共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Ingvar Johansson 《Synthese》2008,163(2):217-225
The paper argues, that a direct formalization of the way common sense thinks about the numerical identity of enduring entities,
requires that traditional predicate logic is developed. If everyday language mirrors the world, then persons, organisms, organs,
cells, and ordinary material things can lose some parts but nonetheless remain numerically exactly the same entity. In order
to formalize this view, two new logical operators are introduced; and they bring with them some non-standard syntax. One of
the operators is called ‘the instantiation operator’; it is needed because the existential quantifier and its traditional relatives cannot do the job required. The other operator
is called ‘the form-on-matter operator’, and it allows an individual (an instance of a form) to stay the same even though some of its parts (its constituting matter)
is taken away from it. Also, a certain kind of predicates, called ‘nature terms’, is needed in order to represent what gives a particular its kind of identity. Both the operators and the nature terms introduced can be used in constructions of formal languages and formal systems,
but no such constructions are made in the paper. The paper is structured as a comment on the philosophical problem called
‘the problem of the cats Tibbles and Tib’. 相似文献
2.
Benjamin Schnieder 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(3):369-385
The paper discusses whether there are strictly inexpressible properties. Three main points are argued for: (i) Two different
senses of ‘predicate t expresses property p’ should be distinguished. (ii) The property of being a predicate that does not apply to itself is inexpressible in one of the senses of ‘express’, but not in the other. (iii) Since the said property is related to Grelling’s
Antinomy, it is further argued that the antinomy does not imply the non-existence of that property. 相似文献
3.
In this paper we examine Prior’s reconstruction of Master Argument [4] in some modal-tense logic. This logic consists of a
purely tense part and Diodorean definitions of modal alethic operators. Next we study this tense logic in the pure tense language.
It is the logic K
t
4 plus a new axiom (P): ‘p Λ G
p ⊃ P G
p’. This formula was used by Prior in his original analysis of Master Argument. (P) is usually added as an extra axiom to an axiomatization of the logic of linear time. In that case the set of moments is
a total order and must be left-discrete without the least moment. However, the logic of Master Argument does not require linear
time. We show what properties of the set of moments are exactly forced by (P) in the reconstruction of Prior. We make also some philosophical remarks on the analyzed reconstruction.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
4.
Geoffrey Hellman 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2006,35(6):621-651
A remarkable development in twentieth-century mathematics is smooth infinitesimal analysis (‘SIA’), introducing nilsquare and nilpotent infinitesimals, recovering the bulk of scientifically applicable classical analysis (‘CA’) without resort to the method of limits. Formally, however, unlike Robinsonian ‘nonstandard analysis’, SIA conflicts with CA, deriving, e.g., ‘not every quantity is either = 0 or not = 0.’ Internally, consistency is maintained by using intuitionistic logic (without the law of excluded middle). This paper examines problems of interpretation resulting from this ‘change of logic’, arguing that standard arguments based on ‘smoothness’ requirements are question-begging. Instead, it is suggested that recent philosophical work on the logic of vagueness is relevant, especially in the context of a Hilbertian structuralist view of mathematical axioms (as implicitly defining structures of interest). The relevance of both topos models for SIA and modal-structuralism as appled to this theory is clarified, sustaining this remarkable instance of mathematical pluralism. 相似文献
5.
The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications
of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions
on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions,
according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will
be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate
term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually
in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment
to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows
us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form. 相似文献
6.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献
7.
Ulrich Meyer 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(2):229-247
According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators “now” and “then” are ineliminable in quantified
tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use
of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that “now”
and “then” are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might not
be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does
not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of
the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic. 相似文献
8.
Logic and Reasoning: do the facts matter? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Johan van Benthem 《Studia Logica》2008,88(1):67-84
Modern logic is undergoing a cognitive turn, side-stepping Frege’s ‘antipsychologism’. Collaborations between logicians and
colleagues in more empirical fields are growing, especially in research on reasoning and information update by intelligent
agents. We place this border-crossing research in the context of long-standing contacts between logic and empirical facts,
since pure normativity has never been a plausible stance. We also discuss what the fall of Frege’s Wall means for a new agenda
of logic as a theory of rational agency, and what might then be a viable understanding of ‘psychologism’ as a friend rather
than an enemy of logical theory.
Edited by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
9.
Lionel Shapiro 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):477-515
According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides
promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework
of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses
in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a
relativized notion of extension. The resulting contextualist semantics for ‘true’ construes circularity as a pragmatic phenomenon. 相似文献
10.
Dan López de Sa 《Synthese》2008,163(2):263-272
According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been
claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect
that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry
has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as ‘is a knife,’ ‘is a bachelor,’ or
‘is funny.’ In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role,
and that the contention that “unnatural” properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded. 相似文献
11.
The motif of the ‘drama of being’ is a dominant thread that spans the entirety of Levinas's six decades of authorship. As
we will see, from the start of his writing career, Levinas consciously frames the tension between ontology and ethics in a
dramatic form. A careful exposition of this motif and other related theatrical metaphors in his work–-such as ‘intrigue,’
‘plot,’ and ‘scene’–-can offer us not only a better appreciation of the evolution of Levinas's thought, but also of his proper
place within the western philosophical tradition. Levinas accuses western philosophers of being exclusively attuned to what
he calls the ‘drama of existence.’ And even then, philosophers have eluded the implications of the tragic fatalism that define
this drama. Philosophers are generally unaware of an ‘other scene’ that radically alters the fatalistic logic of the ontological
drama. Levinas calls this other scene the ‘ethical intrigue.’ 相似文献
12.
Matthias Hild 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(1):109-135
Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish
valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to
accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there
exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative
introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive
inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory. 相似文献
13.
Johan van Benthem 《Synthese》2009,167(2):251-270
Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues
of ‘factual’ versus ‘procedural’ information, or ‘statics’ versus ‘dynamics’. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information?
How does its view relate to its ‘cousin’ epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent
protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge. 相似文献
14.
In this paper we study the notion of forcing for Łukasiewicz predicate logic (Ł∀, for short), along the lines of Robinson’s
forcing in classical model theory. We deal with both finite and infinite forcing. As regard to the former we prove a Generic
Model Theorem for Ł∀, while for the latter, we study the generic and existentially complete standard models of Ł∀.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
15.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2005,126(1):1-27
Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator
has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘
ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly
treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges
not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation
of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a
solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of
heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been
drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate
to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson
is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic
in some cases. 相似文献
16.
In the 1970s, Robin Giles introduced a game combining Lorenzen-style dialogue rules with a simple scheme for betting on the
truth of atomic statements, and showed that the existence of winning strategies for the game corresponds to the validity of
formulas in Łukasiewicz logic. In this paper, it is shown that ‘disjunctive strategies’ for Giles’s game, combining ordinary
strategies for all instances of the game played on the same formula, may be interpreted as derivations in a corresponding
proof system. In particular, such strategies mirror derivations in a hypersequent calculus developed in recent work on the
proof theory of Łukasiewicz logic.
Presented by Daniele Mundici 相似文献
17.
David Ellerman 《Synthese》2009,168(1):119-149
Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates
are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions
are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event
of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions
made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|2 pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.”
The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the
average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a
conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.”
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend. 相似文献
18.
Anders John 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(2):137-143
In his “Third Way” Aquinas appears to argue in a way that relies upon shifting quantifiers in a fallacious way. Some have
tried to save this and other parts of the “Third Way” by introducing sophisticated logical and metaphysical machinery. Alternatively,
Aquinas’ apparently fallacious quantifier shift can be seen to be part of a valid argument if we supply a simple premise which
an Aristotelian natural philosopher would surely hold. In this short paper, I consider candidates for this premise, defend
a specific premise, and from that discussion draw a moral about quantifier predicate logic. I conclude that Aristotelian natural
philosophy is more than an historical backdrop to Aquinas’ arguments. 相似文献
19.
Wilfrid Hodges 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2009,38(6):589-606
In a recent paper Johan van Benthem reviews earlier work done by himself and colleagues on ‘natural logic’. His paper makes
a number of challenging comments on the relationships between traditional logic, modern logic and natural logic. I respond
to his challenge, by drawing what I think are the most significant lines dividing traditional logic from modern. The leading
difference is in the way logic is expected to be used for checking arguments. For traditionals the checking is local, i.e.
separately for each inference step. Between inference steps, several kinds of paraphrasing are allowed. Today we formalise
globally: we choose a symbolisation that works for the entire argument, and thus we eliminate intuitive steps and changes
of viewpoint during the argument. Frege and Peano recast the logical rules so as to make this possible. I comment also on
the traditional assumption that logical processing takes place at the top syntactic level, and I question Johan’s view that
natural logic is ‘natural’. 相似文献
20.