The Donor's Dilemma: Recipient's Reactions to Aid from Friend or Foe1

Subjects participating as decision-makers in the Tactical and Negotiations Game experimental simulation encountered a programed emergency and then received an offer of aid from either an ally or an enemy donor. Findings indicate that recipients of aid from an ally donor perceived the donor to be more positively motivated and perceived the aid to reflect greater effort and to be of greater value than recipients of an equal amount of aid from an enemy donor. In addition, aid from an ally precipitated a positive shift in recipient perceptions of the donor and a negative shift in recipient perceptions of the enemy nondonor, while aid from an enemy had essentially no effects. The applied implications of these findings are discussed.     

Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third‐party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third‐party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.     

Victims' Satisfaction With Compensation: Effects of Initial Disadvantage and Third Party Intervention

Two experiments examined the reactions of victims of disadvantage to compensation designed to improve their lot. In Experiment 1, subjects participated in an organizational simulation where they were disadvantaged with respect to their pay. Subsequently, a third party intervened with one of a number of strategies which varied according to whether or not the subjects received compensation and whether or not the person responsible for their disadvantage suffered. The interaction between compensation and suffering was significant on a satisfaction measure and the pattern indicated that subjects were most satisfied when the harmdoer suffered to provide compensation. This interaction was not significant on a measure of perceptions of fairness. Experiment 2 examined the possibility that the intervention of the third party in Experiment 1 may have created feelings of indebtedness. In a similar paradigm, subjects were either disadvantaged by a harmdoer or by external events and received compensation that either was or was not accompanied by a request for repayment. When subjects had been disadvantaged by external events, they were more satisfied and felt more fairly treated when there was an opportunity for reciprocation than when there was not, while the opposite pattern was the case when the harmdoer was responsible for the disadvantage. The results were discussed in the context of the complexity of the receipt of aid phenomenon and possible implications for the design of ameliorative social programs.     

儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响

为了探讨儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响，实验1考察106名幼儿园大班、小学2年级和4年级儿童的道德义愤在年级以及数目和价值不公平分配上的差异；实验2考察57名小学儿童在有无代价条件下，其道德义愤对第三方公正行为的影响。结果表明：儿童的道德义愤呈现随年级增长而不断增强的趋势；儿童由数目不公平分配引发的道德义愤得分显著高于价值不公平分配；幼儿园大班和2年级儿童在数目不公平分配中的道德义愤得分均显著高于价值不公平分配，而4年级儿童在数目和价值不公平分配中的道德义愤得分不存在显著差异；诱发道德义愤的儿童更多地做出第三方公正行为，并且更愿意选择补偿受害者；在不同诱发道德义愤条件下，是否需要付出代价都不会影响儿童的第三方公正行为。研究说明儿童的道德义愤随年级增长而发展，并影响第三方公正行为。     

Blood donation is an act of benevolence rather than altruism.

OBJECTIVES: Blood donation is described as an archetypal altruistic behavior, and recruitment/retention campaigns emphasize altruism. Here, a benevolence hypothesis for blood donation (both the donor and recipient benefit) rather than the altruism hypothesis (only the recipient gains) is proposed. DESIGN: Three United Kingdom-based studies contrasted benevolence and altruism: (a) a 6-month prospective study of blood donor behavior (Study 1: N = 957), (b) a cross-sectional study of blood donors' intentions (Study 2: N = 333), and (c) an experimental study examining the effect of benevolent and altruistic messages on willingness to help across high- and low-cost helping behaviors for committed and noncommitted blood donors (Study 3: N = 200). MAIN OUTCOME: Donor behavior and intentions-willingness. MEASURES: Beliefs in personal and societal benefit (Time 1) and actual donations (Time 2) were assessed in Study 1; beliefs in benevolence, altruism, hedonism, and kinship along with donation intentions were assessed in Study 2; and empathy, donor commitment, and willingness to donate blood, money, fund-raise, and staff a telephone helpline were assessed in Study 3. RESULTS: Beliefs in personal rather than societal benefit predicted actual future donation. A path model showed that only beliefs in benevolence were associated with intentions to donate. Committed blood donors were more willing to donate blood when exposed to a benevolent message rather than an altruistic one. This effect was not observed for other forms of helping. CONCLUSIONS: The benevolence hypothesis is supported, suggesting that blood donor motivation is partly selfish. Blood donation campaigns should focus on benevolent rather than purely altruistic messages.     

Consent Under Pressure: The Puzzle of Third Party Coercion

Coercion by the recipient of consent renders that consent invalid. But what about when the coercive force comes from a third party, not from the person to whom consent would be proffered? In this paper I analyze how threats from a third party affect consent. I argue that, as with other cases of coercion, we should distinguish threats that render consent invalid from threats whose force is too weak to invalidate consent and threats that are legitimate. Illegitimate controlling third party threats render consent invalid just as they do in two party cases. However, knowing that the consent is invalid is not sufficient to tell the recipient of consent what she may or should do. I argue that when presented with a token of consent from someone whom she thinks is experiencing an illegitimate controlling threat, the recipient may act on that token if and only if doing so represents a reasonable joint decision for her and the victim of coercion. The appropriate action for someone faced with third party coercion therefore depends on the other options open to her and those open to the victim of coercion.     

The omission strategy

People are more willing to bring about morally objectionable outcomes by omission than by commission. Similarly, people condemn others less harshly when a moral offense occurs by omission rather than by commission, even when intentions are controlled. We propose that these two phenomena are related, and that the reduced moral condemnation of omissions causes people to choose omissions in their own behavior to avoid punishment. We report two experiments using an economic game in which one participant (the taker) could take money from another participant (the owner) either by omission or by commission. We manipulated whether or not a third party had the opportunity to punish the taker by reducing the taker's payment. Our results indicated that the frequency of omission increases when punishment is possible. We conclude that people choose omissions to avoid condemnation and that the omission effect is best understood not as a bias, but as a strategy.     

Effects of decision-making on reactions to an evaluational stressor

The present study tested the hypothesis that an opportunity to make decisions enhances perceived control. This hypothesis predicts that decision-making will reduce the adverse effects of stress. Subjects worked on an intellectual task and their stress reactions were assessed using subjective and behavioral measures. Decision-making improved the highly anxious subjects' persistence with the task. This finding supports the hypothesis. However, less anxious subjects persisted less after being allowed to make decisions. Several explanations positing possible cognitive and motivational processes of the less anxious subjects are offered.     

The bystander effect in an N-person dictator game

Dozens of studies show that bystanders are less likely to help victims as bystander number increases. However, these studies model one particular situation, in which victims need only one helper. Using a multi-player dictator game, we study a different but common situation, in which a recipient’s welfare increases with the amount of help, and donors can share the burden of helping. We find that dictators transfer less when there are more dictators, and recipients earn less when there are multiple dictators. This effect persisted despite mechanisms eliminating uncertainty about other dictators’ behavior (a strategy method and communication). In a typical public goods game, people seem to transform the situation into an assurance game, willing to contribute if certain others will too. Despite similarities, people do not treat a recipient’s welfare like a public good. Instead, people seem to transform the situation into a prisoner’s dilemma, refusing to help whatever others do.     

A Comparison of Help Giving to Individuals Versus Humanitarian Organizations1

The theories of social conduct, seriousness of need, and similarity; cost–benefit models; and individual differences in ideology are used to predict self‐reported help giving that is interpersonal or through humanitarian organizations. The results indicate that persons tend to be more helpful interpersonally than through organizations, are more responsive to characteristics of the needy when helping interpersonally than through organizations, and have stronger affective responses toward individuals than toward individuals represented by organizations. For both interpersonal and organization‐mediated assistance, perceived benefit to the donor strongly predicts help giving. Relatively conservative persons report less helpfulness, both interpersonally and through humanitarian organizations. Collectively, these findings offer an integrative approach to help giving and have implications for fundraising in the humanitarian sector.     

Fairness in Children's Resource Allocation Depends on the Recipient

ABSTRACT— Sixty-six children between 4.5 and 6 years of age were tested in a resource-allocation game with three different recipients. When the recipient was a friend, children made equitable decisions and shared as much when there was a cost to themselves as when there was no cost. When the recipient was another familiar child who was not a friend, children were less likely to allocate resources to that child. When the recipient was a stranger, children allocated resources as much as with a friend and more than with a nonfriend when there was no cost to themselves. However, when there was a cost to themselves, children treated strangers like nonfriends. These results show that resource-allocation decisions made by young children depend on the recipient. Young children prefer equitable division of resources with friends, treat nonfriends less well, and make prosocial moves with strangers when the cost to self is not high.     

Cultural Aid and Jewish Identity in Post-Communist Hungary

This paper is based on current research which is concerned with the revival of religious and ethnic identity among Jews in Hungary after the collapse of communism. Several non-governmental institutions, groups and individuals from various countries, but especially Israel, the UK and the USA, are involved in the revitalization and transformation of Jewish life in the areas of education, ethnicity, religion and social welfare. I examine the complex relationship between emigre donors, often from an Hungarian background, and local Hungarian Jews, to show how cultural aid is accepted, transformed and sometimes resisted. Such aid is not uni-directional from donor to recipient. Rather, it may require the donors to modify their goals; to realize that their assessment of Hungarian needs may be based on anachronistic attitudes. The impact of the recipients on the donors is such that reciprocal change occurs between the two parties.     

Intergroup contact: The typical member and the exception to the rule

Three studies examined the role of the perceived typicalness of an out-group member on her effectiveness in improving evaluations of her group. Subjects were students at two adjacent colleges. In the first study they interacted with a member of the out-group college. The interaction was either pleasant or unpleasant, and the contact person either confirmed or disconfirmed several stereotypes of the out-group (typicalness manipulation). Subjects evaluated the out-group most favorably when they interacted with the typical-pleasant member of the out-group. The second study demonstrated that contact with a highly typical member is not beneficial if her typicalness is based on stereotypes that reflect negatively on the subject's in-group. Several explanations of the typicalness findings were considered in a third study. Support was found for the hypothesis that the more typical member is perceived to be more predictive of the personality and actions of other out-group members.     

Effect of depression level and length of acquaintance on reactions of others to a request for help

This experiment examined an interpersonal-process view of depression by assessing subjects' reactions to a request for help from a hypothetical depressed or nondepressed person with whom they had been acquainted for a relatively short (2 weeks) or long (1 year) period of time. Subjects responded to each of the four hypothetical persons by indicating their probable affective reactions to the request, the number of minutes they would be willing to help, their desire for future social contact with the hypothetical person, and their expectations of future requests for help. Requests from depressed persons elicited significantly more anger and social rejection but equal amounts of concern and willingness to help. This mixed response pattern was interpreted as providing partial support for an interpersonal-process view of depression. In addition a path analysis provided limited support for Coyne's (1976b) hypothesis that rejection of depressed persons results from the negative mood they induce in others.     

Women's Reactions to Rape Victims: Motivational Processes Associated With Blame and Social Support1

A study was conducted with 128 female college students to test the hypothesis that when observers feel vulnerable to rape, they are more likely to blame a rape victim³ and are less willing to offer social support. Similarity and empathy were expected to moderate the effects of perceived vulnerability on blame and predict greater social support. Assumptions about the world were predicted to be associated with greater blame. A multivariate model was tested with structural equation modeling techniques. Perceived vulnerability did not directly or indirectly predict blame. However, similarity directly predicted less blame and indirectly predicted greater social support through associations with blame, perceived vulnerability, and empathy. World assumptions directly predicted greater blame and indirectly predicted less social support through blame. These findings suggest that blame and social support are interrelated processes which are associated with social observers' perceptions of the victim and their basic assumptions about the world.     

Acting knowingly: effects of the agent's awareness of an opportunity on causal attributions

According to difference-based (e.g. counterfactual/covariational) models of causal judgement, the epistemic state of the agent should not affect judgements of cause. Four experiments examined opportunity chains in which a physical event (distal cause) enabled a subsequent proximal cause to produce an outcome. All four experiments showed that when the proximal cause was a human action, it was judged as more causal if the agent was aware of his opportunity than if he was not or if the proximal cause was a physical event. The first two experiments showed that these preferences could not be explained in terms of differences in perceived conditional probability (whether from the observer's or the agent's point of view), social controllability or perceptions of the causal sequence as forming a single unit. The third experiment showed that awareness affected the perceived deliberateness with which the action brought the outcome about but not its perceived voluntariness. The fourth experiment showed that when the outcome was intended, the perceived deliberateness of the agent's action was a plausible mediator of the effect of awareness of opportunity on causal preference. We conclude that awareness of the opportunity allows inferences about the deliberate production of the outcome when the action is voluntary, which in turn influence causal judgements.     

An application of the foot in the door technique to organ donation

The extent to which the size of an initial request related to organ donation could be reduced when using the foot-in-the-door technique was investigated. After being asked to comply with an initial request to complete a questionnaire related to organ donation having either 5, 10, 15, or 20 items or not being asked to complete the questionnaire, subjects indicated their willingness to become an organ donor. In addition to replicating earlier research, the results indicated that the original 20-item questionnaire could be reduced to five items without losing its effectiveness to increase willingness to become an organ donor when compared to the no-request condition. The implications of the foot-in-the-door technique for medical volunteering in general and suggestions for future research are also discussed.     

Judgements of compensation for misfortune: The role of expectation

In three questionnaire studies, we asked subjects how much compensation should be provided, by a third party, to an accident victim. We tested the hypothesis, derived from norm theory, that compensation would be greater when the injury was less to be expected, e.g. when the injury was caused by failure - as opposed to success - of a safety routine. To rule out the possibility that such expectation effects depended on subjects' anticipations of the reactions of the parties involved in the accident. the parties were said to be ignorant of factors that could affect these reactions. Effects of expectation were still found, even when subjects themselves judged the accident to be equally serious in all conditions. Information about what would have happened in the absence of the cause (e.g. if the routine had succeeded instead of failed) affected compensation. as predicted by norm theory, but expectation effects were found even when this information about counterfactuals was held constant, so norm theory cannot account for all the results. We suggest that subjects are applying simple heuristics unreflectively Subjects may also have attempted to fulfil an implicit social contract through their awards. The results cannot be explained through the hypothesis that compensation was optimal: the accident was the same, and it had no deterrent effect, so optimal compensation should be the same in all cases.     

Determinants of the perception of choice

Two experiments were conducted to investigate possible determinants of perceived choice. The first experiment employed an observer paradigm and the second employed an actor paradigm. The results of both studies provided evidence for the hypotheses that perceived choice will be greater when there is a small difference in attractiveness between outcome alternatives than when there is a large difference and under conditions of low certainty about the attractiveness of each outcome alternative than under conditions of high certainty. Also, the results of both studies provided some evidence for the hypothesis that the effect of the relative difference in attractiveness upon perceived choice will be greater under conditions of low certainty than under conditions of high certainty. The hypothesis that perceived choice will be less when there is no difference in attractiveness between outcome alternatives than when there is a small difference was not supported by the results of the first experiment but was supported by the results of the second experiment. The hypothesis that perceived choice will be greater the more time a person takes to select an action from possible actions was supported by results of the first experiment but not by those of the second experiment. The results for the relative difference and certainty variables were discussed in terms of a theoretical analysis of perceived choice.