constrained to achieve selfish goals by inflicting hurtful losses on their counterparts. Study 3 confirms the assumption that in an integrative context egoistic perspective-takers overcome the risk of impasses by means of logrolling. The findings of the present studies are discussed with respect to their contribution to research on negotiations, social motivation, and perspective taking.     

Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators

We addressed the questions of how and to what end negotiators sacrifice their economic outcomes in exchange for hoped-for relationship gains with the other party. We predicted that negotiators' chronic belongingness needs–fundamental to human beings–would undercut the economic value of their deals. Moreover, we tested two mechanisms by which this occurs. Belongingness needs encouraged negotiators to reduce their economic ambitions ahead of time, and they interfered with negotiators' attention to the substantive issues on the table. Rather than finding that partners were able to exploit negotiators' belongingness needs for their own economic gains, we found that their partners were left worse off. If negotiators were making a calculation initially to trade economic gains for relationship gains, we did not find evidence that this paid off with a partner who especially wanted to work with the focal negotiator in the future. We conclude that belongingness needs lead negotiators to sabotage their economic outcomes without any clear benefits to the relationships these negotiators are keen to build.     

Implementation intentions and the willful pursuit of prosocial goals in negotiations

Three studies examined whether the self-regulation strategy of forming implementation intentions (i.e., if-then plans) facilitates the attainment of prosocial goals when a limited resource is to be distributed between two parties who hold adverse cognitive orientations. In three experiments, pairs of negotiators were assigned prosocial goals that either had to be supplemented with plans (if-then plans, Gollwitzer, 1999) on how to act on these goals or not. Experiment 1 used a mixed-frames negotiation paradigm in which one negotiation partner operated on a gain-frame, the other on a loss-frame. When participants had the prosocial goal to find fair agreements and furnished it with a respective if-then plan, unfair agreements in favor of the loss-frame negotiator no longer occurred. Experiment 2 used a same-frame negotiation paradigm, where both negotiation partners had either a loss or a gain-frame. When loss-frame pairs had furnished their prosocial goals to cooperate with the negotiation partner with a respective if-then plan, reduced profits as compared to gain-frame pairs of negotiators were no longer observed. In addition, negotiators who had formed implementation intentions were more likely to use the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling (i.e., making greater concessions on low rather than high priority issues). Experiment 3 used a computer-mediated negotiation task in order to analyze the effects of prosocial goals and respective implementation intentions on the course of the negotiation. Again, implementation intentions facilitated the pursuit of prosocial goals in the face of adversity (i.e., loss frames) by use of the integrative negotiation strategy of logrolling. The present research adds a self-regulation perspective to the research on negotiation by pointing out that the effects of negotiation goals can be enhanced by furnishing them with respective plans (i.e., implementation intentions).     

Expectancy Disconfirmation and Negotiator Reactions Across Negotiation Episodes

In the negotiation literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the impact of negotiator goals and expectancy disconfirmations on negotiator behaviors and affective outcomes. We found that negotiators with larger negative expectancy disconfirmations were less satisfied; set lower targets for a subsequent negotiation; and were more likely to settle with the other party in the second negotiation, rather than requiring third-party imposition of a settlement. Those negotiators who settled had more positive feelings and perceptions about the negotiation and set higher targets for a third negotiation. Further, negotiators who experienced repeated high levels of negative expectancy disconfirmation also experienced the greatest decrements in their feelings and perceptions across negotiation episodes. Implications of study findings for future research are discussed.     

The Negotiated Allocation of Benefits and Burdens: The Impact of Outcome Valence, Contribution, and Relationship

This laboratory study investigates negotiated allocations of benefits and burdens. We compare both the distributive and integrative aspects of negotiation to determine whether benefits and burdens are allocated according to the same norms of distributive justice and how well negotiators integrate their interests. We hypothesize that the distribution of resources depends on the valence of the resources and negotiators′ relative contributions to those resources. We also expect that the efficiency of agreements depends on the valence of resources, the negotiators′ contributions, and the time horizon of their relationships. Results support the hypotheses. Equity is more commonly used to allocate burdens than benefits; agreements for allocating burdens are less integrative than those for benefits; and agreements are more efficient when relationships are long term and subjects contribute unequally to the resources being allocated than when they contribute equally or relationships are short term. We discuss these results in terms of Taylor′s (1991) hypothesis about the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events.     

Creative People Create Values: Creativity and Positive Arousal in Negotiations

Most negotiations are ill-structured situations, and the ability to identify novel options is likely to be crucial for success. This study, therefore, examined how creativity impacts negotiation processes and outcomes, and how this effect is moderated by positive arousal. The negotiators’ creative personality and their state of positive arousal were measured before they participated in a simulated negotiation, with the results demonstrating that the level of creativity in negotiation dyads was positively related to the negotiators’ joint outcome. Negotiators in high creativity dyads searched for more information by asking questions about priorities and were less narrowly focused by providing fewer single-issue offers than negotiators in low creativity dyads. Positive arousal did not affect outcome directly, but moderated the effect of creativity on joint outcomes; the effect of creativity was strongest under high levels of positive arousal. The discussion section emphasizes that future research may find creativity to have even more of a positive effect when negotiations become more complex.     

Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: The impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements

Prior research has identified benefits from certain emotion tactics in negotiation, particularly expressing anger to achieve short‐term gains. We demonstrate that such tactics can be strategically problematic due to their impact on an actor's emotions and felt trust. Through five studies, we find that negotiators' use of anger tactics during a negotiation increased their feelings of guilt and reduced the extent to which they felt trusted by their counterpart following the negotiation. We found this guilt to be the result of their aggressive tone and how they treated their counterpart. The guilt and diminished felt trust in turn motivated negotiators to engage in greater cooperative behaviors during the deal implementation process that benefited their counterpart, even if doing so was costly to the negotiator. Our results demonstrate that negotiator guilt and felt trust resulting from anger tactics influence the dynamic relationship between negotiators and their counterparts. This in turn has strategic implications for negotiators, who attempt to mitigate these negative feelings during the crucial implementation phase of a negotiated agreement.     

How Negotiator Self-Efficacy Drives Decisions to Pursue Mediation

We examined the role of self-efficacy in negotiators' choice of dispute-resolution procedures and responsiveness to third-party recommendations after an impasse. Results show that high self-efficacy negotiators were more likely to choose continued negotiation over mediation than were their low self-efficacy counterparts. In addition, we found that these negotiators were more likely to reject a mediator's recommendation for settlement, even when this recommendation was evenhanded and met their interests. As predicted, however, the influence of self-efficacy on the acceptance of recommendations was moderated by mediator credibility. When disputants perceived that the mediator had low credibility, the pattern of effects remained unchanged. However, when disputants viewed the mediator as being highly credible, self-efficacy had no influence on the acceptance/rejection of mediator recommendations.     

Negotiator confidence: The impact of self-efficacy on tactics and outcomes

In a series of four studies, we examined whether and how negotiators’ task-related self-efficacy affects their performance. In the first two studies, we identified two theoretically meaningful self-efficacy constructs—distributive self-efficacy (DSE) and integrative self-efficacy (ISE)—and provided evidence of construct validity. In the third study, task-congruent self-efficacy was positively associated with negotiators’ self-reports of tactical decision-making. In the fourth study, we measured negotiators’ tactics and found that ISE and DSE affected negotiators’ initial choice of tactics. We conclude that ISE and DSE predisposes negotiators to select certain tactics, which then guide the course of the negotiation, and, ultimately, affect the quality of deals.     

Unfixing the fixed pie: a motivated information-processing approach to integrative negotiation

Negotiators tend to believe that own and other's outcomes are diametrically opposed. When such fixed-pie perceptions (FPPs) are not revised during negotiation, integrative agreements are unlikely. It was predicted that accuracy motivation helps negotiators to release their FPPs. In 2 experiments, accuracy motivation was manipulated by (not) holding negotiators accountable for the manner in which they negotiated. Experiment 1 showed that accountability reduced FPPs during face-to-face negotiation and produced more integrative agreements. Experiment 2 corroborated these results: Accountable negotiators revised their FPPs even when information exchange was experimentally held constant. Experiment 2 also showed that accountability is effective during the encoding of outcome information. Negotiators appear flexible in their reliance on FPPs. which is consistent with a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

The more (complex), the better? The influence of epistemic motivation on integrative bargaining in complex negotiation

Negotiating about a larger number of issues is often argued to enhance the potential for integrative bargaining. However, the enhanced complexity may also make negotiators more susceptible to bias, making it less likely for them to reach win–win agreements. We argue that epistemic motivation, the motivation to hold accurate perceptions of the world, provides a key to solve this paradox. In a negotiation experiment we manipulated complexity by having participants negotiate about 6 or 18 issues and we manipulated epistemic motivation by making participants process‐accountable or not. Under low complexity, there was no effect of epistemic motivation on created value. Under high complexity, however, negotiators with high epistemic motivation created more value than negotiators with low epistemic motivation. Thus, negotiating about larger numbers of issues was only beneficial for negotiators if they were motivated to think deeply and thoroughly. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

Power and the Illusion of Transparency in Negotiations

This study examines how the illusion of transparency in negotiation differs depending on whether one is the powerful or less powerful negotiator. The illusion of transparency is the tendency for individuals to overestimate the extent to which their internal states and intentions are apparent to an outside observer. Thus, this illusion equals the difference between perceived and actual transparency. We predict that less powerful negotiators experience more perceived transparency than do powerful negotiators and that powerful negotiators exhibit greater actual transparency than do less powerful negotiators. The main hypothesis that the illusion of transparency is greater for less powerful negotiators than for powerful negotiators was supported.     

Mere physical distance and integrative agreements: When more space improves negotiation outcomes

We examined the effects of negotiating non-face-to-face with someone that is physically nearby versus faraway on integrative (mutually beneficial) agreements. Across Studies 1 and 2, we found that individuals who negotiated with another person that they believed was physically faraway (several thousand feet away) rather than nearby (a few feet away) attained more integrative agreements (higher joint outcome, more Pareto efficient agreements). In Study 3, we found that the effect of different magnitudes of physical distance between negotiators on integrative agreements depended on negotiators' construal level: individuals who negotiated with another person who was purportedly farther away achieved more integrative agreements when their level of construal was not constrained, but had no effect when they adopted a high-level of construal. The implications for non-face-to-face communication are discussed.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Longer-term consequences of anger expression in negotiation: Retaliation or spillover?

Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? According to the spillover hypothesis, negotiators demand less from previously angry partners because they perceive them as tough. According to the retaliation hypothesis, negotiators demand more from previously angry partners because of negative impressions and a desire to get even. Experiment 1 showed that participants demanded less in later negotiations when their partner in a previous negotiation had expressed anger (rather than no emotion) and the later negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner’s toughness. Experiment 2 showed that apologies reduce the negative effects of anger on impressions and desire for future interaction. Behavioral reactions were moderated by social value orientation: extending the established might/morality effect, prosocial participants responded cooperatively to an apology, whereas proselfs responded competitively.     

"Fixed Pie" a la Mode: Information Availability,Information Processing,and the Negotiation of Suboptimal Agreements

Negotiators often make errors in judgment that lead to suboptimal negotiated agreements. Although researchers agree that these errors result from "fixed pie" expectations, there is disagreement regarding how "fixed pie" expectations lead to poor outcomes. One view suggests that suboptimal agreements result when negotiators accurately process faulty and incomplete information (information availability errors); a second view holds that poorly negotiated agreements result when negotiators inaccurately process valid or complete information (information processing errors). The two experiments described in this paper confirmed that negotiators′ "fixed pie" expectations lead to suboptimal agreements via both information availability and information processing errors.