Adolescents' approval of peer and spousal retribution in their culture vs. other cultures: The role of group stereotypes

This study examined whether negative group stereotypes similarly affect adolescents' reasoning about peer and spousal retribution in interpersonal situations. Findings from cognitive domain theory, school violence, family violence, and group stereotyping and prejudice literatures were used to examine this. The sample of adolescents was drawn from northern and central Israel and consisted of 1,168 Arab and Jewish students (grades 7–11). A quasi‐experimental between‐subject design was used, in which the students in each grade were randomly assigned to one of two peer retribution scenarios and one of two spousal retribution scenarios. In each scenario, only the ethnicity of the peers and married couples depicted in the story was systematically altered. The study was a 2 (Arab/Jewish respondent) 2 (peer retribution scenarios) 2 (spousal retribution scenarios) factorial design. The findings provide evidence that Arab and Jewish students have negative stereotypes about one another; however, these group stereotypes did not affect their judgments and justifications about peer and spousal retribution. Jewish and Arab students judged peer retribution similarly, but differed in their judgments of spousal retribution. However, altering the ethnic background of the individuals in the scenarios did not affect respondents' judgments. This suggests that respondents in both groups did not base their judgments on negative stereotypes about the out‐group, but instead were focusing on the behavioural act itself. Overall, the vast majority of respondents condemned retribution based on moral, social conventional and personal reasons. This inquiry provides evidence that it was the number of justifications endorsed within a specific domain that distinguished Arab and Jewish respondents. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

道德文本阅读中预期推理的许可效应的眼动研究

元分析表明道德许可效应具有一定的普遍性。为了直接检验这种效应作为认知偏差是否影响道德信息预期推理,本研究结合眼动追踪技术,比较了高/低善良被试在启动积极道德自我前后,阅读道德主题故事结果句的差异。阅读速度的眼动指标表明,启动主效应显著,积极道德结果的预期显著减弱,消极道德结果的预期显著增强,而且善良特质不能抑制这些倾向。这表明启动积极道德自我,会导致道德材料阅读加工速度产生许可效应。     

Will moral outrage stand up?: Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation

Moral outrage—anger at violation of a moral standard—is claimed to be a prevalent and powerful moral emotion. However, evidence for moral outrage has been compromised by failure to distinguish it from personal anger—anger at harm to self—felt by victims of a moral violation. Although it does not seem possible to distinguish these two forms of anger by measurement, it is possible to do so by experimental manipulation of their distinct eliciting conditions. Extending previous research, the current study manipulated how a victim (self vs. stranger) was excluded (fairly vs. unfairly) from a favorable experience. Reported anger and behavioral retribution provided evidence of personal anger and revenge, not of moral outrage. These findings suggest that the prevalence and power of moral outrage has been exaggerated. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Viewer's moral sanction of retribution in the appreciation of dramatic presentations

An audiovisually presented fairy tale, which involved provocation and retaliation as the central theme, was created in three versions. Relative to the provocation, retaliation was too mild, equitable, or too severe. Children at the developmental stages of expiatory retribution (4-yr olds) and equitable retribution (7- and 8-yr olds) served as subjects. Appreciation of the presentation was measured in facial displays, in structured interviews, and in ratings. Consistently across measures, it was found that for children at the stage of expiatory retribution, appreciation increased with the severity of the retaliatory acts. Children at the stage of equitable retribution, in contrast, appreciated equitable retaliation the most. At this stage, inequitable retaliation (too mild or too severe) was found to impair appreciation significantly. The findings were interpreted as consistent with the proposal that the depiction of punitive, retaliatory activities will be enjoyed the more, the closer they approximate the viewer's moral expectations.     

Vengeance: The Half Hidden Pillager of Our Lives

Vengeance is presented as a destructive, deeply rooted, human tendency to punish without limit those who arouse the sense of injustice. Retribution is distinguished from it principally by being measured out in proportion to the wrong felt, though the two are often fused in individual and corporate life. Vengeance is viewed as rooted in infantile mourning for the felt loss of the mothering figure, but significantly developed through experiences of shame. Retribution, sometimes not distinguished from vengeance, is defended by some sophisticated ethical and legal theorists. Christianity has had a mitigating effect upon vengeance, but further remedies need to be found. Symbolic acts of public reparation at monuments may be one such remedy.     

I—The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the 'relativism of distance'. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical (he thought it often involved a certain 'fantasy'). I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame , which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate— moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance.     

Indigenous Psychotherapies and Religion: Moral Vision and Embodied Communities

Over the past century, the dominant model for addressing mental illness has been the treatment of individuals, largely by individual therapists who assume the availability of individual psychological resources. That form of therapy is a scarce commodity in capitalist societies, and social models of healing have been largely marginalized and forgotten. From the point of view of an indigenous psychology of religion, this essay (1) reports on local cultural and community models of healing that honor the common good, draw on local, communal narratives, and involve a given community in the process of healing. However, because it is not simply community in itself that is therapeutic, the authors argue (2) that healing cultures have communities that are guided by their moral vision and are committed to justice, moral integrity, and the sharing of resources. They draw on intergenerational studies that detail the effects in Inuit communities where a moral vision and a sense of community was present but then was eroded. Therapists whose interventions draw on the moral resources of the community may facilitate healing, as demonstrated by the use of allocentric imaging in more communal traditions. Finally, it is not simply communities with moral ideals that are therapeutic but (3) indigenous communities whose structures and whose role models embody their ethic that is critical for healing. The authors examine ecological communities in China committed to Confucian values and protection of the earth. The L’Arche communities begun in France by Jean Vanier and Alcoholics Anonymous groups around the world serve as examples of embodied moral communities.     

Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.     

Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But Not Hume versus Kant

Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.     

The Internal Consistency of Moral Reasoning: A Multitrait-Multimethod Assessment

The consistency of moral judgment across five dimensions (immanent justice, moral realism, retribution vs. restitution, efficacy of severe punishment, and communicable responsibility) from two basic, structural components of the cognitive-developmental approach was examined. The two components were (a) the more general concept of level and (b) the more specific concept of stage. Multitrait-multimethod analysis supported the compatibility between the two constructs. The methods differed in their degree of association between the five measured dimensions; the stage technique appeared to be more consistent than the level scale. Finally, comparisons between dimensions indicated that the notion of moral development seems to be multidimensional, vis-à-vis unidimensional, as originally implied by Piaget and later by Kohlberg.     

Is revenge about retributive justice,deterring harm,or both?

This paper explores the vast literature on revenge and retributive punishment to ascertain whether revenge seekers are primarily seeking retribution or to deter future harm. This review considers research findings from social, consumer, evolutionary, and industrial/organizational psychology. Revenge is defined as an action in response to some perceived wrongdoing by another party that is intended to inflict damage, injury, discomfort, or punishment on the party judged responsible. In support of the perspective that revenge is about retribution, vengeance is typically triggered only by unjust harms, revenge‐seekers report a moral imperative, justice beliefs predict revenge, and justice‐related information has the greatest influence on punishment calculations. On the other hand, a plethora of findings in economic games such as serial prisoner dilemmas reveal that tit‐for‐tat style revenge is an effective means of deterring future harm. Overall, the evidence seems to support a retribution model of revenge over a deterrence model; however, as this review describes in its conclusion, the psychology of revenge is in need of further investigation along several key dimensions.     

Retributive and restorative justice: Importance of crime severity and shared identity in people's justice responses

Retributive and restorative justice present two different responses to wrongdoing: one that focuses on addressing the moral wrong through punitive sanctions (retribution) and one that focuses on addressing the harm that has been caused through reparative sanctions (restoration). Psychological investigations of what factors influence which justice outcome that people desire (retributive, restorative, or both) have focused on two constructs: crime severity and shared identity. The crime severity approach contends that people can have multiple justice goals, and which justice goals people want to fulfil is dependent on the salient features of the situation (such as offence seriousness). The shared identity approach argues that people's desire for restoration or retribution is dependent on the shared identity and perceptions of value consensus between offender and victim in the judgement context. The findings related to both of these factors are reviewed, and possibilities for future research integrating these two approaches are discussed.     

When ideology matters: Moral conviction and the association between ideology and policy preferences in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Do people's policy preferences toward outgroups in intractable conflict consistently correspond with political ideology? To what extent are policy‐related cleavages between the political right and left in such contexts fueled by moral conviction and emotions? Analyses of a survey of Jewish‐Israelis (N = 119) conducted immediately after a war between Israelis and Palestinians revealed little to no ideological differences in acceptance of “collateral damage,” support for retribution, or support for compromise when positions about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were devoid of moral fervor. Those on the left and right endorsed polarized policy preferences only when their positions about the conflict were held with moral conviction. Presence or absence of guilt about harm to Palestinians mediated the effects of moral conviction on policy preferences in this context. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Desert,Harm Reduction,and Moral Education: The Case for a Tortfeasor Penalty

Those found liable for negligently injuring others are required to compensate them, but current practices permit most tort feasors to spread the costs of their liability burdens through the purchase of insurance. Those found guilty of criminal offences, however, are not allowed to shift the burdens of their sentences onto others. Yet the reasons for not allowing criminal offenders to shift such burdens – harm reduction, retribution, and moral education – also appear to retain some force in relation to negligent tort feasors. Arguments for and against limiting the abilities of negligent tort feasors to spread such costs, thus imposing a penalty on them, are discussed. The conclusion reached is that further consideration of such a penalty is warranted. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Intergroup retaliation and intra‐group praise gain: The effect of expected cooperation from the in‐group on intergroup vicarious retribution

Intergroup vicarious retribution is the phenomenon whereby, after an out‐group member attacks an in‐group member, a member of the victim's group retaliates against a member of the perpetrator's group. This study examined the effect of expected cooperation from the in‐group on intergroup vicarious retribution through intra‐group reputation based on praise gain and exclusion avoidance. In the experiment, we conducted a one‐on‐one match in which, after participants learned that an out‐group member (as the winner) had imposed a fine on an in‐group member (as the loser) in a previous round, winning participants were allowed to impose an arbitrary fine on the other losing out‐group member. As a result, participants imposed a larger fine on their out‐group member opponent in retaliation when they were expected by in‐group members to cooperate than when such cooperation was not expected. Furthermore, participants regarded a fine as intra‐group cooperation. Since a path analysis revealed a mediating effect of praise gain, but no mediating effect of exclusion avoidance, expected cooperation from in‐group members facilitated vicarious retribution because those involved in retribution sought praise from other in‐group members. These findings suggest that the intra‐group reputation dynamics of expected cooperation and praise gain escalate intergroup conflict.     

The moral maze: Dutch Salafis and the construction of a moral community of the faithful

The Salafi movement presents itself as a moral guardian of Muslims in a world that, according to many, is filled with moral crisis, temptations and anti-Islam tendencies. Salafis claim that it is essential to return to the community of the pious forefathers seen as the most outstanding community of all times with the highest absolute moral standard. In this article I will show how individual participants engage with this idea of a moral community of believers yet remain vulnerable to the ambiguities and ruptures inherent in everyday life and within the Salafi movement. By exploring how Salafis passionately try to search for the ‘correct’ knowledge and strive to maintain a unity between knowledge, conviction and behavior, and the role of friendships therein, I argue that Salafism does not remain separate from the troubles of everyday but that these issues enter into and exist in Salafi thought and practice, not by being resolved but by being transformed into personal struggles. These ambiguities and ruptures may cause problems but also provide an incentive for Salafis to continuously work at the self-improvement of one’s piety, authenticity, and sisterhood and brotherhood.     

Husserls Evidenzbegriff in der intersubjektiven Bewährung moralischer Evidenzen

Evidence is a central theme in Husserl´s transcendental phenomenology. This article investigates not only the theoretical aspects of evidence, but also tries to develop prolegomena for a phenomenological theory of moral evidence and moral truth. Nevertheless, this endeavor is based upon the theoretical insights of Husserl: the importance of intersubjectivity and the relevance of time, which are reviewed in the first two chapters. The temporal aspect, under the title of perpetuation (Bewährung), is crucial for the understanding of the concept of evidence. But it becomes even more important when the question of moral truth is considered. Perpetuation is not only stressed in the understanding of values, but also in the unanimity (Einstimmigkeit) of the ethical and loving person. As evidence of any kind can only be falsified by a higher evidence of the same character, moral evidence cannot be understood isolated from the living process of any prefigured moral settings of a society, moral evidence can give itself only in an interpersonal community and its moral tradition and demands the community’s own readiness for a critical habituality.     

Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest

I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue.