Biologically Plausible,Human‐Scale Knowledge Representation

Several approaches to implementing symbol‐like representations in neurally plausible models have been proposed. These approaches include binding through synchrony (Shastri & Ajjanagadde, 1993 ), “mesh” binding (van der Velde & de Kamps, 2006 ), and conjunctive binding (Smolensky, 1990 ). Recent theoretical work has suggested that most of these methods will not scale well, that is, that they cannot encode structured representations using any of the tens of thousands of terms in the adult lexicon without making implausible resource assumptions. Here, we empirically demonstrate that the biologically plausible structured representations employed in the Semantic Pointer Architecture (SPA) approach to modeling cognition (Eliasmith, 2013 ) do scale appropriately. Specifically, we construct a spiking neural network of about 2.5 million neurons that employs semantic pointers to successfully encode and decode the main lexical relations in WordNet, which has over 100,000 terms. In addition, we show that the same representations can be employed to construct recursively structured sentences consisting of arbitrary WordNet concepts, while preserving the original lexical structure. We argue that these results suggest that semantic pointers are uniquely well‐suited to providing a biologically plausible account of the structured representations that underwrite human cognition.     

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to “embodiment” or “grounding.” We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations “interact,” and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized—the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to “grounding.” Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations—conceptual vs. sensory-motor—from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of “grounding” or “embodiment,” because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.     

Directions in Connectionist Research: Tractable Computations Without Syntactically Structured Representations

Should connectionists abandon the quest for tractably computable cognitive transition functions while retaining syntactically structured mental representations? We argue, in opposition to Horgan, that it should not. We argue that the case against tractably computable functions, based upon the claimed isotropic and Quinean character of cognition, fails since cognition is not as isotropic and Quinean as Fodor and Horgan contend. Moreover, we illustrate how current research in both connectionism and cognitive neuroscience suggests that tractability can be preserved through division of overall computations into modular sub-processes, each of which is tractable. As to syntactically structured representations, we argue that they are unneeded for most cognitive tasks organisms confront, and that when they are needed, they may be provided by external representational media such as natural language. Moreover, we note that increasingly cognitive linguistics has become the ally of connectionism and that the research program of cognitive linguistics suggests that abilities to use natural languages may be developed without requiring syntactically structured mental representations to exist prior to natural language.     

Cognition without classical architecture

Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) argue that any successful model of cognition must use classical architecture; it must depend upon rule-based processing sensitive to constituent structure. This claim is central to their defense of classical AI against the recent enthusiasm for connectionism. Connectionist nets, they contend, may serve as theories of the implementation of cognition, but never as proper theories of psychology. Connectionist models are doomed to describing the brain at the wrong level, leaving the classical view to account for the mind.This paper considers whether recent results in connectionist research weigh against Fodor and Pylyshyn's thesis. The investigation will force us to develop criteria for determining exactly when a net is capable of systematic processing. Fodor and Pylyshyn clearly intend their thesis to affect the course of research in psychology. I will argue that when systematicity is defined in a way that makes the thesis relevant in this way, the thesis is challenged by recent progress in connectionism.     

A Default-Oriented Theory of Procedural Semantics

Procedural Semantics(PS), broadly construed, is the thesis that the meaning of a symbolic expression may be identified with procedures which specify how the expression is to be used, or applied to the world. J.A. Fodor has characterized PS as a wildly implausible form of the verification theory of meaning, and has argued that PS constitutes a plausible semantic theory only for highly simplistic universes, such as “blocks worlds” and databases. Fodor argued further that insofar as PS is defensible, it is “parasitic upon” classical denotational semantics. Fodor's critique of PS provoked various rejoinders. Although these rejoinders were not always in agreement, both Wilks and Woods reasoned that some form of PS must be true if we are to render coherent certain fundamental concepts of modeloretic semantics (e.g., denotations and truth-conditions). In the present paper these arguments are reviewed and extended. It is argued that not only Tarskian semantics, but other forms of model-theoretic semantics (including possible world and Situation Semantics) may very well ontologically presuppose some form of PS. In addition, a default-oriented form of PS is presented which avoids the “decision procedure” approach of early PS. The new theory embraces aspects of Quine's pragmatism, and assumes that semantic procedures may return pragmatic (default) truth values which may be revised, if the need arises, by adjudication procedures. On the theory here described, semantic procedures do not constitute the complete meanings of symbolic expressions, but constrain these meanings. It is argued that such constraints must exist if there are to be ontological foundations for such traditional notions as denotations and extensions.     

Les représentations de l’entretien structuré chez les recruteurs

We studied recruiters’ representations of the structured interview. In Study 1, 90 recruiters were interviewed. They define “structure” mainly as a schema or list of questions. The terms “structured” and “unstructured” also have different connotations. This can create a social desirability bias in surveys on selection practices, causing an overestimation of the real prevalence of structured interviewing. In Study 2, 59 recruiters responded to a questionnaire. Attitudes towards structured interviews are positive, but representations diverge from scientific definitions, especially regarding unstructured interviews. Recruiters’ representations allow flexibility in practice while maintaining a positive self-image.     

Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle that “Ought” Implies “Can”?

Some philosophers hold that objective consequentialism is false because it is incompatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Roughly speaking, objective consequentialism is the doctrine that you always ought to do what will in fact have the best consequences. According to the principle that “ought” implies “can”, you have a moral obligation to do something only if you can do that thing. Frances Howard-Snyder has used an innovative thought experiment to argue that sometimes you cannot do what will in fact have the best consequences because you do not know what will in fact have the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. This paper examines Howard-Snyder’s argument as well as Carlson’s objections, arguing that Carlson’s objections do not go through but Howard-Snyder’s argument fails nonetheless. Moreover, this paper attempts to show that objective consequentialism and other objectivist moral theories are compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Finally, this paper analyses a special kind of inability: ignorance-induced inability.     

The Occasion-Sensitivity of Thought

On the most common interpretation of occasion-sensitivity what varies cross-contextually is the truth-conditional content of representations. Jerry Fodor argues that when extended to mental representation this view has some problematic consequences. In this paper I outline an approach to occasion-sensitivity which circumvents Fodor’s objections but still maintains that the aspect of thought that guides deliberation and action is occasion-sensitive. On the proposed view, what varies cross-contextually are not truth conditions but rather the conditions for accepting a (true) representation as true relative to a practical goal that is pursued on an occasion. I show that although the proposal entails an error theory this theory is not problematic since it is meant to compensate for the over-generating nature of semantic competence, namely, the fact that not all of the representation’s truth-makers are conducive to a given contextually salient goal.

     

Why is there anything except physics?

In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible.     

A Wittgensteinian Solution to the Sorites

I develop a solution to the Sorites Paradox, according to which a concatenation of valid arguments need not itself be valid. I specify which chains of valid arguments are those that do not preserve validity: those that pass the vague boundary between cases where the relevant concept applies and cases where that concept does not apply. I also develop various criticisms of this solution and show why they fail; basically, they all involve a petitio at some stage. I criticise the conviction that if every short argument in a long concatenated argument is valid, so is the long argument: it is, I argue, the result of an unjustified generalisation from the case of arguments that do not employ vague concepts (as in mathematics) to arguments that do employ them. My approach is Wittgensteinian in its “leaving everything as it is,” in its claiming that the “beginning” has been searched too far back (see paper's epigraph) and in its claim that the paradox was generated by a misapplication of a partial picture of the behaviour of arguments. I conclude my paper by comparing and contrasting my approach to the few precedents found in the vagueness literature and by answering a few additional objections that were raised there.     

Minds as Connoting Systems: Logic and the Language of Thought

The principal aim of this essay is to discuss some logical features of the so-called Classical model of cognitive architecture as it is advocated by J. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn in their much discussed article 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis'. It is pointed out that their structural assumptions have consequences of a logical kind which call into question the view that the Classical architecture (in their sense) can be employed to model human cognition. It seems that the consequences have escaped Fodor and Pylyshyn's notice, or else they have failed to appreciate them, since some of their claims evidently conflict with them. It is also investigated whether the human mind can be characterized as being logical in some weaker sense of logic. Furthermore, it is argued that J. H. Fetzer's view that it is a semiotic system is more realistic than the Classical model, but the distinction he suggests between human cognition and other kinds may be problematic.     

The formation of novel social category conjunctions in working memory: A possible role for the episodic buffer?

Recent research (e.g., Hutter, Crisp, Humphreys, Waters, &; Moffit; Siebler) has confirmed that combining novel social categories involves two stages (e.g., Hampton; Hastie, Schroeder, &; Weber). Furthermore, it is also evident that following stage 1 (constituent additivity), the second stage in these models involves cognitively effortful complex reasoning. However, while current theory and research has addressed how category conjunctions are initially represented to some degree, it is not clear precisely where we first combine or bind existing social constituent categories. For example, how and where do we compose and temporarily store a coherent representation of an individual who shares membership of “female” and “blacksmith” categories? In this article, we consider how the revised multi-component model of working memory (Baddeley) can assist in resolving the representational limitations in the extant two-stage theoretical models. This is a new approach to understanding how novel conjunctions form new bound “composite” representations.     

The paradox of the universal triangle: Concepts,language, and prototypes

For over 300 years, the humble triangle has served as the paradigmatic example of the problem of abstraction. How can we have the idea of a general triangle even though every experience with triangles is with specific ones? Classical cognitive science seemed to provide an answer in symbolic representation. With its easily enumerated necessary and sufficient conditions, the triangle would appear to be an ideal candidate for being represented in a symbolic form. I show that it is not. Across a variety of tasks—drawing, speeded recognition, unspeeded visual judgments, and inference—representations of triangles appear to be graded and context dependent. I show that using the category name “triangle” activates a more prototypical representation than using an arguably coextensive cue, “three-sided polygon”. For example, when asked to draw “triangles” people draw more typical triangles than when asked to draw “three-sided polygons”. Altogether, the results support the view that (even formal) concepts have a graded and flexible structure, which takes on a more prototypical and stable form when activated by category labels.     

Towards a constitutive account of implicit narrativity

The standard reply to the critique that narrative theories of the self are either chauvinistic or trivial is to “go implicit”. Implicit narratives, it is argued, are necessary for diachronically structured self-experience (barring triviality), but do not require that such narratives should be wholly articulable life stories (barring chauvinism). In this paper I argue that the standard approach, which puts forward a phenomenological conception of implicit narratives, is ultimately unable to get out of the clutches of the dilemma. In its place, I offer an alternative approach that does avoid the dilemma, by construing implicit narrativity as an enabling condition for experiences, rather than as something that is itself present in experience. According to this constitutive account, the coherence and intelligibility of our experiences is due to the fact that they are anchored in a larger, diachronic context. This context, I argue, takes a fundamentally embodied and narrative dimension.     

Le modèle écoculturel: un cadre pour la psychologie culturelle comparative

The main goal of this article is to examine the epistemological foundations of the contemporary cross‐cultural psychology from a constructivist point of view. We argue for the necessity of heuristic paradigms like the eco‐cultural framework of John Berry. Such an approach can be considered as a systemic modelling of complex phenomena by a psychologist (e.g., the relations of “mind‐brain‐culture” as well as their development). At the individual level, we argue the necessity to surpass the classic distinction between competence and performance. Competences are differentiated here as “intuitive representations” (or elementary mental functions) and “reflective representations” (or superior mental functions). Intuitive and reflective representations remain at the origin of both behaviour and performance. Such systemic conception allows the theoretical possibility of a “relativist constructivism” that could be more suitable than the “absolutist constructivism” proposed by Jean Piaget.     

The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit “self‐avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohibiting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non‐practicing.” In other words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condemnation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church (USA).     

Spatial attention is necessary for object-based attention: Evidence from temporal-order judgments

Attentional selection is a dynamic process that relies on multiple types of representations. That object representations contribute to attentional selection has been known for decades; however, most evidence for this contribution has been gleaned from studies that have relied on various forms of spatial cueing (some endogenous and some exogenous). It has thus remained unclear whether object-based attentional selection is a direct result of spatial cuing, or whether it still emerges without any spatial marker. Here we used a novel method—the temporal-order judgment (TOJ)—to examine whether object-based guidance emerges in the absence of spatial cuing. Participants were presented with two rectangles oriented either horizontally or vertically. Following a 150-ms preview time, two target stimuli were presented on the same or on different objects, and participants were asked to report which of the two stimuli had appeared first. The targets consisted of stimuli that formed a percept of a “hole” or a “hill.” First, we demonstrated that the “hill” target was indeed processed faster, as evidenced by a positive perceived simultaneity (PSS) measure. We then demonstrated that if two targets appeared with equal probabilities on the same and on different objects, the PSS values, although positive, were not modulated by the objects. In a subsequent set of experiments, we showed that objects can modulate attentional allocation—however, only when they are biased by a spatial (endogenous) cue. In other words, in the absence of a spatial cue or bias, object representations do not guide attentional selection. In addition to providing new constraints for theories of object-based attentional guidance, these experiments introduce a novel paradigm for measuring object-based attentional effects.     

Connectionist representation,semantic compositionality,and the instability of concept structure

Summary In the present paper connectionist approaches to the problem of internal representation and the nature of concepts are discussed. In the first part the concept of representation that underlies connectionist modeling is made explicit. It is argued that the connectionist view of representation relies on a correlational theory of semantic content- i.e., the covariation between internal and external states is taken as the basis for ascribing meaning to internal states. The problems and virtues of such a correlational approach to internal representation are addressed. The second part of the paper is concerned with whether connectionism is capable of accounting for the apparent productivity and systematicity of language and thought. There is an evaluation of the recent arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn, who claim that systematicity can only be explained if one conceives of mental representations as structured symbols composed of context-free constituents. There is a review of empirical evidence that strongly suggests that concepts are not fixed memory structures and that the meaning of constituent symbols varies, depending on the context in which they are embedded. On the basis of this review it is concluded that the meaning of a complex expression is not computed from the context-free meanings of the constituents, and that strong compositionality, as endorsed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), seems implausible as a process theory for the comprehension of complex concepts. Instead, the hypothesis is endorsed that constraint satisfaction in distributed connectionist networks may allow for an alternative account of weak compositionality compatible with the context sensitivity of meaning. In the final section, it is argued that neither mere implementation of a language of thought in connectionist networks nor radical elimination of symbol systems seems to be a fruitful research strategy, but that it might be more useful to discuss how connectionist systems can develop the capacity to use external symbol systems like language or logic without instantiating symbol systems themselves.     

Of Innocence and Experience: Commentary on Paper by Stuart A. Pizer

In providing the background to a pivotal session, Stuart Pizer reveals his clinical work as an unsupervised neophyte, prior to his own analysis and analytic training. These early therapeutic efforts were flawed, leaving Pizer at times “grimacing with mortification 26 years after the fact.” But they were also extraordinarily helpful to the patient. Schaffer discusses the challenge of supervising similarly talented beginners: how does one teach psychoanalysis without desiccating a treatment? How does one teach a relational approach, with no “basic model” and few rules, to a beginning analyst infused with an unformulated, yet often passionate, sense of what is “curative”? Pizer recognizes that were he to meet the same patient today, he would not conduct the same treatment. Now trained and analyzed, not to mention more cautious and “worldweary,” Pizer would not do what he did then. But what if he were the supervisor then? Schaffer concludes her discussion by asking Pizer how he, now a seasoned analyst, would supervise his early therapist self.     

Learning about Spirituality Together with “Seekers”

The present era, often referred to as post‐secular, has in many places seen a resurgence in spirituality. Nevertheless, the contemporary quest for spirituality is unique in the sense that many people do not expect to have their spiritual needs fulfilled within the structures of organized religion, starting on a journey of their own explorations instead. Sociologists of religion, therefore, tend to employ the “dwellers” and “seekers” paradigm to account for this phenomenon. This paper will explore this phenomenon in the context of the Czech Republic, whose citizens are frequently characterized as distrustful toward institutional religiosity, through the lens of the recent World Council of Churches' affirmation on mission and evangelism, Together towards Life: Mission and Evangelism in Changing Landscapes (TTL). For our purpose, the statement's emphasis on both “transformative spirituality” and “mission from the margins” will be of central importance. Using the notion of transformative spirituality as the energy engendered by the Spirit for the transformation of life and creation, it will be suggested that “seekers” can be agents in God's mission of liberation, reconciliation, and transformation, despite their inability or unwillingness to identify themselves with the church as institution. Keeping in mind ethical considerations, the paper will not seek to make a case for a forced “christening” of the seekers. Rather, it will argue that they can become partners in missio Dei, thus giving the notion of “mission from the margins” a new, contextually relevant dimension.