The self-protective altruist: terror management and the ambivalent nature of prosocial behavior

Three studies examined the hypothesis that mortality salience (MS) will increase prosocial behaviors when the prosocial cause promotes terror management processes. However, when the prosocial cause interferes with these processes, MS will reduce prosocial behavior. In Study 1, following a MS procedure, participants indicated their willingness to donate money to charity or to donate to an organ donation organization. In Study 2, a research assistant randomly distributed fliers with reminders of death or back pain, and another research assistant solicited participants' assistance from either a charitable fund booth or an organ donation booth. Study 3 examined the impact of MS on helping a wheelchair-bound confederate or a walking confederate. The results indicated that MS increased charitable donations and increased help to a walking confederate. However, MS significantly decreased organ donation card signings and decreased help to a wheelchair-bound confederate. The discussion examines the tension between personal fear and worldview validation.     

On the nonassociative nature of working memory

Rats were trained in an eight-arm radial maze in two experiments. A “fixed set” of four arms, randomly selected and sequenced, was assigned to each rat. The fixed set was always presented in the same order. Each training trial began with rewarded forced choices of the four arms in the fixed set. The trial concluded with a free-choice test among all eight arms after a delay of about 40 min; choices of the four arms not in the fixed set were rewarded. The degree to which the identities and order of the arms in the fixed set had been learned was assessed in a reversal test. The four arms that were not in the fixed set were presented at the beginning of the reversal test trial; after the usual delay a free-choice test was given, but choices of arms in the fixed set were rewarded. In both experiments, the rats showed no negative transfer in the reversal test. Moreover, sequences of postdelay choices during training varied across days, and the sequence of choices during the reversal test did not match the sequence of arms in the fixed set. The rats therefore learned little if anything about the identities and the order of arms in the fixed set in spite of the consistencies between trials and the maintenance of the fixed set in memory for 40 min within trials. The finding is congruent with the view of working memory as nonassociative.     

On the differential nature of implicit and explicit memory

In this article, we report two experiments that provide further evidence concerning the differential nature of implicit and explicit memory. In Experiment 1, subjects first undertook a sentenceverification task. While carrying out this task, half of the subjects were also required to carry out a secondary processing task involving tone monitoring. Twenty-four hours later, the subjects’ memory for target items in the sentence-verification task was tested explicitly by means of a recognition task and implicitly by examining the extent to which the items primed fragment completion. Recognition performance was significantly impaired by the imposition of secondary processing demands during the original learning phase. In contrast, fragment completion was completely unaffected by this additional processing, even though substantial priming was observed. In Experiment 2, we examined whether priming in fragment completion is influenced by the nature of repetition during initial learning. Subjects studied a list of target items that were each repeated twice. Halfthe items were repeatedimmediately (lag 0) and halfwere repeated after six intervening items (lag 6). Memory for the itemswas assessed by recognition and by priming in fragment completion. Recognition was affected by lag, with lag 6 items being recognized better than lag 0 items. However, although significant priming was obtained, the extent of this priming was uninfluenced by lag. These data indicate two additional dimensions along which implicit and explicit memory differ and, furthermore, they support recent conceptualizations of processing differences underlying these two forms of memory.     

On the nature of associative information in recognition memory

In a typical associative-recognition task, participants must distinguish between intact word pairs (both words previously studied together) and rearranged word pairs (both words previously studied but as part of different pairs). The familiarity of the individual items on this task is uninformative because all of the items were seen before, so the only way to solve the task is to rely on associative information. Prior research suggests that associative information is recall-like in nature and may therefore be an all-or-none variable. The present research reports several experiments in which some pairs were strengthened during list presentation. The resulting hit rates and false alarm rates, and an analysis of the corresponding receiver operating characteristic plots, suggest that participants rely heavily on item information when making an associative-recognition decision (to no avail) and that associative information may be best thought of as a some-or-none variable.     

On the nature of the verbal memory deficit in Alzheimer''s disease

Verbal memory was investigated in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) with previously documented deficits in word production and comprehension. Procedures were employed to evaluate word recall and recognition within the context of both "multistore" and "levels of processing" models of memory. In addition, memory abilities were evaluated with respect to performance on measures of verbal fluency and language comprehension. As expected, the AD patients performed significantly worse than normal individuals on all tasks. However, in each experiment their pattern of recall across conditions was found to be qualitatively similar to that produced by normal subjects. It was argued that the memory impairment associated with Alzheimer's disease may be largely due to an inability to encode a sufficient number of stimulus features or attributes. Furthermore, this encoding deficit includes, but is not limited to, semantic attributes. Similarities between the performance of the AD patients and reported findings with Korsakoff patients and normal subjects with "weak" memory were discussed.     

On the categorical nature of the semantic interference effect in the picture-word interference paradigm

Two picture-word interference experiments are reported in which the boundaries of the semantic interference effect are explored. In both experiments, participants named pictures (e.g., a picture of a car) that appeared with superimposed word distractors. Distractor words from the same semantic category as the word for the picture (e.g., CAR) produced semantic interference, whereas semantically related distractors from a different category (e.g.,Bumper) led to semantic facilitation. In Experiment 2, the semantic facilitation from semantically related distractors was replicated. These results indicate that a semantic relationship between picture and distractor does not necessarily lead to interference and in fact can lead to facilitation. In all but one case tested until now, a semantic relationship between picture and distractor has led to semantic facilitation. The implications of these results for the assumption that the semantic interference effect arises as a consequence of lexical competition are discussed.     

The structure of semantic person memory: evidence from semantic priming in person recognition

This paper reviews research on the structure of semantic person memory as examined with semantic priming. In this experimental paradigm, a familiarity decision on a target face or written name is usually faster when it is preceded by a related as compared to an unrelated prime. This effect has been shown to be relatively short lived and susceptible to interfering items. Moreover, semantic priming can cross stimulus domains, such that a written name can prime a target face and vice versa. However, it remains controversial whether representations of people are stored in associative networks based on co-occurrence, or in more abstract semantic categories. In line with prominent cognitive models of face recognition, which explain semantic priming by shared semantic information between prime and target, recent research demonstrated that priming could be obtained from purely categorically related, non-associated prime/target pairs. Although strategic processes, such as expectancy and retrospective matching likely contribute, there is also evidence for a non-strategic contribution to priming, presumably related to spreading activation. Finally, a semantic priming effect has been demonstrated in the N400 event-related potential (ERP) component, which may reflect facilitated access to semantic information. It is concluded that categorical relatedness is one organizing principle of semantic person memory.     

On the nature of nonverbal working memory fractionation: a case of selective spatial short-term memory deficit in a child

Several lines of research on adult subjects demonstrate a visual/spatial fractionation of nonverbal working memory (WM), while behavioral studies on normal children support the idea of a static/dynamic distinction. In the present paper, we report a child (Z.M.) who failed on nonverbal WM tasks. To verify the nature of his defect, we carried out two experiments: in Experiment 1, Z.M. failed on spatial WM tasks but not on visual WM tasks and was not affected by the static/dynamic format of stimulus presentation; in Experiment 2, this visual/spatial dissociation was extended to the imagery domain. These results are best accounted for within the visual/spatial fractionation of WM and confirmed the role of WM in mental imagery. Clinical and rehabilitative implications of the present findings are also discussed.     

On the nature of the decision axis in signal-detection-based models of recognition memory

Most models of recognition memory involve a signal-detection component in which a criterion is placed along a decision axis. Older models generally assume a familiarity-decision axis, but newer models often assume a likelihood ratio axis instead because it allows for a more natural account of the ubiquitous mirror effect. In 3 experiments reported here, item strength was differentially manipulated to see whether a mirror effect would occur. Within a list, the items from 1 category were strengthened by repetition, but the items from another category were not. On the subsequent recognition test, the hit rate was higher for the strong category, but the false-alarm rates for the weak and strong categories were the same (i.e., no mirror effect was observed). This result suggests that the decision axis represents a familiarity scale and that participants adopt a single decision criterion that they maintain throughout the recognition test.     

The nature of perceived authority in the milgram paradigm: Two replications

Thirty-eight college students watched a short, edited version of Milgram’s documentary film, Obedience. They were then randomly assigned to one of two responseconditions: A Choice condition, in which they chose one of six explanations for the compliance of a subject depicted in the film, or a Likelihood condition, where they used a Likert-type scale to indicate the likelihood that each explanation elicited the subject’s compliance. The six explanations were based on French and Raven’s (1959) constructs regarding the bases of social power. We found that expert and legitimate power were judged as the most likely explanations in both conditions, replicating the findings of an earlier study that had used a different response format, i.e. rankordering the explanations, and thereby verifying the generality and robustness of the phenomenon.     

The nature of perceived authority in the milgram paradigm: Two replications

Thirty-eight college students watched a short, edited version of Milgram’s documentary film, Obedience. They were then randomly assigned to one of two responseconditions: A Choice condition, in which they chose one of six explanations for the compliance of a subject depicted in the film, or a Likelihood condition, where they used a Likert-type scale to indicate the likelihood that each explanation elicited the subject’s compliance. The six explanations were based on French and Raven’s (1959) constructs regarding the bases of social power. We found that expert and legitimate power were judged as the most likely explanations in both conditions, replicating the findings of an earlier study that had used a different response format, i.e. rankordering the explanations, and thereby verifying the generality and robustness of the phenomenon.     

Using contextual analysis to investigate the nature of spatial memory

The present study investigated the properties of episodic spatial memory by conducting contextual analysis on spatial memory tasks in a large sample of individuals (N = 778) between the ages of 18 and 92. The results suggest that episodic spatial memory as measured by a dot location task is not uniquely influenced by memory but is strongly influenced by fluid ability (Gf). The spatial memory–Gf relationship is evident and robust even when spatial memory is operationalized with a very simple single-dot location task, suggesting that allocation of attention across space may play a role in the relationship. Results also indicate that the spatial memory–Gf relations are not dependent on complexity of processing, because Gf has a similar magnitude of relations with a more complex version of the dot location task. Collectively, the results suggest that spatial memory likely represents some aspect of fluid intelligence and is not uniquely related to measures of verbal memory.     

Individual differences in susceptibility to false memory in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

The authors addressed whether individual differences in the working memory capacity (WMC) of young adults influence susceptibility to false memories for nonpresented critical words in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott associative list paradigm. The results of 2 experiments indicated that individuals with greater WMC recalled fewer critical words than individuals with reduced WMC when participants were forewarned about the tendency of associative lists (e.g., bed, rest, . . .) to elicit illusory memories for critical words (e.g., sleep). In contrast, both high and low WMC participants used repeated study-test trials to reduce recall of critical words. These findings suggest that individual differences in WMC influence cognitive control and the ability to actively maintain task goals in the face of interfering information or habit.     

On the automatic nature of the task-appropriate processing effect in event-based prospective memory

This research tested competing predictions about the cognitive processes underlying the task-appropriate processing effect in prospective memory. Participants had to press a designated key whenever a word from the semantic category of animals or from the structural category of palindromes occurred in an ongoing lexical decision task. The availability of attentional resources was manipulated by varying the effort to the ongoing task in terms of speed or accuracy. In the task-appropriate semantic prospective memory task, performance was robust against the speed versus accuracy instructions. In the task-inappropriate structural prospective memory task, performance declined under speed instructions that detracted attentional resources. Accordingly, a facilitating effect of task-appropriate processing was observed under speed instructions but not accuracy instructions. The results support the notion that the task-appropriate processing effect is due to a larger contribution of automatic cue detection to prospective memory performance under task-appropriate than task-inappropriate conditions.     

Cognitive load and person memory: the role of perceived group variability

Two studies investigated the effects of cognitive busyness and group variability on participants' memory for stereotype‐related information. In Study 1, participants formed an impression of an experimentally created group that was either homogeneous or heterogeneous in composition. While learning about the group, half of the participants were made cognitively busy, the others were not. The results supported our prediction that stereotypical efforts on memory are moderated by both the availability of processing resources and the variability of the target group under consideration. Under optimal processing circumstances, participants' recollections were dominated by the perceived variability of the group in question. That is, participants displayed preferential recall for stereotype‐consistent information when they believed the group to be homogeneous in composition, but a tendency to recall more stereotype‐inconsistent information when they considered the group to be heterogeneous in nature. Under sub‐optimal processing conditions, however, a different pattern emerged. Now, participants preferentially recalled stereotype‐consistent information regardless of the perceived variability of the group. These results were largely replicated in Study 2 when the perceived variability of a real social group was manipulated. We consider the implications of these findings for contemporary theories of stereotyping. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to measure working memory capacity in the change detection paradigm

Although the measurement of working memory capacity is crucial to understanding working memory and its interaction with other cognitive faculties, there are inconsistencies in the literature on how to measure capacity. We address the measurement in the change detection paradigm, popularized by Luck and Vogel (Nature, 390, 279-281, 1997). Two measures for this task-from Pashler (Perception & Psychophysics, 44, 369-378, 1988) and Cowan (The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-114, 2001), respectively-have been used interchangeably, even though they may yield qualitatively different conclusions. We show that the choice between these two measures is not arbitrary. Although they are motivated by the same underlying discrete-slots working memory model, each is applicable only to a specific task; the two are never interchangeable. In the course of deriving these measures, we discuss subtle but consequential flaws in the underlying discrete-slots model. These flaws motivate revision in the modal model and capacity measures.     

Decision moving window: using interactive eye tracking to examine decision processes

It has become increasingly more important for researchers to better capture the complexities of making a decision. To better measure cognitive processes such as attention during decision making, we introduce a new methodology: the decision moving window, which capitalizes on both mouse-tracing and eye-tracking methods. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this methodology in a probabilistic inferential decision task where we reliably measure attentional processing during decision making while allowing the person to determine how information is acquired. We outline the advantages of this methodological paradigm and how it can advance both decision-making research and the development of new metrics to capture cognitive processes in complex tasks.     

Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm

Understanding how memory processes contribute to the conscious experience of memory is central to contemporary cognitive psychology. Recently, many investigators (e.g., Gardiner, 1988) have examined theremember-know paradigm to understand the conscious correlates of recognition memory. A variety of studies have demonstrated that variables have different effects on remember and know responses, and these findings have been interpreted in the context of dual-process models of recognition memory. This paper presents a single-process model of the remember-know paradigm, emphasizing the dependence of remember and know judgments on a set of common underlying processes (e.g., criterion setting). We use this model to demonstrate how a single-process model can give rise to the functional dissociations presented in the remember-know literature. We close by detailing procedures for testing our model and describing how those tests may facilitate the development of dual-process models.