Counterfactual Causation and Mental Causation

Counterfactual conditionals have been appealed to in various ways to show how the mind can be causally efficacious. However, it has often been overestimated what the truth of certain counterfactuals actually indicates about causation. The paper first identifies four approaches that seem to commit precisely this mistake. The arguments discussed involve erroneous assumptions about the connection of counterfactual dependence and genuine causation, as well as a disregard of the requisite evaluation conditions of counterfactuals. In a second step, the paper uses the insights of the foregoing analyses to formulate a set of counterfactuals-based conditions that are characterized as sufficient to establish singular causal claims. The paper concludes that there are ample reasons to believe that some mental events satisfy all these conditions with respect to certain further events and, hence, that mental events sometimes are causes.     

Sparse Causation and Mere Abundant Causation

Philosophical Studies - Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere...     

Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation

The paper argues for four claims: (1) The problem of mental causation and the argument for its solution in terms of the identity of mental with physical causes are independent of the theory of causation one favours. (2) If one considers our experience of agency as described by folk psychology to be veridical, one is committed to an anti-Humean metaphysics of causation in terms of powers that establish necessary connections. The same goes for functional properties in general. (3) A metaphysics of causation in terms of powers is compatible with physics. (4) If combined with the argument for mental causes being identical with physical causes, that metaphysics leads to a conservative reductionism.     

The development of Marx's economic theory

Marx develops his economic theory in Capital in a rather peculiar way. This paper focuses on some of these peculiarities, especially his attempt to base his account of prices and derivative entities (profit, rate of profit, etc.) on the labour theory of value. Although he may be said to have failed in this, there is still some kind of Marxist theory of prices possible. This is due to both, the so-called fundamental theorem (linking profit and surplus-value) and the possibility, shown by Sraffa and others, to determine prices from the physical parameters of production. By adding on an earlier paper of mine, in which the surplus-value theory has been reconstructed within the structuralistic framework, this paper sketches such a reconstruction for the basic parts of a full-blown Marxist economic theory of capitalistic production.I am indebted to Prof. Peter Flaschel for some useful hints.     

Computation and Causation

The computer's effect on our understanding of causation has been enormous. By the mid-1980s, philosophical and social-scientific work on the topic had left us with (1) no reasonable reductive account of causation and (2) a class of statistical causal models tied to linear regression. At this time, computer scientists were attacking the problem of equipping robots with models of the external that included probabilistic portrayals of uncertainty. To solve the problem of efficiently storing such knowledge, they introduced Bayes Networks and directed graphs. By attaching a causal interpretation to Bayes Networks, the philosophy of causation changed dramatically. We are now able to be extremely general about how causal structure connects to data, and systematic about when causal structures are empirically indistinguishable. In this essay I try to motivate and describe this synthesis.     

心理学中的个体性与因果性

心理因果性是个体主义和反个体主义争论的问题之一。福多坚持心理学个体主义,主张心理因果性随附于大脑因果性,心理状态在类型上是个体化的。本文认为,福多个体主义论证的前提是不成立的,心理因果性观念不同于物理因果性观念,心理因果性并不完全依赖于大脑因果性,它还受到个体-环境交互活动,以及进化历史的影响。本文提出心理学中的因果性观念不是一个有关属性或实在的描述,而是一个解释类,它可以用非个体主义方式处理而实现个体化。     

Causation and Identity

Causal accounts of the transtemporal identity of physical objects and of persons are not completely new. Passages in Hume can be read as suggesting causal accounts of the identity of physical objects and of the self, as can Kant's arguments that the successive states of an objective substance must be causally connected; and in this century, a variety of causal accounts of the identity conditions for persons and for physical objects have been proposed. Such accounts, especially for physical objects, have not been very fully developed, however, and here I want to provide a more detailed motivation for, and development of, a causal account of identity through time and to examine some of its implications. I think that my general line of argument applies both to persons and to physical objects, though to keep the discussion manageable I shall concentrate on the latter.     

Causation and Counterfactual Dependence

Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.     

Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Causation

It is suggested that taking into account considerations that traditionally fall within the scope of computer science in general, and artificial intelligence in particular, sheds new light on the subject of causation. It is argued that adopting causal notions con be viewed as filling a computational need: They allow reasoning with incomplete information, facilitate economical representations, and afford relatively efficient methods for reasoning about those representations. Specifically, it is proposed that causal reasoning is intimately bound to nonmonotonic reasoning. An account of causation is offered that relies upon this connection, and compares this proposal to previous accounts within philosophy and artificial intelligence.     

Transition Chances and Causation

Abstract: The general claims of this paper are as follows. As a result of chaotic dynamics we can usually not know what the deterministic causes of events are. There will, however, be invariant forwards transition chances from earlier types of events, which we typically call the causes, to later types of events, which we typically call the effects. There will be no invariant backwards transition chances between these types of events. This asymmetry has the same origin and explanation as the arrow of time of thermodynamics.     

Causation and Induction1

The connection between views about causation and attempts to justify inductive reasoning is sufficiently close that some philosophers² have taken success at the latter as a litmus test for the truth of the former. I do not agree with this approach. Like Hume, I believe that the nature of causal connections must be understood prior to, and independently of, solutions to the problem of induction. Like Hume, I also hold that the problem of induction cannot be solved if Hume's analysis of causal connections is correct. But unlike Hume, I believe that that analysis is incorrect. However, I shall not attempt to establish this crucial thesis here. I mention it because this paper presupposes it. Hume's difficulty about causation must—and can—be faced head-on. There are phenomenological grounds for affirming that we sometimes directly experience nonlogical, necessary connections between events. I shall only briefly summarize these grounds, which will be argued for in detail elsewhere. The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which a necessitarian theory of causation can bring the problem of induction closer to solution.     

Determination and Mental Causation

Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won't work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by Yablo. I then consider two common accounts of the mental, token identity theories and dispositional theories, and argue that on neither do mental and physical properties satisfy the requirements for determination.     

Current Issues in Causation

Book Information Current Issues in Causation. Current Issues in Causation Wolfgang Spohn Marion Ledwig Michael Esfeld Paderborn Mentis 2001 207 Paperback DM 78 Edited by Wolfgang Spohn; Marion Ledwig; Michael Esfeld. Mentis. Paderborn. Pp. 207. Paperback:DM 78,     

Doings and Subject Causation

In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human experience. A theory of ‘subject causation’ according to which the active subject continuously and simultaneously causes physical changes is sketched. This account is—according to the phenomenological claim defended—compatible with the content of our daily experiences in doing something and in observing others in their doings and it has a number of further more theoretical advantages: it does not touch the autonomy of neurophysiology and it is compatible with a thesis of supervenience of the mental on the physical. It does however require a weak version of subject-body dualism.

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