Tone matters for Cantonese–English bilingual children’s English word reading development: A unified model of phonological transfer

Languages differ considerably in how they use prosodic features, or variations in pitch, duration, and intensity, to distinguish one word from another. Prosodic features include lexical tone in Chinese and lexical stress in English. Recent cross-sectional studies show a surprising result that Mandarin Chinese tone sensitivity is related to Mandarin–English bilingual children’s English word reading. This study explores the mechanism underlying this relation by testing two explanations of these effects: the prosodic hypothesis and segmental phonological awareness transfer. We administered multiple measures of Cantonese tone sensitivity, English stress sensitivity, segmental phonological awareness in Cantonese and English, nonverbal ability, and English word reading to 123 Cantonese–English bilingual children ages 7 and 8 years. Structural equation modeling revealed a longitudinal prediction of Cantonese tone sensitivity to English word reading between 8 and 9 years of age. This relation was realized through two parallel routes. In one, Cantonese tone sensitivity predicted English stress sensitivity, and English stress sensitivity, in turn, significantly predicted English word reading, as postulated by the prosodic hypothesis. In the second, Cantonese tone sensitivity predicted English word reading through the transfer of segmental phonological awareness between Cantonese and English, as predicted by segmental phonological transfer. These results support a unified model of phonological transfer, emphasizing the role of tone in English word reading for Cantonese–English bilingual children.     

A critique of Confucius’ philosophy

Throughout the millennia since the composition of the Analects, orthodox scholars have maintained that Confucius faithfully passed down the thought of early eras, particularly those of Yao and Shun: ‘I transmit but do not create ideas.’ This paper shows that Confucius actually subverted the essence of orthodox thought represented mainly by Yao and Shun. His subversion of orthodox thought compels perforce the idea of ‘ren (humanity),’ which concerns itself with the human world, to stand out with the near exclusion of otherworldliness in his teaching. As a result of the misunderstanding of Confucius’ heritage, scholars in the past tended to equate Confucius’ idea of ‘ren’ with specific moral attributes. Again taking exception to the interpretations of bygone eras, this essay demonstrates that humanity in Confucius’ theory signifies a dynamic process rather than a specific attribute or a static rule, changing constantly with different people, different places, and different times.     

A Reappraisal of Children’s ‘Potential’

What does it mean for a child to fulfil his or her potential? This article explores the contexts and implications of the much-used concept of potential in educational discourses. We claim that many of the popular, political and educational uses of the term in relation to childhood have a problematic blind spot: interpersonality, and the necessary coexistence for the concept to be receivable of all children’s ‘potentials’. Rather than advocating abandoning the term—a futile gesture given its emotive force—we argue that the concept of children’s potential must be profoundly rethought to be workable as a philosophical notion in education. In an era marked by the unspoken assumption that ‘unlimited potential’ is always a good thing, we argue that it might be necessary to think about the limitations of the notion of individual potential; namely, the moment when it comes into contact with other people’s projects. We propose a conceptualisation of potential as the negotiated, situated, ever-changing creation of a group of individuals, in a process marked by conflict, and which remains essentially difficult.     

A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts

Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. Thoughts are supposed to do work that requires that they be structured and work that requires that they be unstructured. But this cannot be! While the standard response to this problem is to reject either (i) or (ii), I propose a charitable repair in the spirit of Frege’s theory that accepts both. The key idea can be found in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic(BL, GGA). Frege argues that the thought expressed by a sentence is determined by the truth-conditions that can be derived from the semantic axioms for the sentence constituents. The fact that the same axiomatic truth-condition can be derived in different ways from different semantic axioms suggests a Fregean solution of the dilemma: A thought is a type that is instantiated by all sequences of senses (decomposed thoughts) that have the same axiomatic truth-conditions. This allows for multiple decomposability of the same thought (for different decomposed thoughts can have the same axiomatic truth-conditions) and for a notion of containment (the decomposed thought contains those senses whose semantic axioms are needed in the derivation of the truth-conditions). My proposal combines the virtues of (i) and (ii) without inheriting their vices.     

A discussion of Kretchmar’s elements of competition

Recently Kretchmar attempted to apply and to explore Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method in relation to clarifying, in the context of sport particularly, the main features of competition. He concludes with the strong claim that competition is unintelligible unless understood in relation to the four elements of plurality, comparison, normativity, and disputation. Roughly, the idea is that competition needs to be understood as a context in which more than one competitor is involved; where competitors are compared; that comparisons are evaluations of their performance/entry in the competition; and that the expected result of the latter is a matter of dispute between or among contestants. In investigating these points some refinement of this basic outline is attempted against occasional reference to others who in the past made similar claims about the conditions of competition. I conclude that Kretchmar’s claims are mistaken.     

A defence of mencius’ ethical naturalism

I argue that Mencius puts forth a defensible form of ethical naturalism, according to which moral properties, moral motivation, and moral deliberation can be accounted for within the parameters of a naturalistic worldview. On this position, moral properties are the subjectively real properties which acts have in virtue of their corresponding to our most coherent set of shared desires. I give a naturalistic definition of ‘right’ which, I argue, is implicit in Mencius’ philosophy. I address the objection that some of the contemporary‐sounding views which I attribute to Mencius are positions which are alien to the ancient thinker, and I argue that the version of Mencius given here is not only quite faithful to Mencius but also a true metaethical theory.     

A meta-analysis of children’s self-reports of dietary intake

Objective: Although research studies increasingly use children as primary reporters in dietary assessments, it is unclear how well children’s self-reported intake correlates with independently validated reports of their intake; this meta-analysis assesses that correlation.

Design: Moderators of the correlation between self-reported and independently validated intake were predicted a priori: type of dietary intake assessment (24 h recall, food diary and food frequency questionnaires), validation measures, parental assistance and age. Online databases were searched for articles published from 1990 to 2014 that compared children’s self-reports of dietary intake to validated observations of food intake in children age 4–16.

Main outcome measures: Summary effect size Pearson r between children’s self-reported dietary intake and independently validated dietary intake were calculated.

Results: In k = 32 samples from 23 studies, a statistically significant correlation (r = .48, Z = 7.26, p < .001) was found between children’s self-reported dietary intake and independently validated reports of dietary intake. Validation method (Q = 17.49, df = 2, p < .001) and parental assistance (Z = 2.03, p = .042) were significant moderators of this correlation. Self-report methodology (Q = 3.95, df = 2, p = .139) and age (Q = .02, p = .879) were not significant moderators of the distribution of effect sizes.

Conclusion: Together, these results provide baseline information about children’s recall in dietary intake assessments conducted with children as primary reporters.     

A defence of Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation

Calls to decolonise the university and revise what we research and teach is a challenge that ought to be taken up by those working in African philosophy and philosophy in Africa, more generally. Often, the thought is that such decolonisation will involve a complete subversion, destruction or deconstruction of colonial attitudes, processes and concepts. A more moderate proposal for decolonisation of philosophy can be found, however, which is Kwasi Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation. In this paper, I defend the project from two categories of objection, what I call the decolonisation and methodology objections. I argue that the objections are misdirected and unfair because they fail to recognise the theoretical backing of Wiredu’s wider work. The critical reflection central to Wiredu’s project of conceptual decolonisation can be a genuinely helpful and viable route to take when tackling the challenges of decolonising philosophy.     

A physicalist reinterpretion of ‘phenomenal’ spaces

This paper argues that phenomenal or internal metrical spaces are redundant posits. It is shown that we need not posit an internal space-time frame, as the physical space-time suffices to explain geometrical perception, memory and planning. More than the internal space-time frame, the idea of a phenomenal colour space has lent credibility to the idea of internal spaces. It is argued that there is no phenomenal colour space that underlies the various psychophysical colour spaces; it is parasitic upon physical and psychophysical colour spaces. The argumentation is further extended to other sensory spaces and generalised quality spaces.     

A resolute reading of Cassirer’s anthropology

In the paper I try, resolutely, to associate the open ended encyclopedic character of Cassirer’s philosophy with the core part of this philosophy concerning symbolic formation. In this way I try to supplement and strengthen the anthropology that Cassirer formulated in AN ESSAY ON MAN. Finally I discuss the historical character and value of this anthropology.     

A Ludic Appreciation of Mechner’s Aesthetics

The Psychological Record - We can imagine many of our emotions in our family pet: hunger, fear, anger, lust, and even the bonding that we call love. But not the appreciation of a sunset, sonnet,...     

A Critique of Resnik’s Mathematical Realism

This paper attempts to motivate skepticism about the reality of mathematical objects. The aim of the paper is not to provide a general critique of mathematical realism, but to demonstrate the insufficiency of the arguments advanced by Michael Resnik. I argue that Resnik’s use of the concept of immanent truth is inconsistent with the treatment of mathematical objects as ontologically and epistemically continuous with the objects posited by the natural sciences. In addition, Resnik’s structuralist program, and his denial of relational properties, is incompatible with a realist metaphysics about mathematical objects.     

A consequentialist account of Narveson’s dictum

Philosophical Studies - In population ethics, Narveson’s dictum states: morality favours making people happy, but is neutral about making happy people. The thought is intuitively appealing;...     

The invisibility of richness: A critique of Vice’s ‘strange place’

Abstract

This article builds on Samantha Vice’s argument on the problem of whiteness in contemporary South Africa. I will explore the thesis of invisibility regarding whiteness and argue for its relevance to the rich per se. This thesis demonstrates how white privilege and affluence, despite being glaringly visible in a concrete sense, is rendered invisible together with the mostly black poverty by which it is contrasted. The invisibility of whiteness translates and flows into the so-called ‘invisibility of richness’, which involves anyone who is economically affluent in this country and has the same effect of rendering poverty invisible. The massive and ever-growing divide between rich and poor means that both have fundamentally incommensurate experiences of life in this country, which is why post-apartheid South Africa is such a strange place to live in for all of its inhabitants. In the latter part of the article, a suggestion will be made about what the appropriate response to the injustices of this strange place might look like for whites.     

A Completeness Proof of Kiczuk’s Logic of Physical Change

In this paper the class of minimal models C ^ZI for Kiczuk’s system of physical change ZI is provided and soundness and completeness proofs of ZI with respect to these models are given. ZI logic consists of propositional logic von Wright’s And Then and six specific axioms characterizing the meaning of unary propositional operator “Zm”, read “there is a change in the fact that”. ZI is intended to be a logic which provides a formal account for describing two kinds of process change: the change from one state of the process to its other state (e.g., transmitting or absorbing energy with greater or less than the usual intensity) and the perishing of the process (e.g., cessation of the energetic activity of the sun).     

A preliminary discussion of Dai Zhen’s philosophy of language

Dai Zhen’s philosophy of language took the opportunity of a transition in Chinese philosophy to develop a form of humanist positivism, which was different from both the Song and Ming dynasties’ School of Principles and the early Qing dynasty’s philosophical forms. His philosophy of language had four primary manifestations: (1) It differentiated between “names pointing at entities and real events” and “names describing summum bonum and perfection”; (2) In discussing the metaphysical issue of “the Dao,” it was the first to introduce a syntax analysis of linguistics, clearly differentiating between the different roles of predicate verbs “zhi wei” and “wei zhi” in Classical Chinese; (3) In criticizing Confucian thought during the Song and Ming dynasties, it adopted specific philological skills such as the analysis of phraseology, the meaning of sentences and the thread of words in texts; and (4) It re-interpreted the meaning of Confucian classics by studying characters and language, adopting a positivist and philological manner to seek metaphysical sense in philosophy. In this way, his philosophy was different from the scholars of the School of Principles during the Song and Ming dynasties and from the goal of Western linguistic philosophy in the 20^th century, which refuted metaphysics. Accordingly, it helped to develop 18^th century Chinese philosophy as it turned towards linguistic philology.     

A Survey of Management Educators’ Perceptions of Unethical Faculty Behavior

To help academic associations in management develop, refine, and implement a code of ethics, we conducted a survey of management educators’ perception of the ethicality of 142 specific behaviors in teaching, research, and service. The results of the survey could be used to inform ethics committees of these associations regarding the level of acceptability of such conduct. The potential value of our study for the Academy of Management or similar management associations lie in our (1) systematically involving the members in building support for the code of ethics, (2) assessing members’ ethical judgments on both cross-sectional and longitudinal bases so as to identify areas needing particular attention in ethical training, (3) providing an extensive list of specific examples of questionable and potentially unethical behaviors so as to make it easier to implement the code, and (4) providing a template survey document for potential use in involving more stakeholder groups in the development of codes of ethics.