C. I. Lewis,Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy

ABSTRACT

If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can be detected by focusing on Lewis’ account of the method of philosophy in the first chapter of Mind and the World Order. In that context, Lewis argues that the method of philosophy should be reflective and critical. It will be my contention that this understanding of philosophy involves a therapeutic perspective, which bears important resemblances to Kant’s account of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason. I will illustrate how this therapeutic application of reflection works in Lewis’ metaphysics. In this context, reflection can correct errors of reasoning that occur when we are operating within a particular conceptual scheme and use the criteria of reality that are appropriate in another.     

Gaining perspective on spatial perspective taking

Spatial perspective taking is a term that encompasses a class of phenomena that assess the extent to which a perceiver can access spatial information relative to a viewpoint different from the perceiver’s egocentric viewpoint (e.g. something on my right is on the left of someone facing me). We investigated whether spatial perspective taking that involves judging how objects are oriented around an agent is susceptible to alterations in social motivations. In all experiments, participants saw a picture of two objects and asked to judge the relationship between the objects when there was, or was not, an agent between them. Results from Experiment 1 showed that participants spontaneously described the objects from the agent’s perspective when he was present. Experiments 2 and 3 explored whether this effect was altered by prior participant exposure to manipulations of social inclusion or social exclusion. Results from these two studies demonstrated that socially included participants and socially excluded participants did not differ in their tendencies to adopt the spatial perspective of another. These results are discussed in the context of the results of other studies showing that perspective taking can be influenced by social motivations.     

Pitches that Wire Together Fire Together: Scale Degree Associations Across Time Predict Melodic Expectations

The ongoing generation of expectations is fundamental to listeners’ experience of music, but research into types of statistical information that listeners extract from musical melodies has tended to emphasize transition probabilities and n-grams, with limited consideration given to other types of statistical learning that may be relevant. Temporal associations between scale degrees represent a different type of information present in musical melodies that can be learned from musical corpora using expectation networks, a computationally simple method based on activation and decay. Expectation networks infer the expectation of encountering one scale degree followed in the near (but not necessarily immediate) future by another given scale degree, with previous work suggesting that scale degree associations learned by expectation networks better predict listener ratings of pitch similarity than transition probabilities. The current work outlines how these learned scale degree associations can be combined to predict melodic continuations and tests the resulting predictions on a dataset of listener responses to a musical cloze task previously used to compare two other models of melodic expectation, a variable-order Markov model (IDyOM) and Temperley's music-theoretically motivated model. Under multinomial logistic regression, all three models explain significant unique variance in human melodic expectations, with coefficient estimates highest for expectation networks. These results suggest that generalized scale degree associations informed by both adjacent and nonadjacent relationships between melodic notes influence listeners’ melodic predictions above and beyond n-gram context, highlighting the need to consider a broader range of statistical learning processes that may underlie listeners’ expectations for upcoming musical events.     

Risky visuomotor choices during rapid reaching in childhood

Many everyday actions are implicit gambles because imprecisions in our visuomotor systems place probabilities on our success or failure. Choosing optimal action strategies involves weighting the costs and gains of potential outcomes by their corresponding probabilities, and requires stable representations of one's own imprecisions. How this ability is acquired during development in childhood when visuomotor skills change drastically is unknown. In a rewarded rapid reaching task, 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children followed ‘risk‐seeking’ strategies leading to overly high point‐loss. Adults' performance, in contrast, was close to optimal. Children's errors were not explained by distorted estimates of value or probability, but may reflect different action selection criteria or immature integration of value and probability information while planning movements. These findings provide a starting point for understanding children's risk‐taking in everyday visuomotor situations when suboptimal choices can be dangerous. Moreover, children's risky visuomotor decisions mirror those reported for non‐motor gambles, raising the possibility that common processes underlie development across decision‐making domains.     

Biased information and the exchange paradox

This paper presents a new solution to the well-known exchange paradox, or what is sometimes referred to as the two-envelope paradox. Many recent commentators have analyzed the paradox in terms of the agent’s biased concern for the contents of his own arbitrarily chosen envelope, claiming that such bias violates the manifest symmetry of the situation. Such analyses, however, fail to make clear exactly how the symmetry of the situation is violated by the agent’s hypothetical conclusion that he ought to switch envelopes on the assumption that his own envelope contains some specific amount of money. In this paper, I offer an explanation of this fact based on the idea that the agent’s deliberations are not only constrained by the epistemic symmetry reflected in the agent’s uniform ignorance as to the contents of the two envelopes, but also by a deeper methodological symmetry that manifests itself in the intuition that the two envelopes constitute equally legitimate sources of potential information. I interpret this intuition as implying that the agent’s final decision should reflect a point of rational equilibrium arrived at through an iterated process of counterfactual self-reflection, whereby the agent takes account of what he would have thought had he instead chosen the other envelope. I provide a formal model of this method of counterfactual self-reflection and show, in particular, that it cannot issue in the paradoxical conclusion that the agent ought to switch regardless of how much money is in his envelope. In this way, by correcting for the bias in the agent’s reasoning, the paradox is resolved.

     

Population Thinking in Epistemic Evolution: Bridging Cultural Evolution and the Philosophy of Science

Researchers in cultural evolutionary theory (CET) have recently proposed the foundation of a new field of research in cultural evolution named ‘epistemic evolution’. Drawing on evolutionary epistemology’s early studies, this programme aims to study science as an evolutionary cultural process. The paper discusses the way CET’s study of science can contribute to the philosophical debate and, vice versa, how the philosophy of science can benefit from the adoption of a cultural evolutionary perspective. Here, I argue that CET’s main contribution to an evolutionary model of scientific growth comes from the application of ‘population thinking’ to science. Populationism offers a ‘variation based’ understanding of scientists’ epistemic and socio-epistemic criteria that is able to better accommodate the variegated preferences that intervene in scientific epistemic decisions. A discussion of the so called theory choice context is offered as an example of the way a populationist approach can shed new light on the operation of scientists’ epistemic choices.

     

小概率权重问题及其市场应用

探讨了决策制定中有关“小概率权重”的理论问题和市场应用问题。若干实验结果表明概率的权重大小不是绝对的,而是背景依赖的,在决策问题中价值对比降低或不存在时,小概率事件权重不太可能被高估。然而,对小概率的权重也会因决策人所处的目前状况有关,个体在财富状况等方面的差异会对小概率事件的赋权产生影响。实验结果还证明有关小概率权重问题的理论发现对彩票价格制定、保险费用确定以及选择有效的有奖促销策略具有重要的启示     

Agent-Basing,Consequences, and Realized Motives

According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can be made sensitive to an act’s consequences. According to the approach which I defend, an action is right just in case it realizes an agent’s morally praiseworthy motive. Conversely, an action is wrong just in case it realizes a morally blameworthy motive. Specifying act-evaluation in terms of the realization, rather than the expression, of an agent’s motives allows an agent-based approach to distinguish between agent- and act-evaluation. This is because an agent may act from a morally praiseworthy motive, but fail (either through bad luck or poor judgment) to realize that motive. Her action will therefore not have been the right one, despite its being the expression of morally praiseworthy motives.     

Communicative functions of directional verbal probabilities: Speaker’s choice,listener’s inference,and reference points

Verbal probabilities have directional communicative functions, and most can be categorized as positive (e.g., “it is likely”) or negative (e.g., “it is doubtful”). We examined the communicative functions of verbal probabilities based on the reference point hypothesis According to this hypothesis, listeners are sensitive to and can infer a speaker’s reference points based on the speaker’s selected directionality. In four experiments (two of which examined speakers’ choice of directionality and two of which examined listeners’ inferences about a speaker’s reference point), we found that listeners could make inferences about speakers’ reference points based on the stated directionality of verbal probability. Thus, the directionality of verbal probabilities serves the communicative function of conveying information about a speaker’s reference point.     

Husserl on Meaning,Grammar, and the Structure of Content

Husserl’s Logical Grammar is intended to explain how complex expressions can be constructed out of simple ones so that their meaning turns out to be determined by the meanings of their constituent parts and the way they are put together. Meanings are thus understood as structured contents and classified into formal categories to the effect that the logical properties of expressions reflect their grammatical properties. As long as linguistic meaning reduces to the intentional content of pre-linguistic representations, however, it is not trivial to account for how semantics relates to syntax in this context. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s Logical Grammar as a system of recursive rules operating on representations and suggest that the syntactic form of representations (both mental and linguistic) contributes to their semantics because it carries information about semantic role. I further discuss Husserl’s syntactic account of the unity of propositions and argue that, on this  account, logical form supervenes on syntactic form. In the last section I draw some implications for the phenomenology of thought and conjecture that the structural features it displays are likely to convey the syntactic structures of an underlying language-like representational system.     

Assigning and combining probabilities in single-case studies: A second study

The present study builds on a previous proposal for assigning probabilities to the outcomes computed using different primary indicators in single-case studies. These probabilities are obtained by comparing the outcome to previously tabulated reference values, and they reflect the likelihood of the results in the case that no intervention effect is present. In the present study, we explored how well different metrics are translated into p values in the context of simulation data. Furthermore, two published multiple-baseline data sets were used to illustrate how well the probabilities might reflect the intervention effectiveness, as assessed by the original authors. Finally, the importance of which primary indicator would be used in each data set to be integrated was explored; two ways of combining probabilities were used: a weighted average and a binomial test. The results indicated that the translation into p values worked well for the two nonoverlap procedures, with the results for the regression-based procedure diverging due to some undesirable features of its performance. These p values, when either taken individually or combined, were well aligned with effectiveness for the real-life data. These results suggest that assigning probabilities can be useful for translating the primary measure into the same metric, using these probabilities as additional evidence of the importance of behavioral change, complementing visual analysis and professionals’ judgments.     

Memory for conversation and the development of common ground

Efficient conversation is guided by the mutual knowledge, or common ground, that interlocutors form as a conversation progresses. Characterized from the perspective of commonly used measures of memory, efficient conversation should be closely associated with item memory—what was said—and context memory—who said what to whom. However, few studies have explicitly probed memory to evaluate what type of information is maintained following a communicative exchange. The current study examined how item and context memory relate to the development of common ground over the course of a conversation, and how these forms of memory vary as a function of one’s role in a conversation as speaker or listener. The process of developing common ground was positively related to both item and context memory. In addition, content that was spoken was remembered better than content that was heard. Our findings illustrate how memory assessments can complement language measures by revealing the impact that basic conversational processes have on memory for what has been discussed. By taking this approach, we show that not only does the process of forming common ground facilitate communication in the present, but it also promotes an enduring record of that event, facilitating conversation into the future.     

A parameter analysis method for the weight‐set to satisfy preference orders of alternatives in additive multi‐criteria value models

In the context of the additive multi‐criteria value model, this paper investigates how the set of criteria weights (weight‐set hereafter) can be determined according to the preference orders of alternatives given by the decision maker. A construction method is proposed for the weight‐set for different intervals of β, where β is a differential amount of value between the preference information on two alternatives. The results of this paper are important for sensitivity analysis in multi‐criteria decision making (MCDM) problems and multi‐criteria group decision analysis. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Christian values in education: teachers in India narrate the impact of their faith and values on practice

ABSTRACT

India’s education system is complex because it has to meet the needs of a population which is culturally, geographically, politically, religiously and economically diverse. The principal investigator spent two summers in India talking with teachers and learners. This paper reports on the impact of Christian values in the secular but arguably Hindu nationalist education system. Working within an interpretivist paradigm and through an ethnographic lens, an interpretive phenomenological analysis approach was adopted to make sense of 34 interviewees’ narratives from five Indian states. The narratives were mapped onto an adaptation of a ‘tree metaphor’ to illustrate how values underpin decision-making and action in the school context. Five of the narratives are presented as keyhole examples to exemplify the similarities and contrasts in reported beliefs, values and behaviours set within the context of teachers’ professional practice. Findings reveal that all 34 participants drew on their Christian faith, and Indian cultural context, in their decision-making both in how they made sense of education policy, and how they interpreted school events and behaviours. Despite their common faith (Christianity), the 34 interpretations, decision-making and actions varied as demonstrated in the five selected narratives. We explore how the variance manifested and was influenced by the geographical, cultural, post colonial and school context.     

Towards a semantics for the artifactual theory of fiction and beyond

In her book Fiction and Metaphysics (1999) Amie Thomasson, influenced by the work of Roman Ingarden, develops a phenomenological approach to fictional entities in order to explain how non-fictional entities can be referred to intrafictionally and transfictionally, for example in the context of literary interpretation. As our starting point we take Thomasson’s realist theory of literary fictional objects, according to which such objects actually exist, albeit as abstract and artifactual entities. Thomasson’s approach relies heavily on the notion of ontological dependence, but its precise semantics has not yet been developed. Moreover, the modal approach to the notion of ontological dependence underlying the Artifactual Theory has recently been contested by several scholars. The main aims of this paper are (i) to develop a semantic approach to the notion of ontological dependence in the context of the Artifactual Theory of fiction, and in so doing bridge a number of philosophical and logical gaps; (ii) to generalize Thomasson’s categorial theory of ontological dependence by reconstructing ontological categories of entities purely in terms of different structures of ontological dependence, rather than in terms of the basic kinds of entities the categorical entities depend on.     

The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck

The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader “information effect”.     

Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel

ABSTRACT

Here, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from the epistemological role it also played for him. It is argued that Kant’s approach to modality in the Critique of Pure Reason can best be understood as a transcendental variation on Leibniz’s earlier ‘possibilist’ approach that treated the actual world as just one of a variety of possible alternative worlds. In this context, empirical intuitions seem to work like the mythical Givens subject to Sellars’ critique. This Kantian possibilism is then contrasted with an ‘actualist’ alternative approach to modality found in the contemporary work of Robert Stalnaker, but also recognizable in Hegel. In particular, the role of immediate perceptual judgments in Hegel is likened to that played by ‘witness statements’ in Robert Stalnaker’s attempt to distinguish the logic of judgments about the actual world from those about its alternate possibilities.     

Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory

Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a short presentation of Carnap's theory it is then shown that this theory cannot claim validity for arbitrary random processes. It is suggested that the theory be only applied to binomial and multinomial experiments. By application of de Finetti's theorem Carnap's inductive probabilities are interpreted as consecutive probabilities of the Bayesian kind. Through the introduction of a new axiom the decision parameter λ can be determined even if no a priori knowledge is given. Finally, it is demonstrated that the fundamental problem of Wald's decision theory, i.e., the determination of a plausible criterion where no a priori knowledge is available, can be solved for the cases of binomial and multinomial experiments.     

Resources and the Rule of Rescue1

abstract The central issue that I consider in this paper is the use of the so‐called ‘Rule of Rescue’ in the context of resource allocation. This ‘Rule’ has played an important role in resource allocation decisions in various parts of the world. It was invoked in Ontario to overturn a decision not to fund treatment for Gaucher's Disease and it has also been used to justify resource decisions in Israel concerning the same condition. In the paper I consider the nature of the Rule of Rescue and its moral justification. The latter involves consideration of the distinction between agent‐relative and agent‐neutral obligations. If the Rule of Rescue is to be justified, it is plausible to think that it will be in the context of agent‐relative obligations. Two problems with this suggestion are considered: the role of identifiability in the Rule of Rescue and the extent to which policy makers in a health care system can be taken to have such obligations. It is argued that in both cases these problems can be overcome and hence that there is a prima facie obligation to follow the Rule of Rescue.