Music, evolution and language

Darwin (1871) noted that the human musical faculty 'must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed'. Indeed, previous research with human infants and young children has revealed that we are born with variable musical capabilities. Here, the adaptive purpose served by these differing capabilities is discussed with reference to comparative findings regarding the acoustic behavior of nonhuman primates. The findings provide evidence supporting Darwin's hypothesis of an intermediate stage of human evolutionary history characterized by a communication system that resembles music more closely than language and possibly acting as a precursor for both current language and music.     

Mental time travel,language evolution,and human self-domestication

Cognitive Processing - Human self-domestication might have contributed to the evolutionary changes in the hippocampus accounting for our enhanced mental travel abilities, and ultimately for our...     

Creative analogy and language evolution

The English good and intensifier is discussed as an example of a form that is acceptable even though ungrammatical, both synchronically and diachronically. The construction is analyzed as a case of creative analogy: the extension of a grammatically generated form to a new function, one for which it has no direct grammatical justification. From the perspective of a dynamic theory of language acquisition and evolution, it is argued that such forms constitute a new sort of evidence regarding the nature of language universals.Previous versions of this work were presented to the LSA summer meetings in 1974 and in Carroll (1975, 1978).     

On the evolution of language and generativity.

One of the properties that most conspicuously distinguishes human language from any other form of animal communication is generativity. Language with this property therefore presumably evolved with the Homo line somewhere between H. habilis and H. sapiens sapiens. Some have suggested that it emerged relatively suddenly and completely with H. sapiens sapiens, and this view is consistent with (a) linguistic estimates as to when vocal language emerged, (b) the relatively late "explosion" of manufacture and cultural artifacts such as body ornamentation and cave drawings, and (c) evidence on changes in the vocal apparatus. However, evidence on brain size and developmental patterns of growth suggests an earlier origin and a more continuous evolution. I propose that these scenarios can be reconciled if it is supposed that generative language evolved, perhaps from H. habilis on, as a system of manual gestures, but switched to a predominantly vocal system with H. sapiens sapiens. The subsequent "cultural explosion" can then be attributed to the freeing of the hands from primary involvement in language, so that they could be exploited, along with generativity, for manufacture, art, and other activities.     

Race, language, and mental evolution in Darwin's descent of man

Charles Darwin was notoriously ambiguous in his remarks about the relationship between human evolution and biological race. He stressed the original unity of the races, yet he also helped to popularize the notion of a racial hierarchy filling the gaps between the highest anthropoids and civilized Europeans. A focus on Darwin's explanation of how humans initially evolved, however, shows that he mainly stressed not hierarchy but a version of humanity's original mental unity. In his book The Descent of Man, Darwin emphasized a substantial degree of mental development (including the incipient use of language) in the early, monogenetic phase of human evolution. This development, he argued, necessarily came before primeval man's numerical increase, geographic dispersion, and racial diversification, because only thus could one explain how that group was able to spread at the expense of rival ape-like populations. This scenario stood opposed to a new evolutionary polygenism formulated in the wake of Darwin's Origin of Species by his ostensible supporters Alfred Russel Wallace and Ernst Haeckel. Darwin judged this outlook inadequate to the task of explaining humanity's emergence.     

The puzzle of language evolution

Linguistics must again concentrate on the evolutionary nature of language, so that language models are more realistic with respect to human natural languages and have a greater explanatory force. Multi-agent systems are proposed as a possible route to develop such evolutionary models and an example is given of a concrete experiment in the origins and evolution of word-meaning based on a multi-agent approach.     

The puzzle of language evolution

Zusammenfassung. Die Sprachwissenschaft muß sich wieder auf den evolutionären Aspekt der Sprache konzentrieren, damit Sprachmodelle in bezug auf menschliche natürliche Sprachen realistischer und überzeugungskräftiger werden. Multiagent-Systeme werden als ein möglicher Weg zur Entwicklung solcher evolutionärer Modelle vorgeschlagen, und es wird ein Beispiel eines konkreten Experiments über Ursprung und Entwicklung der Semantik auf der Grundlage einer Multi-agent-Methode gegeben. Abstract. Linguistics must again concentrate on the evolutionary nature of language, so that language models are more realistic with respect to human natural languages and have a greater explanatory force. Multi-agent systems are proposed as a possible route to develop such evolutionary models and an example is given of a concrete experiment in the origins and evolution of word-meaning based on a multi-agent approach.     

Primate vocal production and the riddle of language evolution

Trying to uncover the roots of human speech and language has been the premier motivation to study the signalling behaviour of nonhuman primates for several decades. Focussing on the question of whether we find evidence for linguistic reference in the production of nonhuman primate vocalizations, I will first discuss how the criteria used to diagnose referential signalling have changed over time, and will then turn to the paradigmatic case of semantic communication in animals, the alarm calls of vervet monkeys, Chlorocebus pygerythrus. A recent in-depth analysis of the original material revealed that, while the alarm calls could be well distinguished, calls of similar structure were also used in within- and between-group aggression. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the idea that calls denote objects in the environment. Furthermore, nonhuman primates show only minimal signs of vocal production learning, one key prerequisite for conventionalized and symbolic communication. In addition, the structure of calls in different populations or closely related species is highly conserved. In conclusion, any continuity between nonhuman primate and human communication appears to be found at the level of the processing of signals. Why and how the ancestors of our own species one day began to talk to each other continues to be an enigma. Future research should focus on changes in the neural structure supporting volitional control over vocalizations, the gene networks associated with vocal production, and the developmental processes involved in the integration of production and perception of vocalizations.     

The nature of the language faculty and its implications for evolution of language (Reply to Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky)

In a continuation of the conversation with Fitch, Chomsky, and Hauser on the evolution of language, we examine their defense of the claim that the uniquely human, language-specific part of the language faculty (the “narrow language faculty”) consists only of recursion, and that this part cannot be considered an adaptation to communication. We argue that their characterization of the narrow language faculty is problematic for many reasons, including its dichotomization of cognitive capacities into those that are utterly unique and those that are identical to nonlinguistic or nonhuman capacities, omitting capacities that may have been substantially modified during human evolution. We also question their dichotomy of the current utility versus original function of a trait, which omits traits that are adaptations for current use, and their dichotomy of humans and animals, which conflates similarity due to common function and similarity due to inheritance from a recent common ancestor. We show that recursion, though absent from other animals' communications systems, is found in visual cognition, hence cannot be the sole evolutionary development that granted language to humans. Finally, we note that despite Fitch et al.'s denial, their view of language evolution is tied to Chomsky's conception of language itself, which identifies combinatorial productivity with a core of “narrow syntax.” An alternative conception, in which combinatoriality is spread across words and constructions, has both empirical advantages and greater evolutionary plausibility.     

Language acquisition meets language evolution

Recent research suggests that language evolution is a process of cultural change, in which linguistic structures are shaped through repeated cycles of learning and use by domain-general mechanisms. This paper draws out the implications of this viewpoint for understanding the problem of language acquisition, which is cast in a new, and much more tractable, form. In essence, the child faces a problem of induction, where the objective is to coordinate with others (C-induction), rather than to model the structure of the natural world (N-induction). We argue that, of the two, C-induction is dramatically easier. More broadly, we argue that understanding the acquisition of any cultural form, whether linguistic or otherwise, during development, requires considering the corresponding question of how that cultural form arose through processes of cultural evolution. This perspective helps resolve the "logical" problem of language acquisition and has far-reaching implications for evolutionary psychology.     

Empirical approaches to the study of language evolution

The study of language evolution, and human cognitive evolution more generally, has often been ridiculed as unscientific, but in fact it differs little from many other disciplines that investigate past events, such as geology or cosmology. Well-crafted models of language evolution make numerous testable hypotheses, and if the principles of strong inference (simultaneous testing of multiple plausible hypotheses) are adopted, there is an increasing amount of relevant data allowing empirical evaluation of such models. The articles in this special issue provide a concise overview of current models of language evolution, emphasizing the testable predictions that they make, along with overviews of the many sources of data available to test them (emphasizing comparative, neural, and genetic data). The key challenge facing the study of language evolution is not a lack of data, but rather a weak commitment to hypothesis-testing approaches and strong inference, exacerbated by the broad and highly interdisciplinary nature of the relevant data. This introduction offers an overview of the field, and a summary of what needed to evolve to provide our species with language-ready brains. It then briefly discusses different contemporary models of language evolution, followed by an overview of different sources of data to test these models. I conclude with my own multistage model of how different components of language could have evolved.     

The evolution of the language faculty: clarifications and implications

In this response to Pinker and Jackendoff's critique, we extend our previous framework for discussion of language evolution, clarifying certain distinctions and elaborating on a number of points. In the first half of the paper, we reiterate that profitable research into the biology and evolution of language requires fractionation of "language" into component mechanisms and interfaces, a non-trivial endeavor whose results are unlikely to map onto traditional disciplinary boundaries. Our terminological distinction between FLN and FLB is intended to help clarify misunderstandings and aid interdisciplinary rapprochement. By blurring this distinction, Pinker and Jackendoff mischaracterize our hypothesis 3 which concerns only FLN, not "language" as a whole. Many of their arguments and examples are thus irrelevant to this hypothesis. Their critique of the minimalist program is for the most part equally irrelevant, because very few of the arguments in our original paper were tied to this program; in an online appendix we detail the deep inaccuracies in their characterization of this program. Concerning evolution, we believe that Pinker and Jackendoff's emphasis on the past adaptive history of the language faculty is misplaced. Such questions are unlikely to be resolved empirically due to a lack of relevant data, and invite speculation rather than research. Preoccupation with the issue has retarded progress in the field by diverting research away from empirical questions, many of which can be addressed with comparative data. Moreover, offering an adaptive hypothesis as an alternative to our hypothesis concerning mechanisms is a logical error, as questions of function are independent of those concerning mechanism. The second half of our paper consists of a detailed response to the specific data discussed by Pinker and Jackendoff. Although many of their examples are irrelevant to our original paper and arguments, we find several areas of substantive disagreement that could be resolved by future empirical research. We conclude that progress in understanding the evolution of language will require much more empirical research, grounded in modern comparative biology, more interdisciplinary collaboration, and much less of the adaptive storytelling and phylogenetic speculation that has traditionally characterized the field.     

The evolution of the critical period for language acquisition

Evidence suggests that there is a critical, or at least a sensitive, period for language acquisition, which ends around puberty. The existence of this period is explained by an evolutionary model which assumes that (a) linguistic ability is in principle (if not in practice) measurable, and (b) the amount of language controlled by an individual conferred selective advantage on it. In this model, the language faculty is seen as adaptive, favoured by natural selection, while the critical period for language acquisition itself is not an adaptation, but arises from the interplay of genetic factors influencing life-history characters in relation to language acquisition. The evolutionary model is implemented on a computer and simulations of populations evolving under various plausible, if idealized, conditions result in clear critical period effects, which end around puberty.     

The evolution of language comes of age

The Fourth International Conference on the Evolution of Language was held at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, on 27-30 March 2002.     

An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge

Gossip has been the object of a number of different studies in the past 50 years, rehabilitating it not only as something worth being studied, but also as a pivotal informational and social structure of human cognition: Dunbar (Rev Gen Psychol 8(2):100–110, 2004) interestingly linked the emergence of language to nothing less than its ability to afford gossip. Different facets of gossip were analyzed by anthropologists, linguists, psychologists and philosophers, but few attempts were made to frame gossip within an epistemological framework (for instance Ayim in (Good gossip, pp. 85–99, 1994)). Our intention in this paper is to provide a consistent epistemological (applied and social) account of gossip, understood as broadly evaluative talk between two or more people, comfortably acquainted between each other, about an absent third party they are both at least acquainted with. Hence, relying on the most recent multidisciplinary literature about the topic, the first part of this paper will concern the epistemic dynamics of gossip: whereas the sociobiological tradition individuates in gossip the clue for the (theoretically cumbersome) group mind and group-level adaptations Wilson et al. (The evolution of cognition, pp. 347–365, 2002), we will suggest the more parsimonious modeling of gossip as a soft-assembled epistemic synergy, understood as a function-dominant interaction able to project a higher organizational level—in our case, the group as group-of-gossips. We will argue that the aim of this synergy is indeed to update a Knowledge Base of social information between the group (as a projected whole) and its members. The second and third part will instead focus on the epistemological labeling of the inferences characterizing gossip: our contention is that the ever-present moral/evaluative dimension in gossip—be it tacit or explicit, concerning the objects or the partners of gossip—is best analyzed through the epistemological framework of abduction. Consequently, we will suggest that a significant role of gossip is to function as a group-based abductive appraisal of social matter, enacted at various levels.     

Language lateralization to the dominant hemisphere: Tool use, gesture and language in hominid evolution

Shared tool use in our hominid ancestry is perhaps the most satisfactory explanation for human dextrality and left-hemisphere language lateralization. Recent palaeoarchaeological evidence suggests that brachiation preceded bipedalism, which in turn preceded advanced tool use, with all three preceding any dramatic increase in brain size and/or the development of speech-related neural structures. Shared tool use probably led to population dextrality, and then to the development of left-hemisphere centres for fine motor coordination and the mediation of serial, segmental, time-dependent and syntactic processes at sensory and more particularly motor levels, including the control of limbs, fingers and articulators. Such centres, initially developed for tool construction and use, would have occupied an intermediate position in the evolutionary sequence. Thus cortically-driven facial gestures may possibly have accompanied manual signing, modulating limbic vocalizations of affect, though a cortical-limbic distinction with respect to communication may be unwarranted. However, the uniqueness of human language is still a matter of debate both with respect to other primates and our own evolutionary ancestors.     

Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip

Spreading information about the members of one’s group is one of the most universal human behaviors. Thanks to gossip, individuals can acquire the information about their peers without sustaining the burden of costly interactions with cheaters, but they can also create and revise social bonds. Gossip has also several positive functions at the group level, promoting cohesion and norm compliance. However, gossip can be unreliable, and can be used to damage others’ reputation or to circulate false information, thus becoming detrimental to people involved and useless for the group. In this work, we propose a theoretical model in which reliability of gossip depends on the joint functioning of two distinct mechanisms. Thanks to the first, i.e., deterrence, individuals tend to avoid informational cheating because they fear punishment and the disruption of social bonds. On the other hand, transmission provides humans with the opportunity of reducing the consequences of cheating through a manipulation of the source of gossip.     

Genes, language development, and language disorders

Genetic factors are important contributors to language and learning disorders, and discovery of the underlying genes can help delineate the basic neurological pathways that are involved. This information, in turn, can help define disorders and their perceptual and processing deficits. Initial molecular genetic studies of dyslexia, for example, appear to converge on defects in neuronal and axonal migration. Further study of individuals with abnormalities of these genes may lead to the recognition of characteristic cognitive deficits attributable to the neurological dysfunction. Such abnormalities may affect other disorders as well, and studies of co-morbidity of dyslexia with attention deficit disorder and speech sound disorder are helping to define the scope of these genes and show the etiological and cognitive commonalities between these conditions. The genetic contributions to specific language impairment (SLI) are not as well defined at this time, but similar molecular approaches are being applied to identify genes that influence SLI and comorbid disorders. While there is co-morbidity of SLI with dyslexia, it appears that most of the common genetic effects may be with the language characteristics of autism spectrum disorders rather than with dyslexia and related disorders. Identification of these genes and their neurological and cognitive effects should lay out a functional network of interacting genes and pathways that subserve language development. Understanding these processes can form the basis for refined procedures for diagnosis and treatment.