Weltanschauung as a priori: sociology of knowledge from a ‘romantic’ stance

In this paper I reconstruct the central concept of the young Lukács??s and Mannheim??s sociology of knowledge, as they present it in their writings in the early decades of the twentieth century. I argue that this concept, namely Weltanschauung, is used to refer to some conceptually unstructured totality of feelings, which they take to be a condition of possibility of intellectual production, and this understanding is contrasted to an alternative construal of the term that presents it as logically structured, quasi-theoretical background knowledge. This concept has Kantian reminiscences: it is a condition of possibility of intellectual production in general. The young Mannheim and Lukács rely on ??Weltanschauung?? so understood as a phenomenon mediating between the facts of society and individual intellectual production and reception: it is seen as being conditioned by sociological facts and therefore as a historical and sociological category through which, and therefore indirectly, society enters into intellectual production.     

When do children begin to understand logical inference as a source of knowledge?

Previous research (Sodian & Wimmer, 1987) suggests that it is not until about 6 years of age that children come to recognize that one can gain knowledge through inferential rather than direct means. However, a great deal of research suggests that children have a sophisticated understanding of other aspects of knowledge, such as perception and communication around age 4. Three experiments were carried out in which we made important task information more salient in order to determine whether children's performance in previous research on their understanding of inference had underestimated their abilities. The design included controls to ensure that children's attribution of knowledge to the story character could not be based on an egocentric tendency to attribute their own knowledge. Results indicated that (a) enhancing the salience of important information significantly improved children's performance; (b) by 4 or 5 years of age children begin to understand inference as a source of knowledge, around the same time they evidence an understanding of knowledge gained through perception and communication; and (c) that their performance lagged slightly behind that exhibited on a standard false-belief task.     

But is it sociology of knowledge? Wilhelm Jerusalem’s “sociology of cognition” in context

This paper considers the charge that??contrary to the current widespread assumption accompanying the near-universal neglect of his work??Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854?C1923) cannot count as one of the founders of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. In order to elucidate the matter, Jerusalem??s ??sociology of cognition?? is here reconstructed in the context of his own work in psychology and philosophy as well as in the context of the work of some predecessors and contemporaries. It is argued that while it shows clear discontinuities with the present-day understanding of the sociology of (scientific) knowledge, Jerusalem??s sociology of cognition was not only distinctive in its own day but also anticipated in nuce a much-discussed theme in current history of science.     

Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments

Decades of research has shown that people are poor at detecting lies. Two explanations for this finding have been proposed. First, it has been suggested that lie detection is inaccurate because people rely on invalid cues when judging deception. Second, it has been suggested that lack of valid cues to deception limits accuracy. A series of 4 meta-analyses tested these hypotheses with the framework of Brunswik's (1952) lens model. Meta-Analysis 1 investigated perceived cues to deception by correlating 66 behavioral cues in 153 samples with deception judgments. People strongly associate deception with impressions of incompetence (r = .59) and ambivalence (r = .49). Contrary to self-reports, eye contact is only weakly correlated with deception judgments (r = -.15). Cues to perceived deception were then compared with cues to actual deception. The results show a substantial covariation between the 2 sets of cues (r = .59 in Meta-Analysis 2, r = .72 in Meta-Analysis 3). Finally, in Meta-Analysis 4, a lens model analysis revealed a very strong matching between behaviorally based predictions of deception and behaviorally based predictions of perceived deception. In conclusion, contrary to previous assumptions, people rarely rely on the wrong cues. Instead, limitations in lie detection accuracy are mainly attributable to weaknesses in behavioral cues to deception. The results suggest that intuitive notions about deception are more accurate than explicit knowledge and that lie detection is more readily improved by increasing behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers than by informing lie-catchers of valid cues to deception.     

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study. This work represents the beginning of a new way to study the processes that can explain the therapeutic change. The method used is the observation and analysis of therapeutic sessions directly recorded and developed inside a behavioural approach. The category system tries to carry out a functional analysis of the therapist-client interaction which enables the identification of learning processes that work in clinical setting and explain success in therapy. Outcomes are provisional but show the utility of this initial trend of investigation to the comprehension of clinical phenomenon. Conclusions also emphasize the importance of associative learning processes on the therapeutic change.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

The underdetermination of theory by data and the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge

Advocates of the “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are “underdetermined” by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. Nonetheless, the sociologists' argument falls to a different criticism, for the version of the underdetermination thesis that the argument requires, has not been shown to be true.     

Why do we think? Consequences of regarding thinking as behavior

Cognitive psychologists have made significant progress in explaining how people think. However, relatively little time and energy have been invested in understanding why we think--the factors that make us start or stop thinking, choose and change strategies and solutions. Such questions are linked to motivation and to discriminative and reinforcing stimuli. In this article, the idea that studying thinking as a form of behavior closely connected to antecedent stimuli and consequences leads to potentially important questions that are not presently being studied in the field of cognitive psychology. This is not an argument for reverting to behaviorism--rather, the argument is made that integrating a behavioral perspective on thinking would enrich cognitive psychology.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

What makes a saint? A Lincoln case study in the communion of the local and the universal Church

Within the curtilage of Lincoln Cathedral lie buried the remains of three very different people to whom sainthood has been attributed: Saint Hugh, Bishop of Lincoln (d.1200); 'Little Saint Hugh' (d.1255), a child maliciously alleged to have been murdered by the local Jewish community; and Edward King (d.1910), Anglican Bishop of Lincoln. Hugh is a saint of the Catholic Church, commemorated by Catholics and Anglicans; 'Little Saint Hugh' was for a short while acclaimed by local people as a saint but never officially recognised as one; Edward King is commemorated by Anglicans but not formally recognised as a saint. The marked difference of approach to the attribution of sainthood between local Christians and Catholic Church authorities, as well as between Catholics and Anglicans, is illustrated by this case study, which raises important ecumenical questions: 'What makes a saint?’, ‘How are non-Catholics to regard the Roman Catholic procedure for beatification and canonisation?’, ‘To what extent can there be fully ecumenical calendars of local saints?’, ‘Does beatification offer a way forward by which Catholics may recognise the holiness of non-Catholic Christians?’     

Why do people rideshare? An experimental study

Enabled by mobile technologies and fueled by the economic downturn, ridesharing has emerged in recent years as a private transportation facet of the shared economy. Our study investigates the motives for participation in situated ridesharing. We propose a theoretical model that includes economic benefits, time benefits, transportation anxiety, trust, and reciprocity either as direct antecedents of ridesharing participation intention, or mediated through attitude towards ridesharing. We conduct a scenario-based survey, with 300 participants. Our findings indicate that, in situations where transportation anxiety is high (e.g. construction on the road), if people can trust the ridesharing service providers and participants, in the presence of economic and time benefits, they will have a strong intention to participate in ridesharing.     

Why a common commemoration of the Reformation?

This article provides information about the fact that today any commemoration of the Reformation can only be celebrated in ecumenical communion. In contrast to earlier Reformation jubilees, the commemoration of the Reformation in 2017 is taking place, for the first time, in an ecumenical era. The year 2017 refers back to the year 1517, that is, to a time when the break with the Catholic Church had not yet happened. Martin Luther himself did not intend the division of the Church, nor did he visualise the founding of a new church, but the renewal of all Christendom. This failed in his time. Therefore one should regard the ecumenical search for the restoration of unity as the – indeed very belated – success of the Reformation. The commemoration of ??a reformation is an ecumenical opportunity, if it is committed to living the triad of gratitude for the reformation’s positive aims, of repentance for the sins of division and subsequent confessional wars, and of hope for a greater unity between Lutherans and Catholics.     

Barriers to primary prevention efforts in the schools: Are we the biggest obstacle to the transfer of knowledge?

Dialogue and debate regarding the definition of prevention has subsided and has been replaced by research and information regarding pathways to dysfunction and effective primary prevention strategies. In spite of the solid research base and the strong desire of practitioners to apply prevention strategies, there continues to be sporadic implementation in schools. Barriers to the implementation of primary prevention programs include traditional professional practice within psychology, lack of communicating pertinent information between professions and policymakers, commitment of resources, and limited understanding of the pathways to successful and widespread implementation. Recommendations to address these barriers are discussed.     

Why do People Disagree? Explaining and Endorsing the Possibility of Partiality in Judgments

The current study examines developing changes in children's intuitions about why disagreements about decisions might occur, focusing on what children understand about partiality and how it may vary depending on the context. Eighty children ages 6 to 13 years old and 20 adults were presented with stories in which there was a disagreement with the judge about who the winner of a contest should be. Participants were asked to generate their own explanations for why the disagreement may have occurred and to evaluate the plausibility of different explanations provided by the experimenter. Even 6-year-olds generated and endorsed partiality as a possible explanation for disagreement, although they did so at a lower rate than older children. A richer understanding of how context influences both the reasons for disagreement and the likelihood of partiality seems to develop over childhood.     

Is Consumer Culture Theory research or realpolitik? A sociology of knowledge analysis of a scientific culture

When Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) was introduced by Arnould and Thompson ( 2005 ) it was part of a strategy to create legitimacy for interpretive research. It was argued that interpretive researchers needed to be more pragmatic in their attitude. This was a fundamental change in the scientific culture in this stream of research. This paper analyses these changes and studies how CCT represents a new and pragmatic attitude. It is shown how the changes intended by CCT can imply a shift from a focus on new groundbreaking research to an awareness of the consequences of realpolitik. This strategic move can be seen as an example of how scientific cultures try to move from a marginal position to the mainstream. The consequences of this attempt to manage science are analysed, and solutions to problems created by these changes are developed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Research and the organization of knowledge: where do psychotherapy and counselling fit in?

In order to clarify the place of research in psychotherapy and counselling, I look at the interrelationship of two ‘organizations of knowledge’. Organization can represent a process or an institution. My thesis is that there are particular characteristics of psychotherapy and counselling, considered as an intellectual discipline, that mean it organizes knowledge in peculiar ways that are reflected in the difficulty of reconciling them within the organization of the modern university. I shall propose that a different conception of research, based upon a third ‘organization of knowledge’, is necessary to resolve these tensions. Once psychotherapy/counselling finds more cohesion as a discipline, it is more likely to establish an independent niche within the university.     

Serendipity? Are there gender differences in the adoption of computers? A case study

In a study of the effect of learning styles of patent examiners on adoption of computers, there was an important serendipitous finding: women showed a greater propensity to adopt than did men. Moreover, within the sample of women covered in the study, adoption of the computer related to a preference for abstract thinking, scientific education, and effective use of training. No such relationships were found within the group of men. Women were more encouraging to others than men but less assertive in assisting others to learn how to use the computer, implying that the socialization of men and women affects their behavior. The data also suggest that there are important implications of these findings for programs intended to train men and women to use the computer. This paper speculates on the reasons for and implications of these findings.