The Predictors of Post-Sterilization Regret in Married Women1

We interviewed a sample of 317 married women prior to a tubal sterilization (195) or a husband's vasectomy (122) and then reinterviewed them yearly for 5 years. Using these women's responses to six questions about their feelings and desires following sterilization, we fitted a latent-variable model of post-sterilization regret to the data by means of a linear structural equation analysis. The results confirmed our view that post-sterilization regret was not a simple psychological state but rather was a complex process with different, causally linked manifestations. This process began with a renewed interest in having a baby, proceeded to the development of negative feeling about the three decisions that lead to sterilization, and concluded with a desire to reverse the surgery. This sequence was affected by the negative, post-sterilization effects of the sterilization and by the Occurrence of divorce. Next, we identified the pre-sterilization predictors of six regret variables from our model by means of a series of linear regression analyses. The major pre-sterilization predictors of the regret process included being relatively young, ambivalence about future childbearing, negative attitudes toward sterilization, dominance of the decision making by the woman's husband, and conflict with her husband during decision making. Finally, we divided the sample into quintiles on the basis of their scores on a Pre-Sterilization Predictor Scale and assessed the performance of our predictor variables as indicators of risk of regret by determining the level of negative feelings toward sterilization in each quintile. The results confirm the discriminatory power of our predictors. The overall findings indicate a number of psychological and marital issues, the exploration of which might help counselors provide anticipatory and preventative services to couples seeking sterilization.     

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated children's responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.     

The development of children's regret and relief

Previous research found that children first experience regret at 5 years and relief at 7. In two experiments, we explored three possibilities for this lag: (1) relief genuinely develops later than regret; (2) tests of relief have previously been artefactually difficult; or (3) evidence for regret resulted from false positives. In Experiment 1 (N=162 4- to 7-year-olds) children chose one of two cards that led to winning or losing tokens. Children rated their happiness then saw a better (regret) or worse (relief) alternative. Children re-rated their happiness. Regret after winning was first experienced at 4, regret after losing and relief after winning were experienced at 5 years and relief after losing at 7 years. Experiment 2 (N=297 5- to 8-year-olds) used a similar task but manipulated children's responsibility for the outcome. Greater responsibility for the outcome resulted in a greater likelihood of an experience of regret and relief. Results support that previous tests of relief were artefactually difficult and regret and relief are experienced earlier than previously thought.     

When the alternative would have been better: Counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning—asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got—creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that—when controlling for false positives—regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

When the alternative would have been better: counterfactual reasoning and the emergence of regret

Counterfactual reasoning about how events could have turned out better is associated with the feeling of regret. However, developmental studies show a discrepancy between the onset of counterfactual reasoning (at 3 years) and the feeling of regret (at 6 years). In four experiments we explored possible reasons. Experiment 1 (3- to 6-year-old children) and Experiment 2 (adult control) show that even when regret is assessed more directly than in previous studies (e.g., Amsel & Smalley, 2000) only adults but not children regret their decision. Experiment 3 (3- to 14-year-old children) suggests that double-questioning--asking children how happy they are with what they got before and after they had seen what they could have got--creates false positive indications of regret in the youngest children and that--when controlling for false positives--regret is not evident before 9 years. However, children before this age make a difference between attractive (three candies) and less attractive (one candy) items (Experiment 4; 6- to 8-year-old children). Taken together, this suggests that before 9 years of age children base their judgements solely on what they got without taking into account what they could have got.     

Regret Causes Ego-Depletion and Finding Benefits in the Regrettable Events Alleviates Ego-Depletion

ABSTRACT. This study tested the hypotheses that experiencing regret would result in ego-depletion, while finding benefits (i.e., “silver linings”) in the regret-eliciting events counteracted the ego-depletion effect. Using a modified gambling paradigm (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) and a retrospective method (Experiments 3 and 5), five experiments were conducted to induce regret. Results revealed that experiencing regret undermined performance on subsequent tasks, including a paper-and-pencil calculation task (Experiment 1), a Stroop task (Experiment 2), and a mental arithmetic task (Experiment 3). Furthermore, finding benefits in the regret-eliciting events improved subsequent performance (Experiments 4 and 5), and this improvement was mediated by participants’ perceived vitality (Experiment 4). This study extended the depletion model of self-regulation by considering emotions with self-conscious components (in our case, regret). Moreover, it provided a comprehensive understanding of how people felt and performed after experiencing regret and after finding benefits in the events that caused the regret.     

Regret and quality of life across the adult life span: the influence of disengagement and available future goals

Two studies examined the associations between life regrets and indicators of quality of life across the adult life span. Given that opportunities to undo regrets decline with age, regret intensity was expected to be inversely associated with subjective well-being and health among older adults. In addition, the research explored protective factors that have the potential to reduce older adults' regret intensity. It was suggested that being disengaged from undoing the consequences of regrets and having many future goals available may reduce older adults' intensity of regret and thereby contribute to a better quality of life. Across both studies, the findings demonstrate that older adults perceived reduced opportunities to undo the consequences of their regrets and that regret intensity predicted a reduced quality of life only among older adults. Furthermore, the findings support the adaptive value of disengagement and available future goals for managing life regrets in older adults.     

Children's understanding of anticipatory regret and disappointment

The anticipation of regret and disappointment plays an important role in decision making by adults. The anticipation of regret may also lead to a desire to avoid feedback about likely outcomes of non-chosen courses of action, while the anticipation of disappointment is associated with avoidance of risk-taking and the deliberate dampening of expectations. The present study used the context of a simple game to examine children's understanding of these anticipatory regret and disappointment emotion-regulation strategies. It was found that even though children 7/8 years of age were able to understand the situational factors that produce disappointment and regret, it was not until 9/10 years of age that children exhibited an understanding of anticipatory regret emotion-regulation strategies, and even at this age children did not exhibit an understanding of the use of dampening of expectations as a strategy for coping with the anticipation of disappointment.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.     

Perceived control of life regrets: good for young and bad for old adults

Age differences in the associations among intensity of regret, control attributions, and intrusive thoughts were investigated (N = 122, age range = 20-87 years). Given that the opportunities to overcome regrettable behavior decline with age, older adults' attributions of low internal control were expected to serve self-protective functions and facilitate deactivation of regret. In younger adults, by contrast, high levels of internal-control attributions might facilitate active change of regrettable behavior, resulting in low intensities of regret. The results showed that internal-control attributions were related to high intensity of regret and intrusive thoughts in older adults. Among younger adults, however, internal-control attributions were associated with low intensity of regret and low levels of intrusive thoughts.     

Testing the Compatibility Test: How Instructions, Accountability, and Anticipated Regret Affect Prechoice Screening of Options

Subjects screened a set of jobs, retaining those for which they wished to apply and rejecting those that were no longer under consideration. In Experiment 1, subjects who indicated the jobs for which they would apply/not apply screened out fewer jobs than those with instructions to reject/not reject or those with instructions simply to screen (control). There were no differences between the reject and control conditions. Experiment 2 used a design similar to that of Experiment 1, but subjects were made accountable for their screening judgments. The reject-apply discrepancy remained, but the accountability manipulation made the subjects more stringent in their screening compared to those who were not accountable for their judgments. In Experiment 3, subjects were told to consider either the regret resulting from retaining a bad option (regret bad) or the regret from rejecting a good option (regret good). Subjects in the regret bad condition rejected more jobs than did subjects in the regret good condition, but not more than subjects in the control condition. As predicted by image theory, the normal screening process appears to be to screen out the bad options rather than screen in the good options. This is demonstrated by screening in the control condition being similar to screening under the reject instructions (Experiment 1) and under regret bad instructions (Experiment 3), since these conditions were shown to focus attention on the bad options. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

The development of regret

In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the unchosen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evidence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional findings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, children's emotions were determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual scenarios.     

Value in the guise of regret

Abstract

According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent‐regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent‐regret. I suggest that the object of agent‐regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention is that agent‐regret is a mode of valuing: a way in which the agent expresses and confers value.     

Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The case of the Dutch postcode lottery

Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may influence decision-making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates and extends these findings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, one’s postcode is the ticket number, and hence even if not participating one may still find out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery influences the level of anticipated post-decisional regret, and moderates the influence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews, confirmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 replicated these findings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not differ with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret influence decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These findings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret research are discussed.     

Using self-generated validity to promote exercise behaviour

Self-generated validity (SGV) refers to the fact that measurement of cognitions can lead to behaviour change. The present research tested to two predictions in relation to SGV: SGV is stronger when supplementing measures of intentions and other components of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) with measures of anticipated regret; SGV is only stronger when measuring anticipated regret before measuring intentions and other components of the TPB. A total of 576 18-22-year-old students were randomly allocated to complete one of three questionnaires in relation to exercise: (1) TPB questionnaire in relation to exercising in a sports centre (TPB only); (2) TPB questionnaire including anticipated regret questions that appear after intention items and are mixed in with other items (TPB + regret mixed); (3) TPB questionnaire with anticipated regret questions first (TPB + regret first). Past use of the sports centre was also measured by self-report in all conditions. Use of the sports centre 4 and 5 weeks later was measured based on objective records. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated no effect of measuring anticipated regret compared to only measuring TPB variables, but a significant effect of measuring anticipated regret first compared to the other two conditions on sports centre use. This effect persisted after controlling for TPB variables and past behaviour (PB). The effect was moderated by intention strength but not PB. Implications for understanding SGV and behaviour change are discussed.     

反事实思维与后悔的关系：调节模式的调节作用

已有研究表明反事实思维越多则后悔越强烈。本研究试图通过两项实验分别探讨特质性、情境性调节模式是否影响反事实思维与后悔之间的关系。结果表明：特质性调节模式及情境性调节模式均对反事实思维与后悔之间的关系具有调节作用,具体来说,针对情境性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微,评估模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越强烈;针对特质性调节模式而言,运动模式下加法式思维越多则后悔越轻微。     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When thinking hurts: Attachment,rumination, and postrelationship adjustment

The current study used an attachment framework to explore postrelationship rumination and adjustment. Young adults (N= 231) involved in a romantic relationship that (a) was of 3 months duration or longer and (b) ended in the last 12 months participated in the study. The study assessed rumination generally (brooding, regret, and reflection), and specifically concerning the ended relationship (relationship preoccupation and romantic regret). At the general level, brooding and regret were associated with more negative adjustment, whereas reflection was associated with more positive adjustment. At the relationship level, both relationship preoccupation and romantic regret were associated with more negative adjustment. Models tested indicated that rumination largely mediated the association between attachment anxiety and adjustment.     

Emotions and preventive health behavior: worry, regret, and influenza vaccination.

The role of worry, regret, and perceived risk in preventive health decisions was explored in a longitudinal questionnaire study on influenza vaccination among 428 university employees. The study yielded 3 main findings. First, ratings of anticipated worry and regret were stronger predictors of vaccination than perceived risk and mediated the effect of risk on vaccination. Second, the anticipated level of emotions differed systematically from experienced emotions, such that vaccinated individuals anticipated more regret and less worry than they actually experienced. Third, anticipated and experienced emotions had implications for subsequent vaccination decisions. Those who did not vaccinate in the 1st year but had high levels of worry and regret were likely to be vaccinated the following year.     

Executive control and the experience of regret

The experience of regret rests on a counterfactual analysis of events. Previous research indicates that regret emerges at around 6 years of age, marginally later than the age at which children begin to answer counterfactual questions correctly. We hypothesized that the late emergence of regret relative to early counterfactual thinking is a result of the executive demands of simultaneously holding in mind and comparing dual representations of reality (counterfactual and actual). To test this hypothesis, we administered two regret tasks along with four tests of executive function (two working memory tasks, a switch task, and an inhibition task) to a sample of 104 4- to 7-year-olds. Results indicated that switching, but not working memory or inhibition, was a significant predictor of whether or not children experienced regret. This finding corroborates and extends previous research showing that the development of counterfactual thinking in children is related to their developing executive competence.