Thomas Aquinas on hylomorphism and the in-act principle

In Summa Theologiae I.76.1 Aquinas presents an argument for the hylomorphic union of body and soul that he attributes to Aristotle. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s original argument, however, offering his own short but powerful line of reasoning in support of one of the main premises. This additional argument involves an appeal to the principle that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. This principle has roots in the thought of Aristotle, but is not explicitly used by him. It is, however, fundamental for Aquinas and pervasive throughout his work. In this paper I examine the principle and its implications for Aquinas’ version of the argument. Furthermore, I argue that the principle is foundational to Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes’ account of the intellective soul and that its inclusion renders Aquinas’ version of the argument incompatible with Averroes’ view.     

Peter Martyr Vermigli on grace and free choice

Abstract

Within contemporary scholarship there has been considerable debate over the character and scope of Peter Martyr Vermigli’s scholasticism, which has sought to locate his thought between the two poles of the ‘via Thomae’ and the ‘via Gregorii.’ This paper traces the Augustinian-Thomist polarity throughout Vermigli’s doctrine of grace and free choice. In particular it seeks to discover Gregorian distinctives in his thought, namely, doctrinal points shared by Vermigli and Rimini, representing a development of Augustine and a departure from Aquinas. Without denying the important Thomist and Aristotelian elements of his thought, this paper concludes that renewed attention now needs to be paid to his profound debt to late-medieval Augustinian scholasticism and its global impact on his theology.     

Vermigli Replicating Aquinas: An Overlooked Continuity in the Doctrine of Predestination

Although Peter Martyr Vermigli is well recognized for his integration of Thomism with Reformed theology, there is no consensus on whether to consider Thomas Aquinas a dominant influence on his doctrine of predestination. Recent scholarship argues that Gregory of Rimini’s influence is greater than Aquinas. This essay provides strong evidence to the contrary for the influence of Aquinas on Vermigli’s early exposition of predestination as a Reformer. Vermigli not only drew upon Aquinas’s doctrine in general, as he does elsewhere, but reproduced the details of Aquinas’s article in the Summa on whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. This finding has significance for understanding the development of Vermigli’s thought, his relation to Thomist scholasticism, and his mature writings on predestination. In general, this evidence increases the importance of Thomas as a formative influence on Vermigli’s thought.     

Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy

In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas’s theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents.

     

Martin Bucer's Assessment of the Canon of the Mass in the Era of the Religious Colloquies

Abstract

In the early part of his reforming career Martin Bucer shared Luther's and Zwingli's contempt for the Canon of the Mass. However, in the era of the religious Colloquies (1540-1546) Bucer argued that it was the practices and theological commentaries associated with the Canon—not the Canon itself—that supported the debased theology of Eucharistic sacrifice prevailing under the papacy. Bucer maintained that the genuine meaning of the Canon was to be found in the writing of the Fathers, the liturgies of the Eastern church and, indeed, in Aquinas’ Summa. Bucer seems to have hoped that the Catholics would admit communion under both kinds and abolish the private Mass in exchange for the retention of a ‘suitably interpreted’ Canon. An outline of this interpretation can be seen in Article Twenty of the Worms-Regensburg Book (1540-1541). It was further developed in Constans dejensio (1543) and De vera et falsa caenae dominicae administratione (1546) both written in the aftermath of the first Colloquy of Regensburg (1541).     

Hume on the Distinction of Reason

This paper concerns Hume’s treatment of the distinction of reason in the Treatise, I.i.7. Many scholars have claimed that there is a tension between his account of the distinction of reason and his commitment to his so-called separability principle. I explain why Hume’s account of the distinction of reason is fully consistent with the principle, and show how other discussions, both critical of and sympathetic to Hume, fail to appreciate the radicalness of his position. I evaluate Hume’s bold position and compare it to earlier positions (Aquinas) and current positions (Donald Davidson).     

Relation-Centred Ethics in Confucius and Aquinas

In recent years, it has become a popular trend for the scholars in comparative philosophy to interpret Confucian moral theory by means of Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, this interpretation overlooks the relation-centred characteristics of Confucian ethics that is lacking in Aristotelian ethics. In this article, I will argue that there is relation-based ethics in the Western tradition—the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. By examining Aquinas's theory of love, I will show the relational characteristics of his ethics. I will use Aquinas's theory of love to interpret three important points of Confucian ethics: filial reverence and material support are both integral parts of xiao孝 (filial piety); the importance of remonstration for xiao; and the symmetrical features of Confucius's virtues.     

ACHIEVING A SCIENCE OF SACRED DOCTRINE*

Aquinas claims that sacred doctrine is a science, or scientia. All scientiae involve demonstrations containing principles which yield conclusions that are necessary and certain. The principles leading to sacred scientia are the articles of faith. Those articles are contained in Scripture and constitute the premises of demonstrations the conclusions of which form sacred doctrine's content. Because of those articles' divine origin, we can expect them to yield conclusions the truth of which is guaranteed. According to William Abraham, however, Aquinas must demonstrate Scripture's divine origin as a condition for achieving a sacred scientia. In the absence of such a demonstration, we cannot be certain that the articles contained in Scripture are God‐breathed, nor can we be certain that the conclusions deduced from them belong to sacred doctrine. Abraham argues that Aquinas's putative demonstration of Scripture's divine origin fails and—consequently—so does his attempt to establish a sacred scientia. In this paper, I will show that Aquinas never intended to provide such a demonstration, nor does he need to in order to secure sacred doctrine's status as a scientia. Furthermore, I will show that achieving sacred scientia is not, pace Abraham, an epistemological undertaking but a spiritual discipline that eventuates in knowledge of and love for God.     

Rewriting Aquinas’ animal ethics: the primacy of reason in the determination of moral status

Arguing in support of Aristotle, Aquinas conceptualised the cognitive functioning of the human as exceeding that of other animals. In its base form, the Thomistic position asserts that the intellective functioning of the human animal is superior to the instinctual operation of the non-human animal. For Aquinas, it is the intellect that determines the enactment of the human will. Thus, if a non-human animal is devoid of intellect, no willing of any action is possible. Consequently, an action of a non-human animal which is humanly perceived as immoral, is in fact morally agnostic because the animal lacks the reasoning capacity to judge the potential action's moral status. Given that Aquinas’ argument centres on the role of reason in determinations of moral status, we seek to determine the status theoria of the Thomistic moral theory in light of contemporary studies into animal cognition. The assertion is made that this particular aspect of Aquinas’ moral theory requires rewriting because reason is evident in animal cognition to a greater extent than Aquinas would have been able to appreciate given his contextual limitations. This presence of reason, we argue, ascribes moral status to some non-human animals, analogous to their human counterparts. However, we will also contend that rather than dismissing Aquinas’ reason-founded ethics, value could be found in retaining a rewritten Thomistic theoretical construction which extends Aquinas’ ethic to include animals apart from the human that are bearers of the faculty of reason.     

Paving the Way? Penalty and Atonement in Thomas Aquinas's Soteriology

This article explores the soteriology of Thomas Aquinas. In particular, it considers recent debates over whether Thomas altered Anselm's satisfaction theory in a way which opened the door to the later theory of penal substitution. The article argues that Thomas did indeed alter Anselm's atonement theory in this way insofar as he incorporates punishment within his concept of satisfaction; however, it further contends that his use of ‘placation’ or ‘appeasement’ language does not contribute to such an alteration.     

Is God His Essence? The Logical Structure of Aquinas’ Proofs for this Claim

In this article I consider whether Aquinas’ arguments for the claim that God is His essence are conclusive, and what was his purpose of upholding this thesis. I show his proofs from Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles to be problematic and argue that the defense of Aquinas’ views on that matter suggested by certain remarks of P. T. Geach is flawed.     

The Function and Intentionality of Cartesian Émotions

Abstract

A study of what Descartes calls émotions in his Passions of the Soul (1649) suggests that, rather than just a theory of passions—as Descartes himself explicitly claims to be proposing—he was in practice putting forward a more comprehensive theory of passions-émotions, a unified theory which would be closer to what today should properly be called Descartes’ theory of emotions. I try here to make explicit the grounds of this unity by showing that émotions both (1) fit within the functional account Descartes attributes to what he calls passions; and (2) complement the intentionality of passions by expanding it to new objects. In order to show this I offer also a tentative distinction, functionally and intentionally, between passions and émotions in general, on one hand, and, on the other, between the two apparent types of émotions Descartes refers to in the treatise—interior or internal [intérieure] and intellectual [intellectuelle] émotions.     

RECONSIDERING BARTH'S REJECTION OF PRZYWARA'S ANALOGIA ENTIS

Many interpreters argue that Barth's rejection of Erich Przywara's analogia entis is based upon a misinterpretation and that Barth actually incorporated a form of the analogia entis into his mature theology. Through an examination of records from Przywara's visit to Barth's seminar on Thomas Aquinas at the University of Münster in 1929 along with key texts from that period, I argue that Barth did not reject the analogia entis because he misinterpreted it. Rather, he did so on the basis of an accurate account of its meaning and content provided to him personally by Przywara. I also argue that, while Barth's response to the analogia entis did change over the course of his career, he never retracted, either explicitly or implicitly, his rejection of it—nor should he have done so.     

The ends of medicine and the crisis of chronic pain

Pellegrino and Thomasma have proposed a normative medical ethics founded on a conception of the end of medicine detached from any broader notion of the telos of human life. In this essay, I question whether such a narrow teleological account of medicine can be sustained, taking as a starting point Pellegrino and Thomasma’s own contention that the end of medicine projects itself onto the intermediate acts that aim at that end. In order to show how the final end of human life similarly alters intermediate ends, such as the end of medicine, I describe Thomas Aquinas’s concept of pain and explain how his remedies for pain derive from his account of the telos of human life. In turn, this account has implications for the way in which physicians who accept such a telos would manage their patients’ pain. If a comprehensive telos for human life is necessary to make sense of even such a routine aspect of medical care, then medical ethicists may not be able to sidestep questions about the good life for human beings.

     

To succeed in failing—a dialectically constructed unity in Jaspers's thought

ABSTRACT

Jaspers is justly famous both for his exploration of aportas (Grenzsituationen,) in various fields, as well as for his trenchant pre- and post-war criticism of life in both Germany and in the world at large. In this article I attempt to indicate the extent to which his analyses of both are informed by a metaphysics of foundering/failure (das Scheitern). His apparently paradoxical thesis is that our very failure to achieve sufficient comprehension—in the fields of science, in self-understanding, and in metaphysical striving—ensures us a measure of reconciliation with our fate which may enable us to cope with recurrent crisis-situations. Like Adorno, Jaspers propounds a negative dialectics through which he hopes to indicate how we might succeed in overcoming in practice what seems insoluble in theory. I critically explore the theory-practice relationship, while indicating the underlying unity of his thought.     

THOMAS AQUINAS BETWEEN JUST WAR AND PACIFISM

Some recent authors have argued that Aquinas deliberately integrated a pacifist outlook into his just war theory. Others, by contrast, have maintained that his rejection of pacifism was unequivocal. The present article attempts to set the historical record straight by an examination of Aquinas's writings on this topic. In addition to Q. 40, A. 1 of Summa theologiae II–II, the text usually cited in this connection, this article considers the biblical commentaries where Aquinas explains how the Gospel “precepts of patience,” especially Matthew 5:39, “Do not resist evil,” should be interpreted in light of the doctrine of just war. The article concludes that Aquinas formulated a two‐stage theory whereby pacifism was rejected as a suitable form of agency for the state (respublica), while it was affirmed as the appropriate response to evil for the agency of the church (ecclesia).     

On Recanati’s Mental Files

Abstract

In his book Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), Francois Recanati develops a theory of mind and language based on the idea that Fregean senses should be identified with ‘mental files’, mental representations whose primary function is to store information about objects. I discuss three aspects of Recanati’s book. The first concerns his use of acquaintance relations in individuating mental files, and what this means for ‘file dynamics’. The second concerns his comments on a theory that I have elsewhere advocated, the ‘sequenced worlds’ or ‘multi-centered worlds’ theory. The third concerns how the mental file approach handles non-doxastic attitudes like imagining.     

The Orsino complex: Men who love themselves as love objects

Abstract

The Duke Orsino, in Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, is cited as the archetypal embodiment of a psychological complex which, it is argued, may affect many men in modern patriarchal societies. This condition named the ‘Orsino complex’ is characterized by the subject's experience of being in love with himself as a love object. It is the consequence of the subject's very early experience of his mother's dual psychological reactions to him as a male child. The first of these, and the more significant, I have called maternal phallic projection, while the second I term maternal withdrawal. I also consider the influence of the father upon this complex.

While this paper remains speculative in its present form—that is, its central thesis is based on fictional and not on clinical material—it might, I hope, assist all of us working psychodynamically in understanding further some of the severe problems that male clients present in their relationships with women, as well as directing further research into the complexities of gender identity in contemporary society.     

What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?

Abstract

In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.     

Reckoning With Kant on Race*

This essay develops Kant’s theory of reform to theorize racial justice reform. I assess the function of Kant’s philosophy of race as part of his nonideal theory of justice, which offers a racist pragmatic anthropology that uses the concept of race to determine the practical effectiveness of legislative reason. His philosophy of race defends a teleological account of the natural history of the human species to fulfill the requirements of justice and assumes that certain racial groups have failed to develop their innate capacity for legislative reason. I show that we need an alternative Kantian nonideal theory of justice that demonstrates how legislative reason actualizes practical freedom. Rather than appeal to anthropology, I expand Kant’s model of public reason to advance racial justice reform under the conditions of partial compliance to the requirements of justice in a profoundly nonideal republic such as the U.S. I then showcase the promise—and limits—of the a priori ideals of citizenship and publicity for racial justice reform and introduce the new ideal of interracial civic fellowship to guide the public use of reason in nonideal circumstances.