The octave illusion revisited again

The octave illusion (D. Deutsch, 1974) occurs when 2 tones separated by an octave are alternated repeatedly, such that when the right ear receives the high tone, the left ear receives the low tone, and vice versa. Most subjects in the original study reported hearing a single tone that alternated from ear to ear, whose pitch also alternated from octave to octave, and D. Deutsch (1975a) proposed an explanation in terms of separate what and where auditory pathways. C. D. Chambers, J. B. Mattingley, and S. A. Moss (2002) argued that the perceived pitch difference generally corresponds more to a semitone and proposed an alternative explanation in terms of diplacusis. This article argues that Chambers et al. used problematic procedures and reports a new experiment on the octave illusion. The findings confirm that an octave difference is generally perceived, and they agree with the model of Deutsch (1975a) but are at variance with the diplacusis hypothesis.     

Circularity in relative pitch judgments for inharmonic complex tones: The Shepard demonstration revisited,again

The Shepard illusion, in which the presentation of a cyclically repetitive sequence of complex tones composed of partials separated by octave intervals (Shepard, 1964) gives the illusion of an endlessly increasing sequence of pitch steps, is often cited as evidence for octave equivalence. In this paper, evidence is presented which demonstrates that this illusion can be produced using (inharmonic) complex tones whose partials are separated by equal ratios other than octaves. Therefore, the illusion is not evidence for octave equivalence.     

The case of Debbie revisited: A literary perspective

The publication in theJournal of the American Medical Association of a narrative entitled “It's Over, Debbie,” in which a gynecology resident apparently performs euthanasia, has stirred considerable debate characterized by varying interpretations not only of the ethical issues involved but of the meaning of the text itself. Formal analysis reveals the narrative to be strikingly literary in its ambiguity, its foregrounding of its own textuality, and its dominant structure of repetition and reversal. The analysis points to features that account for some of the varying interpretations in the debate, and it calls into question the relation of the text to whatever events it may represent and to how the resident may have perceived these events.     

Double effect,all over again: The case of Sister Margaret McBride

As media reports have made widely known, in November 2009, the ethics committee of St. Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, permitted the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus in order to save the life of its mother. This woman was suffering from acute pulmonary hypertension, which her doctors judged would prove fatal for both her and her previable child. The ethics committee believed abortion to be permitted in this case under the so-called principle of double effect, but Thomas J. Olmsted, the bishop of Phoenix, disagreed with the committee and pronounced its chair, Sister Margaret McBride, excommunicated latae sententiae, “by the very commission of the act.” In this article, I take the much discussed Phoenix case as an occasion to subject the principle of double effect to another round of philosophical scrutiny. In particular, I examine the third condition of the principle in its textbook formulation, namely, that the evil effect in question may not be the means to the good effect. My argument, in brief, is that the textbook formulation of the principle does not withstand philosophical scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the end, I do not claim that we should then “do away” with the principle altogether. Instead, we do well to understand it within the context of casuistry, the tradition of moral reasoning from which it issued.     

The vanishing argument from queerness1

The ‘argument from queerness’, made famous by J. L. Mackie, remains one of the most influential arguments in metaethics. However, many philosophers focus on just one or two of its strands, while others assume a particular but by no means universal reading of it. This essay attempts to disentangle and evaluate all strands of the argument. Surprisingly, when this is done, not much is left as a distinct argument from queerness. Much of the argument collapses into other types of argument, and what is left, though intuitively appealing, is not viable as philosophical argument.