Majority versus minority influence: when,not whether,source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro‐ versus counter‐attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self‐interest. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Numerical support,information processing and attitude change

In two experiments we studied the prediction that majority support induces stronger convergent processing than minority support for a persuasive message, the more so when recipients are explicitly forced to pay attention to the source's point of view; this in turn affects the amount of attitude change on related issues. Convergent processing is the systematic elaboration on the sources position, but with a stronger focus on verification and justification rather than falsification. In Experiment 1 it was found that numerical support is related to information processing as predicted: The greater the support, the more convergent the processing. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and furthermore confirmed our expectations regarding attitude change: The more convergent processing occurs, the less subjects change their attitude on related issues.     

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (‘majority’ versus ‘minority’), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resistance to persuasive messages as a function of majority and minority source status

Three experiments examined the extent to which attitudes following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In Experiment 1, participants’ attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages which argued opposite positions (initial pro-attitudinal message and subsequent, counter-attitudinal counter-message). Attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a (second) counter-message than attitudes following majority endorsement of the initial message. Experiment 2 replicated this finding when the message direction was reversed (counter-attitudinal initial message and pro-attitudinal counter-message) and showed that the level of message elaboration mediated the amount of attitude resistance. Experiment 3 included conditions where participants received only the counter-message and showed that minority-source participants had resisted the second message (counter-message) rather than being influenced by it. These results show that minority influence induces systematic processing of its arguments which leads to attitudes which are resistant to counter-persuasion.     

Effects of caffeine on persuasion and attitude change: The role of secondary tasks in manipulating systematic message processing

Two experiments are reported that examine the effects of caffeine consumption on attitude change by using different secondary tasks to manipulate message processing. The first experiment employed an orientating task whilst the second experiment employed a distracter task. In both experiments participants consumed an orange‐juice drink that either contained caffeine (3.5 mg/kg body weight) or did not contain caffeine (placebo) prior to reading a counter‐attitudinal communication. The results across both experiments were similar. When message processing was reduced or under high distraction, there was no attitude change irrespective of caffeine consumption. However, when message processing was enhanced or under low distraction, there was greater attitude change in the caffeine vs. placebo conditions. Furthermore, attitudes formed after caffeine consumption resisted counter‐persuasion (Experiment 1) and led to indirect attitude change (Experiment 2). The extent that participants engaged in message‐congruent thinking mediated the amount of attitude change. These results provide evidence that moderate amounts of caffeine increase systematic processing of the arguments in the message resulting in greater agreement. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Majority versus minority influence and prediction of behavioral intentions and behavior

Two experiments examined the effects of majority and minority influence on attitude-consistent behavioral intentions. In the first experiment, when attitudes were changed via minority influence there was a greater likelihood to engage in an attitude-consistent behavioral intention than when attitudes were changed via majority influence. This suggests that minority influence leads to stronger attitudes (based on systematic processing) that are more predictive of behavioral intentions, while attitude change via majority influence is due to compliance through non-systematic processing. Further support for this interpretation comes from the finding that the amount of message-congruent elaboration mediated behavioral intention. When there was no attitude change, there was no impact on behavioral intention to engage in an attitude-consistent behavior. Experiment 2 explored the role of personal relevance of the topic and also included a real behavioral measure. When the topic was of low personal relevance, the same pattern was found as Experiment 1. When the topic was of high personal relevance, thus increasing the motivation to engage in systematic processing, attitudes changed by both a majority and minority source increased behavioral intention and actual behavior. The results are consistent with the view that both majorities and minorities can lead to different processes and consequences under different situations.     

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter‐persuasion

Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter‐persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter‐message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter‐message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter‐message and returned to their pre‐test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter‐message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter‐persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter‐persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Minority versus majority influence and uncertainty orientation: processing persuasive messages on the basis of situational expectancies

The authors examined the effects of uncertainty orientation on processing persuasive messages from minority sources versus majority sources. The authors gave participants a proattitudinal or counterattitudinal message that either a numerical majority or a numerical minority endorsed and that contained strong or weak arguments. In support of the hypothesis that was related to message scrutiny, uncertainty-oriented individuals engaged in greater message scrutiny when the Source-Position (i.e., minority/majority-pro/con) pairing was imbalanced (in majority-con, minority-pro conditions) than when it was balanced (in majority-pro, minority-con conditions). Certainty-oriented participants showed the opposite pattern, scrutinizing the message more when the situation was balanced than when the situation was imbalanced. Support for the hypothesis that was related to nonsystematic processing was less clear because the majority appeared to have played a greater role in accounting for the aforementioned interaction than did the minority. Additional analyses supported this interpretation. However, in all cases, individual differences in uncertainty orientation moderated strength and direction of information processing.     

Social influence: The role of originality

Two experiments investigated the role of message originality vs. conventionality in social influence. It was hypothesized that subjects would generate more original proposals when confronted with a minority advocating an original viewpoint than when confronted with a conventional minority proposal or with an original majority proposal. In the first experiment, subjects exposed to an original minority paired with a conventional majority produced a wider range and more original proposals than those exposed either to a conventional minority paired with a conventional majority or to a majority source only. The second experiment further demonstrated that the original message induced creative processing only when attributed to a minority source but not when attributed to a majority source. It also showed that the original minority elicited creative processing mainly when paired with a conventional majority, but not when paired with a majority advocating an equally original position. Findings are interpreted in the frame of Nemeth's (1986) minority influence theory.     

The Effects of Caffeine Consumption on Direct and Indirect Majority and Minority Influence

A study is reported that examines the effect of caffeine consumption on majority and minority influence. In a double blind procedure, 72 participants consumed an orange drink, which either contained caffeine (3.5mg per kilogram of body weight) or did not (placebo). After a 40-minute delay, participants read a counter-attitudinal message (antivoluntary euthanasia) endorsed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both direct (message issue, i.e., voluntary euthanasia) and indirect (message issue-related, i.e., abortion) change was assessed by attitude scales completed before and after exposure to the message. In the placebo condition, the findings replicated the predictions of Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory; namely, majorities leading to compliance (direct influence) and minorities leading to conversion (indirect influence). When participants had consumed caffeine, majorities not only led to more direct influence than in the placebo condition but also to indirect influence. Minorities, by contrast, had no impact on either level of influence. The results suggest that moderate levels of caffeine increase systematic processing of the message but the consequences of this vary for each source. When the source is a majority there was increased indirect influence while for a minority there was decreased indirect influence. The results show the need to understand how contextual factors can affect social influence processes.     

Heuristic processing of distinctiveness information in minority and majority influence

The role of distinctiveness information in majority and minority influence was studied. Students read a message containing strong or weak arguments advocated by a minority or majority source. The communicator's minority (majority) status was said to be either distinctive to the target topic or nondistinctive across topics. Major dependent variables were attitude judgments and cognitive responses. Across conditions, messages were processed systematically, and a majority communicator tended to be more persuasive than a minority communicator. Most importantly, high distinctiveness led to greater influence than low distinctiveness, and this effect was independent of argument strength and minority versus majority status. Theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation settings: effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment

Ss received consensus information that was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of persuasive message content. In Experiment 1 Ss believed that their processing task was either important or unimportant whereas in Experiment 2 all Ss believed that their task was unimportant. In accord with the heuristic-systematic model's sufficiency principle, high-task-importance Ss exhibited a great deal of systematic processing regardless of congruency, whereas low-importance Ss processed systematically only when they received incongruent messages; in the congruent conditions heuristic processing dominated. Attitude data generally reflected these processing differences and confirmed the additivity and attenuation assumptions of the model. The utility of the sufficiency principle for understanding motivation for elaborative processing and the relevance of the findings to understanding the processing and judgmental effects of expectancy disconfirmation are discussed.     

Matching the message source to attitude functions: Implications for biased processing

A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that matching (vs. mismatching) the source of a persuasive message to the functional basis of recipients’ attitudes may lead to positively biased processing. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, high and low self-monitors were presented with a persuasive message ascribed to a source that either matched or mismatched the functional basis of their attitudes (i.e., an expert source for low self-monitors and an attractive source for high self-monitors). The message content was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. As predicted, given an ambiguous message biased processing led to more agreement when the source matched (vs. mismatched) attitude functions. In contrast, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message regardless of source matching (unbiased processing). Results are discussed with respect to the role of the activation and use of heuristics in biased processing.     

Lateralized goal framing: How health messages are influenced by valence and contextual/analytic processing

The effectiveness of health messages has been shown to vary due to the positive or negative framing of information, often known as goal framing. In two experiments we altered, the strength of the goal framing manipulation by selectively activating the processing style of the left or right hemisphere (RH). In Experiment 1, we found support for the contextual/analytic perspective; a significant goal framing effect was observed when the contextual processing style of the RH – but not the analytic processing style of the left hemisphere (LH) – was initially activated. In Experiment 2, support for the valence hypothesis was found when a message that had a higher level of personal involvement was used than that in Experiment 1. When the LH was initially activated, there was an advantage for the gain- vs. loss-framed message; however, an opposite pattern – an advantage for the loss-framed message – was obtained when the RH was activated. These are the first framing results that support the valence hypothesis. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these experiments.     

The effects of good moods on systematic processing: “Willing but not able,or able but not willing?”

Previous research has indicated that good moods may disrupt systematic processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987). Three experiments were conducted to attempt a replication of this disruptive effect and determine whether this effect is attributable either to cognitive capacity deficits (i.e., ability) or to motivational concerns (e.g., mood maintenance, desire to think about something other than the experimental topic). Several similarities were noted across the experiments. First, no interactions between mood and argument strength emerged on measures of message-based persuasion. Similarly, the quantity of message-related thoughts generated by our subjects was not consistently influenced by the manipulation of mood. Most importantly, consistent findings regarding the relationship between polarity of message elaborations and message-based persuasion implied that good moods may have disrupted message processing when (a) the message was low in personal relevance, (b) source information preceded the message itself, or (c) subjects were led to believe that their moods were stabilized by a drug. These results call into question the robustness of the alleged disruptive effect of positive mood on systematic processing, and are incompatible with the view that such effects are attributable to cognitive capacity deficits.Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, Boston, August 1990, and San Francisco, August 1991. The authors wish to thank Richard E. Petty and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.     

On-line and memory-based modification of attitudes: determinants of message recall-attitude change correspondence

Experiments investigated the impact of message elaboration on attitude change-message recall correspondence when attitude change occurs in an on-line (as attitude-relevant information is received), or memory-based (on the basis of retrieved attitude-relevant information) fashion. In 2 experiments, Ss' processing goals were manipulated to increase or inhibit on-line change and message elaboration. As predicted, Ss reported postexposure attitudes more rapidly in on-line vs memory-based conditions. Decreased message elaboration increased attitude-recall correspondence, regardless of when attitude change occurred. Increased elaboration produced elaboration-attitude judgment correspondence. Results suggest that recall of message content will best predict persuasion when message content is encoded free of elaborations, regardless of when attitude change occurs.     

Mood and multiple source characteristics: mood congruency of source consensus status and source trustworthiness as determinants of message scrutiny

This research deals with the interplay of mood and multiple source characteristics in regard to persuasion processes and attitudes. In a four-factorial experiment, mood (positive vs. negative), source consensus status (majority vs. minority), source trustworthiness (high vs. low), and message strength (strong vs. weak) were manipulated. Results were in line with predictions of a mood-congruent expectancies perspective rather than competing predictions of a mood-as-information perspective. Specifically, individuals in both moods evinced higher message scrutiny given mood-incongruent (vs. mood-congruent) source characteristics. That is, across source trustworthiness, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given a minority (majority) versus a majority (minority) source. Furthermore, across source consensus, positive (negative) mood led to higher message scrutiny given an untrustworthy (trustworthy) versus a trustworthy (untrustworthy) source. Additional analyses revealed that processing effort increased from doubly mood-congruent source combinations (low effort) over mixed-source combinations (intermediate effort) to doubly mood-incongruent combinations (high effort). Implications are discussed.     

Hope, pride, and processing during optimal and nonoptimal times of day

We examine the conditions under which the distinct positive emotions of hope versus pride facilitate more or less fluid cognitive processing. Using individuals' naturally occurring time of day preferences (i.e., morning vs. evening hours), we show that specific positive emotions can differentially influence processing resources. We argue that specific positive emotions are more likely to influence processing and behavior during nonoptimal times of day, when association-based processing is more likely. We show in three experiments that hope, pride, and a neutral state differentially influence fluid processing on cognitive tasks. Incidental hope facilitates fluid processing during nonoptimal times of day (compared with pride and neutral), improving performance on tasks requiring fluid intelligence (Experiment 1) and increasing valuation estimates on tasks requiring that preferences be constructed on the spot (Experiments 2 and 3). We also provide evidence that these differences in preference and valuation occur through a process of increased imagination (Experiment 3). We contribute to emotion theory by showing that different positive emotions have different implications for processing during nonoptimal times of day.     

Judgment under emotional certainty and uncertainty: the effects of specific emotions on information processing.

The authors argued that emotions characterized by certainty appraisals promote heuristic processing, whereas emotions characterized by uncertainty appraisals result in systematic processing. The 1st experiment demonstrated that the certainty associated with an emotion affects the certainty experienced in subsequent situations. The next 3 experiments investigated effects on processing of emotions associated with certainty and uncertainty. Compared with emotions associated with uncertainty, emotions associated with certainty resulted in greater reliance on the expertise of a source of a persuasive message in Experiment 2, more stereotyping in Experiment 3, and less attention to argument quality in Experiment 4. In contrast to previous theories linking valence and processing, these findings suggest that the certainty appraisal content of emotions is also important in determining whether people engage in systematic or heuristic processing.