Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It!

Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mood and belief-value correlation

This is an investigation of belief-value distortion as measured by the correlation between sets of beliefs and values for a given attitude object. Correlations were computed for each subject separately. Initial mood levels and mood changes subsequent to ratings of attitudes to nuclear power were investigated in the first two studies. In Study 1 mood changes were positively correlated with attitude. In Study 2, mood levels were positively correlated both with attitude, optimism, and tendency towards extreme belief-value correlations (belief-value distortion). In a third study, attitudes were studied both towards nuclear power and alcohol. There were no clear relations between the two fields of contents. Mood changes were small and inconsistent. However, tendency to act correlated with both optimism and belief-value distortion, also with the level of attitude kept constant. A model relating mood, optimism, belief-value distortion, and action is suggested.     

The coincidence effect in similarity and choice

Medin, Goldstone, and Markman (1995) recently described a series of parallel effects in similarity and choice. They suggested that similarity and choice are related in a nontrivial way such that choice may entail a similarity judgment to an explicit or constructed ideal. In this paper, the correspondences between similarity and choice were investigated with respect to a phenomenon in similarity known as thecoincidence effect. In coincidence (pronounced “coincide-ence”), two items that match on one dimension but have a large difference on another dimension receive a higher similarity rating than do two items that have only modest differences on both dimensions. We conducted five experiments in order to examine commonalities between similarity and choice processes with respect to coincidence. Four types of tasks were given: similarity ratings, desirability ratings, forced choice similarities (which of two items is most similar to a target), and forced choice preferences (which of two items one would prefer, given a target). We found a main effect for ratings as opposed to forced choices, with ratings showing greater coincidence effects than did choices. Similarity measures tended to produce more coincidence than did preference measures. The overall pattern of results suggests the presence of dimensional weighting processes sensitive to task characteristics and operating somewhat differently for similarity and decision making.     

Construction of preferences by constraint satisfaction

Participants were given a choice between two multiattribute alternatives (job offers). Preferences for the attributes were measured before, during, and after the choices were made. We found that over the course of decision making, the preferences shifted to cohere with the choice: The attributes of the option that was eventually chosen came to be rated more favorably than they had been rated initially, while the attributes of the rejected option received lower preference ratings than before. These coherence shifts were triggered by a single attribute that decisively favored one option (Experiment 1), and occurred spontaneously in the absence of a decisive attribute (Experiment 2). The coherence shift preceded commitment to choice. These findings favor constraint-satisfaction models of decision making.     

What people say and what they do: The differential effects of informational cues and task design

Do ratings of tasks accurately reflect the influences on people's choices of tasks? Does information from others have strong effects on attitudes toward tasks, but weak effects on task choices? What effect does direct experience with tasks designed to be stimulating or dull have on task ratings and task choices? To answer these questions, we collected data from 24 male and female undergraduates who individually worked on four tasks involving the analysis of cartoons. Informational cues and task design were cross-cut so that each task was either enriched or unenriched and received either positive or negative cues. Subjects rated the tasks on scales that measured how motivating each task was perceived to be, and how interesting and enjoyable each task was. Then subjects worked on a freely chosen sequence of tasks for 10 min. Cues had significant main effects on task ratings, but not on overall choice of tasks. Task design had no main effect on ratings, but did significantly affect overall choices. These results suggest that behavioral choices are determined more by direct experience with tasks than by information provided by others.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE RELATION BETWEEN CHOOSING AND WORKING PREVOCATIONAL TASKS IN TWO SEVERELY RETARDED YOUNG ADULTS

This study investigated the relation between prevocational preference, as measured by the client's selection of a task object, and the work that followed that choice. After selecting a task object, the clients worked a task previously assessed to be more or less preferred than the one indicated by the object. The results indicated that when the selection represented a task that was less preferred than the one actually worked, choices for that object increased on subsequent trials. Conversely, when the selection represented a task that was more preferred than the task subject actually worked, choices for the object decreased on subsequent trials. The work that followed object choices reinforced or punished subsequent selections. These findings indicated that the clients' object choices were valid indicators of their preference for working different tasks. They were also consistent with Premack's principle that one class of responses may reinforce or punish a different class of responses for the same individual.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beliefs in a Just World and Reactions to Personal Deprivation

ABSTRACT We hypothesized that strong believers in a just world would be motivated to perceive personal deprivation as fair and to report little resentment, compared to weak believers in a just world In two experiments, subjects performed a computer task to earn points toward a goal that had desirable consequences In the first study, some subjects chose their computer task, whereas other subjects were randomly assigned to a task In the second study, some subjects decided not to practice the task before the test trial, whereas other subjects learned after the test trial that the experimenter had forgotten to give them the opportunity to practice All subjects received bogus feedback indicating that they did not earn any points The predicted relation between beliefs in a just world and perceived fairness was obtained in both experiments, especially within the choice condition of Experiments and the experimenter error condition of Experiments The results show that beliefs in a just world have implications not only for perceptions of others, but also for self-perception     

The influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making

People with symptoms of depression show impairments in decision-making. One explanation is that they have difficulty maintaining rich representations of the task environment. We test this hypothesis in the context of exploratory choice. We analyze depressive and non-depressive participants’ exploration strategies by comparing their choices to two computational models: (1) an “Ideal Actor” model that reflectively updates beliefs and plans ahead, employing a rich representation of the environment and (2) a “Naïve Reinforcement Learning” (RL) model that updates beliefs reflexively utilizing a minimal task representation. Relative to non-depressive participants, we find that depressive participants’ choices are better described by the simple RL model. Further, depressive participants were more exploratory than non-depressives in their decision-making. Depressive symptoms appear to influence basic mechanisms supporting choice behavior by reducing use of rich task representations and hindering performance during exploratory decision-making.     

选择损耗自我控制资源:取舍效应还是信息加工难度效应?

研究以自我控制的资源模型为理论框架,从选择难度特征的视角出发,通过两项实验考察选择损耗自我控制资源的成因。结果发现,高取舍冲突组被试的stroop任务成绩显著低于低取舍冲突组被试,高、低阅读难度组被试的stroop任务成绩差异不显著;为自己做选择组被试的stroop任务成绩显著低于为他人做选择组被试,完成3选项和4选项任务组被试的stroop任务成绩差异不显著。研究表明,选择损耗效应是由选择的取舍难度而非信息加工难度造成。。     

The influence of episodic memory decline on value-based choice

Recent studies suggest the involvement of episodic memory in value-based decisions as a source of information about subjective values of choice options. We therefore tested the link between age-related memory decline and inconsistencies in value-based decisions in 30 cognitively healthy older adults. Within the pre-registered experiment, the inconsistencies were measured in two ways: i) the consistency between stated preferences and revealed choices; ii) the amount of intransitivities in choice triplets, revealed in a forced paired choice task including all possible pairings of 20 food products. Although no significant association of memory functions to number of intransitive triplets was observed, participants with lower memory scores were more likely to choose the item for which they stated a lower preference. The results suggest a higher noise in the underlying preference signal in participants with lower memory. We discuss the results in the context of the unique needs of elderly consumers.     

Failing to commit: Maximizers avoid commitment in a way that contributes to reduced satisfaction

Past research suggests that individuals who approach decisions with the goal of maximizing, or selecting the best possible option, show less satisfaction with their choices than those with the goal of satisficing, or selecting the first “good enough” option. The present investigation examines whether this difference in choice satisfaction stems from a difference in willingness to commit to one’s choices. We argue that maximizers are reticent to commit to their choices and that this reticence robs them of the dissonance reduction processes that leave people satisfied. In Study 1, maximizers reported a stronger preference than satisficers for retaining the possibility to revise choices, both when reporting preferences in their own life and when choosing between options in a hypothetical situation. In Study 2, satisficers showed evidence of classic dissonance reduction after making a choice - they offered higher ratings of a chosen poster and lower ratings of the rejected alternatives, relative to baseline. However, maximizers were less likely to change their impressions of the posters after their choice, leaving them less satisfied with their selected poster. These results provide valuable insight into post-decision processes that decrease maximizers’ satisfaction with their decisions.     

Are preference reversals reduced when made explicit?

Previous research has shown that preferences for options, such as gambles, can reverse depending on the response mode. These preference reversals have been demonstrated when tasks were performed sequentially. That is, subjects completed one task before beginning another. In an attempt to eliminate preference reversals, we asked subjects to perform tasks simultaneously. That is, subjects made two types of responses for each pair of gambles before evaluating the next pair. In the condition with no financial incentives, preference reversal rates were slightly reduced. In another condition, subjects were paid for their participation and they were allowed to play a gamble with real monetary compensation. A gamble pair was randomly selected, and if a subject's responses in the two tasks were consistent for that pair, he or she was allowed to play the ‘preferred’ gamble. Otherwise, the experimenter selected the gamble from the pair. With these financial incentives, systematic preference reversals were eliminated for two of the three task combinations. Preference reversals continued to occur for attractiveness ratings versus selling prices, although, even for that pair of tasks, the reversal rate was significantly reduced. For all three task pairs, preference orders from the two tasks appeared to merge into more consistent orders.     

Infants Detect Patterns of Choices Despite Counter Evidence,but Timing of Inconsistency Matters

Understanding others’ preference for a relational category of objects (e.g., prefer darker colored shirts) can be challenging for young children, as it involves comparison of choice options within and across exemplars. Adding to the challenge is occasional inconsistency in choices made by others. Here the authors examined whether 14-month-olds could detect an experimenter’s preference for taller objects when they observed choices that were somewhat inconsistent. Infants watched four familiarization events involving different object pairs: The experimenter chose the taller of two objects thrice and the shorter object once—the inconsistent choice was presented at different time points of familiarization. The infants detected the experimenter’s preference for taller objects only when they had observed three consistent choices consecutively from the beginning. This finding is in line with relational learning, specifically the significant role of initial data in the extraction of relational commonality. It also connects to the hierarchical Bayesian models of rational learning: Inconsistency can be discounted when the initial data allow learners to distinguish a highly probable hypothesis.     

Computer interactive heuristics to assess preference indefinition and resolve discrepancies between preference ratings and rankings

Ipsative and absolute assessment of preferences are contrasted, with particular reference to the different quantitative and qualitative information provided by each. Although it may not be possible to mathematically combine the respective qualitative information provided by rankings and ratings, when used in conjunction, they may offer a valuable consistency check of a respondent’s preference assessments. A set of heuristics, interactively implemented via computer, is proposed to (1) identify inconsistencies between preference rankings and ratings of the same set of items, and (2) attempt to resolve those inconsistencies. The number of iterations required to resolve inconsistencies might be used as an index of the respondent’s lack of preference definition.     

I want to be creative: exploring the role of hedonic contingency theory in the positive mood-cognitive flexibility link

Three studies explored the role of hedonic contingency theory as an explanation for the link between positive mood and cognitive flexibility. Study 1 examined the determinants of activity choice for participants in happy, sad, or neutral moods. Consistent with hedonic contingency theory, happy participants weighted potential for creativity as well as the pleasantness of the task more heavily in their preference ratings. In Study 2, participants were given either a neutral or mood-threatening item generation task to perform. Results illustrated that happy participants exhibited greater cognitive flexibility in all cases; when confronted with a potentially mood-threatening task, happy participants were able to creatively transform the task so as to maintain positive mood and interest. Finally, Study 3 manipulated participants' beliefs that moods could or could not be altered. Results replicated the standard positive mood-increased cognitive flexibility effect in the nonmood-freezing condition, but no effects of mood on creativity were found in the mood-freezing condition. These studies indicate that the hedonic contingency theory may be an important contributing mechanism behind the positive mood-cognitive flexibility link.