What can autism and dyslexia tell us about intelligence?

This paper argues that understanding developmental disorders requires developing theories and models that explicitly represent the role of general intelligence in the cognitive phenotype of the disorder. In the case of autism it is argued that the low-IQ scores of people with autism are not likely to be due to a deficit in the cognitive process that is arguably the major cause of mental retardation - namely, speed of processing - but rather low IQ reflects the pervasive and cascading effects of the deficit in the information-processing module that causes autism. In the case of dyslexia, two radically different models of reading disorder (ability = disability and a modular deficit model) are likely to be influenced by the effect of general intelligence on reading performance in ways that will remain unclear without an explicit model of how general intelligence influences reading.     

Sensory discrimination and intelligence: testing Spearman's other hypothesis

At the centenary of Spearman's seminal 1904 article, his general intelligence hypothesis remains one of the most influential in psychology. Less well known is the article's other hypothesis that there is "a correspondence between what may provisionally be called 'General Discrimination' and 'General Intelligence' which works out with great approximation to one or absoluteness" (Spearman, 1904, p. 284). Studies that do not find high correlations between psychometric intelligence and single sensory discrimination tests do not falsify this hypothesis. This study is the first directly to address Spearman's general intelligence-general sensory discrimination hypothesis. It attempts to replicate his findings with a similar sample of schoolchildren. In a well-fitting structural equation model of the data, general intelligence and general discrimination correlated .92. In a reanalysis of data published byActon and Schroeder (2001), general intelligence and general sensory ability correlated .68 in men and women. One hundred years after its conception, Spearman's other hypothesis achieves some confirmation. The association between general intelligence and general sensory ability remains to be replicated and explained.     

General intelligence as a domain-specific adaptation

General intelligence (g) poses a problem for evolutionary psychology's modular view of the human brain. The author advances a new evolutionary psychological theory of the evolution of general intelligence and argues that general intelligence evolved as a domain-specific adaptation for the originally limited sphere of evolutionary novelty in the ancestral environment. It has accidentally become universally important merely because we now live in an evolutionarily novel world. The available data seem to support the author's contention that intelligent people can solve problems better than less intelligent people only if the problems are evolutionarily novel, and they have no advantage in solving evolutionarily familiar problems. This perspective can also solve some empirical anomalies, such as the "central theoretical problem of human sociobiology" (D. R. Vining, 1986, p. 167) and the geographic distribution of general intelligence throughout the world.     

Ability, breadth, and parsimony in computational models of higher-order cognition

Computational models will play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. How can a model's contribution to this goal be evaluated? This article argues that three important aspects of a model of higher‐order cognition to evaluate are (a) its ability to reason, solve problems, converse, and learn as well as people do; (b) the breadth of situations in which it can do so; and (c) the parsimony of the mechanisms it posits. This article argues that fits of models to quantitative experimental data, although valuable for other reasons, do not address these criteria. Further, using analogies with other sciences, the history of cognitive science, and examples from modern‐day research programs, this article identifies five activities that have been demonstrated to play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. These include modeling within a cognitive architecture, conducting artificial intelligence research, measuring and expanding a model's ability, finding mappings between the structure of different domains, and attempting to explain multiple phenomena within a single model.     

What kind of kind is intelligence?

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.     

应用决策树探讨中国当代大学生情感素质下属各情感的相互关系

为深入了解大学生情感素质及其下属情感的相互关系,本文在已有全国大学生情感素质调查的基础上,利用决策树算法对大学生的情感素质及其下属情感(道德情感、生活情感、情绪智力)进行预测分类。结果表明:(1)决策树可以有效地对大学生情感素质下属各情感进行预测分类;(2)按属性重要性提取规则,道德情感对情感素质影响最大,生活情感次之;责任感对道德情感影响较大;自强感对生活情感有较强影响;理解他人情绪能力对情绪智力的影响较大。     

A possible model for understanding the personality‐intelligence interface

Despite the recent increase in the number of studies examining empirical links between personality and intelligence (see Hofstee, 2001; Zeidner & Matthews, 2000), a theoretical integration of ability and nonability traits remains largely unaddressed. This paper presents a possible conceptual framework for understanding the personality‐intelligence interface. In doing so, it conceptualizes three different levels of intelligence, namely, intellectual ability (which comprises both Gf and Gc), IQ test performance and subjectively assessed intelligence (a mediator between personality, intellectual ability and IQ test performance). Although the model draws heavily upon correlation evidence, each of its paths may be tested independently. The presented model may, therefore, be used to explore causation and further develop theoretical approaches to understanding the relation between ability and nonability traits underlying human performance.     

从智力的三元理论到成功智力:是对IQ的再次超越吗?

本文以智力的约定性为立论,把超越界定为智力的约定性的广度、深度和效度的大幅度提高。将斯腾伯格对智力的研究放到智力理论研究的历史过程中,对斯腾伯格的三元智力理论及成功智力理论对IQ的超越做了分析。指出传统IQ是学业差异约定,三元智力是多元权变约定,成功智力是人生成功约定,后者都是对前者的超越,成功智力是对IQ的再次超越。最后尝试性地提出智力约定性的“树”的隐喻。本文对智力理论的研究和教育实践有参考价值。     

聚焦思维结构的智力理论--林崇德的智力理论述评

林崇德的思维结构模型,是其智力理论的核心。因此,林崇德的智力理论,是一种聚焦思维结构的智力理论。不过,林崇德的智力理论,远不止其思维结构模型。他所提出的“智力结构是一个多元结构”的观点、“思维核心说”、“概括基础说”和“思维发展的模式”,也同样是其智力理论的重要内容。通观林崇德的智力理论,不难看出其四大特点:第一,理论性与实践性的有机统一;第二,两点论与重点论的有机统一;第三,智力培养与智力评价的有机统一;第四,不变性与可变性的有机统一。     

From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of "moral marriage" based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong-headed. The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ.     

The plausibility of spiritual intelligence: spiritual experience,problem solving and neural sites

Australian teachers in Church related schools have begun to use the term ‘spiritual intelligence’ in their educational discourse. Is it accurate to describe spirituality as a form of intelligence? This paper explores whether the notion of spiritual intelligence is plausible. It addresses this firstly by discussing the notion of spiritual experience as a mechanism for problem solving—one of the central themes that underlies the concept of intelligence. Secondly, it examines some of the neural sites of the human brain that have been found to be active in those who apperceive spiritual experience. In light of this discussion, this paper argues that although some concerns prevail in considering spirituality as a form of intelligence, the concept of spiritual intelligence may nonetheless be rendered as plausible.     

Philosophers ought to develop,theorize about,and use philosophically relevant AI

The transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is coming to philosophy—the only question is the degree to which philosophers will harness it. This paper argues that the application of AI tools to philosophy could have an impact on the field comparable to the advent of writing, and that it is likely that philosophical progress will significantly increase as a consequence of AI. The role of philosophers in this story is not merely to use AI but also to help develop it and theorize about it. In fact, the paper argues that philosophers have a prima facie obligation to spend significant effort in doing so, at least insofar as they should spend effort philosophizing.     

The many null distributions of person fit indices

This paper deals with the situation of an investigator who has collected the scores ofn persons to a set ofk dichotomous items, and wants to investigate whether the answers of all respondents are compatible with the one parameter logistic test model of Rasch. Contrary to the standard analysis of the Rasch model, where all persons are kept in the analysis and badly fittingitems may be removed, this paper studies the alternative model in which a small minority ofpersons has an answer strategy not described by the Rasch model. Such persons are called anomalous or aberrant. From the response vectors consisting ofk symbols each equal to 0 or 1, it is desired to classify each respondent as either anomalous or as conforming to the model. As this model is probabilistic, such a classification will possibly involve false positives and false negatives. Both for the Rasch model and for other item response models, the literature contains several proposals for a person fit index, which expresses for each individual the plausibility that his/her behavior follows the model. The present paper argues that such indices can only provide a satisfactory solution to the classification problem if their statistical distribution is known under the null hypothesis that all persons answer according to the model. This distribution, however, turns out to be rather different for different values of the person's latent trait value. This value will be called ability parameter, although our results are equally valid for Rasch scales measuring other attributes.As the true ability parameter is unknown, one can only use its estimate in order to obtain an estimated person fit value and an estimated null hypothesis distribution. The paper describes three specifications for the latter: assuming that the true ability equals its estimate, integrating across the ability distribution assumed for the population, and conditioning on the total score, which is in the Rasch model the sufficient statistic for the ability parameter.Classification rules for aberrance will be worked out for each of the three specifications. Depending on test length, item parameters and desired accuracy, they are based on the exact distribution, its Monte Carlo estimate and a new and promising approximation based on the moments of the person fit statistic. Results for the likelihood person fit statistic are given in detail, the methods could also be applied to other fit statistics. A comparison of the three specifications results in the recommendation to condition on the total score, as this avoids some problems of interpretation that affect the other two specifications.The authors express their gratitude to the reviewers and to many colleagues for comments on an earlier version.     

Placing inspection time, reaction time, and perceptual speed in the broader context of cognitive ability: The VPR model in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936

The idea that information processing speed is related to cognitive ability has a long history. Much evidence has been amassed in its support, with respect to both individual differences in general intelligence and developmental trajectories. Two so-called elementary cognitive tasks, reaction time and inspection time, have been used to compile this evidence, but most studies have used either one or the other. Relations between speed and fluid intelligence have tended to be stronger than those between speed and crystallized intelligence, but studies testing this have confounded verbal abilities with crystallized intelligence and spatial/perceptual abilities with fluid intelligence. Questions have also been raised regarding whether speed contributes directly to general intelligence or to more specific cognitive abilities to which general intelligence also contributes. We used 18 ability and speed measures in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936, assessed at approximately age 70, to construct alternative versions of the Verbal-Perceptual-Image Rotation (Johnson & Bouchard, 2005a) model of cognitive ability to test different hypotheses regarding these issues. Though differences in the extents to which our models fit the data were relatively small, they suggested that reaction and inspection time tasks were comparable indicators of information processing speed with respect to general intelligence, that verbal and spatial abilities were similarly related to information processing speed, and that spatial, verbal, and perceptual speed abilities were more directly related to information processing speed than was general intelligence. We discuss the theoretical implications of these results.     

Predicting workplace outcomes from the ability to eavesdrop on feelings

Emotion recognition, the most reliably validated component within the construct of emotional intelligence, is a complicated skill. Although emotion recognition skill is generally valued in the workplace, "eavesdropping," or relatively better recognition ability with emotions expressed through the less controllable "leaky" nonverbal channels, can have detrimental social and workplace consequences. In light of theory regarding positive emotion in organizations, as well as research on the consequences of perceiving negative information, the authors hypothesized and found an interaction between nonverbal channel and emotional valence in predicting workplace ratings from colleagues and supervisors. Ratings were higher for eavesdropping ability with positive emotion and lower for eavesdropping ability with negative emotion. The authors discuss implications for the complexity of interventions associated with emotional intelligence in workplace settings.     

Bioethics in a liberal society--political, not moral

This paper argues for the importance of the political context of a society for bioethics. In particular, I argue that in a liberal constitutional society, such as the one we find ourselves in, no particular moral perspective is granted a privileged position. Rather, individuals are allowed to live their lives according to values they adopt for themselves, and the rights granted to protect this ability "trump" social consensus, and place boundaries on the social application of personal moral beliefs and values.     

Emulation and mimicry for social interaction: a theoretical approach to imitation in autism

The "broken-mirror" theory of autism argues that dysfunction of the "mirror neuron system" is a root cause of social disability in autism. The present paper aims to scrutinize this theory and, when it breaks down, to provide an alternative. Current evidence suggests that children with autism are able to understand and emulate goal-directed actions, but may have specific impairments in automatic mimicry of actions without goals. These data are not compatible with the broken-mirror theory, but can be accounted for by a new model called EP-M. The EP-M model segments the mirror neuron system into an indirect, parietal route for goal emulation and planning (EP) and a direct occipital-frontal route for mimicry (M). This fractionation is consistent with neuroimaging and behavioural studies of the mirror neuron system in typical children and adults. I suggest that top-down modulation of the direct M route may be dysfunctional in individuals with autism, leading to abnormal behaviours on mimicry tasks as well as other social disabilities.     

右侧脑发育不全患者启动效应与智力水平分离

采用 ＷＭＳ－ＣＲ． ＷＩＳＣ－ＣＲ和４项内隐记忆任务（偏好、自由联想、字根补笔和字辨认）观察一例右侧脑发育不全患者和两正常对照组被试的智商、记忆商和启动效应。发现该患者智力发育迟滞、记忆功能严重损伤,但启动效应正常。提示右侧脑发育不全患者启动效应与智力测验结果分离。由于启动效应是人类的一种重要的无意识习得能力,因此该研究表明智力发育迟滞者或脑损伤患者仍可能存在较好的无意识习得能力,这对特殊教育和临床脑损伤患者康复有一定的参考价值;同时该研究提示当前智力测验未能反映大脑功能的无意识方面,提出今后的智力测验应包括无意识习得能力的测量。