Vollmer on Allport-some short comments

In an earlier issue of this journal, Fred Vollmer criticizes Allport's rejection of operational definitions (Vollmer, 1974), He states that it is useless to postulate an internal structure behind or within the observations made of personality. These observations constitute personality. Thus psychologists should only study the observed phenomena and operational definitions are important tools in this endeavour. In this reply we want to show that his views are confused and try to point out the roots of this confusion.     

Personality Psychology: Lexical Approaches, Assessment Methods, and Trait Concepts Reveal Only Half of the Story—Why it is Time for a Paradigm Shift

This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for personality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail. One of the field’s most important guiding scientific assumptions, the lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-theoretical viewpoints to reveal that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena that must be clearly differentiated: 1) lexical repertoires and the representations that they encode and 2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far, personality psychologists largely explored only the former, but have seriously neglected studying the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of these different kinds of phenomena and their distinct natures, commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality psychology’s focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts entails a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the phenomena being studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed and interpreted, b) that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on everyday psychological knowledge, and c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used in trait psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread assumptions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent personality models. The current state of knowledge about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and implications for personality psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future research are outlined to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substantially hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field.     

Portrait of a narcissist: Manifestations of narcissism in physical appearance

Narcissism is characterized in part by an acute concern for one’s appearance. Despite this fundamental aspect of narcissism, little is known about whether narcissism is manifested in features of physical appearance. Can you tell if someone is narcissistic just by looking at them? Our results indicate that snap judgments of narcissism based on full-body photographs are at least as accurate as snap judgments of any of the big five personality traits. Narcissists are more likely to wear expensive, flashy clothing, have an organized, neat appearance requiring a lot of preparation, and (in females) wear makeup and show cleavage. Furthermore, observers’ judgments correlate with the presence of these cues, suggesting that they are drawing on the correct information when making their judgments. Finally, observers’ judgments are associated with three of the four facets of narcissism and capture the unique constellation of personality traits typical of narcissists (i.e., high extraversion and low agreeableness). These findings suggest that physical appearance reflects narcissists’ personality, preoccupation with good looks, and desire to be the center of attention, and serves as a vehicle with which to promote their status.     

Personality predicts words in favorite songs

Psychologists have long theorized that people actively create, select, or modify experiences and situations to fulfill their individual psychological needs. However, little is known about how people may use forms of art and entertainment such as music to enhance their experiences and shape their environments for need satisfaction. In this research, we measured participants’ personality and the linguistic styles of their favorite songs, and observed significant associations between personality traits and linguistic cues in lyrics. These associations were stronger for participants who generally liked a song because of its lyrics rather than melody. Our study is the first to show how one’s personality is related to linguistic cues in someone else’s writings. It points to the possibility that people may like certain songs because the linguistic cues in the lyrics are congruent with their personality and hence can satisfy personal needs. This expands research on person-situation interaction and literature on personality and language use, and has important practical implications.     

ACCESSORIAL AND INCLUSIVE APPROACHES TO MARGINAL PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENA

Since most theories of perception are based on focal data in the phenomenal field, an array of accessorial concepts have to be added in order to account for marginal data. The present paper indicates how both classes of phenomena may be included in the same experimental operation and referred to a unitary, operational model of perception—personality. The core of this model is the assumption that everyday perception is the result of a micro-process which proceeds from stimulus-distal stages to more and more stimulus-proximal ones. The interrelations between this model on the one hand and physiological and genetic frames on the other are also indicated.     

Angstzustände bei Patienten mit schweren Persönlichkeitsstörungen

States of anxiety are very common problems in patients with severe personality disorders. All phenomena of anxiety can be observed. In this connection a continuum of the severity of impairment of structural personality organisation can be postulated. In many cases proper anxiety disorders exist as comorbid disorders. Anxiety is esteemed to be the central affective problem of borderline patients. In spite of these relations, states of anxiety in patients with personality disorders are often underdiagnosed or misdiagnosed. For the treatment of neurotic anxiety disorders (for example panic disorders), there exist disorder-specific therapy manuals that proceed from behavioural as well as psychodynamic perspectives. Nevertheless, for the treatment of anxiety states in personality disordered patients, the techniques that focus heavily on symptomatology appear often contraindicated. In our opinion, treatment of these typically severe anxieties must be contained within a therapeutic framework, which essentially takes into account the personality organisation of this group of patients. Such treatment makes special demands on the therapist for working with transference and countertransference processes. From a disorder-specific psychodynamic perspective recommendations are given for psychotherapy.     

Takin’ It to the Streets: Approach/Avoidance Motivation in the Lives of At-Risk Youth

An attempt is made in this article to relate creativity to personality in a much more definitive way than has been done previously and to use the known correlates of personality to suggest a theory of creativity that would explain many of the phenomena associated with this concept. A causal chain is suggested reaching from DNA to creative achievement, based largely on experimental findings not usually considered in relation to creativity (e.g., latent inhibition). Inevitably, the model is highly speculative, but it is testable and hence may prove useful in not only accounting for many observations and experimental results but also in suggesting new experiments and observations.     

What is Testimony?

C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p . I offer examples to show that Coady's conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant or directed to someone in need of evidence. I give alternative conditions. Coady was led into the stronger conditions by investigating testimony as it occurs in legal contexts, where special steps are taken to ensure that testimony provides the jury or the judge with evidence by a competent speaker that is relevant to the disputed question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.     

From adorable to worthless: implicit and self‐report structure of highly evaluative personality descriptors

So‐called highly ‘evaluative’ personality judgments (e.g. describing someone as exceptional, odd, or vile,) are an integral component of people's daily judgments of themselves and others. However, little is known about the conceptual structure, psychological function, and personality‐relevance of these kinds of attribution. Two studies were conducted to explore the internal (i.e. implicit) and external (i.e. self‐report) structure of highly evaluative terms. Factor analyses of semantic‐similarity sortings and self‐reports on several representative samples of highly evaluative personality adjectives yielded internal and external structures that were very similar. Both types of structure included five dimensions representing distinction, worthlessness, depravity, unconventionality, and stupidity. The robustness of the uncovered dimensions across the two studies suggests that typically excluded highly evaluative personality terms, far from being behaviorally ambiguous and psychologically uninformative, allude to meaningful dispositions that people both implicitly understand and possess to different degrees. These findings also suggest that highly evaluative personality judgments are organized around the basic domains of morality (i.e. depravity), power (distinction and worthlessness), peculiarity (unconventionality), and intelligence (stupidity). We discuss the implications of our findings for the study of self‐ and other‐esteem processes, personality perception, and the Big Seven factor model of personality. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leary's circle matrix: A comprehensive model for the statistical measurement of Horney's clinical concepts

Three issues associated with the lack of statistical evaluation of Horney's theory were presented. They are the preference for professional and clinical impression over the use of more objective methods for defining and evaluating behaviors; the difficulty involved in validly assessing the dysfunctional nature of the expansive type; and the disregard of many objective scales for intrapsychic processes that should be viewed in terms of the total "organization of personality." Leary's model was described as a systematic and formal set of procedures that are relevant and appropriate to the measurement of behavior within the context of Horney's theory. Additionally, a current study was cited that used Leary's model with significant results pertaining to the statistical implications of Leary's procedures and the adaptation of the model to Horney's theory. It is clear that any theory which presumes to provide therapeutic treatment to clients in an ethical manner must be critiqued and evaluated to safeguard the welfare of its clients. However, it is a common practice to accept therapeutic concepts that are nestled in a defined model without testing them in a relatively objective manner. With the help of Leary's circle matrix and operational procedures, it is crucial that Horney's constructs be further submitted to empirical testing on a formal basis. The procedures have been available since 1957.     

Luck,Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence

There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”     

人格研究中国化之我见

人格是一个人的存在方式。人不是一个纯自然的范畴,而是受社会文化和历史制约的。当今西方人格心理学不是普世的人格心理学,它虽然有多种定义,但其核心是强调个人的独特性。中华文化注重个人所肩负的社会义务、历史责任和道德价值,强调个人要正确处理与他人、与集体、与社会、与自然界的关系,而不是个人的独特性。人格研究中国化就是从中国的实际出发研究中国人的人格,努力创建具有中国特色的人格心理学,更好地为我国的人才培养和社会发展服务。我们在教学中应当引导并支持学生厘清概念,深入中国实际,采用质性和量化相结合的方法开展人格的中国化研究;鼓励师生学以致用,优化人格,成为幸福的进取者。     

On the Concept of Psychological

The idea that certain mental phenomena (e.g. emotions, depression, anxiety) can represent risk factors for certain somatic diseases runs through common thinking on the subject and through a large part of biomedical science. This idea still lies at the focus of the research tradition in psychosomatic medicine and in certain interdisciplinary approaches that followed it, such as psychoneuroimmunology. Nevertheless, the inclusion in the scientific literature of specifically mental phenomena in the list of risk factors pertaining to a specific pathological condition would seem, to say the least, problematic when not completely absent, unlike what happens for certain behavioural factors, such as smoking, sedentary life, and alcohol abuse. It is also significant that insurance companies and health and welfare services do not pay for interventions and treatment for states of anxiety, disorders of mood and of the personality, alexithymia and stress reduction, as means of prevention or treatment of somatic diseases, as instead they do for the treatment of tobacco addiction. However, as I shall endeavour to argue here, there are numerous and well grounded reasons why this different consideration of psychic conditions compared with behaviours is valid and must be maintained in the evaluation of pathogenetic risk factors.     

Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood

Abstract: In this article I critically discuss a claim made by several writers in philosophy and the social sciences that for an individual to count as a person, a single personality, or the subject of a life, the experiences of the subject in question must take a narrative form. I argue that narrativity is a misleading and, in some ways of understanding it, implausible condition of what it is that adds unity to personhood and personality. I pursue this critique by considering canonical accounts of narrativity in philosophy and literary studies. I consider those connections between events that must hold for the sequence to be considered a narrative: causal, teleological, and thematic connections. I argue that for each of these, the condition that experiential sequences (for a given subject) must have this structure is empty: any life sequence that is reflected upon in an interpretive spirit can meet it. What the condition of narrativity amounts to, then, is the more basic requirement that the person must be able to look upon the factors and events of her life with a certain interpretive reflection, whether or not those factors and events have any particular narrative unity in a traditional sense.     

An examination of regifting

This study develops an operational definition of the phenomenon of regifting. Gifting refers to the act of giving something to someone else without an expectation of compensation. Regifting is similar to gifting in that there is no expectation of compensation, but the gift itself differs in that it is one previously given to the giver. This study uses previous literature on established gift‐giving themes to explore regifting's meaning, importance, and implications to consumer research. In‐depth interviews and focus groups aid in the discovery of themes within regifting and regifting motivations, as well as those within relationships between the regifter and recipient. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

COLLABORATING WITH THE UNCONSCIOUS OTHER

The analysand's capacity for making use of psychoanalytic treatment has been a subject of importance since the beginning of psychoanalysis. The author addresses an aspect of the difficulty encountered by analysands in achieving a psychic state that allows the creative use of free association, dreams, parapraxes and other spontaneous phenomena occurring during the course of treatment. He suggests that a very specific state of mind is essential to both the psychoanalytic process and the creative process. Using theoretical concepts derived from Freud, Klein and Bion, he develops the idea of an internal object relationship, 'the collaboration with the unconscious other', which forms the basis for both creative thinking and the psychoanalytic function of the personality. Creative thinking is distinguished from artistic endeavour and discussed as a universal potential, on which growth in psychoanalysis depends. The term 'unconscious other' is meant to signify the subjective experience of a foreign presence within oneself from which both spontaneous creative inspiration and involuntary psychic phenomena are felt to emanate. The author presents clinical material to suggest that paranoid-schizoid and depressive anxieties form obstacles to collaborating with the unconscious other, and must be worked through in order to achieve an analytic process.     

Trust and Trustworthiness

What is it to trust someone? What is it for someone to be trustworthy? These are the two main questions that this paper addresses. There are various situations that can be described as ones of trust, but this paper considers the issue of trust between individuals. In it, I suggest that trust is distinct from reliance or cases where someone asks for something on the expectation that it will be done due to the different attitude taken by the trustor. I argue that the trustor takes Holton’s ‘participant stance’ and this distinguishes trust from reliance. I argue that trustworthiness is different from reliability and that an account of trustworthiness cannot be successful whilst ignoring the point that aligning trustworthiness with reliability removes the virtue from being trustworthy. On the question of what it is distinguishes trustworthiness from reliability, I argue that the distinction is in the opportunity for the trustee to act against the wishes of the trustor and the trustee’s consideration of the value of the trust that has been placed in them by the trustor.     

Practical Moore Sentences*

I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don't know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this infelicity points to a striking psychological fact, with potentially broad ramifications concerning the structure of norms of speech acts: namely, when giving an order, we must act as if we believe we will be obeyed.