THE VAGUENESS ARGUMENT FOR MEREOLOGICAL UNIVERSALISM*

Abstract:  In this paper, I critically discuss one of the more influential arguments for mereological universalism, what I will call 'the Vagueness Argument'. I argue that a premise of the Vagueness Argument is not well supported and that there are at least two good reasons for thinking that the premise in question is false.     

CIRCULARITY AND INCONSISTENCY IN KUHN'S DEFENSE OF HIS RELATIVISM

For more than a century, it has been a standard ploy to argue against relativism on the grounds of self-referential incoherence (e.g., “if the relativists say that beliefs have no objective validity then that belief itself has none,” etc.). This paper determines the particular form this sort of charge takes when applied to a problematic passage in which Kuhn defends his relativistic theory of science by applying that theory to the debate between his critics and himself. If Kuhn were to give up relativism with respect to facts and truth but retain it with respect to the strength of reasons, a pair of dilemmas charging circularity and inconsistency could be circumvented.     

A NOTE ON KRIPKE's FOOTNOTE 56 ARGUMENT FOR THE ESSENTIALITY OF ORIGIN

In footnote 56 of his Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers a ‘proof’ of the essentiality of origin. On its most literal reading the argument is clearly flawed, as was made clear by Nathan Salmon. Salmon attempts to save the literal reading of the argument, but I argue that the new argument is flawed as well, and that it can’t be what Kripke intended. I offer an alternative reconstruction of Kripke's argument, but I show that this suffers from a more subtle fault.     

A DEFENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR PHYSICALISM

One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.     

THE KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM

A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted. ¹     

AN ARGUMENT FOR THE MANY

If one believes vagueness to be an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many: in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many 'mountain-candidates', all, apparently, with more or less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all these billions of mountain-candidates are mountains. I argue that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis's proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites paradox.     

DENNETT ON THE BASIC ARGUMENT

Abstract: I argue that Dennett does not adequately support his rejection of the “Basic Argument” for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the sort of free will that involves genuine access to alternative possibilities (sometimes referred to as the “Consequence Argument”). In addition, I seek to highlight the plausibility and importance of the incompatibilist's interpretation of this sort of free will.     

THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT FOR SUBCLASSICAL LOGIC

This paper presents a simple but, by my lights, effective argument for a subclassical account of logic—an account according to which logical consequence is (properly) weaker than the standard, so‐called classical account. Alas, the vast bulk of the paper is setup. Because of the many conflicting uses of ‘logic’ the paper begins, following a disclaimer on logic and inference, by fixing the sense of ‘logic’ in question, and then proceeds to rehearse both the target subclassical account of logic and its well‐known relative (viz., classical logic). With background in place the simple argument—which takes up less than five pages—is advanced. My hope is that the minimal presentation will help to get ‘the simple argument’ plainly on the table, and that subsequent debate can move us forward.