Domain-Specific Principles Affect Learning and Transfer in Children

In this paper I discuss the curious lack of contact between developmental psychologists studying the principles of early learning and those concentrating an later learning in children, where predispositions to learn certain types of concepts are less readily discussed. Instead, there is tacit agreement that learning and transfer mechanisms are content-independent and age-dependent. I argue here that one cannot study learning and transfer in a vacuum and that children's ability to learn is intimately dependent on what they are required to learn and the context in which they must learn it. Specifically, I argue that children learn and transfer readily, even in traditional laboratory settings, if they are required to extend their knowledge about causal mechanisms that they already understand. This point is illustrated in a series of studies with children from 1 to 3 years of age learning about simple mechanisms of physical causality (pushing-pulling, wetting, cutting, etc.). In addition, I document children's difficulty learning about causally impossible events, such as pulling with strings that do not appear to make contact with the object they are pulling. Even young children transfer on the basis of deep structural principles rather than perceptual features when they have access to the requisite domain-specific knowledge. I argue that a search for causal explanations is the basis of broad understanding, of wide patterns of generalization, and of flexible transfer and creative inferential projections—in sum, the essential elements of meaningful learning.     

Principles of cognitive science in education: The effects of generation,errors, and feedback

Principles of cognitive science hold the promise of helping children to study more effectively, yet they do not always make successful transitions from the laboratory to applied settings and have rarely been tested in such settings. For example, self-generation of answers to questions should help children to remember. But what if children cannot generate anything? And what if they make an error? Do these deviations from the laboratory norm of perfect generation hurt, and, if so, do they hurt enough that one should, in practice, spurn generation? Can feedback compensate, or are errors catastrophic? The studies reviewed here address three interlocking questions in an effort to better implement a computer-based study program to help children learn: (1) Does generation help? (2) Do errors hurt if they are corrected? And (3) what is the effect of feedback? The answers to these questions are: Yes, generation helps; no, surprisingly, errors that are corrected do not hurt; and, finally, feedback is beneficial in verbal learning. These answers may help put cognitive scientists in a better position to put their well-established principles in the service of children’s learning.     

When the alternative would have been better: counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning--asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got--creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that--when controlling for false positives--regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

When the alternative would have been better: Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning—asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got—creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that—when controlling for false positives—regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

What Abandoned Children Construe as Stressful Experiences: Implications for Psychoanalytic Relational Theory and Child Psychotherapy

As part of psychological evaluations to determine whether interventions were needed, 106 abandoned children (aged 5 to 19 years) residing in SOS-Kinderdorf International Children's Villages in Spain were individually administered a structured interview to learn what each child construed as upsetting. Before admission, each child had been exposed to one of three traumatic, interpersonal experiences: excessive neglect; physical abuse; and parents who were prostitutes, abusing drugs, or both. In an unexpected finding, the events these children discussed most often as having upset them did not focus on abandonment or on traumatic conditions they had endured. Rather, converging with reports of public school children residing with their families in the United States, the events they discussed concerned harm to loved ones (e.g., accident, illness, hospitalization). In addition, children who had been visiting relatives while residing in a Children's Village differed from those who had not visited relatives in what they experienced as traumatic. The results are examined in terms of implications for psychoanalytic-relational theory and for planning treatment programs for children who have been abandoned or are living in institutions.     

Improving examples to improve transfer to novel problems

People often memorize a set of steps for solving problems when they study worked-out examples in domains such as math and physics without learning what domain-relevant subgoals or subtasks these steps achieve. As a result, they have trouble solving novel problems that contain the same structural elements but require different, lower-level steps. In three experiments, subjects who studied example solutions that emphasized a needed subgoal were more likely to solve novel problems that required a new approach for achieving this subgoal than were subjects who did not learn this subgoal. This result suggests that research aimed at determining the factors that influence subgoal learning may be valuable in improving transfer from examples to novel problems.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.     

Transfer of learning between 2D and 3D sources during infancy: Informing theory and practice

The ability to transfer learning across contexts is an adaptive skill that develops rapidly during early childhood. Learning from television is a specific instance of transfer of learning between a two-dimensional (2D) representation and a three-dimensional (3D) object. Understanding the conditions under which young children might accomplish this particular kind of transfer is important because by 2 years of age 90% of US children are viewing television on a daily basis. Recent research shows that children can imitate actions presented on television using the corresponding real-world objects, but this same research also shows that children learn less from television than they do from live demonstrations until they are at least 3 years old; termed the video deficit effect. At present, there is no coherent theory to account for the video deficit effect; how learning is disrupted by this change in context is poorly understood. The aims of the present review are: (1) to review the conditions under which children transfer learning between 2D images and 3D objects during early childhood and (2) to integrate developmental theories of memory processing into the transfer of learning from media literature using Hayne’s (2004) developmental representational flexibility account. The review will conclude that studies on the transfer of learning between 2D and 3D sources have important theoretical implications for general developmental theories of cognitive development, and in particular the development of a flexible representational system, as well as policy implications for early education regarding the potential use and limitations of media as effective teaching tools during early childhood.     

Beyond competence: The significance of performance for conceptual development

Conceptual constraints must change with age if they are to account for children's acquisition of kinds of knowledge that do not fall within the initial constraints. A bi-directional relation between competence and performance is therefore hypothesized, such that cognitive competences not only guide performance but also are shaped by it. This hypothesis offers a solution to the difficulties that current competence models have in accounting for developmental change. Goals are proposed as a potential source of changing constraints because they change with age, they shape what children do, and they also influence what children learn from what they do. These ideas are illustrated with examples drawn primarily from research on children's quantitative concepts.     

Children with developmental coordination disorder are equally able to generate force but show more variability than typically developing children

Several studies have suggested that children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) have difficulties in the fine-tuning of manual force. However, parameterization of the generated force per se is hard to test under normal circumstances as movement planning and execution are also involved. In the present study, an isometric force production task was used to test the hypothesis that children with DCD have a decreased ability to scale force to a required force level and to maintain steady low to submaximal forces. We also tested if the developmental trends were different between the children with DCD and typically developing (TD) children. Twenty-four children with DCD and 24 matched TD children, divided over three age groups (7-9-11 years) participated in this study. Analysis of the data showed that DCD and TD children are equally able to adapt their generated force to the required levels, however DCD children produced a less steady force, even more variable than in the youngest TD children. These results suggest that problems in force control in children with DCD are caused by a higher level of inherent noise of the output system. Since younger DCD children are much more affected than older ones it is suggested that these children are able to learn a strategy to cope with their increased stochastic variability, especially at higher force levels.     

Means-means-end tool choice in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): finding the limits on primates’ knowledge of tools

Most studies of animal tool use require subjects to use one object to gain access to a food reward. In many real world situations, however, animals perform more than one action in sequence to achieve their goals. Of theoretical interest is whether animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize the relationship between consecutive action sequences in which there may be one overall goal and several subgoals. Here we ask if cotton-top tamarins, a species that in captivity uses tools to solve means-end problems, can go one step further and use a sequence of tools (means) to obtain food (end). We first trained subjects to use a pulling tool to obtain a food reward. After this initial training, subjects were presented with problems in which one tool had to be used in combination with a second in order to obtain food. Subjects showed great difficulty when two tools were required to obtain the food reward. Although subjects attended to the connection between the tool and food reward, they ignored the physical connection between the two tools. After training on a two-tool problem, we presented subjects with a series of transfer tests to explore if they would generalize to new types of connections between the tools. Subjects readily transferred to new connections. Our results therefore provide the first evidence to date that tamarins can learn to solve problems involving two tools, but that they do so only with sufficient training.     

Naming and categorization in young children: IV: listener behavior training and transfer of function

Following pretraining with everyday objects, 14 children aged from 1 to 4 years were trained, for each of three pairs of different arbitrary wooden shapes (Set 1), to select one stimulus in response to the spoken word /zog/, and the other to /vek/. When given a test for the corresponding tacts ("zog" and "vek"), 10 children passed, showing that they had learned common names for the stimuli, and 4 failed. All children were trained to clap to one stimulus of Pair 1 and wave to the other. All those who named showed either transfer of the novel functions to the remaining two pairs of stimuli in Test 1, or novel function comprehension for all three pairs in Test 2, or both. Three of these children next participated in, and passed, category match-to-sample tests. In contrast, all 4 children who had learned only listener behavior failed both the category transfer and category match-to-sample tests. When 3 of them were next trained to name the stimuli, they passed the category transfer and (for the 2 subjects tested) category match-to-sample tests. Three children were next trained on the common listener relations with another set of arbitrary stimuli (Set 2); all succeeded on the tact and category tests with the Set 2 stimuli. Taken together with the findings from the other studies in the series, the present experiment shows that (a) common listener training also establishes the corresponding names in some but not all children, and (b) only children who learn common names categorize; all those who learn only listener behavior fail. This is good evidence in support of the naming account of categorization.     

Teaching autistic children to use extra-stimulus prompts

Autistic children often do not transfer from extra-stimulus prompts, and thus do not utilize a frequent learning aid. It has been hypothesized that this is due to stimulus overselectivity; a failure to respond to simultaneous multiple cues. This study was designed to determine if autistic children who initially respond only to single cues can be taught a set to respond to two cues and subsequently utilize an extra-stimulus (pointing) prompt. Four autistic children were pretested to determine if they could learn a complex visual discrimination by either trial and error or an extra-stimulus prompt fading procedure. Since they did not, the children were then taught to respond to two cues through a multiple-cue training procedure and subsequently tested to determine if they could now utilize a pointing prompt. Results indicated that while all four children initially did not transfer from an extra-stimulus (pointing) prompt, they did so subsequent to multiple-cue training. The results are discussed in terms of implications for treatment (remediating overselectivity) and in relation to normal child development.     

What Low-Income,Depressed Mothers Need From Mental Health Care: Overcoming Treatment Barriers From Their Perspective

Maternal depression is a major public health concern, as children of depressed mothers have a substantially increased risk for psychiatric problems into adulthood. Low-income mothers have high rates of depression, yet few receive mental health care. Barriers have been identified, but solutions have been based on what mental health professionals believe is helpful rather than mothers’ own perspectives, or require participation in an existing treatment. The purpose of our study was to learn what low-income, depressed mothers believe they need from mental health care to overcome barriers to mental health care. Twelve mothers with at least one child between the ages of 2 and 17 participated in individual interviews. Using qualitative grounded theory methodology, data were organized into six theoretical constructs. These included: (1) attitudes, expectations, and emotions impact the intention to enter treatment, (2) identifying as self-sufficient inhibits the intention to enter treatment, (3) providing knowledge, skills and environmental resources facilitate treatment entry, (4) habits and life circumstances that make treatment seem unimportant inhibit treatment entry, (5) balancing acceptance, change, and the therapeutic relationship facilitates treatment retention, and (6) sharing similarities with people involved in treatment often, but does not always facilitate treatment retention. A 3-step theory was developed regarding variables that influence mothers’ (a) intentions to enter treatment, (b) treatment entry, and (c) treatment retention. Offering what low-income, depressed mothers believe they need could better engage and retain them in mental health treatment.     

Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

Trust in testimony about strangers: young children prefer reliable informants who make positive attributions

Young children have been described as critical consumers of information, particularly in the domain of language learning. Indeed, children are more likely to learn novel words from people with accurate histories of object labeling than with inaccurate ones. But what happens when informant testimony conflicts with a tendency to see the world in a particular way? In impression formation, children exhibit a positivity bias in personality judgments. This study examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds would accept reliable testimony about a stranger’s personality that conflicted with a putative positivity bias (i.e., a negative trait attribution). Overall, participants accepted testimony from reliable informants more often than expected by chance, although they were significantly more likely to do so when the information was positive than when it was negative. These findings indicate that in addition to the reliability status of informants, information processing biases have a substantial impact on children’s use of informant testimony to learn about the social world.     

Dealing with conflicting information: young children's reliance on what they see versus what they are told

Children often learn about the world through direct observation. However, much of children's knowledge is acquired through the testimony of others. This research investigates how preschoolers weigh these two sources of information when they are in conflict. Children watched as an adult hid a toy in one location. Then the adult told children that the toy was in a different location (i.e. false testimony). When retrieving the toy, 4- and 5-year-olds relied on what they had seen and disregarded the adult's false testimony. However, most 3-year-olds deferred to the false testimony, despite what they had directly observed. Importantly, with a positive searching experience based on what they saw, or with a single prior experience with an adult as unreliable, 3-year-olds subsequently relied on their first-hand observation and disregarded the adult's false testimony. Thus, young children may initially be credulous toward others' false testimony that contradicts their direct observation, but skepticism can develop quickly through experience.     

先前知识经验对远距离水平映射规则内隐学习的限制

先前研究发现远距离规则能够被内隐地习得和迁移,表明内隐学习获得的知识是底层的抽象规则,那么这一抽象规则的习得和迁移是否会受到先前知识经验的限制?研究采用汉语声调的远距离水平映射规则为材料,通过创设不符合平仄知识经验的任意声调水平映射规则,在控制组块和重复结构等表面特征的条件下,探讨先前知识经验是否限制了远距离水平映射规则的内隐学习和迁移。结果发现相对于符合平仄知识经验的汉语声调水平映射规则,被试不能够内隐地习得和迁移任意声调的水平映射规则,表明先前知识经验在远距离水平映射规则内隐学习过程中发挥着重要作用。     

Children's ability to infer utterance veracity from speaker informedness

Children between the ages of 3 years 7 months and 6 years 5 months experienced a contradiction between what they knew or guessed to be inside a box and what they were told by an adult. The authors investigated whether children believed what they were told by asking them to make a final judgment about the box's content. Children tended to believe utterances from speakers who were better informed than they themselves were and to disbelieve those from less well-informed speakers, with no age-related differences. This behavior implies an understanding of the speaker's knowledge and suggests that children can learn from oral input while being appropriately skeptical of its truth. Children also gave explicit knowledge judgments on trials on which no utterances were given. Performance on knowledge trials was less accurate than, and unrelated to, performance on utterance trials. Research on children's developing explicit theory of mind needs to be broadened to include behavioral indexes of understanding the mind.     

Believing what you’re told: Young children’s trust in unexpected testimony about the physical world

How do children resolve conflicts between a self-generated belief and what they are told? Four studies investigated the circumstances under which toddlers would trust testimony that conflicted with their expectations about the physical world. Thirty-month-olds believed testimony that conflicted with a naive bias (Study 1), and they also repeatedly trusted testimony that conflicted with an event they had just seen (Study 2)—even when they had an incentive to ignore the testimony (Study 3). Children responded more skeptically if they could see that the testimony was wrong as it was being delivered (Study 3), or if they had the opportunity to accumulate evidence confirming their initial belief before hearing someone contradict it (Study 4). Together, these studies demonstrate that toddlers have a robust bias to trust even surprising testimony, but this trust can be influenced by how much confidence they have in their initial belief.