Saying and Showing: Art,Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen’s Brand, Goethe’s Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Saying and Showing: Art, Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen's Brand, Goethe's Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Naming,Saying, and Structure

It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world's structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law‐hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies developed by Lewis and by Sider in his Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint‐carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar. I then show that the collective motivations for distinguishing perspicuous from mere truths do not allow Lewis and Sider to properly impose constraints on grammar.     

Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content

Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in which conceptual pluralism provides an advantage in satisfying the empirical and philosophical demands on a theory of conceptual structure and content.     

Rights Enforcement,Trade-offs,and Pluralism

This paper asks whether (human) rights enforcement is permissible given that it may entail infringing on the rights of innocent bystanders. I consider two strategies that adopt a rights-sensitive consequentialist framework and offer a positive answer to this question, namely Amartya Sen’s and Hillel Steiner’s. Against Sen, I argue that trade-offs between rights are problematic since they contradict the purpose of rights, which is to provide a pluralist solution to disagreement about values, i.e. to allow agents to act in accordance with their values. I further argue that Steiner’s compensation strategy does not succeed in avoiding trade-offs so it falls prey to the same criticism. I propose a non-trade-off solution that is implicit in the accounts discussed and is more consistent with the meta-ethical framework advocated by Sen. This solution relies on an enforceable duty to share in the costs of rights enforcement hence it entails a degree of redistribution for enforcement purposes.     

Art,Ethics, and Critical Pluralism

Those who have views about the relation between aesthetic and ethical value often also have views about the nature of art criticism. Yet no one has paid much attention to the compatibility of views in one debate with views in the other. This is worrying in light of a tension between two popular kinds of view: namely, between critical pluralism and any view in the art and ethics debate that presupposes an invariant relation between aesthetic value and ethical value. Specifically, the tension with invariance arises insofar as critical pluralism accommodates the aesthetic value of interpretive richness, including the aesthetic value of ethically conflicted interpretive richness. Given this tension, a shift of focus is needed in the art and ethics debate; from specifying the criteria for the aesthetic relevance of a work's ethical qualities to defending the fundamental nature of the aesthetic‐ethical value relation.     

Pluralism,Postmodernism and Interreligious Dialogue

Interreligious dialogue does not take place in a vacuum, nor is it a matter of casual conversation. Dialogue is a contested phenomenon, advocated and embraced on one hand, eschewed and discarded on the other. By way of an exploration of the fact of plurality, the notions of modernism and postmodernism, and a brief discussion of select pertinent issues (unity, truth, and the very idea of theology), the paradigmatic context of pluralism will be critically discussed. Contemporary engagement in interreligious dialogue and interfaith relations requires to be underpinned by a carefully thought-out conceptualising of the context in which it can authentically occur. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the context of and for interreligious dialogue.

Pluralism, Otherness, and the Augustinian Tradition

Recent work on religious pluralism profits from the systematic theological framework offered by the Augustinian tradition, which uses interrreligious dialogue in the service of its larger "conversionist" purposes. In so using dialogue, the tradition transforms our vision of the epistemic problem of pluralism into the theological problem of otherness; interreligious dialogue reflects the self's inescapable dialogue with God, and reveals the self as constituted by such dialogue. Thus, those more mundane forms of dialogue, which engage the self in conversation with others, offer opportunities for the further manifestation of the Divine love and the fulfillment of the divine purpose.