What will they say?—Public Announcement Games

The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I argue that in order to make sense of the process of stabilization, we need to distinguish between two types of phenomena: phenomena as patterns in the data (“surface regularities”) and phenomena as underlying (or “hidden”) regularities. I show that the epistemic relationships that data bear to each of these types of phenomena are different: Data patterns are instantiated by individual data, whereas underlying regularities are indicated by individual data, insofar as they instantiate a data pattern. Drawing on an example from memory research, I argue that neither of these two kinds of phenomenon can be stabilized in isolation. I conclude that what is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized is the fit between surface regularities and hidden regularities.     

From rocks to graphs — the shaping of phenomena

Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and the use of paleomagnetic data in early discussions of continental drift. Some general features of this study are presented in formalized language. It is suggested that the presentation given is particularly suited for a semantic conception of theories. Even though the construction of scientific phenomena is the main topic of this paper, the view presented here is more adapted to realism than social constructivism.     

Psychophysical correlations,synchronicity and meaning

The dual‐aspect framework which Jung developed with Wolfgang Pauli implies that psychophysical phenomena are neither reducible to physical processes nor to conscious mental activity. Rather, they constitute a radically novel kind of phenomena, deriving from correlations between the physical and the mental. In synchronistic events, a particular subclass of psychophysical phenomena, these correlations are explicated as experienced meaning.     

Understanding the coherence of the severity effect and optimism phenomena: Lessons from attention

Claims that optimism is a near-universal characteristic of human judgment seem to be at odds with recent results from the judgment and decision making literature suggesting that the likelihood of negative outcomes are overestimated relative to neutral outcomes. In an attempt to reconcile these seemingly contrasting phenomena, inspiration is drawn from the attention literature in which there is evidence that both positive and negative stimuli can have attentional privilege relative to neutral stimuli. This result provides a framework within which I consider three example phenomena that purport to demonstrate that people’s likelihood estimates are optimistic: Wishful thinking; Unrealistic comparative optimism and Asymmetric belief updating. The framework clarifies the relationships between these phenomena and stimulates future research questions. Generally, whilst results from the first two phenomena appear reconcilable in this conceptualisation, further research is required in reconciling the third.     

Isakower-like experience on the couch: a contribution to the psychoanalytic understanding of regressive ego phenomena

Since Isakower's original contribution of 1938, Isakower phenomena have been viewed as primitive experiences involving maternal breast, womb, and face imagery. This clinical report harks back to the less well-known hypothesis with which Isakower concluded his paper: he suggested that these perceptual experiences are related to childhood oedipal masturbatory fantasies at the time of going to sleep. In this paper four Isakower-like phenomena experienced by a patient on the couch are reported in the dynamic context in which they occurred. It is argued that these phenomena constitute a type of regressive ego experience that defends against oedipal conflict.     

Chance,Experimental Reproducibility,and Mechanistic Regularity

Examples from the sciences showing that mechanisms do not always succeed in producing the phenomena for which they are responsible have led some authors to conclude that the regularity requirement can be eliminated from characterizations of mechanisms. In this article, I challenge this conclusion and argue that a minimal form of regularity is inextricably embedded in examples of elucidated mechanisms that have been shown to be causally responsible for phenomena. Examples of mechanistic explanations from the sciences involve mechanisms that have been shown to produce phenomena with a reproducible rate of success. By contrast, if phenomena are infrequent to the point that they amount to irreproducible observations and experimental results, they are indistinguishable from the background noise of accidental happenings. The inability to detect or measure the phenomenon of interest against the background noise of accidental correlations makes it impossible to elucidate a mechanism by experimental means, to demonstrate that a proposed mechanism actually produces the phenomenon, and ultimately to justify why a hypothetical scenario involving an irregular mechanism should be preferred over attributing irreproducible happenings to chance.     

Believe It Or Not: Religious and Other Paranormal Beliefs in the United States

Paranormal beliefs are often divided between those that are central to traditional Christian doctrine, such as the belief in heaven and hell, and those that are commonly associated with the supernatural or occult, such as the belief in ESP and psychic healing. This study employs data from a recent nationwide random sample general population survey to catalog the social correlates of paranormal beliefs and to examine the relationships between religious and other paranormal beliefs. The results indicate that standard social background factors do a poor job of accounting for who believes in paranormal phenomena and that the importance of specific background factors changes dramatically from phenomenon to phenomenon. The results also show that the correlations between belief in religious phenomena and other paranormal phenomena are largely insignificant. These findings call into question many prevailing theories about paranormal beliefs.     

Phenomena and Patterns in Data Sets

Bogen and Woodward claim that the function of scientific theories is to account for 'phenomena', which they describe both as investigator-independent constituents of the world and as corresponding to patterns in data sets. I argue that, if phenomena are considered to correspond to patterns in data, it is inadmissible to regard them as investigator-independent entities. Bogen and Woodward's account of phenomena is thus incoherent. I offer an alternative account, according to which phenomena are investigator-relative entities. All the infinitely many patterns that data sets exhibit have equal intrinsic claim to the status of phenomenon: each investigator may stipulate which patterns correspond to phenomena for him or her. My notion of phenomena accords better both with experimental practice and with the historical development of science. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Towards a General Model of Applying Science

How is scientific knowledge used, adapted, and extended in deriving phenomena and real‐world systems? This paper aims at developing a general account of ‘applying science’ within the exemplar‐based framework of Data‐Oriented Processing (DOP), which is also known as Exemplar‐Based Explanation (EBE). According to the exemplar‐based paradigm, phenomena are explained not by deriving them all the way down from theoretical laws and boundary conditions but by modelling them on previously derived phenomena that function as exemplars. To accomplish this, DOP proposes to maintain a corpus of derivation trees of previous phenomena together with a matching algorithm that combines subtrees from the corpus to derive new phenomena. By using a notion of derivational similarity, a new phenomenon can be modelled as closely as possible on previously explained phenomena. I will propose an instantiation of DOP which integrates theoretical and phenomenological modelling and which generalises over various disciplines, from fluid mechanics to language technology. I argue that DOP provides a solution for what I call Kuhn’s problem and that it redresses Kitcher’s account of explanation.     

Spontaneous Anomalystic Phenomena,Pragmatic Information and Formal Representations of Uncertainty

I discuss the application of the Model of Pragmatic Information to the study of spontaneous anomalystic mental phenomena like telepathy, precognition, etc. In these phenomena the most important effects are related to anomalous information gain by the subjects. I consider the basic ideas of the Model, as they have been applied to experimental anomalystic phenomena and to spontaneous phenomena that have strong physical effects, like poltergeist cases, highlighting analogies and differences. Moreover, I point out that in such cases we cannot assign a probability of being accepted to every proposition, and so we cannot use standard formulas for pragmatic information and other relevant measures. To overcome the problem, I propose that qualitative possibility theory could be used to describe the situation. In such theory, the confidence in a proposition is expressed using a scale. Basic concepts like epistemic states, belief revision, information gain, pragmatic information etc. are discussed in this frame. Finally an application to some specific cases is sketched.     

Geophysical variables and behavior: LIV. Zeitoun (Egypt) apparitions of the Virgin Mary as tectonic strain-induced luminosities

Temporal analyses were completed between the occurrence of intense displays of exotic luminous phenomena over a church in Zeitoun (Egypt) during the years 1968 through 1969 and regional seismicity. These phenomena, viewed by thousands of onlookers, began one year before an unprecedented increase (factor of 10) in seismic activity about 400 km to the southeast. Monthly analyses also demonstrated a moderate (0.56) correlation between increases in seismicity and the occurrence of luminous phenomena during the same or previous month. These results were interpreted as further support for the hypothesis that most anomalous (terrain-related) luminous phenomena are generated by factors associated with tectonic strain.     

Personality Psychology: Lexical Approaches, Assessment Methods, and Trait Concepts Reveal Only Half of the Story—Why it is Time for a Paradigm Shift

This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for personality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail. One of the field’s most important guiding scientific assumptions, the lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-theoretical viewpoints to reveal that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena that must be clearly differentiated: 1) lexical repertoires and the representations that they encode and 2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far, personality psychologists largely explored only the former, but have seriously neglected studying the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of these different kinds of phenomena and their distinct natures, commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality psychology’s focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts entails a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the phenomena being studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed and interpreted, b) that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on everyday psychological knowledge, and c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used in trait psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread assumptions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent personality models. The current state of knowledge about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and implications for personality psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future research are outlined to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substantially hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field.     

Letters in time and retinotopic space

Various phenomena in tachistoscopic word identification and priming (WRODS and LTRS are confused with and prime WORDS and LETTERS) suggest that position-specific channels are not used in the processing of letters in words. Previous approaches to this issue have sought alternative matching rules because they have assumed that these phenomena reveal which stimuli are good but imperfect matches to a particular word-such imperfect matches being taken by the word recognition system as partial evidence for that word. The new Letters in Time and Retinotopic Space model (LTRS) makes the alternative assumption that these phenomena reveal the rates at which different features of the stimulus are extracted, because the stimulus is ambiguous when some features are missing from the percept. LTRS is successfully applied to tachistoscopic identification and form priming data with manipulations of duration and target-foil and prime-target relationships.     

Method Decisions: Quantitative and Qualitative Inquiry in the Study of Religious Phenomena

The conceptual and procedural differences between quantitative and qualitative methods have led many researchers to realize that some methodologies are better suited for studying some phenomena over other phenomena. However, practical guidelines for making these method decisions have yet to be developed. The primary purpose of this paper is to begin to provide such guidelines, especially in the study of religious phenomena. We first discuss the common mistake in Western psychology of considering methods as mere procedures rather than as the outcomes of different interpretations of the world. We then compare five features of a general quantitative interpretation with five features of a general qualitative interpretation. From this comparison, the advantages and disadvantages of each method strategy are discussed. Knowledge of these advantages and disadvantages allows methods to be better matched to the religious phenomena being studied.     

Identifying adaptive preferences in practice: lessons from postcolonial feminisms

I argue that postcolonial feminist critiques draw our attention to four phenomena that are easily confused with what I call ‘paradigmatic adaptive preference’ – and that the ability to distinguish these phenomena can improve the quality of development interventions. An individual has paradigmatic adaptive preferences (APs) if she perpetuates injustice against herself because her normative worldview is nearly completely distorted. The four look-alike phenomena postcolonial feminist critics help us identify are (a) APs caused by selective value distortion (SAPs), (b) APs caused by forced tradeoffs (TAPs), (c) APs caused by misperceptions of the facts (MAPs), and (d) wellbeing-compatible preferences that are misunderstood because of a lack of cultural or contextual knowledge. The first three, I argue, are non-paradigmatic forms of AP that have gone previously unrecognized and that we need to expand our conceptual vocabulary to describe; the last is not a form of AP at all. Development practitioners can grapple more seriously with the real-world complexities of moral psychology and cross-cultural moral judgments if they are capable of distinguishing paradigmatic AP from the look-alike phenomena.     

Data And Phenomena: A Distinction Reconsidered

Bogen and Woodward (1988) advance adistinction between data and phenomena. Roughly, theformer are the observations reported by experimentalscientists, the latter are objective, stable featuresof the world to which scientists infer based onpatterns in reliable data. While phenomena areexplained by theories, data are not, and so theempirical basis for an inference to a theory consistsin claims about phenomena. McAllister (1997) hasrecently offered a critique of their version of thisdistinction, offering in its place a version on whichphenomena are theory laden, and hence on which theempirical support for inferences to theories is also,unavoidably, theory laden. In this commentary I arguethat McAllister and Bogen and Woodward are mistaken inthinking that the distinction is necessary, and thatthe empirical support for inferences to theories isnot necessarily theory laden in the way McAllister'saccount entails they are.     

THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME IN NATURAL SCIENCE

The various aesthetic phenomena found repeatedly in the scientific enterprise stem from the role of God as artist. If the Creator is an artist, how and why natural scientists study the divine art work can be understood using theological aesthetics and the philosophy of art. The aesthetic phenomena considered here are as follows. First, science reveals beauty and the sublime in natural phenomena. Second, science discovers beauty and the sublime in the theories that are developed to explain natural phenomena. Third, the search for beauty often guides scientists in their work. Fourth, where beauty is perceived, feelings of the sublime often also follow upon further contemplation. This linkage of beauty in science with truth and the sublime runs counter to most aesthetic theory since Kant. Scholarship in theological aesthetics has recently argued that the modern and postmodern elevation of the sublime over beauty is merely a preference that reveals a bias against transcendence—against God. If doing and understanding science can show this sundering of the sublime from the beautiful to be in error, science also gives evidence of transcendence.