The Theology of the Cross and God's Work in the World

Ian Barbour has distinguished eight theologies of God's role in nature, together with corresponding models of divine activity. This essay examines these ideas in the light of a theology of the cross. Three of Barbour's approaches—the neo-Thomist, the kenotic, and the existentialist—are able to provide different aspects of a theology of divine action that is consistent with belief that God's definitive revelation takes place in the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. These approaches encourage attention to a part of traditional doctrines of Providence, the idea that God acts by "cooperation" with natural processes. The kenotic character of divine involvement in the world means that the regularities of the basic interactions of physics are maintained. The idea of cooperation can be extrapolated into the past, to give some insight into ways of understanding God's activity in originating the universe.     

Divine Compositionalism: A Form of Occasionalism or a Preferable Alternative View of Divine Action?

Abstract

This paper recommends divine compositionalism, a distinct view of divine creative action, as God's compositional, existence-conferring efficient causation according to his will or plan. It addresses the question of whether divine compositionalism is a species of occasionalism, treating occasional causation as a manifesting disposition which is analyzed in terms of God's creative action. We describe how divine compositionalism accounts for fundamental concepts in science including dispositions, causation, event, law of nature, and mechanism. We conclude that divine compositionalism is a more comprehensive view of divine creative action than concurrentism, and is distinct from extant views of occasionalism.     

Langdon Gilkey: In Memoriam

Langdon Gilkey died on 19 November 2004. This article reviews his career and examines elements in his systematic theology such as: (1) fallenness in human nature; (2) the transcendence and graciousness of God; (3) the Neo-Orthodox agenda; (4) creation and the dialogue with science; and (5) inter-religious dialogue. Gilkey's theological method of responding to human experience with the Christian message through a process of interpreting symbols is critically evaluated. This article is simultaneously published in Dialog and Theology and Science.     

Evolutionary Theologies and Divine Action1

Abstract

Two challenges loom large for efforts to develop a theology of evolution. The first is the problem of purpose: can evolutionary processes, in which chance plays so prominent a role, be understood as the context of God's purposive action? The second is the problem of the pervasiveness of suffering and death in evolution. To the extent that we succeed in responding to the first difficulty by giving an account of how God's purposes are enacted in the history of life, we deepen the conundrum about God's relation to natural evils. In particular, if we embrace evolution as God's clever way of making life make itself, we will find it difficult to sustain the classical theological claim that death is a disruptive interloper in God's good creation.     

A green Augustine: On learning to love nature well

Augustine of Hippo has expressed a vision of beauty in nature that could, if better known, encourage traditional Christians and secular ecologists to affirm the ground they have in common. For Augustine the ideal would be to see nature as God sees it, feeling deeply both its beauty and its impermanence, loving nature without clinging to it. With such clear seeing would come love and the motivation for sustained and skillful action. This paper discusses Augustine's paradigm and what blocks us from seeing it, and then frames principles for an authentically Augustinian response.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Play-fighting differs from serious fighting in both target of attack and tactics of fighting in the laboratory rat Rattus norvegicus

Play-fighting is often difficult to differentiate from inhibited or immature serious fighting because both may utilize many of the same behavior patterns. In the rat the two behaviors involve different targets of attack. During play-fighting, snout or oral contact is directed at the opponent's nape of the neck, whereas during serious fighting, male residents mostly direct their bites at the intruder's rump. Although similar to those used in serious fighting, the behavior patterns used during play-fighting are modified to achieve the different targets of attack. Even though the tactics of attack and defense appear more adult-like with increasing age, the playful targets persist well into adulthood.     

Aesthetics as evaluative forms of agency to perceive and design reality: A reply to aesthetic realism

Following a naturalist-realist point of view, this paper attempts to contribute to the metaphysical question of whether or not reality includes aesthetics. During evolution, cognitive agents have constructed (goal-directed) regulatory abilities forming anticipatory contents in the form of feelings regarding opportunities for interaction. These feelings are considered to be the fundamental part of an evaluative or (what in this paper considered as aesthetic) behavior through which agents show a preference to aspects of their external world. Thus, ‘aesthetic’ denotes an agential behavior based on an organization of processes integrated in a form that identifies, evaluates, and compares sources of interaction-success or error in specific aspects of external reality. While agents approach the same aspects of reality as they all interact with the same world, our claim is that aesthetic normativity cannot be an objective feature of this reality. This model overcomes problems of correspondence in the sense that an agent's actions and thoughts ought to react to any pre-given (aesthetic) quality or norm, while at the same time it emphasizes the self-directedness of aesthetic behavior that enables the development of creative forms of cognition.     

The development of an autonomy scale

The purpose of this study was to develop a valid and relaible instrument to measure four areas of autonomy. The instrument is composed of four subscales that measure the following constructs of autonomy: (a) family loyalty autonomy, (b) value autonomy, (c) emotional autonomy, and (d) behavioral autonomy. A detailed four-step procedure was used to provide the scale with construct, content, and predictive validity. Presented here is the four-stage process used to develop the Autonomy Scale, data supporting the validity and reliability of the scale, and the final version of the instrument.This article is based on dissertation research in partial fulfillment of degree requirements at Texas Woman's University.     

Agonistic versus amicable targets of attack and defense: Consequences for the origin,function, and descriptive classification of play-fighting

Play-fighting appears to involve the behavior patterns of attack and defense otherwise seen in serious fighting. The degree of similarity, however, depends on the body targets attacked and defended during these forms of fighting. For many taxa, including diverse mammalian families and some birds, the same targets are attacked and defended during both play-fighting and serious fighting. However, for several species of muroid rodents, the targets of play-fighting are not the same as those of serious fighting. In these cases, the tactics of attack and defense are also different. It is argued that for these muroid species the playful targets have arisen from amicable behavior (e.g., social investigation, greeting, allogrooming) rather than, as appears to be the case in so many other taxa, from agonistic behavior. These data strongly suggest that “play-fighting” has evolved from different precursors in different taxa and thus has multiple origins. Furthermore, these data have an important bearing on the universal applicability of many of the suggested functions of play-fighting and also on how such behavior is to be described and classified.     

Scientific Research–Who Should Govern?

I argue that the title question needs to be taken seriously because there are important questions about how the scientific agenda should be set. Natural answers to the question – declarations of the proper autonomy of science or expressions of faith in market forces – are found inadequate. Instead, I propose a form of democracy with respect to scientific research that will avoid the obvious dangers of a tyranny of ignorance. I conclude with some modest proposals about how the ideal of a democratic science might be implemented and with a response to common objections.

Information need,affect, and cognition of autonomic activity

Several studies have shown that bogus feedback of physiological change induces a greater liking for attractive stimuli. Other research suggests that the affective change induced by bogus feedback requires an opportunity to visually search change-associated stimuli for information which can account for its purported physiological effect. While there is considerable agreement among theorists that a greater disliking should obtain when the stimuli are unattractive (but a lack of data supporting this contention), there is disagreement about whether information searching is directed equally toward change-associated stimuli and no-change stimuli, or toward change-associated stimuli alone.Results of the present study support the contention that stimulus features determine the kind of affect experienced: change-associated slides depicting nudes are rated as more attractive than no-change-associated nudes, and change-associated slides depicting accident vitctims are rated as more repulsive than no-change-associated victims. Information seeking data are more consistent with the contention that information needs exist after both types of feedback.     

The effect of three procedures for eliminating a conditioned taste aversion in the rat

Although extinction procedures have been the most common techniques used to eliminate conditioned taste aversions, several studies have employed postconditioning exposure to the US instead. To date, a comparison of the effectiveness of these two techniques has not been possible, because there were differences in the conditioning phases of these studies. In the present study, after an aversion to saccharin had been established, rats were administered 1, 5, or 10 extinction trials, 1, 5, or 10 postconditioning exposures to the US, or a period of no treatment. Then, all rats received seven two-bottle extinction tests. Five or ten extinction trials reduced the aversion to saccharin most effectively. Five or ten postconditioning presentations of the US were also effective. However, this effect was not noticeable until the fourth of seven test trials, suggesting an elimination procedure-test trials interaction. Neither the extinction nor the US postexposure procedure completely eliminated the aversion. In addition: (i) a single postconditioning exposure to either the CS or the US was ineffective in attenuating the aversion; and (ii) when no postconditioning treatment was administered, the strength of the aversion was undiminished for 20 days.     

Schizophrenic speech,slips of the tongue,and jargonaphasia: A reply to Fromkin and to Lecours and Vanier-Clément

Chaika (1974, Brain & Language, 1, 257–276) raised the possibility that speech judged “schizophrenic” by researchers results from an intermittent, cyclical aphasia. Fromkin (1975, Brain and Language, 2, 498–503) judged such speech as no different from normal error and even as proof of intactness of linguistic competence. These claims are examined. Lecours and Vanier-Clément (1976, Brain and Language, 3, 516–565), on the other hand, found it not normal, but different from jargonaphasia, a claim not wholly substantiated. Schizophrenic speech is found to be different from that of normals on both formal and intuitive grounds, contributing to new understanding of the differences between normal, pathological, and artistic language.     

Special random numbers: Beyond the illusion of control

Previous research has shown that gamblers prefer numbers they choose themselves because this choice allows them to feel more in control of the (random) outcome. We identify other conditions under which people find numbers “special” (i.e., worthy of betting more on than other numbers). By manipulating gambling task type and assigning participants a number by an endogenous system outside their own control (as is done in numerology, astrology, and other paranormal systems), we find that indeed people prefer to bet on numbers derived from particular special systems. The mechanism underlying this preference is enjoyment with the task—not control. Further, the enjoyment associated with this “specialness” is related to the prevalence of certain types of numbers (i.e., numbers based on dates and names) in the fortune-telling world and not to other factors such as individuality or even belief in the associated system. We replicate these findings using actual money and show that this prevalence-to-enjoyment link already exists in memory for dates and names and is activated and strengthened by priming the fortune-telling systems relevant to those special random numbers. Finally, we present a model of special random numbers that integrates our findings with other determinants of valuation such as regret and subjective probability. Our results expand the realm of special random numbers beyond control. Our enjoyment model has implications not only for understanding gambling, but also for understanding how reasoning under uncertainty is influenced by little-understood phenomena (such as fortune-telling systems) without affecting subjective probability or actual beliefs.