Focused memory search in fact retrieval

Several studies of fact retrieval have shown that the more facts a person learns about a concept, the longer it takes him or her to retrieve any of these facts. This result has been interpreted to mean that retrieval of a fact about a concept involves a search of all facts stored in memory with that concept. In the present study, it is suggested that retrieval involves not an unfocused search of all facts stored with a concept, but rather a focused memory search that examines relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information. This argument is supported by three experiments in which subjects first learned simple facts (e.g., “The banker likes horses”) and then made speeded true-false decisions for test probes le.g., “The banker likes elephants”). Specifically, results suggest that facts stored with a concept may be organized into subsets. For example, a person’s knowledge about Richard Nixon might be organized into subsets concerning Nixon’s resignation, his trips to China, his family, and so on. The data further suggest that a person attempting to retrieve a fact about a concept (e.g., the name of Nixon’s wife) may simply decide which subset is most likely to contain the desired fact (e.g., the subset concerning Nixon’s family) and search that subset. If the sought-for fact is found in this subset, the search process terminates. If, however, the desired information is not located, other subsets of facts may be searched before the retrieval attempt is given up. The notion that memory search focuses on relevant stored facts and ignores irrelevant information may help to explain why experts (i.e., people who know a large number of facts about a topic) do not experience great difficulty in retrieving facts in their areas of expertise.     

Judgment Internalism: an Argument from Self-Knowledge

One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-knowledge of what we desire.     

Interdisziplinarität und Wissensentwicklung

Interdisciplinarity and the Development of Knowledge. The author is engaged in the question how to explain the development of scientific meanings of facts which does not coincide with producing them rather with processes of the scientists' public communication. So long as the facts are adjustable to the conventional theories of those discipline which the researcher belongs to this connection does not reveal perfectly clear. More instructive is a consideration of so-called anomalies. The author demonstrates with an example of the history of science that researchers in case of new phenomena use to borrow concepts from other disciplines for resolving the interpretative problems. It emerges a loose net-work of concepts. In this way the researchers are producing a disciplinary mixed public at the same time. This process is seen as an important phase of the development of new theories and, complementary, new disciplines.     

Ironic effects of drawing attention to story errors

Readers learn errors embedded in fictional stories and use them to answer later general knowledge questions (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003). Suggestibility is robust and occurs even when story errors contradict well-known facts. The current study evaluated whether suggestibility is linked to participants' inability to judge story content as correct versus incorrect. Specifically, participants read stories containing correct and misleading information about the world; some information was familiar (making error discovery possible), while some was more obscure. To improve participants' monitoring ability, we highlighted (in red font) a subset of story phrases requiring evaluation; readers no longer needed to find factual information. Rather, they simply needed to evaluate its correctness. Readers were more likely to answer questions with story errors if they were highlighted in red font, even if they contradicted well-known facts. Although highlighting to-be-evaluated information freed cognitive resources for monitoring, an ironic effect occurred: Drawing attention to specific errors increased rather than decreased later suggestibility. Failure to monitor for errors, not failure to identify the information requiring evaluation, leads to suggestibility.     

Ironic effects of drawing attention to story errors

Readers learn errors embedded in fictional stories and use them to answer later general knowledge questions (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, 2003). Suggestibility is robust and occurs even when story errors contradict well-known facts. The current study evaluated whether suggestibility is linked to participants' inability to judge story content as correct versus incorrect. Specifically, participants read stories containing correct and misleading information about the world; some information was familiar (making error discovery possible), while some was more obscure. To improve participants' monitoring ability, we highlighted (in red font) a subset of story phrases requiring evaluation; readers no longer needed to find factual information. Rather, they simply needed to evaluate its correctness. Readers were more likely to answer questions with story errors if they were highlighted in red font, even if they contradicted well-known facts. Although highlighting to-be-evaluated information freed cognitive resources for monitoring, an ironic effect occurred: Drawing attention to specific errors increased rather than decreased later suggestibility. Failure to monitor for errors, not failure to identify the information requiring evaluation, leads to suggestibility.     

The development of procedural knowledge: An alternative explanation for chronometric trends of mental arithmetic

In a review of the Chronometrie literature, M. H. Ashcraft (Developmental Review, 1982, 2, 213–236) concluded that the development of number fact efficiency is due to a shift from relying on procedural knowledge such as counting to relying on declarative knowledge (a stored network of facts). This model assumes that all procedural processes are slow or remain slow, which is probably not the case. An alternative account posits that the key change in number fact efficiency involves a shift from slow counting procedures to principled procedural knowledge. As rules, heuristics, and principles become more familiar and interconnected, their use, for example, in producing the number facts becomes more automatic. The use of such procedural knowledge would be cognitively more economical than storing individual facts in long-term memory. Finally, existing Chronometric data can readily be interpreted in terms of this alternative model.     

A re-evaluation of story grammars

Black and Wilensky (1979) have made serious methodological errors in analyzing story grammars, and in the process they have committed additional errors in applying formal language theory. Our arguments involve clarifying certain aspects of knowledge representation crucial to a proper treatment of story understanding. Particular criticisms focus on the following shortcomings of their presentation: 1) an erroneous statement from formal language theory, 2) misapplication of formal language theory to story grammars, 3) unsubstantiated and doubtful analogies with English grammar, 4) various non sequiturs concerning the generation of non-stories, 5) a false claim based on the artificial distinction between syntax and semantics, and 6) misinterpretation of the role of story grammars in story understanding. We conclude by suggesting appropriate criteria for the evaluation of story grammars.     

Elementary subtraction

Four experiments examined performance on the 100 "basic facts" of subtraction and found a discontinuous "stair step" function for reaction times and errors beginning with 11 - n facts. Participants' immediate retrospective reports of nonretrieval showed the same pattern in Experiment 3. The degree to which elementary subtraction depends on working memory (WM) was examined in a dual-task paradigm in Experiment 4. The reconstructive processing used with larger basic facts was strongly associated with greater WM disruption, as evidenced by errors in the secondary task: this was especially the case for participants with lower WM spans. The results support the R. S. Siegler and E. Jenkins (1989) distribution of associations model, although discriminating among the alternative solution processes appears to be a serious challenge.     

N400 Effects Reflect Activation Spread During Retrieval of Arithmetic Facts

Arithmetic facts are stored in densely interconnected memory networks, and retrieval errors may occur because activation spreads to associated results. We studied the extension of activation spread by means of the so-called N400 effect of the event-related brain potential (ERP). With semantic stimuli, N400 amplitude has proved to be inversely proportional to the amount of activation that originates from a priming context. ERPs were recorded from 61 scalp positions while 16 subjects verified 600 multiplication problems (a × b = c). The solution to each problem could be correct or incorrect. Incorrect solutions were either table related to one of the operands (e.g., 5 × 8 = 32, 24, or 16) or unrelated (e.g., 5 × 8 = 34, 26, or 18), and were either a small, medium, or large numerical distance from the correct product. Our findings suggest that activation spread in an arithmetic memory network is restricted to numbers that are table related to one of the operands and that are numerically plausible.     

Cognitive Analysis of Children's Mathematics Difficulties

The aim of the study is to investigate the informal and formal mathematical knowledge of children suffering from "mathematics difficulty" (MD). The research involves comparisons among three groups: fourth-grade children performing poorly in mathematics but normal in intelligence; fourth-grade peers matched for intelligence but experiencing no apparent difficulties in mathematics; and a randomly selected group of third graders. These children were individually presented with a large number of tasks designed to measure key mathematical concepts and skills. The findings suggest that: (1) MD children are not seriously deficient in key informal mathematical concepts and skills; (2) MD children seem to have elementary concepts of base ten notation but experience difficulty in related enumeration skills, particularly when large numbers are involved; (3) MD children's calculational errors often result from common error strategies; (4) MD children display severe difficulty in recalling common addition facts; and (5) in the area of problem solving, MD children are capable of "insightful" solutions and can solve simple forms of word problems, but experience difficulty with complex word problems. MD children are in many respects similar to normal, younger peers; an hypothesis of "essential cognitive normality" is advanced. The only and dramatic exception occurs in the area of number facts. While clinical experience corroborates this finding, its explanation is not evident.     

Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.     

Network interference and number-fact retrieval: evidence from children's alphaplication.

The origins of several phenomena of number-fact retrieval were investigated by having children in Grades 3 and 4 memorize alphaplication facts (arithmetic-like memory items composed of letters instead of numbers). Alphaplication performance paralleled memory for arithmetic facts in several important respects: Results showed (a) a large performance advantage for tie (e.g., E, E = j) over nontie problems (E, I = p), (b) that most errors involved answers from the correct alpha-table, (c) that response times and error rates were strongly correlated across problems, (d) that the correct answers to poorly learned problems tended to be the most common error responses, and (e) that performance was lower for problems introduced later in the learning sequence. Taken together, these findings support a network-interference approach (Campbell & Graham, 1985) to memory for arithmetic facts.     

Disentangling the course of epistemic development: parsing knowledge by epistemic content

Over the past three decades, research into the developmental course by means of which persons come to an increasingly mature conception of the knowing process has yielded an highly defracted picture. Despite some concert of opinion about the general bill of particulars, what remains deeply problematic is the increasingly radical disagreement that has arisen regarding the ages at which major milestones in the course of epistemic development are said to be reached. As a way of making some sense of these competing claims, it is argued that the emerging insight that knowledge is ineluctably shaped by those doing the knowing (i.e., that there is an unavoidable “world-to-mind direction of fit” (J.R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) between things in the world and the manner of their understanding) does not arrive in a single piece. Instead, as the data presented here help to illustrate, an appreciation of the constructed character of knowledge more commonly arrives piecemeal and at different ontogenetic moments, the times of which are governed by the place that different objects of knowledge occupy along an envisioned continuum of diverse epistemic contents. On this account, not all “facts of the matter” are ordinarily seen to occupy the same epistemic footing. Rather, some so-called facts are commonly understood to be of an “institutional” sort, where “representational” diversity is early expected and widely tolerated. By contrast, other objects of knowledge are imagined to be more like “brute” facts that, on some less mature readings, fully escape the clutches of subjective opinion. Viewed against the backcloth of this proposed continuum, a developmental sequence hypothesized according to which growing persons first come to view “institutional” facts as humanly constructed before subsequently coming to a similar view about presumptively “brute” facts. To test this hypothesis, 242 young persons were administered a paper and pencil measure of epistemic reasoning (the EDQ). Results strongly support the hypothesis that respondents understood the interpretive nature of beliefs about “institutional” facts at an earlier age than so-called “brute” facts.     

Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified‐to‐generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable‐versus‐idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.     

McEwen-Induced Modulation of Endocrine History: A Partial Review

In endless facets of physiology, there are points of homeostatic balance, such that too much or too litttle of something can both be deleterious (i.e., an "inverse U" pattern). This is particularly true when considering glucocorticoids (GCs), the adrenals steroid secreted during stress. In the first part of this paper, I review a number of realms in which a paucity and an excess of GCs are both damaging. Some findings are classical (for example, concerning GC effects upon body weight), while some are quite recent and have considerable implications for both physiology and pathophysiology (for example, inverse U's of GC actions in the realm of immunity and neuronal survival). The second part of the review considers the far thornier issue of how such inverse U's of GC actions are generated on a cellular and molecular level. One solution that has evolved, primarily in the hippocampus within the nervous system, involves the presence of two different types of receptors for GCs within the same cells; so long as the two receptors have very different affinities and mediate opposing effects on some cellular endpoint, an inverse U will emerge. The second solution, found in a number of peripheral tissues, involves GCs having opposing effects on the amount of some signal being generated (e.g., an immune cytokine) and the sensitivity of target tissues to that signal; under conditions that appear to be physiologically relevant, inverse U's emerge from this pattern as well. The final section of this review considers the enormous role played by Bruce McEwen in the emergence of this literature. I suggest that while much of this obviously has to do with the facts that have come from his group, another substantial contribution is from his steadying and supportive personality, the veritable embodiment of homeostatic balance.     

Treatment of panic attacks using cognitive therapy without exposure or breathing retraining

Cognitive treatment of panic attacks is based on the hypothesis that panic results from the catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations, and that changing such misinterpretations will block the occurrence of panic. The treatment normally involves an integrated set of cognitive and behavioural techniques. In a consecutive series of panic patients, a multiple baseline across subjects design was used to investigate whether a modified form of treatment involving only cognitive procedures could reduce panic attack frequency. The results provide preliminary evidence that cognitive procedures directed at changing misinterpretations of bodily sensations can reduce panic attack frequency, and also that cognitive procedures which do not target misinterpretations may not reduce panic.     

Errors in children's subtraction

Many of the errors that occur in children' subtraction are due to the use of incorrect strategies rather than to the incorrect recall of number facts. A production system is presented for performing written subtraction which is consistent with an earlier analysis of the nature of such a cognitive skill. Most of the incorrect strategies used by schoolchildren can be accounted for in a principled way by simple changes in the production system, such as the omission of individual rules or the inclusion of rules appropriate to other arithmetical tasks. The production system model is evaluated against a corpus of over 1500 subtraction problems done by 10-year olds and is shown to account for about two-thirds of the (nonnumber fact) errors. It also provides an alternative, simpler interpretation of the subtraction errors analysed by Brown and Burton (1978). Some implications for teaching are discussed.     

Comparing the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Response Repetition to Simultaneous Prompting on Acquisition and Maintenance of Multiplication Facts

This study compared the effectiveness and efficiency of an error-correction procedure, response repetition, to a prompting procedure, simultaneous prompting, on the acquisition and maintenance of multiplication facts for three typically developing 3rd grade students. This study employed an adapted alternating treatments design nested in a multiple probe design across three sets of multiplication facts. Results indicated that correct responding increased upon intervention implementation for all participants. For two participants, response repetition was a more effective teaching procedure. For one participant, while both teaching procedures were effective, response repetition was more efficient in terms of sessions to mastery while simultaneous prompting was more efficient in terms of errors and seconds to mastery. Maintenance data were variable. Discussion focuses on conceptual differences between response repetition and simultaneous prompting that might have accounted for results.