自利的契约论和非自利的契约论

契约论的基本思想是:道德应该仿效人们相互间所同意的互惠或地位平等的人之间的合作,或者预设于其中.一个行动是对是错必须取决于该行动是否符合或违反某些原则,这些原则是平等的人们之间达成的或者可能达成的合乎需要的契约的对象.自利的契约论认为,各方的平等状况仅仅是事实上的,各方对原则的选择也是以理性地自利为基础的.非自利的契约论则认为,合理的互惠或道德上平等的人们之间的公平性的一种理想.     

Contractualism and the Non-Identity Problem

This paper argues that T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism can provide a solution to the non-identity problem. It first argues that there is no reason not to include future people in the realm of those to whom we owe justification, but that merely possible people are not included. It then goes on to argue that a person could reasonably reject a principle that left them with a barely worth living life even though that principle caused them to exist, and that current people could not justify creating people with barely worth living lives on the grounds that it caused those people to exist.     

Contractualism and the paradox of deontology

Philosophical Studies - Scanlonian contractualism rejects the consequentialist assumptions about morality, value, and rationality in virtue of which deontological constraints appear paradoxical....     

Contractualism and Global Economic Justice

This article examines Rawls's and Scanlon's surprisingly undemanding contractualist accounts of global moral principles. Scanlon's Principle of Rescue requires too little of the world's rich unless the causal links between them and the poor are unreliable. Rawls's principle of legitimacy leads him to theorize in terms of a law of peoples instead of persons, and his conception of a people leads him to spurn global distributive equality. Rawls's approach has advantages over the cosmopolitan egalitarianism of Beitz and Pogge. But it cannot generate principles to regulate the entire global economic order. The article proposes a new cosmopolitan economic original position argument to make up for this lack in Rawls's Law of Peoples.     

Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism

Metaethics is often dominated by both realist views according to which moral claims are made true by either non-natural or natural properties and by non-cognitivist views according to which these claims express desire-like attitudes. It is sometimes suggested that constructivism is a fourth alternative, but it has remained opaque just how it differs from the other views. To solve this problem, this article first describes a clear constructivist theory based on Crispin Wright’s anti-realism. It then outlines an argumentative strategy that can be used to argue against constructivist views about practical reasons. The rest of the article explains how the outlined constructivist metaethical framework, reasons, and contractualism in normative ethics can still be used to create a new viable metaethical constructivist position about right and wrong.     

略论托马斯·斯坎伦的契约主义

托马斯·斯坎伦是以约翰·罗尔斯为首的平等的自由主义阵营内一位重要政治哲学家,面对《正义论》发表以后所遭受的各方面的批评,他在罗尔斯道德契约论的基础上,转变罗尔斯专注于宏观社会基本制度的学术走向,提出了一种实质性的契约主义,从微观角度来论证个人道德的本质,论证人们为什么要关注正当和不正当的问题,论证为什么正当和不正当对其它关怀和价值具有优先性。从而发展了罗尔斯道德理论的契约形式,对罗尔斯强于制度美德而疏于个人道德论证的缺陷做了有益补充,在伦理学界引起了较大反响。     

斯坎伦的非自利契约论述评

斯坎伦对他的非自利的契约论曾做了这样的概括:"思考对和错,从最基本的层面上考虑,就是根据那些有着恰当动机的人无法合理拒斥的理由,思考面对他们我们能够辩护些什么."他认为道德上行为的对错或道德原则的根据就是人们之间所达成的协议、契约,即人们相互间的责任和人们之间共同持有的理由和看法.斯坎伦理论的主要问题是:其一,当人们没有相似动机的时候,道德的规则很难决定.其二,对合理性的标准问题语焉不详.     

Contractualism,Person-Affecting Wrongness and the Non-identity Problem

A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that all it shows is that the act is impersonally wrong. I then dispute the second claim. On Scanlon's contractualist view, one wrongs a particular other if one treats the other in a way that is unjustifiable to that other on reasons she could not reasonably reject. We should think of person-affecting wronging in terms of the reasons had by the actual agent and the actual person affected by the agent's action. In non-identity cases, interpersonal justifiability is therefore shaped both by the reason to reject the treatment provided by the bad suffered and the reason to affirm the treatment provided by the goods had as a result of existing. I argue it would be reasonable for the actual person to find the treatment justifiable, and so I conclude that Scanlon's contractualist metaethics does not provide a narrow person-affecting solution to the non-identity problem on its own terms. I conclude that the two claims represent a tension within Scanlon's contractualist theory itself.     

Contractualism for Us As We Are

A difficult problem for contractualists is how to provide an interpretation of the contractual situation that is both subject to appropriately stringent constraints and yet also appropriately sensitive to certain features of us as we actually are. My suggestion is that we should embrace a model of contractualism that is structurally analogous to the “advice model” of the ideal observer theory famously proposed by Michael Smith (1994, 1995). An advice model of contractualism is appealing since it promises to deliver a straightforward solution to the so‐called “conditional fallacy.” But it faces some formidable challenges. On the face of it, it seems to be straightforwardly conceptually incoherent. And it seems to deliver a solution to the conditional fallacy at the cost of being vulnerable to what I shall call “the concessional fallacy.” I shall consider how, if at all, these challenges are to be met. I shall then conclude by considering what this might mean for the so‐called “ideal/non‐ideal theory” issue.