“Piensa” twice: On the foreign language effect in decision making

In this article, we assess to what extent decision making is affected by the language in which a given problem is presented (native vs. foreign). In particular, we aim to ask whether the impact of various heuristic biases in decision making is diminished when the problems are presented in a foreign language. To this end, we report four main studies in which more than 700 participants were tested on different types of individual decision making problems. In the first study, we replicated Keysar et al.’s (2012) recent observation regarding the foreign language effect on framing effects related to loss aversion. In the second section, we assessed whether the foreign language effect is present in other types of framing problems that involve psychological accounting biases rather than gain/loss dichotomies. In the third section, we studied the foreign language effect in several key aspects of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. In the fourth study, we assessed the presence of a foreign language effect in the cognitive reflection test, a test that includes logical problems that do not carry emotional connotations. The absence of such an effect in this test suggests that foreign language leads to a reduction of heuristic biases in decision making across a range of decision making situations and provide also some evidence about the boundaries of the phenomenon. We explore several potential factors that may underlie the foreign language effect in decision making.     

The production and perception of randomness

This article contains a discussion of the elusive nature of the concept of randomness, a review of findings from experiments with randomness production and randomness perception tasks, and a presentation of theoretical treatments of people's randomization capabilities and limitations. The importance of task instructions and the difficulty of interpreting results when instructions are vague or ambiguous are stressed. The widely held view that people are incapable of generating or recognizing randomness is shown to lack the strong experimental support that has sometimes been claimed for it.     

The effects of visual conspicuousness and the concept of randomness on the recognition of randomness in sequences

In a number of studies, tendencies toward nonrepetition in judgments of randomness of visually presented sequences of events have been attributed to a biased concept of randomness. The present study proposed that such bias is due to "bottom-up" visual processes rather than a concept of randomness. Experiment 1 showed that judgments of randomness were less biased when repetitions were made less conspicuous by increasing the distance between adjacent items. Experiment 2 produced comparable results for increasing dissimilarity of categorically identical items. A third experiment showed that the bias in the judgment task was not related to a more direct measure of knowledge of random processes, the assignment of probabilities of repetition to imagined random sequences. The results supported the view that judgments of randomness are determined to a high degree by the conspicuousness of repetitions and are independent of the concept of randomness.     

Response biases and the relation between negative life events and psychological symptoms

This research was an investigation of whether reporting biases can account for the correlation between negative life events (as measured via life events questionnaires) and subclinical psychological symptoms. Subjects completed two life events scales, a measure of psychological symptoms, a measure of depression, and a measure of social desirability. Friends were asked to report about life events experienced by the subjects. No evidence was found for a subject reporting bias associated with social desirability, depression, or symptoms. In fact, for one of the life events scales, depression was significantly associated with a higher rate of agreement between subjects and friends as to which negative events occurred to subjects. Moreover, there were significant correlations between symptom and depression measures and life events measures that were free of subject-reporting biases (subjects' negative life events reported by both subjects and their significant others, as well as subjects' negative life events as reported by significant others alone). These data suggest that response biases may not be able to account for the relation between negative events and psychological symptoms. Thus the hypothesis that negative life events play a significant role in symptom development remains plausible.     

Human reasoning: Some possible effects of availability

This paper discusses some possible ways in which the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) may mediate subjects' responses to experimental ‘reasoning’ tasks. A brief review of some effects of availability in other areas is given and then the application of availability to reasoning data is considered with respect to problems employing both ‘thematic’ and ‘abstract’ content.In the case of thematic content, it is argued, with reference to a variety of studies, that to produce a differential effect (to abstract content), the content must provide available cues, resulting from the subjects' experience. Differential effects of content are thus interpreted as differential effects of availability. When abstract content is used, there are cues available from the experimental situation itself, and it is shown that several known error tendencies readily lend themselves to an explanation in terms of availability.In the final section, it is pointed out that a focus on available cues, rather than logical structure, provides a psychological, rather than logical, approach to human reasoning. It is argued that a bias may be psychologically, although not logically, optimal in that it may often produce correct responses in ‘real life’. Accordingly, the possible real life utility of availability is considered, and several ways in which the bias may lead to usually correct decisions are discussed. Given this, it is argued that availability is an effective heuristic and that observed biases on a range of experimental tasks may thus be interpreted as resulting from the application of a behavior that is optimal within the limits of human cognition. However, it is concluded that limitations in both deterministic and probabilistic problem solving may lead to a consistent, but erroneous, view of the world.     

Personhood and neuroscience: naturalizing or nihilating?

Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior.     

Preconception Sex Selection: The Perspective of a Person of the Undesired Gender

Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior.     

Using category structures to test iterated learning as a method for identifying inductive biases

Many of the problems studied in cognitive science are inductive problems, requiring people to evaluate hypotheses in the light of data. The key to solving these problems successfully is having the right inductive biases—assumptions about the world that make it possible to choose between hypotheses that are equally consistent with the observed data. This article explores a novel experimental method for identifying the biases that guide human inductive inferences. The idea behind this method is simple: This article uses the responses produced by a participant on one trial to generate the stimuli that either they or another participant will see on the next. A formal analysis of this "iterated learning" procedure, based on the assumption that the learners are Bayesian agents, predicts that it should reveal the inductive biases of these learners, as expressed in a prior probability distribution over hypotheses. This article presents a series of experiments using stimuli based on a well-studied set of category structures, demonstrating that iterated learning can be used to reveal the inductive biases of human learners.     

Beliefs about what types of mechanisms produce random sequences

Although many researchers use Wagenaar's framework for understanding the factors that people use to determine whether a process is random, the framework has never undergone empirical scrutiny. This paper uses Wagenaar's framework as a starting point and examines the three properties of his framework—independence of events, fixed alternatives, and equiprobability. We find strong evidence to suggest that independence of events is indeed used as a cue toward randomness. Equiprobability has an effect on randomness judgments. However, it appears to work only in a limited role. Fixedness of alternatives is a complex construct that consists of multiple sub‐concepts. We find that each of these sub‐concepts influences randomness judgments, but that they exert forces in different directions. Stability of outcome ratios increases randomness judgments, while knowledge of outcome ratios decreases randomness judgments. Future directions for development of a functional framework for understanding perceptions of randomness are suggested. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotion regulation in depression: Examining the role of cognitive processes

Sustained negative affect is a hallmark feature of depressive episodes. The ability to regulate emotional responses to negative events may therefore play a critical role in our understanding of this debilitating disorder. Individual differences in cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and interpretation may underlie difficulties in emotion regulation and numerous studies have identified cognitive biases and deficits that characterise depressed people. Few studies, however, have explicitly linked these biases to the difficulties in emotion regulation that are associated with depression. In this paper we discuss relations among cognitive processes and emotion regulation and review the depression literature to identify cognitive biases and deficits that may underlie maladaptive responses to negative events and mood states. Our review suggests that difficulties in the disengagement from negative material, memory biases, and deficits in cognitive control are frequently observed in depressive disorders and may be associated with the use of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, such as rumination. These biases may also be related to difficulties implementing strategies that are effective for non-depressed people, such as recall of mood-incongruent material and reappraisal. Our review also suggests, however, that empirical studies linking cognitive biases and emotion regulation in depression are still largely missing and would present an important goal for future research in this area.     

Aid and bias

Over the last few decades, psychologists have amassed a great deal of evidence that our thinking is strongly influenced by a number of biases. This research appears to have important implications for moral methodology. It seems likely that these biases affect our thinking about moral issues, and a fuller awareness of them might help us to find ways to counteract their influence, and so to improve our moral thinking. And yet there is little or no reference to such biases in the philosophical literature on many pressing, substantive moral questions. In this paper, I make a start on repairing this omission in relation to one such question, the 'Aid Question', which concerns how much, if anything, we are morally required to give to aid agencies. I begin by sketching a number of biases that seem particularly likely to affect our thinking about that question. I then go on to review the psychological research on 'debiasing' - that is, on attempts to counteract the influence of such biases. And finally I discuss and illustrate certain strategies for counteracting the influence of the biases in question on our thinking about the Aid Question.     

AN ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY CHALLENGE TO INTELLIGENT DESIGN

William Dembski claims to have established a decision process to determine when highly unlikely events observed in the natural world are due to Intelligent Design. This article argues that, as no implementable randomness test is superior to a universal Martin‐Löf test, this test should be used to replace Dembski's decision process. Furthermore, Dembski's decision process is flawed, as natural explanations are eliminated before chance. Dembski also introduces a fourth law of thermodynamics, his “law of conservation of information,” to argue that information cannot increase by natural processes. However, this article, using algorithmic information theory, shows that this law is no more than the second law of thermodynamics. The article concludes that any discussions on the possibilities of design interventions in nature should be articulated in terms of the algorithmic information theory approach to randomness and its robust decision process.     

Induced processing biases have causal effects on anxiety

After briefly describing the nature of emotional processing biases associated with vulnerability to anxiety, and a model of how they may be produced, we review new data on the experimental induction of attentional and interpretative biases. We show that these biases can be readily induced in the laboratory, in the absence of mood changes. However, induced biases exert effects on the processing of new information and cause congruent changes in state anxiety when they influence how emotionally significant information is encoded. We can therefore conclude that biases have causal effects on vulnerability to anxiety via their influence on how significant events are processed. Finally, we discuss how our model might account for the acquisition of processing bias and for when they can influence anxiety.     

中国古代心理思想中的感应观念

与主流心理学所采用的机械因果观念不同的是,中国古代心理思想所采用的是类似于现代物理学“场”概念的感应观念。其特征是：注重整体性、远距作用及象征意义。感应以关系为核心,具有主体间性、创造性、象征性。受感应观念影响,中国古代心理思想认为可以通过修养工夫恢复人心的本来状态,道家关心如何对来感者作出回应,儒家则重视以真诚的感唤起对方的应。在实践方面,人际交往之对等回报原则、与理想人格相感通的诠释途径、“德政”的治国理念、教学相长的教育方法、培养感性以承担责任的道德发展观,都体现了感应观念。感应观与因果观形成互补关系,可扩大心理学的视野,在异化的世界里恢复生命的意义感     

Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?

ABSTRACT— Despite Miller's (1969) now-famous clarion call to "give psychology away" to the general public, scientific psychology has done relatively little to combat festering problems of ideological extremism and both inter- and intragroup conflict. After proposing that ideological extremism is a significant contributor to world conflict and that confirmation bias and several related biases are significant contributors to ideological extremism, we raise a crucial scientific question: Can debiasing the general public against such biases promote human welfare by tempering ideological extremism? We review the knowns and unknowns of debiasing techniques against confirmation bias, examine potential barriers to their real-world efficacy, and delineate future directions for research on debiasing. We argue that research on combating extreme confirmation bias should be among psychological science's most pressing priorities.     

An associative theory of estimating past dates and past prices

The theory—a location theory, in W. J. Friedman’s (1993) terminology—assumes that time information such as the date of an event is increasingly likely to become unavailable with passing time. The theory suggests that when people are asked to date events whose time is unknown, they find and supply time information for the most similar event and context for which it is available. Simulations of the dating process were compared with experimental results and produced similar patterns of error and bias. The theory is extended to explain errors and biases in how people estimate past prices.     

Moral Injury: A Mechanism for War-Related Psychological Trauma in Military Family Members

Recent research has provided compelling evidence of mental health problems in military spouses and children, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), related to the war-zone deployments, combat exposures, and post-deployment mental health symptoms experienced by military service members in the family. One obstacle to further research and federal programs targeting the psychological health of military family members has been the lack of a clear, compelling, and testable model to explain how war-zone events can result in psychological trauma in military spouses and children. In this article, we propose a possible mechanism for deployment-related psychological trauma in military spouses and children based on the concept of moral injury, a model that has been developed to better understand how service members and veterans may develop PTSD and other serious mental and behavioral problems in the wake of war-zone events that inflict damage to moral belief systems rather by threatening personal life and safety. After describing means of adapting the moral injury model to family systems, we discuss the clinical implications of moral injury, and describe a model for its psychological treatment.     

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs emerge from broader beliefs during problem-solving: a critical review and classification scheme

Abstract

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs (EGRBs) can be defined as beliefs that imply a failure to recognise how commercial gambling activities are designed to generate a guaranteed loss to players. In theorising about how EGRBs develop, previous reviews have proposed that EGRBs are extensions of decision-making heuristics and associated biases. We propose an alternative generative mechanism: one in which gambling games make substantial wins seem possible through problem-solving and eventual correct strategic action. EGRBs are then beliefs in the possibility of correct strategic action (illusions of control) that develop as players trial candidate strategies—strategies selected based on various broader beliefs. We further propose that EGRBs can be classified based on what is theorised in cognitive science about categories of general human beliefs about the world. For example, it has been theorised that human beliefs about supernatural forces and randomness have certain similarities across cultures, and so we propose that there exists a category of supernatural EGRBs, as well as a category of EGRBs based on broader beliefs about the nature of randomness. We review evidence for this classification scheme and discuss how it can be applied in researching and treating gambling disorder.     

Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective

A lay definition of intuition holds that it involves immediate apprehension in the absence of reasoning. From a more technical point of view, I argue also that intuition should be seen as the contrastive of reasoning, corresponding roughly to the distinction between Type 1 (intuitive) and Type 2 (reflective) processes in contemporary dual process theories of thinking. From this perspective, we already know a great deal about intuition: It is quick, provides feelings of confidence, can reflect large amounts of information processing, and is most likely to provide accurate judgments when based on relevant experiential learning. Unlike reasoning, intuition is low effort and does not compete for central working memory resources. It provides default responses which may—or often may not—be intervened upon with high effort, reflective reasoning. Intuition has, however, been blamed for a range of cognitive biases in the psychological literatures on reasoning and decision making. The evidence indicates that with novel and abstract problems, not easily linked to previous experience, intervention with effortful reasoning is often required to avoid such biases. Hence, although it seems that intuition dominates reasoning most of the time—both in the laboratory and the real world—it can indeed be a false friend.     

试论康德心理学思想及其对当代的影响

康德著作中蕴含着丰富的心理学思想,其在继承沃尔夫理性心理学与经验心理学二分的基础上,通过批评理性心理学,消解了我思的主体地位,为解决二元论问题做出了重要努力;通过批评经验心理学,指明了心理学在成长为一门科学过程中必须面对的诸多问题。新康德主义在继承并改造康德思想的过程中,发展出一系列影响深远的心理学理论;认知心理学的重要代表人物皮亚杰基于对康德思想独具特色的把握,提出了发生认识论;而当代认知科学的图式理论,则完全是建基于对康德经验图式理论框架的全面继承上。