Ignatius of Loyola,Jonathan Edwards,and Indifference

The aim of this paper is threefold: First, I provide a brief account of Ignatian indifference as contained in the Spiritual Exercises. I distinguish between two senses of ‘indifference’ and apply them to an imaginary Regina who is faced with the decision about whether to give an inheritance to UNICEF or use the funds to finance her daughter’s college education. Second, I argue that Jonathan Edwards’s polemic, in Freedom of the Will, against Isaac Watts’s account of indifference, is open to the ‘straw man objection’ when applied to the Ignatian concept. Finally, I put forth a Kantian based critique of Ignatian indifference. I claim that while indifference is a logically consistent notion it may very well be psychologically problematic. If it is an open question whether Regina can ever know with certainty that she has acted from the pure motive of duty, then it is also an open question whether she can ‘find’ herself indifferent in the Ignatian senses of the term.     

Honoring Jonathan Edwards

In this response to the papers on Jonathan Edwards's ethical thought by Stephen A. Wilson, Gerald R. McDermott, William C. Spohn, and Roland A. Delattre, I comment on their efforts to show that ideas drawn from Edwards can be successfully appropriated for use in contemporary ethics. I conclude that the four authors build a strong cumulative case for the view that some elements of Edwards's thought can serve as resources for our ethical reflections. But I also argue for a deflationary view of how much of Edwards we will find it feasible to take on board when we engage in the task of working out a religious ethics we might accept.     

Discussions of “Reassurance in Analytic Therapy,” by Douglas H. Ingram

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Rem B. Edwards,Religious Values and Valuations

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Jonathan Edwards,Anselmic Satisfaction and God's Moral Government

Jonathan Edwards' doctrine of atonement has recently become a source of interest amongst some contemporary systematic theologians. This article sets out to redress two longstanding and historically strident claims regarding Edwards' doctrine of the nature of atonement: first, that Edwards espoused an Anselmic satisfaction theory of atonement; second, that Edwards also laid the theological foundation for the moral government theory of atonement, popularized in nineteenth‐century America by those of his intellectual tradition. In this article, I lay out the conceptual core of both Anselm's satisfaction theory and the moral government theory of atonement. I argue that the claims noted above lack the explanatory resources needed to account accurately for Edwards' understanding of the nature of the atonement.     

Discussions of “Reassurance in Analytic Therapy,” by Douglas H. Ingram

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Jonathan Edwards and determinism

This paper argues a new interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's psychological account of human action. In Freedom of the Will (1754), Edwards adapted a sophisticated version of Newtonian determinism to the understanding of human thinking and action. Rejecting a mechanistic determinism, in which antecedent faculties “cause” actions, Edwards instead advocated a systemic view. Thus, rather than the “greatest apparent good” causing the “will,” which in turn caused an action, Edwards claimed that “The will is as the greatest apparent good,” thus grounding a systemic and dynamic account. Misunderstanding of his view has led to much confusion and a failure to properly locate Edwards within the history of American thought. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Edwards on the Will

Jonathan Edwards' The Freedom of the Will advances an ethical argument concerning the nature of the freedom that a person must have to be considered morally culpable. The view he opposes, that free decisions must be uncaused, is shown to be now common in Western culture, and the results he predicted of that are displayed. His own view, whereby a free decision is one constrained only by moral causes, is shown to be theologically grounded and consistent with ethical responsibility. Mention is made of the virtue ethic he relied upon, and of the predestinarian nature of the account.