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1.
This is the editors' preface to a special issue of Philosophia on 'Religion and Limits of Liberalism'. It begins by noting the challenges which the 'return' of religions to liberal democracies
poses to the liberal commitment to respect citizens’ freedom and equality. Then, with particular reference to Rawls' theory
of liberal politics, it situates the papers in relation to three different senses of liberal ‘respect’ that are challenged
by contemporary religions – one understood in terms of the justification of political power, another as tolerance of diversity,
and the third in terms of freedom from interference. 相似文献
2.
William S. Sax 《International Journal of Hindu Studies》2000,4(1):39-60
Conclusion Our understanding of South Asian society and history is sometimes muddled by the rigid distinctions we make between ‘religion’
and ‘politics.’ The resurgent appeal of Hindu nationalism, the involvement of Hindu renouncers in contemporary Indian politics,
and the continuing relevance of religious issues to political discourse throughout South Asia, show that such a distinction
is of limited utility. In this essay, I have examined the notion of digvijaya in some detail, in an attempt to show that this ‘most important Indian concept with regard to sovereignty’ was always both
a ‘religious’ and a ‘political’ phenomenon. When it was performed by Hindu kings in the classical period, the ‘political’
dimension of digvijaya was foregrounded, while in the medieval and modern periods, when it was associated primarily with Hindu renouncers, its ‘religious’
aspects were paramount. But neither ‘political’ nor ‘religious’ aspects were ever absent from any of the digvijayas discussed here because religion and politics were mutually entailed in the digvijaya at all times, just as kings and renouncers were—and still are—alter-egos of each other. I am tempted to conclude that the
digvijaya melded religious and political domains. Yet perhaps even to speak of ‘melding’ religion and politics is a peculiarly modern
kind of discourse. Perhaps we need to rethink our categories and recognize that politics always has a religious element, while
religion is always a political force. 相似文献
3.
Ryan W. Davis 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):207-222
Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words,
a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure
that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest
that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to
learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political
conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice
is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within
the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all
face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set
of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should
receive greater scrutiny. 相似文献
4.
Matteo Bonotti 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):107-123
Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious
political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains
the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction
imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political
liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’
political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily
understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives
on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative
implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to
allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness
and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which
may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to
religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of
reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious
partisanship. 相似文献
5.
Ibrahim Abraham 《Contemporary Islam》2009,3(1):79-97
Drawing on qualitative data from interviews with twelve queer Muslims in Australia, this article analyses the ongoing struggle
for queer Muslim recognition within the context of the so-called ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Analysing the rhetoric of national
security and ‘Western’ civilisational identity, this article interrogates the incorporation of sexuality into the cultural
and political discourse of the ‘war on terror’, from the xenophobic demonisation of Muslims as sexual predators, to liberal
Islamophobia that posits Islam as an aggressive and alien Other against which liberal capitalism must be defended. Within
this hostile environment, queer Muslims in Australia are articulating various strategies for finding meaning in their lives.
From a Marxist perspective, this article analyses these strategies for recognition which range from complex acts of ‘closeting’
sexual, ethnic and religious identities, to subversive acts of critical hybridity that seek to negate the exclusionary nature
of homophobia and Islamophobia within Australia’s multicultural society. 相似文献
6.
This paper attempts to sketch a critical model of political community by drawing upon recent contributions to the theory of
‘recognition’, particularly in the work of Axel Honneth. The paper proceeds by, first, delineating key features shared by
a range of positions associated with ‘communitarianism’, along with the limitations and problems incurred by these commitments.
The second part of the paper attempts to mobilise Honneth’s theoretical work to develop a conception of community that shares
a number of the basic premisesvis-á-vis political life associated with communitarianism, but which nevertheless accommodates
the reservations expressed by communitarianism’s liberal and radical critics.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
7.
Kelly Staples 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):93-106
This article focuses on the account of disrespect found in Honneth’s theory of recognition. In it, I am particularly interested
in the form of misrecognition or disrespect which is the negation of respect, and which is clearly represented by statelessness. Respect, for Honneth, is closely connected to legal recognition. Guided
by Honneth’s view of critical theory as ‘not entirely without a foundation in social reality’, the article puts together an
analysis of the political dynamics of his model of disrespect. This analysis is used to challenge certain aspects of Honneth’s
political theory and in particular the implications of his conception of the state. The article argues that the way in which
the state is used has the effect of obscuring significant political obstacles to recognition, and in particular, the way in
which the state limits respect. 相似文献
8.
Sergei Prozorov 《Studies in East European Thought》2008,60(3):207-230
The article ventures a reading of Russian postcommunist politics from the perspective of the messianic turn in continental
political philosophy, specifically Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the ‘end of history’. Taking its point of departure from
a retrospective construction in the Russian political discourse of the 1990s as a period of ‘timelessness’, the paper argues
that postcommunism may indeed be viewed as a paradoxical ‘time out of time’, a rupture in the ordinary temporality that entirely
dispenses with the teleological horizon of politics. While the problematic of the ‘end of history’ has been popularized by
Francis Fukuyama’s liberal recasting of Kojève’s reading of Hegel, the Russian experience is entirely contrary to this complacent
and self-gratifying account of the triumph of liberalism and accords, instead, with Agamben’s understanding of the end of
history as the deactivation of the teleological dimension of politics as such. The effect of this deactivation is not a catastrophic
disintegration of the social order but rather the opening of the possibility of an inoperative political praxis that is oriented
towards the affirmation of existence in the pure present. The article proceeds with outlining the implications of this reading
of Russian postcommunism for understanding the present conjuncture of Russian politics.
相似文献
Sergei ProzorovEmail: URL: http://www.helsinki.fi/collegium/english/staff/Prozorov/prozorov.htm |
9.
Rasmus Sommer Hansen 《Res Publica》2011,17(2):157-174
Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of
misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact,
liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding
that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background,
I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this background is a ‘principle of independence,’ and that
this principle, properly interpreted, requires government to protect people against the disadvantageous effects of wrongful
prejudicial discrimination. Moreover, I give an account of wrongful prejudice which is grounded in a particular interpretation
of the abstract egalitarian principle Dworkin requires for a government to be legitimate and which goes a long way toward
acknowledging status inequalities. Finally, I suggest other resources within the theory for responding to residual problems
of recognition not addressed by the principle of independence. 相似文献
10.
DUNCAN IVISON 《Journal of applied philosophy》2005,22(2):171-184
abstract Moralism is a frequent charge in politics, and especially in relation to the ‘politics of recognition’. In this essay, I identify three types of moralism — undue abstraction, unjustified moralism and impotent moralism — and then discuss each in relation to recent debates over multiculturalism in liberal political theory. Each of these forms of moralism has featured in interesting ways in recent criticisms of the political theory and public policy of multiculturalism. By ‘multiculturalism’ I mean, broadly speaking, the pursuit of group‐differentiated public policies that move beyond the protection of basic individual civil and political rights. Here the charge is not so much that moral judgments have no application in relation to the treatment of cultural and associational minorities, but that the moral claims of defenders of multiculturalism are: (a) appealed to without any sense of the practical realities on the ground (the undue abstraction charge); (b) asserted as if they were self‐evidently true (the unjustified moralism charge); which often results in (c) a stifling of reasoned criticism of the orthodoxy surrounding multiculturalism (thus engendering impotent moralism). I assess these charges in the course of defending the democratic character of the most plausible forms of multicultural accommodation in liberal democratic societies. 相似文献
11.
Franziska Dübgen 《Res Publica》2012,18(1):65-77
Critiques of development aid from its recipient’s sometimes draw our attention to the perception of paternalism on the part
of ‘development industry’ actors. Even within participatory project designs, critical voices recount experiences of clear
power divides and informal hierarchies determining the content and form of ‘cooperation’. While neoliberal as well as neo-Marxist
scholars base their critiques on a distributive scheme of global justice, post-development theory emphasizes respect and recognition
as the central aspect of justice Indeed, post-development theorists continue to complain of neo-colonial power structures
between nations as well as on a micro-level between the ‘experts’ and local people. The latter feel misrecognized in being
judged according to the parameters of Western actors within the international community. This article explores how charges
of misrecognition within development cooperation challenge the assumption by many liberal political theorists that more global
justice could be achieved through more aid. 相似文献
12.
Martijn Boot 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(1):7-21
Amartya Sen argues that for the advancement of justice identification of ‘perfect’ justice is neither necessary nor sufficient.
He replaces ‘perfect’ justice with comparative justice. Comparative justice limits itself to comparing social states with
respect to degrees of justice. Sen’s central thesis is that identifying ‘perfect’ justice and comparing imperfect social states
are ‘analytically disjoined’. This essay refutes Sen’s thesis by demonstrating that to be able to make adequate comparisons
we need to identify and integrate criteria of comparison. This is precisely the aim of a theory of justice (such as John Rawls’s
theory): identifying, integrating and ordering relevant principles of justice. The same integrated criteria that determine
‘perfect’ justice are needed to be able to adequately compare imperfect social states. Sen’s alternative approach, which is
based on social choice theory, is incapable of avoiding contrary, indeterminate or incoherent directives where plural principles
of justice conflict. 相似文献
13.
Michael Freeman 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2002,5(2):201-220
Liberal theories of justice have often been unable to include the recognition of minority rights or of multiculturalism because of their emphasis on individuals. In contrast, recent theories of cultural recognition and minority rights have underestimated the tensions between group and individual rights. It is precisely the incorporation of past wrongs and their impact on present politics that can advance the liberal theory of justice for cultural minorities and their members. 相似文献
14.
It is estimated that there could be 200 million‘environmental refugees’ by the middle of this century. One major environmental
cause of population displacement is likely to be global climate change. As the situation is likely to become more pressing,
it is vital to consider now the rights of environmental refugees and the duties of the rest of the world. However, this is
not an issue that has been addressed in mainstream theories of global justice. This paper considers the potential of two leading
liberal theories of international justice to address the particular issues raised by the plight of potential and actual environmental
refugees. I argue that neither John Rawls’s ‘Law of Peoples’ approach nor Charles Beitz’s `cosmopolitanism' is capable of
providing an adequate account of justice in this context. Beitz’s theory does have some advantages over Rawls’s approach but
it fails to take proper account of the attachment that some people have to their own ‘home’.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
15.
Shannon Dunn 《The Journal of religious ethics》2013,41(1):27-49
Following the revival of virtue theory, some moral theorists have argued that virtue ethics can provide the basis for a radical politics. Such a politics essentially departs from the liberal model of the moral agent as an autonomous reason‐giver. It instead privileges an understanding of the agent as conditioned by her community, and in the case of social oppression and marginalization, communal virtues may become a vehicle for social change. This essay compares political appropriations of virtue theory by Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas and secular feminist thinkers Lisa Tessman and Margaret Urban Walker. Hauerwas and feminist theorists both embrace a kind of embodied vulnerability as a political virtue, arguing that it enables more genuine social recognition. The virtue feminist critique is more robust than Hauerwas's, however, insofar as it understands mutual recognition to involve acknowledgment of social difference and the concomitant pursuit of justice. 相似文献
16.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
17.
Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
18.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
19.
In this article we examine the idea of a politics of misrecognition of working activity. We begin by introducing a distinction
between the kind of recognition and misrecognition that attaches to one’s identity, and the kind of recognition and misrecognition
that attaches to one’s activity. We then consider the political significance of the latter kind of recognition and misrecognition
in the context of work. Drawing first on empirical research undertaken by sociologists at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, we argue for a differentiated concept of recognition that shows the politics of misrecognition at work to be as much a matter of conflict between modes of recognition as it is a struggle for recognition as opposed to non-recognition. The differentiated concept of recognition which allows for this empirical insight owes much to Axel Honneth’s
theory. But as we argue in the section that follows, this theory is ambiguous about the normative content of the expectations
of recognition that are bound up with the activity of working. This in turn makes it unclear how we should understand the
normative basis of the politics of the misrecognition of what one does at work. In the final sections of the article, we suggest that the psychodynamic model of work elaborated by Christophe Dejours
and others at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers in Paris can shed light on this matter; that is to say, it can help to clarify the normative significance and political stakes
of the misrecognition of working activity. 相似文献
20.
Carsten Ljunggren 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(1):19-33
Agonistic recognition in education has three interlinked modes of aesthetic experience and self-presentation where one is
related to actions in the public realm; one is related to plurality in the way in which it comes into existence in confrontation
with others; and one is related to the subject-self, disclosed by ‘thinking. Arendt’s conception of ‘thinking’ is a way of
getting to grips with aesthetic self-presentation in education. By action, i.e., by disclosing oneself and by taking initiatives,
students and teachers constitute their being. The way Arendt theorizes action (vita activa) makes it essentially unpredictable
and destabilizing, which does not seem to fit into what should be expected from education. In the article I will argue that
it should have a place by virtue of the debate, challenge and contest it offers. But education should also be defined from
a specific kind of contemplation called ‘thinking’ to become the cultivation of a faculty of judgment in education—thinking
(vita contemplativa) as a common virtue in education. Arendt’s demarcation between truth and meaning does from the point of
view of agonistic recognition in education call for ‘thinking’ as a qualification of political and moral meaning–the ‘taste’
to be established in the individual, by individual judgements but always judged in relation to members of a community. 相似文献