共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
C. S. Jenkins 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(3):525-551
I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that
reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to
know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability
of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal
apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to
the paradox argument are reviewed. 相似文献
2.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Synthese》2010,172(2):197-213
Recent work in the philosophy of science has generated an apparent conflict between theories attempting to explicate the nature
of scientific representation. On one side, there are what one might call ‘informational’ views, which emphasize objective
relations (such as similarity, isomorphism, and homomorphism) between representations (theories, models, simulations, diagrams,
etc.) and their target systems. On the other side, there are what one might call ‘functional’ views, which emphasize cognitive
activities performed in connection with these targets, such as interpretation and inference. The main sources of the impression
of conflict here are arguments by some functionalists to the effect that informational theories are flawed: it is suggested
that relations typically championed by informational theories are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific representation,
and that any theory excluding functions is inadequate. In this paper I critically examine these arguments, and contend that,
as it turns out, informational and functional theories are importantly complementary. 相似文献
3.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
4.
Charlie Pelling 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):211-234
In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional
view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have
adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic
claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist
is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second
part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option. 相似文献
5.
Paul Tomassi 《Synthese》2006,148(1):31-56
In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright
(1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns
out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s critics brings a pyrrhic victory: either way, realism wins. Here I argue
that the link between superassertibility and defeasible warrant can be restored in a way which clarifies the consistency of
the pair, provided that the notion of inference to superassertibility is properly understood in logical terms. As one might expect, the requisite notion is not classical in character. As one
might not expect, the notion cannot be properly construed in intuitionist terms either. Hence, I propose an alternative logical
framework which, I believe, is at least formally adequate to the representation of superassertibility on the basis of defeasible
warrant. The price to be paid for rejecting the ‘third way’ proposed here in favour of either of the two more traditional
logical options is precisely that indicated by Kenyon’s discussion. 相似文献
6.
William Child 《Philosophical Investigations》2009,32(4):329-337
I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections. 相似文献
7.
Imogen Dickie 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(2):161-185
Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules
of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is
wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions
in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to the anti-realist argument:
keep 1 and 2, avoiding 4 by rejecting 3. My aim in this paper is to see how much work in the fight against anti-realism this
new response can really do. I argue that there is a powerful objection to the response: 2 is in tension with the claim that
denied sentences can be premisses and conclusions in inferences. But I show that, even given this objection, the new response
has an important role to play. 相似文献
8.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
9.
Christopher Nathan 《Res Publica》2011,17(3):211-225
There is an apparent problem in identifying a basis for equality. This problem vanishes if what I call the ‘intuited response’
is successful. According to this response, there is no further explanation of the significance of the feature in virtue of
which an individual matters, beyond the bare fact that it is the feature in virtue of which an individual matters. I argue
against this claim, and conclude that if the problem of identifying a basis for equality is to be resolved, it is necessary
to defend a substantive account of the independent significance of some feature. 相似文献
10.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
11.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
12.
Billy Dunaway 《Philosophical Studies》2018,175(11):2763-2789
Anti-realism is often claimed to be preferable to realism on epistemological grounds: while realists have difficulty explaining how we can ever know claims if we are realists about it, anti-realism faces no analogous problem. This paper focuses on anti-realism about normativity to investigate this alleged advantage to anti-realism in detail. I set up a framework in which a version of anti-realism explains a type of modal reliability that appears to be epistemologically promising, and plausibly explains the appearance of an epistemological advantage to realism. But, I argue, this appearance is illusory, and on closer investigation the anti-realist view does not succeed in explaining the presence of familiar epistemological properties for normative belief like knowledge or the absence of defeat. My conclusion on the basis of this framework is that there is a tension in the anti-realist view between the urge to idealize the conditions in which normative beliefs ground normative facts, and a robust kind of reliability that normative belief can have if the anti-realist resists these idealizations. 相似文献
13.
Karen Bennett 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(1):79-104
A variety of relations widely invoked by philosophers—composition, constitution, realization, micro-basing, emergence, and
many others—are species of what I call ‘building relations’. I argue that they are conceptually intertwined, articulate what
it takes for a relation to count as a building relation, and argue that—contra appearances—it is an open possibility that
these relations are all determinates of a common determinable, or even that there is really only one building relation. 相似文献
14.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
15.
The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary
aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to
distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent,
I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make plausible the idea that, given the common basis, ethical
instrumentalism provides a more compelling picture of the philosophy of value than Humeanism does. 相似文献
16.
Andreas Karitzis 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2011,42(1):61-73
In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving
arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending
realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I
argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough
to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises
seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist
insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains
with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take
realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and
ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address
three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between
ontology and realism. 相似文献
17.
Justin T. Tiehen 《Synthese》2011,182(3):375-391
In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible
to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can
be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their
physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation
which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This,
I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts. 相似文献
18.
Luca Tranchini 《Topoi》2012,31(1):47-57
Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments
that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion,
at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared
with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter. 相似文献
19.
Julien Murzi 《Philosophical Studies》2010,149(2):269-281
In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little
discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that
this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for
thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and,
most recently, Michael Dummett. Intuitionists can either point out the intuitionistc invalidity of the inference from the
claim that all truths are knowable to the insane conclusion that all truths are known, or they can outright demur from asserting
the existence of forever-unknown truths, perhaps questioning—as Dummett now suggests—the applicability of the Principle of
Bivalence to a certain class of empirical statements. I argue that if intuitionists reject strict finitism—the view that all
truths are knowable by beings just like us—the prospects for either proposal look bleak. 相似文献
20.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(1):29-53
Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen
into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically
basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from
recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections
of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection.
The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism. 相似文献