Experience,action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision

This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing.

Sensibility and the otherness of the world: Levinas and Merleau-Ponty

Sensibility has traditionally been defined as a relation with the world’s exteriority. However, a certain post-husserlian phenomenology tends to reverse this definition and to redefine sensibility as an internal relation that takes place from within the world. This article focuses on this phenomenological concept of “sensibility” in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty and intends to show that this concept rests upon the presupposition of an alternative according to which we would have whether a sensible experience of identity, or an acosmic experience of otherness—whether a wordly experience of the same or a worldless experience of otherness. Yet, by reducing sensibility to the experience of the world’s interiority and rejecting otherness beyond any worldly experience, this conception fails to account for a significant dimension of sensibility—namely, sensibility as the experience of the world’s own otherness, foreignness or exteriority. It is our hope that, from the critical exposition of this alternative, will eventually appear in conclusion the significant part of this forgotten dimension of sensibility.

     

In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on enactive experience

Abstact In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands is discussed, with an overview of the papers presented in this volume.     

Recognising faces: effects of lighting direction, inversion, and brightness reversal.

When information about three-dimensional shape obtained from shading and shadows is ambiguous, the visual system favours an interpretation of surface geometry which is consistent with illumination from above. If pictures of top-lit faces are rotated the resulting stimulus is both figurally inverted and illuminated from below. In this study the question of whether the effects of figural inversion and lighting orientation on face recognition are independent or interactive is addressed. Although there was a clear inversion effect for faces illuminated from the front and above, the inversion effect was found to be reduced or eliminated for faces illuminated from below. A strong inversion effect for photographic negatives was also found but in this case the effect was not dependent on the direction of illumination. These findings are interpreted as evidence to suggest that lighting faces from below disrupts the formation of surface-based representations of facial shape.     

The enactive approach and disorders of the self - the case of schizophrenia

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in...     

Merleau-Ponty,Marx, and Marxism: The problem of history

At the present time, Europe, particularly eastern Europe, is still immersed in a major political transformation, the most significant such change since the Second World War, arising out of the rejection of official Marxism. This unforeseen rejection requires meditation by all those concerned with the relation of philosophy to the historical context. Marxism, that follows Marx’s insistence on the link between a theory and the context in which it arises, cannot be indifferent to the rejection of Marxist theory in practice. In respect to the usual tendency to pass rapidly over practice for a theoretical analysis of social theory, Merleau-Ponty stands out for his concern to evaluate the theoretical claims of Marx and Marxism against practice.     

Body and Language: Butler,Merleau-Ponty and Lyotard on the Speaking Embodied Subject

In this article three viewpoints on the relation of body and language are discussed: the poststructuralist viewpoint of Judith Butler, the phenomenological viewpoint of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the postmodernist viewpoint of Jean-François Lyotard. The reason juxtaposing for these three accounts is twofold. First, the topic requires a combination of post-structuralist and phenomenological insights, and second, the accounts are supplementary. Butler's account raises questions that can be answered with the help of Merleau-Ponty's work. Lyotard's anthropology of the inhuman offers a perspective of finitude that is missing in the other two. The aim of the article is to outline the necessary ingredients of an adequate conception of the speaking embodied subject.     

Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making,bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds.     

Face to face with an enactive approach: A sensorimotor account of face detection and recognition

The enactive approach to perception describes experience as a temporally extended activity of skillful engagement with the environment. This paper pursues this view and focuses on prosopagnosia both for the light that the theory can throw on the phenomenon, and for the critical light the phenomenon can throw on the theory. I argue that the enactive theory is insufficient to characterize the unique nature of experience specific to prosopagnosic subjects. There is a distinct difference in the overall process of detection (with respect to eye movement sequence) of familiar and unfamiliar faces in prosopagnosia; in contrast, normal subjects use the same scanning strategy when exploring both kinds of faces despite an obvious difference in qualitative character. In light of this limitation I outline a supplemental view basing sensorimotor contingencies upon the establishment and reaffirmation of regularities within the organism as it engages with the environment.     

Art, dreams and active imagination: a post-Jungian approach to transference and the image

The term active imagination is sometimes applied rather uncritically to describe all forms of creative activity that take place in depth psychology. Whilst there are many forms of expression that evoke or are evoked by active imagination, they cannot automatically be classed as active imagination. In this article investigation of visualized mental imagery, dreams and art reveals three distinct forms of image-based psychological activity. Integrated and mediated within the transference and countertransference dynamic, it is proposed that the engagement in active imagination reflects and is influenced by the transference. Distinctions between sign and symbol, simple and big dreams as well as diagrammatic and embodied imagery clarify the differences. Examples from clinical practice demonstrate each mode in action within the analytic frame.     

Shades of the mirror effect: Recognition of faces with and without sunglasses

A mirror effect was found for a stimulus manipulation introduced at test. When subjects studied a set of normal faces and then were tested with new and old faces that were normal or wearing sunglasses, the hit rate was higher and the false alarm rate was lower for normal faces. Hit rate differences were reflected in remember and sure recognition responses, whereas differences in false alarm rates were largely seen in know and unsure judgments. In contrast, when subjects studied faces wearing sunglasses, the hit rate was greater for test faces with sunglasses than for normal faces, but there was no difference in false alarm rates. These findings are problematic for single-factor theories of the mirror effect, but can be accommodated within a two-factor account.     

Regional variation in the inversion effect for faces: differential effects for feature shape, feature configuration, and external contour

Faces are perceived via an orientation-dependent expert mechanism. We previously showed that inversion impaired perception of the spatial relations of features more in the lower face than in the (more salient) upper face, suggests a failure to rapidly process this type of structural data from the entire face. In this study we wished to determine if this interaction between inversion and regional salience, which we consider a marker for efficient whole-face processing, was specific to second-order (coordinate) spatial relations or also affected other types of structural information in faces. We used an oddity paradigm to test the ability of seventeen subjects to discriminate changes in feature size, feature spatial relations, and external contour in both the upper and lower face. We also tested fourteen subjects on perception of two different types of spatial relations: second-order changes that create plausible alternative faces, and illegal spatial changes that transgress normal rules of facial geometry. In both experiments we examined for asymmetries between upper-face and lower-face perceptual accuracy with brief stimulus presentations. While all structural changes were less easily discerned in inverted faces, only changes to spatial relations showed a marked asymmetry between the upper and lower face, with far worse performance in the mouth region. Furthermore, this asymmetry was found only for second-order spatial relations and not illegal spatial changes. These results suggest that the orientation-dependent face mechanism has a rapid whole-face processing capacity specific to the internal second-order (coordinate) spatial relations of facial features.     

"Solar love": Nietzsche,Merleau-Ponty and the fortunes of perception

Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty repudiate the mirror view of perception and embrace what Nietzsche refers to as solar love or creative perception. I argue that Merleau-Ponty thinks of this type of perception primarily in terms of convergence and Nietzsche in terms of divergence. I then show how, contrary to their own emphases, Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh and Nietzsche's idea of chaos suggest that convergence and divergence are abstractions from an ontologically prior realm of hybrid perceptions. In this realm, each perception is shot through with the others, simultaneously inside and outside one another. The creative tension among these perceptions continually produces new perspectives or voices, that is, a realm whose very being is metamorphosis. Moreover, this realm of hybrid perceptions suggests a political principle that might prove attractive for communities in an age of diversity and cultural hybridity.     

Holistic processing of shape cues in face identification: Evidence from face inversion,composite faces,and acquired prosopagnosia

According to a classical functional architecture of face processing (Bruce & Young, 1986), sex processing on faces is a parallel function to individual face recognition. One consequence of the model is thus that sex categorization on faces is not influenced by face familiarity. However, the behavioural and neuro-psychological evidences supporting this dissociation are yet equivocal. To test the independence between sex processing on faces and familiar face recognition, familiar (learned) faces were morphed with new faces, generating facial continua of visual similarity to familiar faces. First, a pilot experiment shown that subjects familiarized with one extreme of the face continuum roughly perceive one half of the continuum (60 to 100% of visual similarity to familiar faces) as made of familiar faces and the other part as unfamiliar. In the experiment proper, subjects were familiarized with faces and tested in a sex decision task made on faces at the different steps of the continua. Subjects were significantly quicker at telling the sex of faces perceived as familiar (60-100%), and the effect was not observed in a control (untrained) group. These results indicate that familiar face representations are activated before sex categorization is completed, and can facilitate this processing. The nature of the interaction between sex categorization on faces and familiar face recognition is discussed.     

Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind

Abstract

McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer look at the prima facie puzzling asymmetry dissolves the apparent disagreement and reveals a deeper agreement concerning both the nature and the origin of the problems haunting the Cartesian picture in question. Both McDowell and Merleau-Ponty argue that on the picture of the relation of between mind and world in question, we lose our grip on the very idea of a perceptual appearance. Furthermore, the two authors regard a certain conception of nature as conceived in the image of science, as one of the crucial elements in making the picture of the mind in question look attractive.     

A Respectful World: Merleau-Ponty and the Experience of Depth

The everyday experience of someone, or something, getting in one’s face reveals a depth that is the difference between a world that is intrusive and a world that is respectful. This depth, I argue, should be conceived, not in feet and inches, but in terms of violation and honor. I explore three factors that contribute to this depth’s emergence. First, I examine our body’s capacity, at the level of sense experience, for giving the world a figure/ground structure; this structure insures that most of the world we are in constant contact with, nonetheless, keeps its distance as background. I demonstrate the importance of this figure/ground structure to the depth of our world by considering the experience of people with autism; for those with autism, this structure seems to be, if not entirely missing, at least substantially less robust than our own. Next, I examine our body’s ability, at the level of more personal experience, to handle the world; our handling of the world, which rests on the acquisition of specific skills, transforms things that could easily assault us into the usually motionless objects we tend to take for granted. I demonstrate the importance of these skills to the depth of our world by considering the experience of Gregg Mozgalla; until recently, Mozgalla, who has cerebral palsy, could only “lurch,” rather than walk, through the world. Finally, I draw on the work of the artist Mierle Ukeles to examine the maintenance work that other people, at a broader social level, perform; other’s maintenance work keeps in good condition a world that, by falling into bad condition, could easily intrude on us.