Germ-line genetic enhancement and Rawlsian primary goods

Genetic interventions raise a host of moral issues and, of its various species, germ-line genetic enhancement is the most morally contentious. This paper surveys various arguments against germ-line enhancement and attempts to demonstrate their inadequacies. A positive argument is advanced in favor of certain forms of germ-line enhancements, which holds that they are morally permissible if and only if they augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition.     

The impact of the social context on resistance to persuasion: Effortful versus effortless responses to counter-attitudinal information

Past research has demonstrated that the presence of attitudinal diversity within a person’s social network increases his or her openness to attitude change. The current research explores whether this increased openness to attitude change is the result of relatively thoughtful or nonthoughtful processes. A nationally representative sample of US adults was exposed to a counter-attitudinal persuasive message that contained either strong or weak arguments. Attitudinal diversity within participants’ social networks was associated with greater argument quality differentiation: people embedded in networks that included a variety of views were more likely than those in attitudinally homogenous networks to carefully scrutinize attitude-relevant information, modifying their attitudes in response to strong but not weak arguments.     

An experimental test of three choice shift hypotheses*

The present experiment pitted three choice shift hypotheses against each other in an attempt to eliminate one or more of the hypotheses and find support for those remaining. Ss responded three times to the 12 CDQ items, once as a pretest and twice following presentation of homogeneous sets of three arguments which advocated either a risky or a cautious position. The risk-as-value, relevant arguments, and conformity/attitude change hypotheses generated three separate predictions for the Ss' responses. Results mirrored the prediction of the relevant arguments hypothesis: New information, whether contained in cautious or risky arguments, caused a shift toward the type of argument presented. The risk-as-value and the conformity/attitude change hypotheses could not explain the present data.     

Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Perceptions of entitativity and attitude change

The current work explored the properties of groups that lead them to be persuasive and the processes through which such persuasion occurs. Because more entitative groups induce greater levels of information processing, their arguments should receive greater elaboration, leading to persuasion when members of groups present strong (vs. weak) counter attitudinal arguments. Experiment 1 explored these hypotheses by examining if idiosyncratic perceptions of group entitativity and manipulations of argument strength affect attitude change and argument elaboration. Experiment 2 experimentally manipulated group entitativity and argument strength independently to examine the causal relationship between entitativity, attitude change, and argument elaboration. In both experiments, it was found that groups greater in entitativity were more persuasive when presenting strong (vs. weak) arguments and induced greater argument elaboration. Implications for our understanding of entitativity, persuasion, and information processing about social groups are discussed.     

Age differences in attitude change: influences of cognitive resources and motivation on responses to argument quantity

This study examined the influences of cognitive resources and motivation on how young and older adults process different quantities of persuasive arguments. In the first experiment session, both young and older adults rated their attitudes toward marijuana legalization and capital punishment. After a week, they read either 3 or 9 similar-quality arguments supporting marijuana legalization and capital punishment. Half of participants were assigned to the high-involvement condition (i.e., told that they were going to discuss the arguments later with the experimenter) and the other half were assigned to the low-involvement condition (i.e., given no instructions). After reading the arguments, participants rated their attitudes toward those 2 social issues again. Highly involved young adults changed their attitudes regardless of the quantity of arguments, whereas lowly involved young adults' attitude change was influenced by the argument quantity. Older adults in both high-involvement and low-involvement conditions changed their attitudes according to the argument quantity. Working memory was found to mediate the age effects on attitude change. This finding demonstrated the importance of a cognitive mechanism in accounting for age differences in attitude change.     

Deliberate practice in dogs: a canine model of expertise

The acquisition of expertise is an area of controversy between those who lean more toward learning and those who lean more toward talent. Because the genetics and early life experiences of humans are not open to direct manipulation, human studies are of limited use in this debate. Studies using nonhumans as expert models may prove useful in resolving this dispute. For nonhumans to be considered proper models of human experts, there must be evidence supporting a shared acquisition mechanism. A candidate mechanism is deliberate practice. The author tested the deliberate practice theory of expertise acquisition on dogs competing in the sport of agility. The author examined the relationships between amounts of accumulated deliberate practice and agility performance measures. The author found there was a statistically significant relationship between the amount of deliberate practice and measured performance in agility dogs, even when controlling for sex, breed group, age, and height.     

Evil and the many universes response

I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. It follows that we cannot know that the atheistic argument from evil is sound, in which case we cannot be certain that the argument succeeds, and so it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments.     

Germ-line gene therapy and the clinical ethos of medical genetics

Although the ability to perform gene therapy in human germ-line cells is still hypothetical, the rate of progress in molecular and cell biology suggests that it will only be a matter of time before reliable clinical techniques will be within reach. Three sets of arguments are commonly advanced against developing those techniques, respectively pointing to the clinical risks, social dangers and better alternatives. In this paper we analyze those arguments from the perspective of the client-centered ethos that traditionally governs practice in medical genetics. This perspective clarifies the merits of these arguments for geneticists, and suggests useful new directions for the professional discussion of germ-line gene therapy. It suggests, for example, that the much discussed prospect of germ-line therapy in human pre-embryos may always be more problematic for medical genetics than adult germ-line interventions, even though the latter faces greater technical difficulties.     

Should we change the human genome?

Should we change the human genome? The most general arguments against changing the human genome are here in focus. Distinctions are made between positive and negative gene therapy, between germ-line and somatic therapy, and between therapy where the intention is to benefit a particular individual (a future child) and where the intention is to benefit the human gene-pool. Some standard arguments against gene-therapy are dismissed. Negative somatic therapy is not controversial. Even negative, germ-line therapy is endorsed, if the intention is to cure a certain individual (a future child). In rare cases, positive therapy on somatic cells may be warranted. Germ-line therapy may become a valuable method of preventing harm, through ‘genetic vaccination’. If safe methods evolve, it is harmless (though vain), to try to achieve more ambitious goals. Prospective parents should not be prevented from exercising this harmless kind of parental authority. The paper concludes: Thereis a moral limit to how much we ought to manipulate the human genome, however. We ought not to jeopardize the continued existence of mankind. We ought not to develop methods of germ-line therapy intended in a radical manner to improve human nature, and we ought to leave to prospective parents to decide in individual cases what kind of intervention shall take place.     

The Effects of Argument Quality and Involvement Type on Attitude Formation and Attitude Change: A Test of Dual‐Process and Social Judgment Predictions

Involvement has long been theoretically specified as a crucial factor determining the persuasive impact of messages. In social judgment theory, ego‐involvement makes people more resistant to persuasion, whereas in dual‐process models, high‐involvement people are susceptible to persuasion when argument quality is high. It is argued that these disparate predictions might be reconciled by either different involvement types (i.e., value relevant vs. outcome relevant) or different attitude modification processes (i.e., attitude change vs. attitude formation). An experiment (N = 684) varying topic, position advocated, outcome relevance, and argument quality tested these moderators. The data were consistent with existence of two different types of involvement, but none of the theoretical predictions were consistent with the data. Instead, a main effect for argument quality had the largest impact on attitude change. Regardless of value‐relevant involvement, outcome‐relevant involvement, and attitude modification process, participants were more persuaded by high‐ rather than low‐quality arguments, with boomerang effects observed for low‐quality arguments. These findings highlight the importance of sound message design in persuasion.     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

Individual Differences in the Interpretation of Commitment in Argumentation

The present study explored several dispositional factors associated with individual differences in lay adult’s interpretation of when an arguer is, or is not, committed to a statement. College students were presented with several two-person arguments in which the proponent of a thesis conceded a key point in the last turn. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which that concession implied a change in the proponent’s attitude toward any of the previous statements in the argument. Participants designated as ‘liberal’ used the concession to infer substantial change in commitment to earlier statements in the argument. A group designated as ‘conservative’ were reluctant to make any such inferences. A discriminant analysis indicated that variables assessing participants’ attitudes toward argument as well as their cognitive and communication styles jointly predicted their liberal or conservative status. The discriminant function and follow-up group comparisons indicated that liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in argument. This included a greater tendency to use argument as a source of knowledge. Liberals also employed a more sophisticated message design logic than conservatives on a communication task. The groups did not clearly differ with respect to participants’ implicit theory of argument, though trends were present that merit attention in future research. Implications of these findings for future research on lay interpretations of commitment are discussed.     

Biomedical enhancement and the pursuit of mastery and perfection: a critique of the views of Michael Sandel

This article is a comprehensive critical analysis of the objections of Michael Sandel to the possibilities of human enhancement as foreseen by recent developments in new (particularly genetic) biotechnologies. It is shown that enhancement has always been a feature of human development. The nature and possibilities of these new technologies are briefly discussed, followed by an explanation of Sandel's views. In critical response to Sandel, the author raises three arguments that are discussed in detail, followed by a conclusion that contains wrap-up arguments. The three main arguments relate, first, to Sandel's rejection of enhancement tout court, second to the (in)consistency of his argument about the ‘gifted’ nature of reality, and third to the problems raised by his idea that the striving for mastery is the main problem with enhancement. On the basis of an extensive analysis, the author finds Sandel's position untenable. It is shown that Sandel espouses the ‘simple conservative argument’ (Buchanan). The author concludes that science and technology are not value free, and that the critical evaluation of enhancements cannot lead to an overall judgment, but has to progress in a piecemeal manner. The author also concludes that the notion of ‘human nature’ cannot be regarded as a moral desideratum.     

Biased assimilation: the role of source position

Biased assimilation is the tendency to evaluate belief‐consistent information more positively than belief‐inconsistent information. Previous research has demonstrated that biased assimilation is due to an inconsistency between an argument and the recipient's position toward this argument. The present research revealed that an inconsistency between a source's position (independently of the argument) and the recipient's position is also responsible for biased assimilation. In two studies, participants evaluated arguments stated by a politician. Party affiliation of the politician was correctly labeled, incorrectly labeled, or not labeled. The politicians' arguments were evaluated more favorably by their respective voters when party affiliation was correctly labeled. This biased evaluation diminished when party affiliation was not labeled and even slightly reversed when party affiliation was incorrectly labeled. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The analysis of human behavior in context

Does the name of the special interest group, “The Experimental Analysis of Human Behavior,” imply that those who analyze the behavior of human animals must organize themselves apart from those who analyze the behavior of nonhuman animals? Is the use of nonhumans in experiments really not relevant to the analysis of the behavior of humans? If so, then something must have changed. Many differences exist, of course, between the behavior of humans and nonhumans—humans, for example, cannot fly under their own power—but have we really isolated differences in principle, differences that require separate organizations for the study of each? I will try to indicate why I believe this is a serious concern, where the concern comes from, and what, perhaps, might be done to maintain what was once a flourishing bidirectional relation between research with humans and nonhumans, in both basic and applied research.     

The Development of Expertise: Animal Models?

There is a continuing debate in the psychological literature between researchers who lean more toward learning theories of expertise development and those who lean more toward talent theories. However, the development of human expertise has not been open to direct experimental methods and will probably continue to elude experimentalists in the future. A promising alternative to direct experimental methods is to use nonhuman animal models, a possibility that researchers in expertise seem to have overlooked. However, there are studies in the animal behavior literature that address the development of nonhuman animal expertise without specifically referring to the topic as expertise. In the present study, the author discusses two nonhuman animal examples of expertise development that have been researched by ethologists. Nonhuman animal expertise development, unlike human expertise development, is subject to direct experimentation. The author thus recommends that researchers use nonhuman animals in their studies of expertise.     

The development of expertise: animal models?

There is a continuing debate in the psychological literature between researchers who lean more toward learning theories of expertise development and those who lean more toward talent theories. However, the development of human expertise has not been open to direct experimental methods and will probably continue to elude experimentalists in the future. A promising alternative to direct experimental methods is to use human animal models, a possibility that researchers in expertise seem to have overlooked. However, there are studies in the animal behavior literature that address the development of nonhuman animal expertise without specifically referring to the topic as expertise. In the present study, the author discusses two nonhuman animal examples of expertise development that have been researched by ethologists. Nonhuman animal expertise development, unlike human expertise development, is subject to direct experimentation. The author thus recommends that researchers use nonhuman animals in their studies of expertise.     

Balancing and positivity effects in social recall

Three experiments were conducted, in each of which subjects first rated an issue using the evaluation scales of the semantic differential and subsequently wrote sets of arguments concerning the issue They their rated each argument for strength of then-agreement or disagreement with it The results in all studies showed that subjects wrote a greater number of attitude-consistent arguments than attitude-inconsistent arguments (a balancing effect) The preponderance of attitude-consistent arguments increased as attitude became more extreme In all studies strength of agreement with either pro or con arguments was a function of attitude, but strength of disagreement was not Subjects wrote more arguments with which they agreed than arguments with which they disagreed (a positivity effect), but this effect only occurred when subjects were not specifically instructed to partition arguments into those they agreed with and those they disagreed with. Level of dogmatism or intolerance of ambiguity did not affect the number of attitude-consistent versus attitude-inconsistent arguments written or strength of agreement/disagreement with them. Results were discussed in terms of a balance model of information processing and the effects of the social situation on the recall process