Simultaneous perception of both interpretations of ambiguous figures

When viewing ambiguous figures like the classic duck/rabbit, people alternately perceive one interpretation and then the other, but not both interpretations at once. When two identical ambiguous figures appear together, the majority of observers perceive them as identical, and they typically alternate in unison. Just as most observers cannot see a single figure as both a duck and a rabbit, most cannot see one figure in a pair as a duck and the other as a rabbit even though the two figures and their features are spatially distinct. Is this inability to see both interpretations an inherent limitation of the visual system or is it just due to differences in top-down processing? We show that a simple prompt immediately allows people to see both interpretations, to their own surprise.     

Enduring interest in perceptual ambiguity: alternating views of reversible figures

Research favoring the so-called bottom-up and top-down classes of explanations for reversible figures that dominated the literature in last half of the 20th century is reviewed. Two conclusions are offered. First, any single-process model is extremely unlikely to be able to accommodate the wide array of empirical findings, suggesting that the "final" explanation will almost certainly involve a hybrid conceptualization of interacting sensory and cognitive processes. Second, the utility of distinguishing between 2 components of the observer's experience with reversible figures is emphasized. This distinction between the observer's ability to access multiple representations from the single stimulus pattern (ambiguity) and the observer's phenomenal experience of oscillation between those representations (reversibility) permits the literature to be segregated into useful categories of research that expose overlapping but distinctive cortical processes.     

Multistable perception: when bottom-up and top-down coincide

During prolonged observation of an ambiguous figure sudden perceptual reversals occur, while the stimulus itself stays unchanged. There is a vivid debate about whether bottom-up or top-down mechanisms underlie this phenomenon. In the present study, we investigated the interrelation of two experimental factors: volitional control and discontinuous stimulus presentation. Both factors strongly modulate the rate of perceptual reversals and each is attributed either as top-down or bottom-up. We found that participants can apply specific strategies to volitionally increase and/or decrease the stability duration of each of the possible percepts according to the experimental instructions. When attempts of volitional control are combined with discontinuous stimulus presentation the effects are fully additive. Our results indicate that perceptual reversals can originate from different neural mechanisms on different time scales.     

Children's understanding of ambiguous figures: Which cognitive developments are necessary to experience reversal?

In two experiments involving one hundred and thirty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds we examined the claim that a complex understanding of ambiguity is required to experience reversal of ambiguous stimuli [Gopnik, A., & Rosati, A. (2001). Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations. Developmental Science, 4, 175–183]. In Experiment 1 a novel Production task measured the ability to acknowledge both interpretations of ambiguous figures. This was as easy as and significantly correlated with a False Belief task, and easier than a Droodle task. We replicated this finding in Experiment 2, and also found that perceiving reversal of ambiguous figures was harder than either the False Belief or Production tasks. In contrast to previous findings, the Reversal and Droodle tasks were not specifically related. We conclude that children only attempt reversal once they can understand the representational relationship between the figure and its two interpretations. The process resulting in reversal however is hard, probably requiring additional developments in executive functioning and imagery abilities.     

Perceiving depth in point-light actions

The present study investigates how observers assign depth in point-light figures, by manipulating spatiotemporal characteristics of the stimuli. Previous research on the perception of point-light walkers revealed bistability (i.e., that a point-light walker is perceived as either facing the viewer or facing away from the viewer) and the presence of a perceptual bias (i.e., a tendency to perceive the figure as facing the viewer). Here, we study the generality of these phenomena by having observers indicate the global depth orientation of different ambiguous point-light actions. Results demonstrate bistability for all actions, but the presence of a preferred interpretation depends strongly on the performed action, showing that the process of depth assignment takes into account the movements the point-light figure performs. Two additional experiments, using unfamiliar movement patterns without strong semantic correlates, show that purely kinematic aspects of a naction also strongly affect d epth assignment. Together, the results reveal the perception of depth in point-light figures to be a flexible processinvolving both bottom-up and top-down components.     

Ambiguous figures: living versus nonliving objects

Eleven series of figures were studied, each series ranging from one extreme interpretation via five ambiguous intermediates to a second extreme interpretation. Triplets consisting of an ambiguous exemplar in the middle flanked on the left and right by its two extreme interpretations were presented to large groups of subjects. The initial aim was to establish the levels of perceptual ambiguity of each exemplar in a series, and normative data on the ambiguous figures are provided for future reference and use. However, several biases were encountered and these were examined in more detail. In experiment 1 the subject's task was to compare the middle figure with the flankers and draw an arrow from the middle figure towards the flanking extreme they judged the most similar. Here, an overall preference for the left extreme was found. Therefore the instructions were reversed in experiment 2; flankers had to be compared with the middle figure. The preference for the left extreme remained for figures of living objects, but for nonliving objects the preference switched to the right extreme. To do away with any effect of the arrows, in experiment 3 subjects were divided into two groups each receiving different instructions and were asked to circle one of the extremes. However, the pattern of biases remained the same. The bias found with figures of living objects may be explained on the basis of top-down processes. For nonliving figures, an hypothesis based on bottom-up processes like neural fatigue was considered but rejected.     

Interpreting ambiguous stimuli: Separating perceptual and judgmental biases

Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s [Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59–108] diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment.     

Untrained speakers' use of prosody in syntactic disambiguation and listeners' interpretations

We investigated how naively produced prosody affects listeners' end interpretations of ambiguous utterances. Non-professional speakers who were unaware of any ambiguity produced ambiguous sentences couched in short, unambiguous passages. In a forced-choice task, listeners could not tell which context the isolated ambiguous sentences came from (Exp. 1). However, listeners were able to correctly paraphrase the least ambiguous subset of these utterances, showing that prosody can be used to resolve ambiguity (Exp. 2). Nonetheless, in everyday language use, both prosody and context are available to interpret speech. When the least ambiguous sentences were cross-spliced into contexts biasing towards their original interpretations or into contexts biasing towards their alternative interpretations, answers to content questions about the ambiguous sentence, confidence ratings, and ratings of naturalness all indicated that prosody is ignored when context is available (Exp. 3). Although listeners can use prosody to interpret ambiguous sentences, they generally do not, and this makes sense in light of the frequent lack of reliable prosodic cues in everyday speech. Received: 3 April 1998 / Accepted: 21 October 1998     

Differences in top-down influences on the reversal rate of different categories of reversible figures

Understanding the mechanisms underlying the multistability of reversible figures may provide valuable insights into the normal functioning of our visual system. The proposed factors that control the perceptual alternations of reversible figures can be classified into bottom-up and top-down processes. In the present study, we report differences in top-down effects on the reversal rate depending on whether a structural perspective (Necker cube, Schr?der staircase) or a meaningful content (duck/rabbit figure, chef/dog figure) is subject to the reversal phenomenon. In order to activate top-down mechanisms explicitly the subjects had the instruction to bring the reversal rate under voluntary control. The results indicated that both slowing down and speeding up the rate of alternations was more effective for the content-reversal figures (duck/rabbit, chef/dog) than for the rather abstract perspective-reversal figures (Necker cube, Schr?der staircase). In order to investigate the effect of meaningfulness in figure/ground reversals, the effect of the same instructional variable was also determined for Rubin's vase/faces and the Maltese cross. The results showed a similar tendency as in the case of the comparison between perspective reversals and content reversals. Possible cognitive processes that may play a role in top-down influences on figure reversal and theoretical implications of these findings for the interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes are discussed.     

Moral Instincts and the Problem with Reductionism: A Critical Look at the Work of Marc Hauser

In his most recent book Moral Minds, Marc Hauser argues that many foundational moral instincts have clear biological explanations. To make this argument, Hauser focuses on the similarities between the acquisition of morality and the acquisition of language. Similar to language, one learns a particular moral framework from one's environment, but the biological components necessary for moral development are universal. While I agree with Hauser's overall conclusion regarding moral instincts, I reject the notion that a purely biological analysis of morality can provide an adequate framework for justification. The problem, as I see it, is Hauser acknowledges the bottom-up influences taking place between biology and moral formation, but he refuses to account for the top-down influences that occur between metaphysical assumptions, moral beliefs, and biological conclusions. Thus, the current critique will focus on the connection between Hauser's failure to account for top-down influence and the subsequent shortcoming related to moral justification.     

Ambiguous figure perception and theory of mind understanding in children with autistic spectrum disorders

Researchers in early social‐cognition have found that the ability to reverse an ambiguous figure is correlated with success on theory of mind tasks (e.g. Gopnik & Rosati, 2001 ). The present experiment examined children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) without mental delay to see whether a similar relationship existed. Ropar, Mitchell, and Ackroyd (2003) demonstrated that children with ASD with mental delay were impaired on theory of mind tasks, but were as likely as mentally delayed controls to generate both interpretations of an ambiguous figure when informed of its ambiguity. The present study replicated this finding on children with ASD without mental delay. However, overall perception of ambiguous figures was different. These children were less likely to spontaneously generate both interpretations of the figure, and more likely to perseverate on a single interpretation than the comparison children. Like Ropar et al., we found no correlation between theory of mind and informed reversals, but spontaneous reversals were correlated with performance on an advanced theory of mind task. These data suggest that reversals of ambiguous figures are linked to higher‐level representational abilities, which might also be involved in social functioning, and impaired in children with ASD.     

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Processes in Emotion Generation: Common and Distinct Neural Mechanisms

ABSTRACT— Emotions are generally thought to arise through the interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes. However, prior work has not delineated their relative contributions. In a sample of 20 females, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to compare the neural correlates of negative emotions generated by the bottom-up perception of aversive images and by the top-down interpretation of neutral images as aversive. We found that (a) both types of responses activated the amygdala, although bottom-up responses did so more strongly; (b) bottom-up responses activated systems for attending to and encoding perceptual and affective stimulus properties, whereas top-down responses activated prefrontal regions that represent high-level cognitive interpretations; and (c) self-reported affect correlated with activity in the amygdala during bottom-up responding and with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex during top-down responding. These findings provide a neural foundation for emotion theories that posit multiple kinds of appraisal processes and help to clarify mechanisms underlying clinically relevant forms of emotion dysregulation.     

Attentional processing and the subjective contour illusion

Leading explanations of the subjective contour illusion can be classified as being either "bottom-up" or "top-down." Bottom-up explanations assert that peripheral, physiological mechanisms often associated with the perception of real contours also account for subjective contour (SC) perception. In contrast, top-down explanations posit a more central locus of SC perception and are formulated on a molar, psychological level. A major aspect of bottom-up perceptual processing is that it is largely automatic. On the other hand, top-down processing implies a greater role for selective attention. In an effort to distinguish between bottom-up and top-down accounts of SC perception, the present investigation used a dual-task paradigm to test the relative attentional demands of real contour perception versus SC perception. In the primary task, subjects made speeded same-different discriminations of either paired SC forms or their real contour analogues. Half the subjects performed this primary task in conjunction with a six-digit short-term memory load secondary task. If subjective forms indeed impose a greater limited-capacity processing load than real forms, then the need to share processing capacity with a secondary task was expected to produce a greater increment in reaction time (RT) for subjective relative to real forms. The results indicated that the expected enhanced RT increment for subjective relative to real forms with the addition of a concurrent memory load was limited to same trials. This result implies that the nature of response indicators must be considered in assessing capacity requirements with the sort of dual-task paradigm used in the present investigation. Nevertheless, the fact that the increment in same RT with the addition of a concurrent memory load was greater for subjective relative to real forms accords with expectations derived from the notion that the perception of SCs is more attention demanding than that of real contours. If the interpretation of the present study is correct, then a comprehensive theory of SC perception will most likely be formulated within the top-down perspective of conceptually driven visual information processing.     

Feature-based attention resolves depth ambiguity

Perceiving the world around us requires that we resolve ambiguity. This process is often studied in the lab using ambiguous figures whose structures can be interpreted in multiple ways. One class of figures contains ambiguity in its depth relations, such that either of two surfaces could be seen as being the “front” of an object. Previous research suggests that selectively attending to a given location on such objects can bias the perception of that region as the front. This study asks whether selectively attending to a distributed feature can also bias that region toward the front. Participants viewed a structure-from-motion display of a rotating cylinder that could be perceived as rotating clockwise or counterclockwise (as imagined viewing from the top), depending on whether a set of red or green moving dots were seen as being in the front. A secondary task encouraged observers to globally attend to either red or green. Results from both Experiment 1 and 2 showed that the dots on the cylinder that shared the attended feature, and its corresponding surface, were more likely to be seen as being in the front, as measured by participants’ clockwise versus counterclockwise percept reports. Feature-based attention, like location-based attention, is capable of biasing competition among potential interpretations of figures with ambiguous structure in depth.     

The Learning Signal in Perceptual Tuning of Speech: Bottom Up Versus Top-Down Information

Cognitive systems face a tension between stability and plasticity. The maintenance of long-term representations that reflect the global regularities of the environment is often at odds with pressure to flexibly adjust to short-term input regularities that may deviate from the norm. This tension is abundantly clear in speech communication when talkers with accents or dialects produce input that deviates from a listener's language community norms. Prior research demonstrates that when bottom-up acoustic information or top-down word knowledge is available to disambiguate speech input, there is short-term adaptive plasticity such that subsequent speech perception is shifted even in the absence of the disambiguating information. Although such effects are well-documented, it is not yet known whether bottom-up and top-down resolution of ambiguity may operate through common processes, or how these information sources may interact in guiding the adaptive plasticity of speech perception. The present study investigates the joint contributions of bottom-up information from the acoustic signal and top-down information from lexical knowledge in the adaptive plasticity of speech categorization according to short-term input regularities. The results implicate speech category activation, whether from top-down or bottom-up sources, in driving rapid adjustment of listeners' reliance on acoustic dimensions in speech categorization. Broadly, this pattern of perception is consistent with dynamic mapping of input to category representations that is flexibly tuned according to interactive processing accommodating both lexical knowledge and idiosyncrasies of the acoustic input.     

Duck or rabbit? Reversing ambiguous figures and understanding ambiguous representations

In two studies we investigated 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children’s ability to reverse ambiguous figures and the relation between this ability and the ability to understand multiple representations. Children never reversed before they were informed of the two alternative interpretations of the figures. Even when they were informed of the alternatives and understood that both were possible, 3‐year‐olds and most 4‐year‐olds did not reverse. In contrast, a majority of 5‐year‐olds did reverse. In general, children only reversed if they also passed a standard false belief task. However, there was a closer correlation between reversals and a ‘droodle’ task that involved an understanding of the ambiguity of perceptual representations. These results suggest that the immediate experience of reversal may depend on a more abstract understanding of ambiguous representations.