Radical psychology institutionalized: a history of the Journal Psychologie & Maatschappij [psychology & society

Starting out as a newsletter for radical psychologists, the Dutch journal Psychologie & Maatschappij (Psychology & Society) moved in the past decade toward the theoretical mainstream within psychology. In this paper, the major changes in the journal are described and analyzed, as well as the features that did not change: an emphasis on theory and history, an interdisciplinary approach, and an emphasis on discussion. The main transformations were from psychology as instrumental toward the goals of the progressive movement in the Netherlands, then to extreme criticism of all scientific and professional psychological activities, and finally to adherence to the most advanced approaches within academic psychology.     

Mainstreaming ‘Women’ without feminisms in psychology

Although it has been argued that feminist work has gained recognition in mainstream psychology (Eagly, Eaton, Rose, Riger, & McHugh, 2012 ), these arguments tend to cite a proliferation of research in high‐ranking Euro‐American academic journals, on topics that concern women or gender in psychology. However, the majority of this work is not presented as explicitly feminist. Rather, it tends to be incorporated into mainstream spaces under the umbrella of the psychology of women. This is often interpreted uncritically to mean the study of womanhood as a stable category or variable, reproducing binary accounts of sex and gender that are largely devoid of feminist analysis. Not only do these interpretations reify essentialist constructions of womanhood; they also convert transformative feminist politics into singular and special interest ‘women's issues’. Indeed, broad feminist theoretical perspectives remain largely absent at the fundamental levels of mainstream psychological knowledge production (Eagly et al., 2012 ; Eagly & Riger, 2014 ). Thus, while credit has been given to the growing visibility of issues concerning women and gender in the discipline, less critical attention has been paid to the broader absence of feminist language in this work. As such, instances of mainstream inclusion have come to take priority over broader issues of feminist exclusions in psychology. Taking a critical position on the discipline from within the context of the Global North, this paper questions the state of mainstream inclusions and reasserts the transformative potentials of diverse feminisms (Liebert, Leve, & Hui, 2011 ), arguing that current inclusions of women without feminisms in psychology are problematic. Drawing on recent mobilisations of the psychology of women in the interests of ‘male psychology’, it is argued that the transformative potentials of feminist psychologies are more likely to be stifled than supported by mainstream inclusions.     

Experiences of school psychology interns in psychology internship centers

In the development of psychology internship centers, we must not overlook what is happening to interns from different specialty backgrounds. This article describes centers that accept school psychology students, and examines the nature of the experiences that such students receive as interns. The author suggests implications for school psychology and the broader development of the internship in professional psychology.     

Understanding the “cognitive revolution” in psychology

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The cultural background of the non‐academic concept of psychology in Japan: Its implications for introductory education in psychology

No research has empirically explored the non‐academic concept of psychology itself (implicit theories) in non‐Western cultures despite a widely held belief that this understanding differs cross‐culturally. This study examined whether the non‐academic concept of psychology among inexperienced Japanese students differed from the concept held by students of other countries. In Japanese, psychology is referred to as , which includes the ideographic character , literally meaning heart. This fact led us to hypothesize that psychology will be disproportionately associated with emotion among Japanese students. Indeed, our findings among Japanese students produced a J‐curve, indicating that our prediction was true. We posit that this issue has never been discussed in Japan because a majority of people share this concept of psychology. In our second study, we examined not only preference in students' association of intelligence or emotion but also heart or mind with psychology. Finally, we identified whether students' believe that psychology encompasses both the heart and the mind. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of explicitly defining the non‐academic concept of psychology in early psychology education in Japan.     

The development of counselling psychology in a clinical psychology service

This paper will describe one Clinical Psychology department's efforts to incorporate Counselling Psychology into the service. It is written from the experience of the Chartered Counselling Psychologist.     

Post‐truth politics and discursive psychology

This article argues for the potential of discursive psychology (DP) in the study of post‐truth politics. Work produced outside of psychology is considered, particularly from political science and international relations, which have made a promising start. Providing an overview of this body of research, I argue for their respective strengths and weaknesses. The literature so far tends to work with the notion that truth and emotion are matters that are, or at least should be, distinguishable. Instead, I argue that, rather than lament the blurring between truth and untruth, one should look to how these unfold as matters of practical concern in political discourse. DP is a tool particularly suited to the task; it highlights the importance of viewing ‘truth’ as a rhetorical resource. In this light, we can view post‐truth politics as a rhetorical matter rather than a degeneration of truth.     

Instrumentalism in psychology

I aim to examine two questions. First, whether ‘folk psychology’ is a kind of theory and, second, more seriously, how are we to understand the system of principles of folk psychology. As to the first, there is a confusion between ‘theory’ and ‘science’. Much of the debate ignores the differences between these, and I argue that whereas folk psychology cannot be called a science there are grounds for calling it a theory. On the more serious question of interpretation, I review the general considerations against instrumentalism and argue that they do not apply to folk psychology. The instrumentalist construal of folk psychology is strengthened by the remarkable fact that folk psychology is guaranteed to be successfully applicable to almost any system that has evolved under natural selection. Thus one can maintain that folk psychology is in fact a codification of certain quite general principles of evolutionary theory, and thus is an ancient and brilliant instrument for explaining the behaviour of complex evolved systems. It is, however, an instrument whose ‘theoretical posits’ may have very little to do with the actual springs of action which operate at the level of the neuron or assemblies of neurons.