Indeterminacy in the social sciences

It is maintained that a principle of indeterminacy exists in the social sciences which bears some resemblance to the Heisenberg principle in the realm of physics. In the social sciences, however, the principle is grounded not on physical interference, but on the capacity of human beings to alter their behavior on the basis of changing conceptions of their social condition, and so the contention of writers like Nagel ‘that no distinct principle of explanation is involved’ must be rejected. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the causes of social indeterminacy, which suggests that the phenomenon is ineradicable.     

Reasoning in the social sciences

In 1981, A. C. Crombie identified six styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition that constitute our ways of reasoning in the natural sciences. In this paper, I try to show that these styles constitute reasoning in the social sciences as well, and that, as a result, the differences between reasoning about the physical world and about human beings are not so different as some interpretevists have supposed.     

Methodological naturalism in the sciences

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Creationists have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to a dogmatic metaphysics of naturalism and materialism, which is based on...     

科学的新上帝?——“新时代科学”的形而上学

现代科学的有关研究成果，似乎证实了宗教和神秘主义在很久以前所揭示和阐发的东西。但由于科学本质上只提供受造物的信息，故其本身并不创造一种世界观，也不可能成为一种新的宗教。     

Humean explanations in the moral sciences

There is an essential tension in Hume's account of explanation in the moral sciences. He holds the familiar (though problematic) view that explanations of action are causal explanations backed by the laws of human nature. But he also tenders a rational and historical model of explanation which has been neglected in Hume studies. Developed primarily in the Essays and put into practice in the History of England, this model holds that explanations in the moral sciences cite agents’ reasons for acting in definite historical situations. Such explanations are context‐dependent, social (not psychological) in content, essentially post hoc, and provide insufficient grounds for prediction. The tension between Hume's two models is considerable, not to say inconsistent. We would best understand him as trying to reconcile the two. Each provides different and equally important kinds of intelligibility. Until this is appreciated, the one‐sided interpretation of Hume as a psychological reductionist and a covering‐law theorist will continue.     

Telemetric monitoring in the behavior sciences

This article reviews recent advances in telemetrics, a class of wireless information systems technology that can collect and transmit a wide variety of behavioral and environmental data remotely. Telemetrics include wearable computers that weave on-body sensors into articles of clothing, ubiquitous computers that embed sensors and transmitters seamlessly into the environment, and handheld devices, such as mobile phones and personal digital assistants, that can record cognitive and affective states. Examples of telemetric applications are provided to illustrate how this technology has been used in the behavioral sciences to unobtrusively and repeatedly gather physiological, behavioral, environmental, cognitive, and affective data in natural settings. Special issues relating to privacy and confidentiality, practical considerations, and statistical and measurement challenges when telemetrics are used are also discussed.     

Phenomenological methodology in the human sciences

The author suggests that phenomenological methodology differs from traditional methodologies both in purpose and procedure. The task of a phenomenological researcher is to see the logic or meaning of an experience, for any subject, rather than to discover causal connections or patterns of correlation. The nature of the task demands extensive study of a small sample, allowing the subjects to speak for themselves and to reveal the logic of their experience as lived. The author reviews verification procedures relevant to phenomenological studies and discusses the limitations inherent in phenomenological research.     

Understanding mechanisms in the health sciences

This article focuses on the assessment of mechanistic relations with specific attention to medicine, where mechanistic models are widely employed. I first survey recent contributions in the philosophical literature on mechanistic causation, and then take issue with Federica Russo and Jon Williamson’s thesis that two types of evidence, probabilistic and mechanistic, are at stake in the health sciences. I argue instead that a distinction should be drawn between previously acquired knowledge of mechanisms and yet-to-be-discovered knowledge of mechanisms and that both probabilistic evidence and manipulation are essential with respect to newly discovered mechanisms.     

The crisis of the human sciences

Continental Philosophy Review -