What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.     

On The Virtue of Judging Others

An other‐directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behaviour; it is argued that having a capacity to make self‐directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self‐directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Same destination,different paths: When and how does observing others' choices and reasoning alter confidence in our own choices?

Seeing others make the same decision we do does not always increase choice confidence or tell the whole story of social influence when consumers expect to have to publically discuss their choice and reasoning. Instead, consumers' confidence in their publically stated choices can be diminished if observed others make the same choice but justify the choice using different reasoning. This effect occurs because confidence in one's own reasoning is thrown into doubt, rather than due to a desire to affiliate with the observed other. These effects are eliminated in both private choice contexts and in rejection versus selection tasks.     

Do the right thing: but only if others do so

Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal Standards in Professional Relationships: Limiting Interpersonal Harassment

An attempt is made to define abusive actions by offering criteria against which the behaviour of individuals can be considered. These criteria are based on whether the behaviour is avoidable, the appraisal of an objective observer and the impact of the behaviour on the ‘psychological contract’ between employer and employee. Particular abusive actions, identified by these criteria, are described and are contrasted with what are termed ‘reasonable expectations’ of one person's behaviour towards another. It is argued that only by translating these expectations into personal commitments, against which one's own behaviour can be compared, will interpersonal harassment be limited. It is also proposed that the size of consensus about what constitutes abusive actions measures the integrity of an organization's culture. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What do differences between own,admired, and attributed choices have to do with group induced shifts in choice

Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been considered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison (value-adherence) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. These are (a) the differences between a person's own choice and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the difference between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than those a person predicts others would make because he is more certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they imply that the person's solution to a problem involving choice is well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those relying on interpersonal comparison processes.     

Evaluations Versus Expectations: Children's Divergent Beliefs About Resource Distribution

Past research reveals a tension between children's preferences for egalitarianism and ingroup favoritism when distributing resources to others. Here we investigate how children's evaluations and expectations of others' behaviors compare. Four‐ to 10‐year‐old children viewed events where individuals from two different groups distributed resources to their own group, to the other group, or equally across groups. Groups were described within a context of intergroup competition over scarce resources. In the Evaluation condition, children were asked to evaluate which resource distribution actions were nicer. In the Expectation condition, children were asked to predict which events were more likely to occur. With age, children's evaluations and expectations of others' actions diverged: Children evaluated egalitarian actions as nicer yet expected others to behave in ways that benefit their own group. Thus, children's evaluations about the way human social actors should behave do not mirror their expectations concerning those individuals' actions.     

Risk preference and choice stochasticity during decisions for other people

In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself. Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking.     

Performance evaluation: On choosing to know the related attributes of others when we know their performance

It was hypothesized that people will choose to find out about the performance attributes of others who perform similarly to themselves if they believe the attributes are related to performance. Subjects within a group of nine were supposedly given different amounts of practice prior to taking a test on which performance was said to be either related or unrelated to practice. After taking the test, each subject was given his score, his rank order in the group, and the score obtained by each of the other group members. The subject was then allowed to find out about the number of items practiced by one other person in the group. A second choice was also given. On both first and second choices, subjects in the related condition chose to learn about others who were adjacent to them in the rank order. Subjects in the unrelated condition chose to learn about others with extreme scores. First choices in both conditions were strongly biased upward, supporting the unidirectional drive hypothesis.     

Perceiving high social mindfulness during interpersonal interaction promotes cooperative behaviours

Social mindfulness refers to individual's respect and protection of others’ options in interpersonal interaction. The object‐choosing task is a traditional paradigm to assess social mindfulness. Individuals with high social mindfulness would choose the nonunique object so that others would have more options; on the contrary, individuals with low social mindfulness would choose the unique object, which limits others’ choices. No prior study has examined whether perceiving people with different levels of social mindfulness affects one's cooperation. Based on this background, two experiments were conducted to address this question. In both experiments, a confederate participant's (Player A's) social mindfulness was manipulated by setting the frequency that Player A chose the unique and the nonunique objects. Then, participants were asked to interact with Player A in the public goods game (Experiment 1) or in the centipede game (Experiment 2). Convergent results showed that compared to those interacting with a socially unmindful person, participants interacting with a person perceived as socially mindful contributed more resources in the public goods game and chose to pass on more rounds in the centipede game. These findings suggest that perception of others’ high social mindfulness enhances one's own cooperative behaviour.     

Components of reward in social dilemmas

A social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) may be defined as a situation in which a collection of individuals is faced with a conflict between maximizing selfish interests and maximizing collective interests. The dilemma is based on the fact that if all choose to maximize selfish interests, all are worse off than if all choose to maximize collective interests. In a decomposed social dilemma (Pruitt, 1967), the outcomes are divided into two components: one component is based on one's own choice and the second component is based on the choices made by the others. Using 3-person decomposed games, two types of incentives were contrasted: a positive incentive (bonus) for cooperative choices and a negative incentive (penalty) for noncooperative choices. Two experiments were conducted using male college students. The results of both experiments showed that the positive incentive evoked a higher level of cooperation than the negative incentive. The results are discussed in terms of nonadditive utility components, Pruitt's motivational interpretation, and Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) theory of interdependence.     

A social identity approach to trust: interpersonal perception,group membership and trusting behaviour

Trusting behaviour involves relinquishing control over outcomes valuable to the self. Previous research suggests that interpersonal perceptions of trustworthiness are closely related to this behaviour. The present research suggests that the more proximal determinant of trusting behaviour is the expectation that the other will reciprocate. Based on the Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) model, reciprocity expectations may be created by interpersonal perceptions of trustworthiness or a shared group membership. To investigate this, group membership and individual identifiability were experimentally manipulated (N = 139): When individuals were not identifiable, trusting behaviour was based on expectations of reciprocity inferred from group membership, not on perceived trustworthiness. In contrast, personal identifiability fostered perceptions of trustworthiness for both in‐ and out‐group members. In this case interpersonal trustworthiness enhanced expectations of reciprocity, which in turn increased trusting behaviour. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis

Kelley and Stahelski's (1970) triangle hypothesis states that competitors hold homogeneous views of others by assuming that most others are competitive, whereas cooperators or pro-social people hold more heterogeneous views by assuming that others are either cooperative or competitive. To evaluate the triangle hypothesis, this study examines differences between pro-socials, individualists, and competitors not only in their expectations about others' choice behaviour, but also in the confidence with which such expectations are held. It was found that pro-social subjects expected more cooperation than individualists and competitors. More importantly, as predicted on the basis of the triangle hypothesis, pro-socials were less confident about their expectations than competitors, with individualists holding intermediate levels of confidence.     

决策信心在信息化从众中的作用

研究采用JAS范式,通过操纵群体信息的性质（支持和反对）以及一致性程度,考察了决策信心在信息化从众过程中的作用。结果表明：（1）个体仅在接收到反对信息时会发生决策的偏转,表现出从众;（2）群体参照信息能够显著影响个体的信心：支持性的群体信息使个体的信心显著增高,而反对性的群体信息使信心显著降低,且表现出一种“负性偏向”（即个体对来自群体的负性信息更加敏感）;（3）在反对条件下,个体信心降低的程度能够很好地预测其决策偏转的概率,即信息化从众行为。这说明,决策信心可能在信息化从众中起着核心的中介作用——反对性的群体信息使得决策信心下降,而决策信心的下降导致了决策的偏转,从而表现出从众行为。     

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

This study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.     

If I want you to like me,should I be like you or unlike you? The effect of prior positive interaction with the group on conformity and distinctiveness in consumer decision making

The extant research points to conflicting results regarding social influence in consumer decision making. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that suggests that people conform to other members of their groups. On the other hand, several studies demonstrated the opposite pattern, namely, that individuals seek distinctiveness from others in the group. The goal of the present research is to reconcile these contradictory findings. To this end, I propose that whether a person will conform to or seek distinctiveness from others in a particular consumption situation is contingent on the absence or presence of one's prior positive interaction with the group. I also suggest that this effect will occur in a public context, that is, when an individual's choice is visible to other group members. The results of experiment supported these propositions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the goal prescribes rationality principle

The present study examines the influence of pre-existing individual differences in social value orentations, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to oneself and others (McClintock, 1978), on perceptions of rationality in a social dilemma. In Experiment 1 conducted in Groningen (the Netherlands), it was found that people with pro-social orientations expected more cooperation from another described as intelligent than from another described as unintelligent, whereas individualists and competitors expected relatively more cooperation from another described as unintelligent. The cross-cultural generalizability of this finding was examined and supported in Experiment 2 which was conducted in Santa Barbara (U.S.A.). Results from both studies are consistent with the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle (Van Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman, 1990) which assumes that people with pro-social (cooperative) orientations would perceive rationality in social dilemmas primarily from the collective perspective, whereas individualists and competitors would take a strong egocentric perspective on rationality. In addition, we found a strong relationship between expectations of other's cooperation and own cooperative behaviour when the other was described as intelligent. The strength of this relationship was reduced, particularly for individualists and competitors, when the other person was described as unintelligent.     

Asymmetry in the estimation of interpersonal distance and identity affirmation

An asymmetry effect is known to exist in the estimation of interpersonal distance, depending on whether the point of reference for the estimation is the subject (‘How far are the others from you?’) or the others How far are you from the others?). It looks as though, through the effect of a self-centring schema, subjects feel that others occupy their own space more than they occupy the space of others. A self-centring schema has also been found in many other processes involving judgment or comparison of oneself and others. It is generally interpreted as a sign of the affirmation and defence of personal identity. The three experiments reported here attempt to relate the asymmetries in the distances perceived between persons represented on a map to the following three areas in which one's sense of personal or group identity is involved: (1) in the perception of one's own specificity with respect to others (or of the specificity of the group to which one belongs with respect to other groups) (experiment 1), (2) in one's ability to put oneself in the place of others (exocentrism) (experiment 2). and (3) in the individuation of oneself by others (experiment 3). The results of these three experiments lead us to believe that it is indeed the processes of identification and affirmation of personal and group identity - along with the underlying categorization processes — that are the source of the asymmetries observed in interpersonal distance estimation. The consistency of the data obtained in different situations also validates the technique used for estimating interpersonal distance.