Domain‐based perceptions of risk: a case study of lay and technical community attitudes toward managed aquifer recharge

Despite growing water scarcity, communities in many parts of the developed world often reject technically and economically sound options for water augmentation. This paper reports findings from a study investigating risk perceptions associated with a proposed managed aquifer recharge scheme in Australia. Q Methodology was used to compare decision‐making frameworks of lay community and “technical expert” participants. Technical expert participants were also asked to approximate the decision‐making framework of a “typical” community member. The emerging contrasts between lay community frameworks and those approximated by technical experts suggest that there are prevailing yet errant assumptions about lay community attitudes toward new technologies. The findings challenge the characterization of the lay community and technical experts as being in entrenched opposition with one another.     

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

Past research has shown that counterfactual (“If…then…”) thoughts influence causal and responsibility attribution in the judicial context. However, little is known on whether and how the use of counterfactuals in communication affects lay jurors' and judges' evaluations. In two studies, we asked mock lay jurors (Study 1) and actual judges (Study 2) to read a medical malpractice case followed by an expert witness report, which included counterfactuals focused on either the physician, the patient, or external factors. Results showed that counterfactual focus had a strong effect on both lay jurors' and judges' causal and responsibility attributions. Counterfactual focus also moderated the effect of outcome foreseeability on responsibility attribution. Discussion focuses on how counterfactual communication can direct causal and responsibility attribution and reduce the importance of other factors known to influence judicial decision‐making. The potential implications of these findings in training programs and debiasing interventions are also discussed.     

Factors and fictions in person perception: A reply to lamiell,Foss, and Cavenee1

The systematic distortion hypothesis states that under difficult memory conditions judges infer what “must” have happened from their general model of what the world is like and/or find it easier to retrieve conceptually affiliated memory items. The hypothesis further states that lay conceptual schemes “tend to be innacurate with respect to how behaviors covary, confusing ‘what is like what’ with ‘what goes with what’” (Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979), and that interbehavior correlations derived from memory-based ratings cannot be considered valid evidence for the objective existence of proposed personality traits, factors or syndromes. The systematic distortion hypothesis is clarified with reference to the Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee “critique” (1980). That “critique,” it is argued, is neither a test of the systematic distortion hypothesis nor a critique. What Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee demonstrate is that the validity of the systematic distortion hypothesis does not depend upon the unrealistic assumption that observers are capable of reporting only what they expect to see.     

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, “if she watered the plants they bloomed,” when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, “if the sun shone they bloomed” decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from “the plants did not bloom” to “therefore she did not water them”). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, “if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed,” when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, “she did not water the plants and they did not bloom” increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from “she did not water the plants” to “therefore they did not bloom”) is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new “switched-suppression” effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, “if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed”: modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.     

Luck,envy and gratitude: It could have been different

Previous studies have shown that people feel lucky in situations that could easily have turned into something worse. The present investigation was designed to focus more closely on the comparative aspect of luck, using a linguistic approach (Study 1 and 2) as well as self-reports of perceived luck accompanying selected emotional episodes (Study 3). The participants in Study 1 were asked to comment upon the difference between describing a state of affairs as “lucky” vs. “good”. The term “lucky“ was frequently seen to imply a comparison process, sometimes expressing gratitude (“It is lucky I have a family”) and at other times envy (“it is lucky you have a job”). This was confirmed in Study 2 where statements about self and other being lucky or unlucky were rated for implying comparison, gratitude, envy, concern, and impression of speaker. In Study 3, 60 students described situations in which they had felt grateful towards other people as well as towards “life in general”. Questionnaire answers revealed that they also had felt very lucky and had been thinking “it could have been different”. They also produced recollections of envy, which were rated to imply others' good luck and own bad luck, which could easily have been interchanged (“it could have been merdquo;). It is concluded that counterfactual thoughts are decisive for the experiences of luck, gratitude, and envy.     

Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.     

More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates

Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) probability statements. Results indicate that such single‐bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners' attention in opposite directions. “Over” statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while “under” statements direct attention to its possible non‐occurrence and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) versus negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster's beliefs and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single‐bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level but might “leak” information about the speaker's expectations and about past and future developments of the forecast. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning what from where: Effects of spatial regularity on nonspatial sequence learning and updating

The current study examined the influence of redundant stimulus features on our ability to build and update representations of our environment. We hypothesized that our ability to process redundant spatial features would speed our ability to adapt to changing nonspatial regularities. Using a computerized version of the children's game “rock–paper–scissors”, undergraduates were instructed to win as often as possible against a computer opponent. The computer's plays were repeating sequences of five choices that were presented either with spatial regularity (i.e., “rock” would always appear on the left, “paper” in the middle, and “scissors” on the right) or without spatial regularity (i.e., the items were equally likely to appear in any of the three locations). Once participants learned a sequence, the computer switched to a different sequence without participants being informed that a switch had occurred. Redundant spatial regularity improved a participant's ability both to learn sequences of plays and to update their plays to reflect new computer sequences. Our results suggest that our perceptual system is sensitive to redundant spatial stimulus features and that this information can improve learning and updating.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

I know the rule,but I'll just go with my gut: is there a rational use of intuition?

ABSTRACT

Research has established that human thinking is often biased by intuitive judgement. The base-rate neglect effect provides such an example, so named because people often support their decisions in stereotypical individuating information, neglecting base-rates. Here, we test the hypothesis that reasoners acknowledge information provided by base-rates and may use individuating information in support of a “rational” decision process. Results from four experiments show that “base-rate neglecting” occurs when participants acknowledge sample distributions; participants who prefer individuating over base-rate information perceive base-rates as less diagnostic and are more confident in their individuating-based responses; and that posterior probabilities (assigned after all relevant information is considered) predict more individuating-based responses for individuating-preference participants (suggesting a rational process). However, data also show a deeper form of base-rate neglect: even when some participants report to prefer base-rate information, define individuating information as non-diagnostic, and their posterior probabilities suggest otherwise, they still provide individuating-based responses.     

A Description–Experience Gap in Social Interactions: Information about Interdependence and Its Effects on Cooperation

In social interactions, decision makers are often unaware of their interdependence with others, precluding the realization of shared long‐term benefits. In an experiment, pairs of participants played an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under various conditions involving differing levels of interdependence information. Each pair was assigned to one of four conditions: “No‐Info” players saw their own actions and outcomes, but were not told that they interacted with another person; “Min‐Info” players knew they interacted with another person but still without seeing the other's actions or outcomes; “Mid‐Info” players discovered the other's actions and outcomes as they were revealed over time; and “Max‐Info” players were also shown a complete payoff matrix mapping actions to outcomes from the outset and throughout the game. With higher levels of interdependence information, we found increased individual cooperation and mutual cooperation, driven by increased reciprocating cooperation (in response to a counterpart's cooperation). Furthermore, joint performance and satisfaction were higher for pairs with more information. We discuss how awareness of interdependence may encourage cooperative behavior in real‐world interactions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Insensitivity and oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity in hypothesis testing

Two experiments examined how people perceive the diagnosticity of different answers (“yes” and “no”) to the same question. We manipulated whether the “yes” and the “no” answers conveyed the same amount of information or not, as well as the presentation format of the probabilities of the features inquired about. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with only the percentages of occurrence of the features, which most straightforwardly apply to the diagnosticity of “yes” answers. In Experiment 2, participants received in addition the percentages of the absence of features, which serve to assess the diagnosticity of “no” answers. Consistent with previous studies, we found that participants underestimated the difference in the diagnosticity conveyed by different answers to the same question. However, participants' insensitivity was greater when the normative (Bayesian) diagnosticity of the “no” answer was higher than that of the “yes” answer. We also found oversensitivity to answer diagnosticity, whereby participants valued as differentially diagnostic two answers that were normatively equal in terms of their diagnosticity. Presenting to participants the percentages of occurrence of the features inquired about together with their complements increased their sensitivity to the diagnosticity of answers. We discuss the implications of these findings for confirmation bias in hypothesis testing.     

Speak your mind and I will make it right: the case of “selection task”

ABSTRACT

The “Wason selection task” is still one of the most studied tasks in cognitive psychology. We argue that the low performance originally obtained seems to be caused by how the information of the task is presented. By systematically manipulating the task instructions, making explicit the information that participants are required to infer in accordance with the logical interpretation of the material implication “if, then”, we found an improvement in performance. In Experiment 1, the conditional rule has been formulated within a relevant context and in accordance with the conversational rules of communication, hence transmitting the actual meaning of the material implication. In Experiment 2, a similar improvement has been obtained even without the realistic scenario, only by making explicit the unidirectionality of the material implication. We conclude that task instructions are often formulate neglecting the conversational rules of communication, and this greatly reduces the possibility to succeed in the task.     

The Influence of Disclosure and Ethics Education on Perceptions of Financial Conflicts of Interest

This study explored how disclosure of financial conflicts of interest (FCOI) influences naïve or “lay” individuals’ perceptions of the ethicality of researcher conduct. On a between-subjects basis, participants read ten scenarios in which researchers disclosed or failed to disclose relevant financial conflicts of interest. Participants evaluated the extent to which each vignette represented a FCOI, its possible influence on researcher objectivity, and the ethics of the financial relationship. Participants were then asked if they had completed a college-level ethics course. Results indicated that FCOI disclosure significantly influenced participants’ perceptions of the ethicality of the situation, but only marginally affected perceptions of researcher objectivity and had no significant influence on perceptions of the existence of FCOIs. Participants who had previously completed a college-level ethics course appeared more sensitive to the importance of FCOI disclosure than those who lacked such background. This result suggests that formal ethical training may help individuals become more critical consumers of scientific research.     

Three Dimensional Field Theory: Dramatization and Improvisation in a Psychoanalytic Theory of Change

This paper explores the three-dimensional (3D) field of psychoanalytic practice in four parts. It first begins with the radical shift in epistemology from Freud’s energy theory–based metapsychology to one based in information theory. This shift altered the classical theory of change—based on “cause and effect” of energic forces—to a contemporary one based on patterning of information in the field. This latter view posits that change in living systems is constant, though it operates in two distinct manners: (a) change that keeps living systems the same, that is, “1st Order Change,” in relationship to (b) novel change referred to as “2nd Order Change.” The information-based epistemological view argues that all of the information necessary for determining change in any psychotherapy exists in every session of the 3D field of every treatment. This raises the question in the second part of how this information is accessed in the field, the answer of which explores the functions of the right and left hemispheres of the brain along with their asymmetrical interdependence. While understanding their asymmetrical operation is necessary, it is not sufficient for discerning what truly matters to the analytic participants. This leads to the third part regarding how the experience of what “rings” true is dependent upon the six axes of truth in every 3D field. The fourth part delves into how dramatization and improvisation provide aesthetically charged ways of considering change in psychoanalytic treatment. Dramatic repetition reflects the constancy of change which keeps the system the same (1st Order), whereas improvisation takes up how the analyst and patient learn how to play with possibility amidst the stasis of their emerging repetitions, therefore capturing 2nd Order Change.     

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions of plausibility and background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event “received an enema,” a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from “barium enema administered in a hospital” to “home enema for constipation”; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual’s familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.     

Appraising Loftus and Palmer (1974) post-event information versus concurrent commentary in the context of sport

Two experiments were conducted to examine framing effects in sport. In Experiment 1, a conceptual replication [Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13(5), 585–589], participants watched a hockey collision, with the hit described later in a written format as a “contact”, “bump”, or “smash”. This manipulation resulted in no differences in participants’ report of how fast the players were skating, their intentions, and the outcome of the hit. In Experiment 2, participants watched the same video clip with ongoing commentary. Those who heard the announcer describing the event as “contact” estimated a higher skating speed than participants who were exposed to the “smash” commentary. Participants who were exposed to the “bump” commentary rated the repercussions of the collision as less severe than did those exposed to the other commentaries. These findings show that the perception of magnitude hierarchy may be domain specific and suggest future avenues for exploring framing effects when one is exposed to visual stimuli.     

The Embodied Attunement of Therapists and a Couple within Dialogical Psychotherapy: An Introduction to the Relational Mind Research Project

In dialogical practice, therapists seek to respond to the utterances of clients by including in their own response what the client said. No research so far exists on how, in dialogs, therapists and clients attune themselves to each other with their entire bodies. The research program The Relational Mind is the first to look at dialog in terms of both the outer and the inner dialogs of participants (clients and therapists), observed in parallel with autonomic nervous system (ANS) measurements. In the ANS, the response occurs immediately, even before conscious thought, making it possible to follow how participants in a multiactor dialog synchronize their reactions and attune themselves to each other. The couple therapy case presented in this article demonstrates how attunement is often not a simple “all at the same time” phenomenon, but rather a complex, dyadic or triadic phenomenon which changes over time. In the case presented, there was strong synchrony between one therapist and one client in terms of their arousal level throughout the therapy session. It was also observed that high stress could occur when someone else was talking about something related to the participant, or if that person mirrored the participant's words. Overall, it seems that in evaluating the rhythmic attunement between therapists and clients it is not enough to look at single variables; instead, integrated information from several channels is needed when one is seeking to make sense of the embodiment.     

Counselor Confidence and Accuracy of Prognoses of Success or Failure

This study assessed the accuracy of predictions of freshman and overall college scholastic performance made by groups of high school counselors, college advisors, and counseling psychologists from a university counseling center in relation to the confidence of these judges that their prognoses were accurate. Predictions were made from three sets of case information. The results revealed that: (1) the degree of confidence counselors indicated in their freshman and overall college “pass” predictions was appropriately related to accuracy; (2) counselor confidence in freshman “fail” predictions was not related to accuracy although the “fail” judgments tended to be more accurate than the “pass” prognoses; (3) counselor confidence in their overall “fail” predictions was not significantly related to accuracy and, unlike the results for the freshman judgments, the overall “fail” predictions were not more accurate than the “pass” predictions; (4) the amount of case data available was not related to counselor predictive accuracy.