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1.
In “Intuitions in Linguistics” ( 2006a) and Ignorance of Language ( 2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence.
I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses
to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar.
Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” ( 2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside
between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well
be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong
about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority. 相似文献
2.
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
3.
Linguistic intuitive judgements are the de facto data source of choice within generative linguistics. But why we are justified in relying on intuitive judgements as evidence for grammars? In the philosophy of linguistics, this question has been hotly debated. I argue that the three most prominent views of that debate all have their problems. Devitt’s Modest Explanation accounts for the wrong kind of intuitive judgements. The Voice of Competence view and Rey’s account both lack independent evidence. I introduce and defend a novel proposal that accounts for the evidential role of linguistic intuitive judgements and avoids these shortcomings. On this account, linguistic intuitive judgements are reports of the speaker’s immediate experience of trying to comprehend the sentence. This experience is due to the speaker’s linguistic competence, at least in part, and so the justification for the evidential use of linguistic intuitions ultimately comes from the speaker’s competence. However, the account does not rely on any special input from the speaker’s competence being available as the basis for linguistic intuitive judgements. 相似文献
5.
We have recently presented evidence for cross‐cultural variation in semantic intuitions and explored the implications of such variation for philosophical arguments that appeal to some theory of reference as a premise. Devitt (2011) and Ichikawa and colleagues (forthcoming) offer critical discussions of the experiment and the conclusions that can be drawn from it. In this response, we reiterate and clarify what we are really arguing for, and we show that most of Devitt’s and Ichikawa and colleagues’ criticisms fail to address our concerns. 相似文献
6.
We look into the transformation of meanings in psychotherapy and suggest a clinical application for Wittgenstein’s intuitions
concerning the role of linguistic practices in generating significance. In post-modern theory, therapy does not necessarily
change reality as much as it does our way of experiencing it by intervening in the linguistic-representational rules responsible
for constructing the text which expresses the problem. Since “states of mind assume the truths and forms of the language devices
that we use to represent them” (Foucault, 1963, p. 57), therapy may be intended as a narrative path toward a new naming of one’s reified experiences. The clinical problem
we consider here, the pervasive feeling of inadequacy due to one’s excessive height (dysmorphophobia), is an excellent example
of “language game” by which a “perspicuous representation” (the “therapy” proposed by Wittgenstein in the 1953) may bring out alternatives to linguistically-built “traps”, putting the blocked semiotic mechanism back into motion. 相似文献
7.
Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual
analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual
situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga’s intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic
probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen’s and Plantinga’s intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed. 相似文献
8.
My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial
to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that
motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of
another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory.
A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions.
I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds.
To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are
taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential
success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call ‘polylithic’. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical
concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope
that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity
helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which
concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist’s epistemic claims against the historical record of science. 相似文献
9.
Most people working on linguistic meaning or communication assume that semantics and pragmatics are distinct domains, yet
there is still little consensus on how the distinction is to be drawn. The position defended in this paper is that the semantics/pragmatics
distinction holds between (context-invariant) encoded linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Two other ‘minimalist’ positions
on semantics are explored and found wanting: Kent Bach’s view that there is a narrow semantic notion of context which is responsible
for providing semantic values for a small number of indexicals, and Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore’s view that semantics
includes the provision of values for all indexicals, even though these depend on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Finally,
some implications are considered for the favoured semantics/pragmatics distinction of the fact that there are linguistic elements
(lexical and syntactic) which do not contribute to truth-conditional content but rather provide guidance on pragmatic inference. 相似文献
10.
Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that
the conclusions we draw from Nozick’s thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of
our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative
reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive
to stipulation) but fill in the concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about
the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do
not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions.
And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best
serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making
the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism. 相似文献
11.
In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall
(1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient
motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory
production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising
the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories,
Popper (1975, 1981, 1994) never stated that tentative scientific conjec-tures “while more or less random, are not completely
blind.” He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing,
although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper (1977,
1983), giving a summary of his “Darwinian Model”, he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting
the sentence “On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown.” Recent
developments in the field of genetics (see for example Raff (1996), Lewis (1999), Korn (2002)) indicate that Popper’s intuitions
were along the modern lines while Worrall’s intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper’s “Darwinian Model” remains both
viable and fruitful. 相似文献
12.
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action
as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed
to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a
person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In
this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be
supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining
its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases.
I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break
down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. 相似文献
13.
Summary This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz’s philosophy science and Kant’s theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz’s “pictures” bears close similarities to Kantian “schemata”, that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant’s distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz’s three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the “hidden mass” picture) as symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald H?ffding soon after the publication of Hertz’s Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. 相似文献
14.
There is a clear and controlling philosophical concern that governs Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essays: freedom from limitation
and self-reliance from external authority. What makes it difficult to understand his essays, however, is his style, which
is characterized by disconnection, paradox, and negation. These rhetorical techniques make the meaning of his writings elusive
and slippery. Though many scholars have analyzed Emerson’s style, none have approached it through the writings of Laozi, an
ancient Chinese philosopher. There are two reasons I compare Emerson and Laozi. First, in spite of their differences, there
are important parallel themes and stylistic innovations in their writings. Second, attentiveness to a key figure in the Eastern philosophical tradition can help to explain how Emerson’s thoughts disappoint Western readers, precisely because they employ techniques beyond the method of habitual intellect in the Western frame. This essay
tries to approach several features in Emerson’s writing style from a Daoist perspective to show that both philosophers purposefully
use linguistic strategies such as disconnection, paradox, and negation to provoke readers into participating in understanding
truth, instead of telling them directly what truth is. 相似文献
15.
Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of the “flexibility of origins” thesis is often thought to carry
a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of
the modal may accommodate flexibility of origins without denying S4. One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is
the identification of the Principles of Possibility, which include the Modal Extension Principle (MEP), and a set of Constitutive
Principles. Regarding their modal status, Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some
of the Constitutive Principles be only contingently true. Here, I show that the contingency of the Constitutive Principles
is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and this makes the account validate S4. It is also shown that, compatibly with
the necessity of the Constitutive Principles, the account can still accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins. However,
the account we end up with once those intuitions are consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up
the debate about whether or not artefacts allow for some variation in their origins. 相似文献
16.
In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what
he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical
positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological
theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack
and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’
gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but,
we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about. 相似文献
17.
In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of
a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on
the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ‘If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it’) and Moore’s Paradox that both claims
are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results into account while
doing justice to the key intuitions underlying the Ramsey Test. The semantics is extended to cover some further phenomena,
including the recent observation that epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore’s
Paradox. 相似文献
18.
The Ontological Dilemma of Normative Ethics. This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that normative ethics is confronted with the following dilemma: to be
coherent, this discipline is ontologically committed to acknowledge the existence of objective values, but, to be scientifically
respectable, it is committed to repudiate such values. The second goal is to assess the possible solutions to this dilemma.
To this end, the following strategies are discussed: Kant’s constructive objectivism, Jürgen Habermas’ “epistemic ersatzism”,
Franz von Kutschera’s “confirmation pragmatism”, and David Brink’s “objectivist tour de force”. The paper’s conclusion is
that the dilemma cannot be solved because it rests on a clash of intuitions none of which can be given up.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
19.
David Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unified semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmerss theory does not coherently fit any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identified with straightforward semantic ambiguity). 相似文献
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